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IntroductionIMPROVING THE TOOLBOX
NEW ADVANCES IN AGENT-BASED AND 
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
Jean-Luc Gaffard and Mauro Napoletano
Are current economic models well equipped to provide useful
policy prescriptions? Many economists would have certainly
answered, “yes” before the recent Global Recession. This economic
crisis has not only demonstrated the importance of banking and
financial markets for the dynamics of real economies. It has also
revealed the inadequacy of the dominant theoretical framework. Stan-
dard models have indeed failed to forecast the advent of the crisis. In
addition, they have been unable to indicate a therapy able to restore
economic growth. 
Since the onset of the crisis, the discontent towards the dominant
approach to economic modeling has flourished.1  Criticism has been
mainly directed towards the over-simplicity of standard models in
general, and of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models
(DSGEs) in particular.  Most features that have played a key role in
generating the crisis, such as heterogeneity of agents, markets, and
regulatory frameworks, financial innovation, securitization, are by
and large overlooked in standard macro-models. A second kind of
dissatisfaction is related to the hyper-rationality of individuals.
Markets (and financial markets in particular) are plenty of people
acting on the basis of overconfidence, heterogeneous beliefs, imper-
fect knowledge of the states of the world, and of the consequence of
humans’ actions, etc. These features are not present in standard macro
models, which build on the assumption of a representative individual
1. Interestingly, this time critiques have not only come from “heterodox” schools of thought.
Critiques have also been raised by scholars who made a significant use of the ingredients of
standard models in the past (see e.g. Caballero, 2010, Krugman, 2009, Stiglitz, 2011) as well as
by leading policy-making authorities  (see e.g. Trichet, 2010).  Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
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whatever human intelligence can do (Leijonhufvud, 1993).  A third
concern is the assumption of equilibrium. Standard models typically
focus on states of the economy in which all markets clear. In contrast,
the crisis has shown the possibility of situations in which some
markets (and the market for labor in particular) do not clear. Standard
models ignore the problems that would result from reactions of agents
to such market disequilibria. They are therefore badly equipped to
study how the economy behaves during crises.
A natural way to follow in face of the problems exposed in the
previous section would be departing from the representative agent
paradigm, thereby introducing heterogeneity of agents’ characteristics
and behavior, and allowing for markets that do not clear. All the afore-
mentioned characteristics add new degrees of complexity to
macroeconomic analysis. As eloquently expressed by Tesfatsion (2006): 
“The modeler must now come to grips with challenging issues such as
asymmetric information, strategic interaction, expectation formation on
the basis of limited information, mutual learning, social norms, transac-
tion costs, externalities, market power, predation, collusion, and the
possibility of coordination failures.”
Exploiting the growing capabilities of computers, Agent-Based
Models (ABMs) analyze economic processes as dynamical systems of
heterogeneous interacting agents (Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Tesfat-
sion, 2006). In ABMs repeated interactions among agents over time
induce continuously changing microeconomic patterns, the aggrega-
tion of which generates a dynamics for the macroeconomic variable of
interest (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2007). 
This special issue gathers contributions of leading scholars in
Agent-Based and computational economics and shows the applicabi-
lity of this methodology to several issues both in micro- and in
macroeconomics. This introduction aims to provide some guidelines
to the different contributions in the issue by organizing them around
4 main themes. 
1. The critique to standard economic models and the structure 
of Agent-Based Models
As we mentioned above standard economic models (and DSGEs in
particular) are badly equipped to analyze some key issues that emerged
in the last economic crisis. The contributions of Kirman (2012),
Ashraf, Gershman and Howitt (2012) and of Fagiolo and Roventini
(2012) provide a clear and thorough account of the critiques to mains-
tream macroeconomic models. Kirman (2012) discusses the historical
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outcome the particular path followed by mainstream economics in the
last century. The task of the economist in this tradition (and of the
macroeconomist in particular) is to make assumptions about indivi-
dual preferences and technologies in line with some axioms that are
characteristic of the “rational” agent and to build models on that
basis. Next, one finds the equilibrium of the system and examines the
characteristics of such equilibrium states. In contrast, ABMs allow one
to dispense with the restrictive assumptions of standard models and
put at the center of the analysis the heterogeneity of economic agents
and the evolution of the network of interactions among them. The
article of Fagiolo and Roventini (2012) discusses in details the building
blocks of Agent-Based Models.  
The analysis of the mechanisms that govern (and coordinate)
economic interactions in a decentralized economy is essential not
only for understanding the generation of crises. It also helpful to
provide useful policy insights beyond those provides by standard
models, and to analyze the effects of technical change in the
economy. The first point is vividly stressed in Ashraf, Gershman and
Howitt (2012) and Fagiolo and Roventini (2012), whereas the second
one is extensively discussed in the paper of Amendola, Gaffard and
Saraceno (2012).
2. Analytical vs. simulation methods in ABMs
Agent-Based Models are typically more complex than standard
models, and this implies that one must often employ computer simu-
lations for their analysis. The contribution of Fagiolo and Roventini
(2012) discusses the different problems that emerge in the use of simu-
lation techniques for the analysis of ABMs, and the different solutions
that have so far been proposed in the literature. 
One critique against ABMs is that the use of computer simulations
and the complicated structure of ABMs often prevent one from detec-
ting the mechanisms generating results in the model. In our opinion,
the fact that an overly complicated structure may blur causal mecha-
nisms is a quite general remark applicable to any model, rather than a
specific and unavoidable fallacy of ABMs (see also Napoletano, Gaffard
and Babutsidze, 2012, for more discussion). However, even in very
complicated ABMs—causal mechanisms can be detected through
counterfactual simulation analyses. Indeed, ABMs often allow one to
control the presence of some dynamics in the model through an
appropriate setting of the parameters, and to test how results are diffe-
rent when such dynamics are switched off/on. This technique is
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consider computer simulations and analytical results as possible
complements rather than substitutes. This last methodological point
emerges with great clarity in the contributions of Delli Gatti et al.
(2012) and of Babutsidze (2012). More precisely, the paper of Delli
Gatti et al shows how the interactions among heterogeneous agents
can be successfully modeled by employing master equations tech-
niques. This analytical investigation is then coupled with simulation
techniques that show the reaction of the systems to different microe-
conomic shocks. On related grounds, the paper of Babutsidze studies
analytically the properties of the equilibrium of an economy popu-
lated by heterogeneous agents using asymmetric (S,s) rules to set
prices, and then uses simulation techniques to analyze the far-from-
the-equilibrium dynamics. 
One of the strongest critiques to DSGE models has concerned their
failure to forecast the advent of the crisis (Wieland and Wolters, 2012,
summarize the debate on this issue). At the same time, forecasting
appears difficult in ABMs due to the inherent non-linearities implied
by the complex interactions among heterogeneous agents (see also
Dawid and Neugart (2011), and Grazzini et al. (2012), for more discus-
sions). Barde (2012) makes an important step in overcoming the
hurdles involved in forecasting exercises with ABMs, by showing the
possibility of successfully applying Maximum Entropy techniques to
predict model outcomes in the Agent-Based models of Kirman (1993)
and of Abrams and Strogatz (2003).
3. Agents’ heterogeneity, micro- and macroeconomic dynamics
The recent crisis has shown that distributions matters (see also
Stiglitz, 2011). One instance of this is the market for credit, where the
distribution of information between borrowers and lenders plays a key
role. Asymmetric information, credit contracts, and the possible
bankruptcy of agents are all elements that significantly affect aggre-
gate dynamics in the papers of Cincotti, Raberto and Teglio (2012),
Ashraf, Gershman and Howitt (2012), Delli Gatti et al. (2012) in this
special issue. Furthermore, the crisis and the associated surge in unem-
ployment also generated sharp inequalities within the population:
some individuals have seen their income falling either because they
got unemployed or because of falling wages in a situation of depressed
labor demand. Reduced incomes by a significant fraction of the popu-
lation would normally lead to a fall in consumption demand. The
interplay between inequality and demand and its consequences for
both the micro and the macro-economic dynamics are central the
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Patriarca and Vona (2012). The former paper shows that, indepen-
dently from the investment behavior of firms, steady growth of the
economy requires a balance in the distribution between profits and
wages. The paper of Patriarca and Vona studies instead the relations
between income inequality and the effectiveness of policies aimed at
introducing green technologies and shows that when income inequa-
lity is taken into account carbon taxes may have the paradoxical effect
of reducing (rather than increasing) the number of consumers of green
products. 
Heterogeneity among agents in ABMs does not only relate to
agents’ asymmetries in either characteristics or in behavior. It may
also involve differences in production processes over time. Accor-
dingly, ABMs are suitable for analyzing the interplays between
aggregate long-run growth and the processes of structural transforma-
tions and qualitative change in the economy. The papers of Ciarli
(2012), Amendola, Gaffard and Saraceno (2012) and Saviotti and
Pyka (2012) are devoted to this crucial issue. 
4. Policy analyses under different institutional scenarios
ABMs are not only models that explicitly account for agents’ hete-
rogeneity. They have another advantage that is more related to policy
design, and is represented by their finer description of the economy
compared to standard models. In modern economies very articulated
and heterogeneous institutional arrangements often govern the func-
tioning of key markets (e.g. labor and credit markets). The same
macroeconomic policy can have different effects according to the diffe-
rent institutional setting in which it is implemented (Stiglitz, 2011).
The papers of Cincotti, Raberto and Teglio (2012) and of Ashraf,
Gershman and Howitt (2012) use this feature of ABMs to study of
bank regulation policies. The paper of Napoletano et al. (2012) studies
the effects of wage-flexibility policies under different institutional
regimes characterizing the investment behavior of firms. Guerci and
Sapio (2012) compare the effects of wind power supply on prices in the
Italian electricity market between a scenario in which plant-level and
demand data are calibrated on real-data and a scenario where wind
electricity output is progressively scaled up to the Italian wind poten-
tial, i.e. he maximum amount of wind energy that could in principle be
produced given the geographical characteristics of the Italian territory. 
This brief overview of the papers in this special issue clearly illus-
trates the great flexibility and the great potential of ABMs for the
analysis of key issues emerged in the recent crisis as well as of other
Jean-Luc Gaffard and Mauro Napoletano12important problems both in micro- and macroeconomics. Certainly,
the use of ABMs in economics involves new problems and challenges
for researchers, especially fore those more accustomed with standard
modeling approaches. At the same time ABMs and computational
models allow one to avoid the straitjackets, of standard models in the
analysis of important real situations and allow policy analyses under
more realistic scenarios. These last features should be considered as key
improvements to the toolbox of both micro- and macroeconomists.
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CAN ARTIFICIAL ECONOMIES HELP US 
UNDERSTAND REAL ECONOMIES?
Alan Kirman
GREQAM, Aix Marseille Université, EHESS
This paper argues that the path followed by modern macroeconomic theory
excludes the analysis of major endogenous movements in macroeconomic
variables. Rather than persist with models based on the idea that the economy
behaves like a rational individual we should build models of the economy as a
complex system of interacting agents. Profiting from the advances made in
computer science we can now build agent based or computational models which
allow us to model the out of equilibrium behaviour of such systems. They allow
us to remove many of the restrictive assumptions of standard models and to
incorporate the heterogeneity of economic agents and the evolution of the
network that governs the interactions between the individuals and firms in the
economy. Such models can help fill the theoretical void with which policyma-
kers declare that they have been faced in the current crisis.  
Keywords: crisis, complex system, heterogeneity, networks.
“First, we have to think about how to characterise the homo econo-
micus at the heart of any model. The atomistic, optimising agents
underlying existing models do not capture behaviour during a crisis
period. We need to deal better with heterogeneity across agents and
the interaction among those heterogeneous agents. We need to enter-
tain alternative motivations for economic choices. Behavioural
economics draws on psychology to explain decisions made in crisis
circumstances. Agent-based modelling dispenses with the optimisa-
tion assumption and allows for more complex interactions between
agents. Such approaches are worthy of our attention. ”
Jean-Claude Trichet (2010).
Recently, considerable dissatisfaction has been expressed not
only by Trichet but also by Bernanke, Turner and many others in
policymaking positions, with economic theory in general andRevue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
Alan Kirman16macroeconomic theory in particular. This leads to two questions,
why does macroeconomic theory seem to have become, as Trichet
and others suggest, so irrelevant particularly in times of crisis and to
what extent are agent based or computational economic models a
more satisfactory alternative?
Before answering these questions it is worth observing that
computational or algorithmic models have a long and distinguished
tradition in economics. One has only to think of Von Neumann’s
work and of Scarf’s contributions, particularly to the computation of
economic equilibria and the contributions of Dantzig and Kuhn in
using mathematical programming, to see this. What agent based
modelling is doing is to renew the tradition of using an algorithmic
approach to model economic phenomena. The recent, rapid deve-
lopment of computer science explains the resurgence of this
approach. Now computational models have two significant advan-
tages. Firstly there is a wealth of data on the behaviour of individuals
and from this we can categorise different behavioural types and use
these as a basis for building agent based models. Secondly, given the
progress that has been made in computational power and capacity
we are now capable of simulating the dynamics of very large systems
of heterogeneous interacting agents. This is, for example, the ambi-
tion of the EU project, Futur-ICT. 
1. The evolution of modern macroeconomics
But to return the first question as to how macroeconomic theory
seems to have become so irrelevant, it is worth looking at the recent
evolution of the discipline of economics. Economic theory has deve-
loped, as a criterion for “rigorous” analysis that our models should
be based on the intellectual bedrock of the “rational individual” or
homo oeconomicus. The rationality of economic agents is not
defined by the intuitive idea that individuals do not act against their
own interest, but rather, that they have preferences, which satisfy
the axiomatic structure typified by that used in the Arrow Debreu
model. For firms it is even simpler, they choose that combination of
inputs and outputs which maximises their profit. If we take time
into account we assume that our agents, consumers and firms, have
infinite horizons and that they discount the future appropriately.
Lastly if the future is uncertain, they know the nature of that uncer-
Can artificial economies help us understand real economies?  17tainty, they know the probability distribution of future events, they
have “rational expectations”. This is the basis for the underlying
theoretical model of modern economics the “general equilibrium
model” initiated by Walras, improved by Pareto and honed to
perfection by their successors and which culminated in the Arrow
Debreu model and was closed by assuming rational expectations.
The task of the economist in this tradition is, therefore, to make
assumptions about individual preferences and technologies and to
build models, particularly macroeconomic models on that basis.
One then finds the equilibrium of the system and examines the
characteristics of such equilibrium states. Whenever objections as to
the realism of the model are made, the response is to modify some
aspect of it to take the criticism into account but not to put the
whole exercise in doubt. 
The problems with this approach are well known and need not
be elaborated here. Suffice it to say that we know that restricting
ourselves to only making assumptions on individual preferences
and technologies will allow us to say nothing about how one might
get to an equilibrium nor whether such a state is unique. Thus, all
that we can say is that, under our assumptions, an equilibrium will
exist. But, since the idea that the only way to construct “scientific”
models is to limit ourselves to assumptions on individuals, all that
we can do is assume the economy to be in equilibrium all the time.
This is precisely where modern macroeconomics has arrived. The
answer to building models which allow us to say something about
how economies function out of equilibrium and how they might
move to equilibrium seems to be simple, add assumptions about the
way in which people interact and the institutions that govern them,
and this is precisely what Lucas suggested.
“Applications of economic theory to market or group behaviour
require assumptions about the mode of interaction among agents as
well as about individual behaviour.” Lucas (1988).
However, curiously, rather than do this, and maybe change the
basic approach to economics, the solution that has been adopted is
to assume that the economy as a whole acts like a rational indivi-
dual, an assumption for which there is no theoretical justification,
(see Kirman (1992).  Perversely, the idea of enlarging the model to
incorporate assumptions about how it is organized has been consi-
dered to be “unscientific” whilst the assumption that the economy
Alan Kirman18acts like an individual was not. Not only was this intrinsic contradic-
tion ignored, the underlying assumption that we should only make
assumptions about individuals was actually elevated to the status of
a principle. Lucas, some years before making the observation just
mentioned, explicitly rejected the idea of adding parameters to the
basic model to allow even for an adjustment process. In fact at that
time he said,
“Now, I am attracted to the view that it is useful, in a general way, to
be hostile toward theorists bearing free parameters, so that I am
sympathetic to the idea of simply capitalizing this opinion and calling
it a Principle.” Lucas (1980, p. 709).
But, by doing so he made it impossible for economists, who
followed his lead, to study out of equilibrium phenomena. Since,
with the assumptions that he considered scientific, all that we could
show was that an equilibrium exists, the economy should be studied
in that state. Even if one considers dynamics, the idea would be that
the economy simply evolves through a sequence of equilibrium,
thus business cycles are equilibrium phenomena. The fact that, at
another point of time, Lucas suggested that we needed additional
assumptions on the organisation of the economy in addition to the
assumptions on individuals, did not deviate macroeconomic theo-
rists from the path which he had encouraged them to pursue. 
Following this theoretical path has had important consequences
for the way in which macroeconomics has been developed. Despite
Lucas’ observations, it is generally assumed in macroeconomic
models that the way in which the economy or markets are orga-
nised, as such, has little impact on economic outcomes. Individuals
participate in anonymous markets in which they are price takers and
little is said about who sets the prices and how. When exceptions are
made to this basic structure it is significant that economists refer to
“imperfect competition” and market “imperfections”. Thus there is
a benchmark model in which individuals interact only through the
price system and other situations in which individuals react to each
other are thought of as deviations from the norm. Direct interac-
tion, and the externalities that go with it are either declared to be
the subject of game theory or are incorporated with difficulty into a
modified GE model.
Our attraction for the idea of economics as a “science” which
stems from Walras’ obsession with showing that we could develop a
Can artificial economies help us understand real economies?  19general internally consistent mathematical model of the economy,
has driven us into a corner. The attitude of many theoretical econo-
mists to real world economic problems is directly in the spirit of
Bourbaki from whom Debreu took his inspiration. As Bourbaki1 said, 
“Why do applications [of mathematics] ever succeed? Why is a
certain amount of logical reasoning occasionally helpful in practical
life? Why have some of the most intricate theories in mathematics
become an indispensable tool to the modern physicist, to the engineer,
and to the manufacturer of atom-bombs? Fortunately for us, the
mathematician does not feel called upon to answer such questions.”
(Bourbaki, Journal of Symbolic Logic 1949, 2).
Thus, in that spirit, the furthering of economy theory was seen as
an avenue to more advanced models and not as a pursuit of explana-
tions of economic phenomena. We became totally preoccupied by
the properties of the economy in an equilibrium state. But, given the
important results established in the ‘70s2 it became clear that we
had, within our “scientific” models, to abandon the concern with
how the equilibrium prices are established and how the economy
evolves towards equilibrium. There was almost no consideration of
the idea that the economy might never be in equilibrium in the
standard sense. So theorists have concentrated on the properties, in
particular, the efficiency, of equilibrium states.  They have insisted
on the rigour of the analysis, but much less on the realism of the
assumptions. In the end, the mathematical road that we followed
petered out some 40 years ago in pure theory and has only remained
in macroeconomic theory.
2. An alternative approach
Keynes once remarked, and this remark has been widely cited
recently, that economists should become more like dentists, using
such knowledge of the economy that they have acquired to improve
the health of the patient particularly in times of crisis. Colander
(2011) refers to this as, an “engineering”, rather than a “scientific”
approach. Rather than developing general theories which have the
ambition of giving us a clear, if simplified, vision of the economy as
1. Nicolas Bourbaki was, of course, a pseudonym for a group of mathematicians mainly based
in Paris.
2. The results in question are those of Sonnenschein (1972), Mantel (1974) and Debreu (1974)
himself. 
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concentrate on developing models capable of providing us with
recommendations for specific situations. Unconcerned with the
basic physics that underlies the tools that he uses, the engineer tries
to solve problems, often relying on generous approximations to give
him self a margin of safety.   
I would like to argue that we should not necessarily abandon the
idea of a general model, after all Keynes called his major contribu-
tion, “The General Theory…”. This does not mean that we should
aim at a model of everything, but rather, that we can establish some
basic principles on which our models should be built. However, if
we are to have such basic foundations they should be radically diffe-
rent to those that we are in the habit of using. Our basic model, as
suggested in Miller and Page (2007), Epstein (2007) and Kirman
(2010) should be one of a complex system of interacting agents who
learn and adapt (for an early exposition, see e.g Aoki (1996)). Their
behaviour and their interaction with each other generates aggregate
phenomena, from which they again learn or to which they adapt.
There are positive feedbacks, and we have no reason to believe that
such a system will converge to a stationary equilibrium. We have
therefore to study economies that are out of equilibrium and how
they evolve. In such systems the aggregate behaviour is not like that
of an individual and the way in which individuals react to each
other will be an important feature of the evolution of the economy.
Two things should be emphasised. Firstly, we cannot assume the
aggregation problem away as is currently done in macroeconomics.
Secondly, we need to understand out of equilibrium dynamics. 
I claim therefore that we have to turn things inside out and bring
direct interaction to the centre of the stage. Furthermore, I claim
that we should radically simplify our models of individuals and that,
in so doing, we may still observe interesting and complicated aggre-
gate behaviour which is, however, the result of the aggregation itself
and not of the complicated behaviour of some “representative indi-
vidual”. We should treat the economy as a complex system and, as
in other disciplines, we should not expect the system to behave like
an individual. 
The way to do this is by building models of simple individuals
who follow simple rules and interact with each other just as mole-
cules in biological systems or particles in physical systems. This is at
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Indeed, the now widely accepted definition of this approach is that
given by Leigh Tesfatsion3, (2002) where she says the following,
“Agent based computational economics is the computational study of
economic processes modelled as dynamic systems of interacting
agents.”
The fact that we are talking about a computational approach does
not mean that we are abandoning any attempt to obtain analytical
results, but does mean that a reasonable way to proceed is to try to
obtain formal results in simple models and, where this proves too
difficult in more general models, to use simulations and to see
whether the results persist in those contexts. The formal analysis is
more likely to come from statistical physics (see e.g. Blume (1993)),
discrete mathematics and computer science, than the sort of mathe-
matics that we use, in general, in theoretical economics. This does
not make it any less rigorous. Lucas’ principle, as he stated it at the
time, was based on the false premise that our assumptions on indivi-
duals are, in some sense, scientific. In fact, those assumptions have
no special status. They come from the introspection of economists
and not from the long and careful examination of how individuals
actually behave. We have become familiar with them and this has
made them acceptable. But there is no reason that we should not
adopt different formal models that were originally used to explain
the behaviour of systems of interacting particles or molecules. 
The usual argument against this is that humans have intentions
and are forward looking and cannot therefore be modelled as one
would model molecules or inanimate particles. This misses the
essential point, if we can describe the rules that an individual
follows and the way, in which he interacts with other individuals,
we can use the formal models developed elsewhere to understand
what the outcomes will be. We do not need to know what the deep
psychological motives for an individual’s actions are. Consider the
argument that individuals are forward looking, and think of the
problem of forecasting. In all our models individuals map past
history into forecasts of the future. Once they have a forecast of the
3. Those who are interested in the agent based modelling approach cannot do better that to
go to Tesfatsion’s website devoted to this issue,  http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/
amulmark.htm
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rithm, which maps past history into actions. There is nothing
intrinsic which prevents us from building simple agents or robots
that do this. We can choose what we consider to be the appropriate
level of sophistication for the mapping from the past to actions; we
can also model the reactions of other agents to an individual’s
choice of actions. What is more we can let the agent learn about the
rules that he uses and we can find out if our simple creatures can
learn to be the sophisticated optimisers of economic theory. 
In doing this we are not straying far from what has been recom-
mended by our illustrious predecessors and the leaders of our
profession. The first idea that I am suggesting is that we have to treat
the economy as a complex system. But Herb Simon (1962) already
described a complex system when explaining how he thought
economic theory should develop and he said,
“Roughly by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number
of parts that interact in a non-simple way. In such systems, the whole
is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate metaphysical
sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties
of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter
to infer the properties of the whole. In the face of complexity, an in-
principle reductionist may be at the same time a pragmatic holist.”
Herbert Simon (1962, p. 267).
The second argument that I would make is that we should
dispense with the a priori assumptions about rationality and optimi-
sation, which are so central to economic theory. But, if you think
that this might be heretical consider what Robert Lucas (1988), had
to say on the subject:
"In general we view or model and individual as a collection of decision
rules (rules that dictate the action to be taken in given situations) and
a set of preferences used to evaluate the outcomes arising from parti-
cular situation-action combinations. These decision rules are
continuously under review and revision: new decisions are tried and
tested against experience, and rules that produce desirable outcomes
supplant those that do not. I use the term "adaptive" to refer to this
trial-and-error process through which our modes of behaviour are
determined."  
However, Lucas then goes on to argue that we can safely ignore
the dynamics of this process since,
"Technically, I think of economics as studying decision rules that are
steady states of some adaptive process, decision rules that are found to
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ciably as more experience accumulates.".
In general, however, one cannot assume convergence to some
equilibrium but one has to look at the dynamic evolution of the
economy resulting from the interaction between agents. One is also
interested in knowing how the state of the system evolves over time
and not only whether it settles down to what might be thought of as
some sort of equilibrium. Here I am taking a different position from
Lucas and arguing that one cannot assume that all the adaptation
has taken place in the past but that we are faced, in economics, with
many situations in which individuals are constantly adapting to
change and thereby generating change. Thus, not only the relevant
time scale but also the process itself is very different from that rele-
vant for biological evolution, which is too often used by simple
analogy. Indeed when explaining the difference between standard
and computational or agent based economic models, Farmer and
Foley (2010) explain,  
“An agent-based model is a computerized simulation of a number of
decision-makers (agents) and institutions, which interact through
prescribed rules. The agents can be as diverse as needed — from
consumers to policy-makers and Wall Street professionals — and the
institutional structure can include everything from banks to the
government. Such models do not rely on the assumption that the
economy will move towards a predetermined equilibrium state, as
other models do. Instead, at any given time, each agent acts according
to its current situation, the state of the world around it and the rules
governing its behaviour.” Farmer and Foley (2010) p.685.
In fact, the economy is a noisy system that may not show any
tendency to settle to a steady state. Thus the argument that indivi-
duals learn to achieve equilibria does not take into account the fact
that the environment about which they are learning is largely
composed of other agents who are also learning. This undermines
the basic arguments made by Evans and Honkapohja, (2001) who
argue that learning in macroeconomics leads to equilibrium states.
If we take the view that most of the dynamics of the economy is
due to the interaction between the heterogeneous agents in the
economy, this means taking a very different view of business cycles
and crises. Rather than putting these down to some exogenous,
(technological) shock, the shocks would be idiosyncratic ones which
affect individuals or firms and are transmitted to others. The system
Alan Kirman24is not occasionally knocked off course and then returns to its steady
state path but internally generates movements and from time to
time, phase changes. As Wilhem Buiter, a former member of the
Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee and now chief
economist of Citigroup, says,
“Those of us who worry about endogenous uncertainty arising from
the interactions of boundedly rational market participants cannot but
scratch our heads at the insistence of the mainline models that all
uncertainty is exogenous and additive.” Buiter (2009).
3. Business cycles and crises
What is necessary then is to build models in which much of the
volatility of macroeconomic variables is accounted for by microeco-
nomic shocks. A step in this direction has been made by Gabaix
(2011) who suggests that simply making assumptions about the
heterogeneity of firms more consistent with the observed data, can
make a major difference. He  points out, in a recent paper, that if
one accepts, consistently with the empirical evidence, that the
distribution of firm sizes in the U.S. follows a power law, then the
idiosyncratic movements of the largest 100 firms appear to explain
about one-third of variations in output growth. The underlying
assumption about firm sizes, that he refers to as the “granular”
hypothesis, suggests that a number of macroeconomic questions
can be clarified by looking at the behaviour of large firms.  He
actually details the history of a number of major incidents at the
firm level that were translated into movements of aggregate output.
The underlying idea is not new and in the past several economists
have proposed mechanisms that generate macroeconomic shocks
from purely microeconomic causes. A pioneering paper is by Jova-
novic (1987), whose models generate non-vanishing aggregate
fluctuations owing to a multiplier proportional to , the square
root of the number of firms in the economy. However, Jovanovic’s
results have been criticised as empirically implausible. Yet a number
of economists followed the route he mapped out. For example
Scheinkman, and Woodford (1994) applied the physical theory of
self-organizing criticality to explain aggregate fluctuations. Their
approach however, generates fluctuations  which are more fat-tailed
than in reality, with infinite means. Again Nirei (2006) proposed a
model where aggregate fluctuations arise from the (s,S) rules deve-
N
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close, in spirit, to the complex systems approach that I am recom-
mending here. Still we have a large residual to explain in terms of
the overall size of aggregate shocks. This leads naturally to the
second point, that individual shocks may be transmitted to other
individuals producing contagion effects, and thus relatively small
shocks may be amplified, through the network of linkages between
firms. This suggests that we have to pay much more attention to the
network structure of the economy than is typically done.
4. Networks
As I have said, it is remarkable that Lucas observed that we had to
develop hypotheses about the organisation of the interaction
between agents in direct contradiction with the principle that he
invoked when he argued that we should not add any assumptions to
those we make about the characteristics of individuals. Nevertheless,
it is directly in line with the basic argument of this paper, which is
that we have to model the economy as a system in which rather
simple individuals, organisations or enterprises interact with each
other. The complicated outcomes that we observe at the aggregate
level are not due to the complicated nature of the individuals but
rather to the structure of the system within which they interact.
However, once one argues that it is the interaction between agents
that is primordial in determining the aggregate outcomes then one
has also to be much more specific about the way in which those
interactions are structured. 
In particular the network of relationships between individuals,
banks and even nations are of primary importance. They do not
figure in macroeconomic models but have been extensively studied
by economists (see e.g. Jackson (2008), Goyal (2007), and Vega
Redondo (2007).)
This means modelling the network of links between the indivi-
duals and institutions, specifying the nature of the nodes and links
and, in addition, establishing criteria for determining their robus-
tness. Here, however, we find an interesting problem with the
economist’s approach to networks. Economists wish to develop a
very general theory and, in particular, one which is based on indivi-
dual maximising behaviour. As Goyal (2007) says, 
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different methodology used. These differences can be traced to a subs-
tantive methodological premise in economics: social and economic
phenomena must be explained in terms of the choices made by
rational agents.”
In fact if, as I have claimed, and others do, (see Haldane and May
(2011), that we have to view networks as an integral part of the
vision of  the economy as a complex adaptive system, what we need
is a very different basis for our models. Again Lucas’ recommenda-
tion that we interest ourselves in the structure of interactions,
reveals the difficulties in dealing with phenomena such as networks
and trying to stick to the conventional macroeconomic approach.
Firstly, it underlines the economist’s quest for a very general abstract
model which will encompass many of the empirical phenomena
that we observe and, secondly, the need that theoretical macroeco-
nomists feel to base the model on the same micro-foundations that
have been shown to be inadequate as a basis for a general, empiri-
cally verifiable model. 
A different approach is needed. For example if we now couple the
role of networks with the explanations of the origins of aggregate
shocks, proposed by Gabaix (2011) we can move a long way to
explaining  a large part of the volatility of macroeconomic variables
and the onset of crises. As Gabaix says, 
“ It would be interesting to exploit the hypothesis that the financial
crisis was largely caused by the (ex post) mistakes of a few large firms,
e.g., Lehman and AIG. Their large leverage and interconnectedness
amplified into a full-fledged crisis, instead of what could have been a
run-of-the-mill (sic) that would have affected in a diffuse way the
financial sector.” Gabaix (2011, p.764). 
Thus what we need to do is to integrate considerations of the
interconnectedness of the network into explaining macroeconomic
evolution. This has been the subject of a considerable theoretical
and empirical literature. Durlauf (1993) generated macroeconomic
uncertainty with idiosyncratic shocks and local interactions
between firms. His results are driven by the nonlinear interactions
between firms.  This sort of result based on diffusion across a
network, coupled with the « granularity » of firm size advanced by
Gabaix (2011) is a powerful basis for examining the dynamics of the
macro-economy.  The argument would then be that the skewed size
distribution of firms together with their strong inter-linkage under-
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may be due to the input output structure of the economy but might
also be linked to the ownership structure of the large firms in an
economy. If we are interested in global fluctuations then we need,
for the latter explanation, a detailed analysis of the ownership struc-
ture of the largest international firms, or Trans-national
corporations (TNCs) as they are sometimes called. Vitali et al. (2011).
use a large data base on the share holdings of firms to establish the
nature of the network of  international ownership. Their findings,
which have provoked considerable discussion, are remarkable. As
the authors explain 
“Nearly 40 percent of the control over the economic value of TNCs in
the world is held, via a complicated web of ownership relations, by a
group of 147 TNCs in the core, which has almost full control over
itself.” Vitali et al. (2011).
Unsurprisingly, three-quarters of these companies are banks.
5. The emergence of the networks structure
An important observation is that there is no evidence that this
structure was intentional, there was no giant conspiracy, rather the
network evolved endogenously in this way.  The network is an emer-
gent phenomenon, characteristic of complex systems. However,
concentrated power in the hands of a few has clear implications for
global financial stability as recent events have shown. What is worth
observing is that, starting from the empirical evidence, the authors
were able to build a picture of the structure of the network and then,
to emphasise the implications of that structure for the stability of
the network. Building on this approach could potentially help poli-
cymakers and economists to find ways to stabilize financial markets.
The important thing to notice here is that two statistical charac-
teristics of the network of the international network of firms allow
one to draw conclusions as to the evolution and fragility of the
international economy. This does not depend on finding micro-
founded explanations of those statistics although a number of
efforts have been made to do This is at the opposite end of the spec-
trum to the idea that fluctuations at the macroeconomic level are
essentially due to large unspecified (technological?) shocks to the
economy as a whole.  
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based|” or computational modelling? What we are looking at here is
a system of different interacting agents, and one where the diffe-
rences between the agents can be measured. Starting from the
distribution of the sizes of the firms in the particular system in ques-
tion, one already obtains a measure of the aggregate volatility
induced by idiosyncratic shocks. If one then couples this with the
network structure of the firms, one can then model the aggregate
impact of individual shocks. But both the size distribution of firms
and the nature of the network are initially inferred from the data, so
this is an inductive rather than a deductive approach. The robus-
tness of the conclusions to the specification of the distribution and
of the network structure can be examined by simulating a model in
which the distribution of firm sizes is varied and where the network
structure can be modified. 
To take another example, the properties of the international
financial network have been examined by Haldane, the director of
the Bank of England responsible for financial stability (Haldane
(2009)). In this case, the nodes correspond to countries and the size
of the nodes to the total amount of foreign assets held by the
country corresponding to the node in question. A link between
countries means that at least one of the two holds the assets of the
other and these links are weighted by the sum of the mutually held
assets. Typically one would define a minimum threshold for such
assets to constitute the basis for a link. One can calculate a number
of statistics to characterise the structure of the graph, the empirical
degree distribution for example, and the proportion of the total
weight of all the links made up by the total of the weights associated
with the links emanating from the largest nodes. Whilst the connec-
tivity of the global financial network has increased remarkably in
recent years (see Nier et al. 2007), the degree distribution3 has
changed and has become more skewed with a few nodes having very
high degree and a group of nodes becoming very central. To quote
Haldane (2009) of the Bank of England, when talking about these
developments in the banking network before the global financial
crisis, he says:
“This evolution in the topology of the network meant that sharp
discontinuities in the financial system were an accident waiting to
happen. The present crisis is the materialisation of that accident.”
Haldane (2009, p. 4).
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phenomenon, establish its features and then examine the conse-
quences for the evolution of the system of those features. Here what
one is looking at is a network that emerged from a particular evolu-
tion of trading relationships which were mutually advantageous.
What we see is how it can become fragile, without those who partici-
pate in it realizing what is going on. The importance of this for
economists is clear. Interaction and the networks through which it
operates have to be analysed since they play a large role in determi-
ning aggregate economic phenomena. Furthermore, understanding
the evolution of the structure of the networks that make up the
economy is not just an intellectual exercise; it is important for very
practical reasons and policy makers are coming to appreciate this. For
as Haldane says,
“Deregulation swept away banking segregation and, with it, decom-
posability of the financial network. The upshot was a predictable lack
of network robustness. That is one reason why Glass-Steagall is now
back on the international policy agenda. It may be the wrong or too
narrow an answer. But it asks the right question: can network struc-
ture be altered to improve network robustness? Answering that
question is a mighty task for the current generation of policymakers.
Using network resilience as a metric for success would help ensure it
was a productive one.” Haldane (2009).
When models that would address these questions are proposed,
they are often described as following an engineering methodology
rather than a scientific one.  Rather than demanding the total
internal consistency which characterises current economic models
such a methodology would use a much broader and looser set of
assumptions that would blend economic and non-economic consi-
derations. In this view, all aspects of the problem necessary to arrive
at an answer to the economic problem posed would be included in
the applied economist’s research. Thus, for example, if judgments
about tradeoffs of individual’s welfare were necessary, the economic
engineer would develop as his objective a method for making those
judgments as possible. Again this sort of approach is not new. Earlier
economists, who took a more engineering approach, were quite
willing to develop models involving interpersonal welfare compari-
sons as Colander (2007) points out. He gives the example, of Irving
Fisher (1927) and Ragnar Frisch (1932) who developed a statistical
method for making interpersonal comparisons of wants; they justi-
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question about whether the necessary assumptions can be used, and
answered: “To all these questions I would answer ‘yes’—approxima-
tely at least. But the only, or only important, reason I can give for
this answer is that, in actual practical human life, we do proceed on
just such assumptions.” He continues: “Philosophical doubt is right
and proper, but the problems of life cannot, and do not, wait.”
(Fisher, 1927). As Colander says, maximizing a non-operational
social welfare function is not a policy goal of engineering research.
Whilst many would accept to accept the idea that an engineering
approach may be useful in providing solutions to, or understanding
of, very specific economic problems they would ask that it should
also allow us to better understand more general economic pheno-
mena. A first example of an area where this approach may be
particularly useful is that of the market.
6. Markets and their organisation
Of all economic institutions the market is probably the most
ancient and the most historically documented. If any feature of the
economy is emphasised in analysing economic phenomena it is
surely the market.  Indeed, as Braudel observed,
“Ce très vieux type d’échange se pratiquait dejà à Pompei, à Ostie ou à
Timgad la Romaine, et des siècles, des millénaires plus tôt : la Grèce
ancienne a eu ses marchés; des marchés existent dans la Chine clas-
sique comme dans l’Egypte pharaonique, dans la Babylonie où
l’échange était si précoce... En Ethiopie, les marchés par leurs origines
se perdent dans le temps.” Braudel (1979).
Yet as Douglas North remarked,
“It is a peculiar fact that the literature on economics…contains so
little discussion of the central institution that underlies neoclassical
economics—the market.” North (1977, p.710).
One has only to think of the standard vision, in economic
theory, of a market to see why there is such a gulf between what
Braudel is describing and modern economic theory. What is
described is a system in which the actors act according to a system of
rules, which constrains them, and this, in turn, generates the aggre-
gate economic outcomes. These actors are anonymous and their
relations with others are not considered. Financial markets are often
analysed on the basis of such a vision. Yet, those who participate in,
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rent view. For example Aboulafia argues that markets are essentially
social institutions in his well-known study of financial markets,
indeed he says,
“Markets are socially constructed institutions in which the behavior
of traders is suspended in a web of customs, norms, and structures of
control...Traders negotiate the perpetual tension between short-term
self-interest and long-term self-restraint that marks their respective
communities.” M. Aboulafia (1997).
Kuhn goes further and argues that individual relationships and
trust are necessary for the functioning of markets. For him, it is clear
that, 
“Markets are not self-operating, objective mechanical objects. They
are, rather, a complex set of constraints, rules, rights, regulations, and
laws, guiding human participants in making their multiple, various
trades, purchases, and exchanges. The motivating force that generates
benign market outcomes is the willingness of all to obey the guidelines
and deal openly—transparently—with each other. Invisible to the
naked eye are the common social bonds of trust among all, strangers
and acquaintances alike. The bonds of trust are what create and
sustain truly efficient, effective markets.” Kuhn (1995).
In another context Alan Greenspan, Chairman at the time of the
Federal Reserve, has remarked that,
“It is hard to overstate the importance of reputation in a market
economy. To be sure, a market economy requires a structure of formal
rules—a law of contracts, bankruptcy statutes, a code of shareholder
rights—to name but a few. But rules cannot substitute for character.
In virtually all transactions, whether with customers or with collea-
gues, we rely on the word of those with whom we do business. If we
could not do so, goods and services could not be exchanged efficiently.
Even when followed to the letter, rules guide only a small number of
the day-to-day decisions required of corporate management. The rest
are governed by whatever personal code of values corporate managers
bring to the table.” Greenspan (2003).
This poses a problem for those who would like to model the way
markets really function. The anonymous market poses few
problems, for one just has to specify the rules which individuals
follow when they are faced with the prices given by some unspeci-
fied market mechanism. However if we take the previous remarks
seriously, we are faced with the idea that individuals build up rela-
tions of confidence with each other and this seems more like a
subject for psychologists or, at least, for behavioural economists.
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simply have to specify the graph in which the various buyers and
sellers are linked and we return to the sort of network analysis I have
already described.  Moreover, if we are to explain how these links
form and are sustained, the task is even more difficult. An argument
that is often used is that in the large anonymous markets of today,
relationships are not longer important, therefore we do not need to
worry about the network linking traders together nor how it is
formed. The quotes that I have given suggest that this, even today, is
far from being the case. Traders in financial markets such as the
Forex market use a very limited number of other traders, despite the
fact that they are faced with thousands of quotes at any point in
time. Again, in a recent paper, Puri et al. (2011), analyzed the impor-
tance of retail consumers’ banking relationships for loan defaults
using a dataset of over one million loans by savings banks in
Germany. They find that loans of retail customers, who have a rela-
tionship with their savings bank prior to applying for a loan, default
significantly less than customers with no prior relationship. Thus
relationships play a very significant role. 
Two remarks are worth making here. Firstly, not long ago such an
analysis would have been almost impossible but, as I have remarked,
the abundance of data together with the progress in computational
capacity now allows us to undertake such exercises. Secondly, the
same advances now permit us to build models in which individuals
learn with whom they wish to interact and within which one can
study the consequences of such interactions. In this way, artificial
markets can contribute to the quest for the explanation of some of
the features of the complex market structures that we observe.
Conventional macroeconomic models are not concerned with the
details of how markets function, but a better knowledge of market
microstructure may be very useful in explaining some of the evolu-
tion of financial markets, for example. However, what we are talking
about here is the emergence of certain phenomena and the dynamic
evolution of the structure of the relations within markets, where, by
their very nature, many transactions are on a repeated basis. Such
problems do not sit well in the context of models that aim at the
analysis of steady states of systems in which agents only interact
through some anonymous unspecified “market”. 
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suggests, artificial. The three traditional approaches for economists
are, theoretical, experimental and empirical. The idea here is that
the fourth approach that I am recommending, that of using agent
based models to construct artificial markets which are then simu-
lated, can complement the other approaches each of which has its
weaknesses.
What are the drawbacks of theoretical models? The first and most
important weakness is that they have to be greatly simplified in
order to make them analytically tractable. Miller and Page (2007) in
describing the purification of economic models, cite a Chinese
philosopher, who says,
“Water which is too pure has no fish.” Ts’ai Ken Tan.
 That is, in reducing our models to a minimum to be able to solve
them analytically, for example to characterise their equilibria we
may actually purify away the phenomena we are interested in. The
second weakness is that the assumptions are often made for analytic
tractability rather than for economic realism. Artificial markets can
help here by providing results in more general analytically intrac-
table situations and then seeing if these results coincide with those
obtained in the simpler case which could be handled analytically.
A second approach that has developed rapidly in recent years is
that of experimental economics. Leaving aside the fact that macroe-
conomics may not be the most suitable subject for  laboratory
experiments,4 one could ask, in general, what are the limitations of
experiments? Once again, this time, in order to make the situation
understandable for the subjects, one has to simplify.  Furthermore,
the situation with which the subjects are faced is extremely unna-
tural. Often they believe that they have a problem to solve for which
there is a « right » answer, thus rather than reacting naturally, they
try to outguess the experimenter. The first lesson, it seems to me,
that we learn is that, even when faced with a well specified problem
in a controlled environment, subjects frequently do not behave as
theory would predict. Thus, my own view is that this teaches us that
individuals are noisier and less consistent than we assume them to
4. Although it is only fair to observe that the formation of bubbles in asset markets and the
formation of expectations have been the subject of a considerable number of experiments, (see
e.g Duffy (2008)).
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economists are more ambitious and would like to know if, other
than using simplified theoretical models, one could not develop
another benchmark for the rationality against which to evaluate
subjects’ behaviour in experiments.  Again artificial models could be
used to provide such a benchmark. 
Finally, why can one not content oneself with working with
empirical data directly?  Doing this can enable us to establish some
« stylised facts » or statistical regularities but gives us no idea as to
the structure that generated them. It is precisely to get an understan-
ding of how the system functions, that we typically build a model,
and then we are faced again with the choice between a theoretical
model and its agent-based counterpart. Although we can usefully
employ both approaches, the typical theoretical models is deve-
loped before looking at the facts, while, what I would argue is that
we should use salient features of the empirical data as our bench-
mark, and then construct models, which reproduce some of these.
This is the essence of the agent based approach which is essentially
data driven and more inductive than deductive.
As a very simple example, in Weisbuch et al. (2000), and Kirman
and Vriend (2001)  we wished to explain the strong loyalty of many
buyers to sellers in the Marseille fish market. We first developed an
extremely primitive theoretical model in which people simply learn
from their previous experience and then, in consequence, change
their probability of visiting different sellers as a result of their expe-
rience.  We then went on to simulate more elaborate versions of the
model and were still able to reproduce the salient feature. Models of
this sort that attribute very little computational ability or general
reasoning capacity to individuals are capable of reproducing specific
features of real markets. Since then a literature on this sort of model
for these markets has developed. (see e.g. Sapio et al., 2011). 
As a further illustration, consider another example of a market,
but this time for a financial asset, (Anand et al. (2010)), where we
once again started with an empirical phenomenon, the collapse of
the price of asset backed securities early in the current crisis. We first
constructed a simple theoretical model to capture the essence of the
phenomenon and then ran simulations of a more general dynamic
model in which the agents act in the same way as in the theoretical
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theory. 
Our goal was to model the general mechanism whereby inves-
tors, as a rule, trade securities without giving due diligence to
fundamental information that is, they do not check on the toxicity
of the asset. The rationale motivating investors, is simply that it is
profitable to adopt this rule, because other investors have already
adopted it.
The market consists of agents, who, in the case of the sub-prime
crisis, we can think of as the banks who were both the issuers and
the investors in these Asset Backed Securities,(ABS). Each agent
decides whether or not to follow a rule, which is to purchase an ABS,
relying on signals from the rating agencies, without independently
evaluating the fundamental value of underlying assets. If enough
other participants do so, the agent becomes convinced, not irratio-
nally, that the ABS is highly liquid and hence easy to trade.
Let us assume that the ABS is toxic with a certain probability. By
toxic I mean, for example, that the underlying asset was incorrectly
graded and that the original borrower of loan has already defaulted or
has a higher probability of defaulting. Agents are linked together with
trading partners in a financial network. This captures the fact that the
secondary market for trading ABS and other credit derivatives is not
centralized but instead takes place over-the-counter with traders in
one firm directly calling up other traders to sell their securities.  
When an agent i receives an offer to buy a new ABS, she considers
whether or not to follow the rule. The line of reasoning she pursues is
to first determine the probability that, if she adopts the rule and
subsequently attempts to re-sell the security, the potential buyer,
agent j will refuse to buy the security. This will be because agent j
does not follow the rule and, as such, may verify that the underlying
asset is toxic and, hence, not liquid. Each agent now calculates the
expected gain to him of following the rule given the rules chosen by
the neighbours in his network and adopts the rule if the expected
pay-off is higher than that obtained by not adopting it and checking. 
It is not difficult to find the equilibria of this simple market, in
terms of the rule being followed, and there are two, one of which is
always an equilibrium, and the other which only appears above a
certain critical value for the probability of default on the underlying
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assets whilst in the second all banks do so.  Now in order to test the
stochastic stability of the two equilibria we ran simulations in which
agents noisily learn (they use reinforcement learning, (see Bush and
Mosteller, 1955 or for a more sophisticated version Camerer and Ho,
1999), which rule is more profitable. What transpires from the simu-
lations, is that the system always converges to the no-checking
equilibrium if the probability of default is low enough, but a small
increase in that probability, can lead the market to collapse into the
equilibrium in which everyone checks. Thus a small change in one
of the parameters of the model can lead to catastrophic conse-
quences at the aggregate level. 
Indeed, what we did was to examine the co-evolution of the
default rates on mortgages and the prices of securities backed by
those mortgages. The default rates steadily increased but this was
not reflected in the price of assets until they suddenly collapsed and
the interbank market froze. Thus, a continuous change at one level
led to a discontinuous change at the aggregate level. Whilst we
could establish the existence of the equilibria of the model analyti-
cally, we had to resort to simulations to see to which equilibria the
learning process converged. 
This underlines an important message. As soon as we are inte-
rested in real economic phenomena we cannot avoid examining
how the economy behaves out of equilibrium and the characteristics
of the states through which it passes, or to which it settles. This sort
of "bounded rationality" approach has received a lot of attention but
is often dismissed for its lack of rigour. In reality, the analysis of the
evolution of the "state" of the market in the model can be perfectly
rigorous given the specific choice of rules for the agents. Yet, it is still
the case that building artificial markets or economies, in which
agents have simple rules of behaviour, is not widely accepted in
economics. The reason seems to me simple; choosing rules of thumb
for agents is regarded as ad hoc. However, as I have already
explained, we have come to accept that the restrictions that we
impose on the preferences of individuals, unlike other behavioural
rules, are not ad hoc. Therefore, if we replace those assumptions,
which, by their very nature, cannot be empirically tested, by other
rules, we are subject to the criticism that we lose the rigour of
"proper micro foundations". 
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ling is that, unlike the more standard economic models, their
approach is largely innocent of theoretical pre-suppositions. In
many agent based models, the individuals learn, as Lucas (1988)
would have them do, which rules to use, and this is not dictated a
priori. However, it should be noted that the very specification of the
rules amongst which the agent chooses has an impact on the
outcomes.  Ideally, one would like to start, as in the “artificial life”
approach, with agents who are totally ignorant (see Arthur et al.
(1997).  However, this would imply that they would somehow gene-
rate a set of rules with which they would experiment.  This pushes
the analysis back many stages to a very fundamental level.  What is
done in most agent based models is to provide the agents with a set
of rules and simply note that this, to some extent, conditions the
outcomes of the process.
Still we are faced with the criticism that artificial markets, are not
“scientific”. Let me simply repeat that choosing the best element of
a well defined preference order is not necessarily a reasonable
assumption when both the order and the set of alternatives are
highly complicated, and that something is to be gained from
simplifying our account of individuals' behaviour in complicated
situations5. Whether the specification of the set of rules available to
individuals is more ad hoc than the standard assumptions on prefe-
rences and technologies is a subject for legitimate debate.
The message here is rather simple. Markets are an important
feature of all economies. Each market is characterised by an organi-
sation and structure that will have an impact on the outcomes
observed. In general it is difficult to capture all but the simplest
feature of such markets in theoretical markets. Even in the case of
the simplest markets, those for perishable goods, standard models
do not seem to be well adapted to shedding light on the nature of
the economic outcomes that one might expect. Curiously enough
the particular example which I have mentioned, that of the
Marseille fish market does exhibit rather a lot of regularity at the
aggregate level. Nevertheless this is not due to individuals behaving,
in isolation in a regular way as in the standard competitive model.
5. I have developed this sort of argument at length in Kirman (2006) where I suggest that we
have gone down the wrong route in modelling demand.
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simple link between individual and aggregate behaviour. A number
of the specific features of this market, such as the special trading
relationships that have developed are difficult to account for in the
standard framework. 
Artificial or agent based markets are particularly useful in
studying situations where the interaction and organisation make
simple theoretical analysis too difficult. To repeat, it is not legiti-
mate, I would argue, to dismiss these models as “ad hoc”. Firstly, one
can develop a theoretical model in a very restricted case and then
simulate the model to see if the conclusions hold up in a more
general case. Secondly, one can use a simplified version of the artifi-
cial market in which the solution should be obvious to see if it
functions correctly before moving on to the more general
framework in which the situation is more difficult to predict. This
allows us to do more than simply confirm standard theoretical
results but also to detect those features which emerge from the addi-
tional structure in the artificial markets. Finally, armed with this
information, one can then, return to the empirical data to check
them. In this approach therefore there is a constant feedback
between the data and the model construction. The data is not just
used to test or validate the theoretical model, but plays an active
part in its conception and construction. 
7. Conclusion 
The sort of argument made in this paper in favour of agent based
models and computational models in general is often interpreted as
an argument against a “scientific approach” to economics.  I would
argue that this is based on a false notion of what science consists of.
Whereas economists have insisted, in the recent past, on a very
particular approach to the development of formal economic models
it is now time to explore the possibility of different but no less rigo-
rous avenues. As mathematics moves into a more computational
mode, economics cannot afford to stand aside and insist on the sort
of Bourbakian axiomatics that have dominated the field in recent
years. Many leading mathematicians, such as Avi Widgerson at the
Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, have argued forcefully
that a computational revolution is taking place in that discipline.
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mathematics in the past, theoretical computer science is now consi-
dered to be an integral part of the field. The dismissal of the
computational approach by many economic theorists overlooks this
and, as I said at the outset, it also forgets that there has been a long
and distinguished part of the evolution of economic theory that
focused on an algorithmic approach to economic problems. What
agent based modelling is doing, is to renew the tradition of using an
algorithmic approach to model economic phenomena. Its advan-
tages are clear since it focuses on the essentially dynamic nature of
the economy and allows for the explicit introduction of heteroge-
neity into the models, rather than vainly trying to reduce aggregate
activity to that of an individual. None of this is an argument for a
less analytical approach to economics but it is an argument for
entertaining the possibility of other types of analysis, without any a
priori restriction on the field in which they originated. We were
wedded to physics and then to mathematics in the past and it seems
likely that computer science is more likely to play an increasing role
in constructing economic models in the future. Developing and
using such models is surely to be preferred to a situation in which
theoretical models are abandoned in times of crisis and policyma-
king reverts to “judgement and experience” alone, to cite Trichet
(2010). Agent based modelling is not just an intellectual exercise. As
Farmer and Foley (2009) say, « Policy-makers can thus simulate an
artificial economy under different policy scenarios and quantitati-
vely explore their consequences. ». Although we will not be able to
predict precisely the onset of the next crisis at least we may be better
prepared to deal with it. 
References
Aboulafia M., 1997, Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall
Street. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Aoki M., 1996, A New Approach to Macroeconomic Modelling. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Arthur B. et al., 1997, "Asset Pricing Under Endogenous Expectations in an
Artificial Stock Market". in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System
II, Edited by W. B. Arthur, S.N. Durlauf, and D. Lane, Addison Wesley.
Alan Kirman40Blume L., 1993, "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction". Games
and Economic Behaviour, 5: 387-424.
Buiter W., 2009, "The Unfortunate Uselessness of Most `State of the Art'
Academic Monetary Economics" Financial Times, March 3.
Bush R.-R., & F. Mosteller, 1955, Stochastic Models for Learning.  New York:
Wiley.
Camerer & Ho, 1999, Experience-Weighted Attraction learning in normal-form
games. Econometrica, 67: 827-873.
Durlauf, S., 1993, “Non Ergodic Economic Growth”. Review of Economic
Studies, 60: 349-366.
Duffy J. 2008, “Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research”.
Chapter prepared for the Handbook of Experimental Economic,s Vol. 2,
J. Kagel and A.E. Roth, Eds.  
Epstein J. M., 2007, Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based Compu-
tational Modeling. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Evans G.W., & Honkapohja, S., 2001, Learning and Expectations in
Macroeco- Nomics. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Farmer J. D., & D. Foley, 2009, "The Economy Needs Agent-Based Model-
ling".  Nature, 460: 685-686.
Goyal S., 2007, Connections: An introduction to the economics of networks.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Greenspan A., 2003, “Corporate governance”. Remarks at the 2003 Confe-
rence on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, Illinois May 8.
Haldane A., 2009, “Rethinking the financial network”. Speech delivered at
the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam
Jackson M., 2008, Social and economic networks, Princeton, NJ: Princeton,
University Press.
Jovanovic, B., 1987, “Micro Shocks and Aggregate Risk”. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 102: 395-409.
Kirman A., 1992, “What or whom does the representative individual repre-
sent?”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6 (2): 117-136
———, and N. Vriend, 2000, "Evolving Market Structure: A Model of Price
Dispersion and Loyalty". Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
459-502.
———, 2006, "Demand Theory and General Equilibrium: From Explana-
tion to Introspection, a Journey down the Wrong Road". Annual
supplement, History of Political Economy.
Kuhn J., 2005, “On Today’s Business Ethics”. EPIC, New York: Columbia
University.
Lucas R., 1980, “Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory”. Journal
of Money Credit and Banking 12(4): 696-715.
Can artificial economies help us understand real economies?  41Lucas R., 1988, "Adaptive Behaviour and Economic Theory". Journal of
Business, 59: 401-426.
Mantel R., 1974, “On the characterisation of aggregate excess demand”.
Journal of Economic Theory, 7: 348-53.
Miller  J. & S. Page, 2007, Complex Adaptive Systems. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 
Nirei M., 2006, “Threshold Behavior and Aggregate Critical Fluctuations”.
Journal of Economic Theory, 127: 309-322.
North D., 1977, “Markets and other allocation systems in history”.  Journal
of European Economic History, 6: 703–16.
Robbins L., 1935, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic
Science. London Macmillan.
Sapio S, A. Kirman & G. Dosi, eds, 2011, “Special Section on Fish Markets”.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 30: 1-68.
Scheinkman J. A. & M. Woodford, 1994, “Self-Organized Criticality and
Economic Fluctuations”. The American Economic Review Vol. 84, 2:
417-421 
Simon H, 1962, “The Architecture of Complexity”. Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society 106: 467-482
Solow R., 2007. “Reflections on the Survey”. In David Colander, The
Making of an Economist, Redux. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sonnenschein H., 1972, “Market excess demand functions”. Econometrica,
40: 549-63.
Vega-Redondo F., 2007,  Complex Social Networks, Econometric Society”.
Monograph Series, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vitali S., J-B. Glattfelder & S. Battiston, 2011, The Network of Global Corpo-
rate Control. PLoS ONE 6(10): e25995. doi:10.1371.
Weisbuch G., A. Kirman & D. Herreiner, 2000, "Market Organisation and
Trading Relationships. Economic Journal, 110: 411-436.

MACROECONOMICS IN 
A SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY*
Quamrul Ashraf
Williams College
Boris Gershman
American University
Peter Howitt
Brown University
This paper emphasizes the importance of considering the mechanisms that
coordinate economic transactions in a decentralized economy, namely the role
played by a self-organizing network of entrepreneurial trading firms, for theories
aimed at guiding macroeconomic policy. We review a research program that
aims to understand how, and how well, trading activities are coordinated in
various circumstances by employing agent-based computational (ACE) models
of stylized economies where these activities take place in a self-organizing
network of markets created and operated by profit-seeking business firms. We
discuss how such a research program can yield important policy-relevant
insights, beyond those that can be offered by conventional dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models, into several macroeconomic phenomena
including the emergence of monetary equilibria in a decentralized economy, the
microfoundations of the multiplier process, the costs of a higher trend rate of
inflation, and the role of the banking system in economic crises.
Keywords: Self-organizing trade networks, Market coordination, Agent-based computational economics, Emer-
gence of monetary equilibria, The multiplier process, Costs of inflation, Bank regulation, Economic crises.
* We thank participants of the REPLHA International Conference, Milan, October 13, 2011,
for helpful comments. The research reported on here was partly funded by the NSF.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
Quamrul Ashraf, Boris Gershman & Peter Howitt44This paper is largely about macroeconomic theory, but it is
motivated by some of the most important policy challenges that we
are confronted with in the extraordinary world we are living in
today. Dealing effectively with these challenges requires a concep-
tual framework that focuses on those parts of the economic system
that matter most for the question at hand. We are not alone in thin-
king that such a conceptual framework is not provided by the
theories that guide macroeconomic policy in most countries today.
What we aim to do in this paper is to describe a line of research that
we have been pursuing, one that goes back to joint work between
Howitt and his former teacher and co-author, Robert Clower, and is
aimed at providing a more appropriate conceptual framework for
thinking about some important macroeconomic policy issues.
Our starting point is one of the oldest and most important ideas
in economics, going back at least to Adam Smith, namely the idea
that a decentralized economic system is self-organizing. It is capable
of “spontaneous order,” in the sense that a globally coherent pattern
of transactions can result from purely local interactions, without the
intervention of a central coordinator. Indeed, like an anthill, a free
market economy can organize transactions into patterns that are
beyond the comprehension of any of its individual participants. We
would like to understand how this self-organization takes place.
Specifically, what is the process that coordinates the exchange acti-
vities of millions of independent transactors in a decentralized
economy?
The reason why these questions are critical for understanding
macroeconomic policy is that an economy’s coordination mecha-
nism works better at some times than others. Even Smith and Hayek
recognized that the automatic workings of the decentralized
economy could sometimes be improved by collective intervention.
Consider, for example, the increase in unemployment that takes
place during a deep recession. Unemployed workers who used to be
employed are just as willing and able to work as before, the fall in
aggregate output that accompanies recession has enhanced the scar-
city value of the output they could potentially produce if employed,
and yet the market for their services has somehow disappeared. The
Macroeconomics in a self-organizing economy 45coordination mechanism that had previously allowed them and
those with a taste for their output to realize their potential gains
from mutually advantageous exchange is no longer allowing them
to do this, even though those gains are if anything larger than
before.1 Macroeconomic policy to deal with unemployment thus
amounts to fixing a mechanism that has malfunctioned, and a
highly complex mechanism at that. And attempts to fix this broken
mechanism without first understanding how it is supposed to work
normally are likely to be as successful as medieval medicine was in
treating bacterial infections.
The main premise of our research has been that the role of coor-
dinating transactions in a decentralized economy is performed, for
better or worse, by a self-organizing network of business firms that
seek profit from creating and operating the markets through which
others transact. To use a phrase that Clower once coined, business
firms are the visible fingers of the invisible hand. Economics has a
long tradition of regarding exchange as a do-it-yourself affair, in
which people with goods and services to sell trade directly with the
ultimate demanders of those goods and services. But a little reflec-
tion on the experience of daily life is enough to persuade most
people that exchange in a market economy is not a do-it-yourself
affair. People are not like the actors in a typical monetary search
model, who when hungry go wandering aimlessly in hopes of
randomly encountering someone with surplus food. They go to a
grocery store or to a restaurant. When in search of clothing they
visit a tailor or a clothing store. They lend surplus funds through the
intermediation of a bank, arrange for long-distance travel by using
facilities provided by a travel agent, and so on and so forth. Most of
us also sell our labor services to an economic entity, either a private
business or a government agency (the latter of which would not
exist in a purely decentralized economy) whose primary purpose is
1. Of course there are some macroeconomists who would claim that unemployment can only
arise when productivity falls or tastes change toward more leisure, in which case there is no
malfunction; it’s not that the gains from trade are unexploited but rather that the gains have
disappeared. But this is a view that we do not accept. Recessions are not periods of technological
regress or of contagious laziness. Although there may be shifts in demand from one sector to
another, or changes in the overall level of aggregate demand, there is nothing inherent about
such shifts that would imply that the gains from trade have shrunk in all sectors of the
economy, yet in the typical recession unemployment rises in all sectors of the economy.
Instead, it seems clear to us that some kind of market failure takes place in recessions.
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and sell the resulting output. So to understand how, and how well,
exchange activities are coordinated in a decentralized economy, the
first place to look is to this self-organizing network of firms that
constitutes the institutional structure through which we all conduct
our daily business.
Now some would argue that a good economic theory involves
abstraction, and that if we want to model the transactions process of
a modern economy we should maybe abstract from business firms,
by assuming that people who work for businesses trade their output
directly with those having a taste for the workers’ output. This is the
stance taken by search theoretic models of money, which typically
assume that trade takes place directly between ultimate suppliers
and ultimate demanders, who meet in random non-repeated
encounters without the aid of any intermediary. Presumably the
rationale for this way of looking at the transactions process is the
same as the rationale for abstracting from money in the theory of
value. On the surface, what we see is people trading goods and
services for money, but the deeper underlying reality that we see
once we pierce the veil of money is that people are ultimately
trading goods and services for other goods and services, with money
acting only as a device for executing these ultimate exchanges.
The analogy between money and firms is a useful one. But as
John Stuart Mill once observed, there is nothing more insignificant
than money, except when it goes wrong. By the same token, the fact
that people find it convenient to trade through shops rather than
directly with one another is perhaps of little significance for unders-
tanding the long-run structure of relative prices. But when
something goes wrong with the network of firms that people
normally rely upon, then abstracting from the existence of such
firms is as unhelpful as it would be to ignore money when trying to
understand inflation.
Moreover, a good case can be made that, by recognizing that
production takes place in firms but not recognizing their role in
coordinating transactions by creating and operating markets, we are
ignoring their most important activity, as measured by the value of
resources they use. Wallis and North (1986), for instance, have
shown that more than 50 percent (by value) of the primary
resources used up in the course of economic activity in the United
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sactions services, services that would be of no use to a Robinson
Crusoe with no trading partners. The value added in Finance, Insu-
rance, and Real Estate, for example, is typically much more than
that of the entire manufacturing sector, as is the value added in
Retail and Wholesale Trade. Moreover, much of the input to the
manufacturing sector is best construed as being used up in the
production of transactions that help people realize gains from trade
rather than being used up in transforming inanimate objects. We
have in mind the inputs of lawyers, sales people, those engaged in
personnel, marketing, and advertising, and so forth, all of whom are
undertaking activities whose main purpose is to facilitate
transactions.
We made reference at the start of this paper to the theories now
guiding macroeconomic policy. We were referring, of course, to the
broad class of rational-expectations equilibrium models generally
known as DSGE, for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium. DSGE
started out 4 decades ago as a reaction against the Keynesian econo-
mics that had been the dominant paradigm of the profession in the
1950s and 60s, a reaction that was first expressed by new classical
economists, like Lucas and Sargent, and later by real business cycle
theorists. The early proponents of DSGE argued that an equilibrium
model built on a slightly modified Walrasian conceptual framework,
in which markets clear everywhere and always, could account for
important short-run as well as long-run macroeconomic pheno-
mena. But soon Keynesian economists began developing their own
versions of DSGE, which consisted of rational expectations equili-
brium models in which not all prices were perfectly flexible, and by
now DSGE has become the dominant paradigm agreed upon by all
sides of the great macroeconomic debates.
Of course there are many serious criticisms one might make of
DSGE, and many of them have been made in the literature. The criti-
cism we consider most important for present purposes is that
existing DSGE models, even those with imperfectly flexible prices,
are built on a conceptual foundation that pays little or no attention
to the way in which economic transactions are organized. To borrow
a phrase from Jevons, they ignore the institutions and processes that
make up the mechanism of exchange.
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wrong with the market mechanisms that coordinate economic tran-
sactions, we find that in most of them there is no such mechanism.
In models with perfect competition, the setting of prices is left to a
mysterious outside agent called the auctioneer, whose behavior is
left largely unexplained. But that is just the tip of the iceberg. There
is no description of how trades are arranged. Even if we accept that
the auctioneer can provide everyone with a price vector such that
the sum of desired demands equals total supply for each tradable
object, there is no account of how buyers and sellers are matched up
with one another and how the trades that people have planned will
be executed. When demand and supply are not equal, the theory
offers no guidance as to who gets to trade how much and with
whom, no indication of how people learn about trading opportuni-
ties, about who creates and maintains the shops and other facilities
through which they trade, about how bids and offers are trans-
mitted, and so on and so forth.
The canonical model of Woodford (2003), which forms the basis
of the estimated New Keynesian DSGE models, now used in central
banks around the world, makes less use of the mysterious auctio-
neer, inasmuch as many prices are set by a given set of
monopolistically competitive firms who are explicitly motivated to
maximize their shareholders’ wealth. So far, so good. But, there is no
account of where these price-setting monopolists come from, how
they maintain their monopolies against the threat of entry, how
people decide to trade with one set of firms rather than another,
how firms manage to coordinate with their suppliers and customers,
what happens when one of them goes out of business in a recession,
and so forth. Instead, all transactors are in continuous touch with
each other through the intermediation of these firms, whose exis-
tence is merely assumed, and who take care of enough details of the
transactions process that the other people in the model are
connected only through the market prices that they take as given
from the firms. As a result, there is nothing that can go wrong in the
transactions process other than some mistake in price-setting.
In essence, these New Keynesian DSGE models are providing the
same diagnosis that economists have given for generations; unem-
ployment rises because wages and prices are slow to adjust to shifts
in demand and supply. This is the answer provided by classical
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offered by modern Keynesian economics. Indeed it is now even the
answer that has been finally accepted by most proponents of the
real-business-cycle school of macroeconomics, who admit the need
for wage-and-price stickiness to account for various features of the
business cycle.2
The problem with this time-honored tradition of blaming wage-
and-price stickiness is not that the assumption of stickiness is
factually incorrect. On the contrary, the stickiness of wages and
prices is one of the most well-documented facts of macroeconomics.
Instead, as Leijonhufvud (1968) forcefully pointed out, the problem
is that, first, the experience of the Great Depression in the United
States shows clearly that the downturn that started in 1929 did not
come to an end until wages and prices started to rise, that is, until
the reflation that was clearly a deliberate policy move on the part of
the Roosevelt administration started to take place. If lack of wage
and price flexibility had caused the downturn, then it would have
taken deflation rather than reflation to cure the unemployment
problem. Second, as Keynes argued in Chapter 19 of the General
Theory, and as Fisher had already argued in Debt Deflation Theory of
Depressions, there are many reasons for believing that wage and price
flexibility would actually make fluctuations in unemployment
larger rather than smaller.
So when unemployment rises in a recession, something has gone
wrong with the process by which economic transactions become
organized, something that goes beyond the mere stickiness of wages
and prices, something that we think can only be discovered by
investigating simple stylized models of economies in which trading
activities take place, in and out of equilibrium, in a self-organizing
network of markets that are created and operated by profit-seeking
business firms, and by asking how, and how well, those activities are
coordinated in various circumstances. What we would like to do in
this paper is to give the reader an idea of what kind of model that
research has led us to construct, and why we think this class of
models provides a more solid framework for analyzing certain policy
questions than does any DSGE model currently in use.
2. See Chari and Kehoe (2006) for example.
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Based Computational Economics (ACE) is particularly well suited for
two main reasons. First, by endowing each agent with a set of relati-
vely simple adaptive behavioral rules that allow the agent to operate
intelligently in an unknown environment, an ACE model gives the
system a chance to achieve some semblance of order without giving
anyone the kind of systemic knowledge that would allow him to act
as a central coordinator. A rational expectations equilibrium might
or might not emerge from the interaction of these rules. If it does,
then we have discovered something about at least one possible
mechanism that produces that kind of spontaneous order whereas,
if the system fails to approximate a rational expectations equili-
brium, we will have discovered something about the conditions
under which a spontaneous order is likely to require some kind of
collective intervention. The second reason for using ACE is that
models of spillovers between multiple markets that are not in
supply-demand equilibrium are notoriously difficult to analyze. The
attempts by Barro and Grossman, Benassy, Malinvaud, and others in
the 1970s to understand what some called “general disequilibrium
analysis,” building on the original contributions of Clower and
Patinkin, made little progress largely because the problem quickly
became analytically intractable. ACE can deal with this kind of
intractability by substituting simulation and Monte-Carlo results for
unattainable analytical results.
1. Self-organization of trading firms
At the heart of all our work is a parable concerning the sponta-
neous emergence of a more-or-less self-regulating network of
markets operated by profit-seeking business firms. The details of this
parable were first laid out in the form of an ACE model by Howitt
and Clower (2000). The rest of this section briefly describes the
Howitt-Clower model of a self-organizing economy.
Time comes in discrete “weeks” indexed by t. There are n non-
storable goods and m households. In the computer simulations,
n = 10 and m = 2160. Each household is of a type (i, j), where i and j
are distinct goods; such an agent receives a weekly endowment of
one unit of good i and wishes to consume only good j. There is a
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number b (= 25 in the simulations) of each type of household.
It is assumed that households can trade only through organized
trading facilities called “shops.” A new shop is created whenever a
household chooses to act on a random opportunity to enter
business (i.e., to become an “entrepreneur”). Each shop trades only
two goods, which we assume must be the endowment and
consumption goods of the “owner” (the entrepreneur who opened
the shop). Once opened, a shop of type (i, j) will make weekly
postings of two offer prices—an amount of i offered for each unit of j
delivered by anyone who chooses to do so, and an amount of j
offered for each unit of i delivered. Those households seeking to
trade any good for which they do not own a shop must form a
“trading relationship” with such a shop. They form such rela-
tionships by searching, both directly through the space in which the
shops are located and indirectly by querying randomly met people
about the shops with which they have relationships.
Each week the computer simulation takes the households
through a fixed routine involving 5 stages, each of which represents
what we take to be an important aspect of the trading process. First,
there is an entry process in which a random selection of households
is faced with an opportunity to become an entrepreneur. There is a
fixed setup cost of opening the shop, and there will be a fixed
weekly overhead cost of maintaining the shop in operation if
opened. So before deciding whether or not to open, the potential
entrepreneur will conduct “market research” by querying two other
households—one that might want to trade i for j and one that might
want to trade j for i, asking each if they would choose to form a
trading relationship with the proposed shop if it were to open, at the
posted prices that the entrepreneur has decided on (more on these
prices below). Both households will answer the query using the same
criterion (to be described below) they will use when searching for
better trading opportunities in the next stage of the program. If both
answer affirmatively, then the potential entrepreneur will indeed
open. Otherwise, the opportunity will be allowed to lapse.
In choosing his shop’s prices, the potential entrepreneur uses a
simple form of full-cost markup pricing. First, an estimate is formed
of how much of each good will be delivered by the shop’s suppliers/
customers. Each of these initial estimates is taken from a uniform
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“animal spirits.” The entrepreneur then calculates, given the fixed
costs of operation and the margin required to compensate for the
sunk cost of setting up the shop, the combination of offer prices that
would just allow the shop to break even in terms of each of the
goods it trades if its estimates were correct. The bigger the delivery
estimates, the bigger those breakeven offer prices will be because of
the economy of scale implicit in the fixed costs. These breakeven
prices are the prices the shop will post.
The second stage of weekly activities is one in which households
search for trading relationships. Each household can have only two
relationships at a time—one with a shop (outlet) trading the house-
hold’s endowment good and the other with a shop (source) trading
its consumption good. In some cases, the same shop can serve as
both source and outlet (double coincidence). The household wants
to maximize weekly consumption. In the double coincidence case,
weekly consumption good will be the shop’s offer price for the
household’s endowment good. Otherwise, if the household has a
source and outlet both trading the same complementary good, then
it can engage each week in indirect exchange using the common
complementary good as an exchange intermediary, and weekly
consumption will be the product of the outlet’s offer price for the
endowment good and the source’s offer price for the complementary
good. In all other cases, weekly consumption will be zero. During the
search stage, a household always forms a new relationship with any
shop that would allow weekly consumption to be raised at currently
posted prices. Whenever a new source or outlet is chosen, the rela-
tionship with the old source or outlet must be severed.
The third stage of the Howitt-Clower model is a trading stage, in
which each household, in random order, visits the shops with
which it has a relationship, first delivering its endowment to the
outlet and then, if possible, using the entire sales proceeds to buy
the consumption good from the source. During this stage it is
assumed that all planned trades can be executed by the shops,
regardless of the shop’s inventory position.
The fourth stage of this process is the exit stage. During the course
of trading, a shop trading good j will have had an amount x of good j
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j to its suppliers of the other good it trades. In addition, it will have to
pay out some fixed amount to cover its overhead cost. The remainder
is available for the owner’s consumption. If this is negative, then the
owner will have had to engage in home production of the good just
to stay in business. This home production, or negative consumption,
represents a loss that the shopowner does not want to incur indefi-
nitely. Any shop that has incurred a loss in either of the goods it
trades will exit at this stage with some fixed probability.
The fifth and final stage of weekly activity is where expectations
and prices are updated by each shop. Delivery expectations are
adjusted using the simplest form of adaptive expectations. That is,
the expectation for each delivery amount is adjusted by some fixed
fraction of the gap between what was actually delivered this week
and what had been expected this week. Prices are then updated
using the same full-cost markup procedure used when the shop
opened, but with the newly revised delivery estimates.
The model sketched above can be described as a stochastic
process. Provided that animal spirits are not too large and that fixed
costs are not too large, the process will possess several absorbing
states. These absorbing states correspond to stable shop networks
that provide a coherent pattern of trading activity throughout the
system.
One such absorbing state is a stationary barter equilibrium, in
which there exists in operation exactly one shop for each unordered
(i, j) pair. Each household of type (i, j) either owns the shop of that
type or has a trading relationship with it, and delivers its unit
endowment to it each week in exchange for consumption. Delivery
estimates of each shop equal b, the number of households of each
type, and prices are constant at the values that allow the shops to
break even at those estimates.
Other absorbing states are stationary monetary equilibria, in
which one good k has emerged as a universal medium of exchange,
being traded in each shop, and in which there is exactly one shop
trading each other good. Every non-shopowner who is not endowed
with k and does not consume k engages in indirect exchange using k
as an exchange intermediary. The others are able to consume using
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amounts, and prices are constant.
In order for both barter and monetary absorbing states to exist, it
is necessary that animal spirits not be too large. This ensures that the
state is never disturbed by new entrants who pass the market
research test during entry because their delivery estimates are so
optimistic that they can undercut the prices charged by incumbents.
Howitt and Clower show that the monetary equilibrium in
which fixed costs are lowest (a shop’s fixed costs are assumed to vary
according to the identity of the goods traded in the shop) allows the
maximal feasible total consumption. As in the barter stationary
equilibrium, since each household has an outlet, all endowment is
used either for consumption or for defraying a shop’s fixed costs.
The total number of fixed costs is minimized in a monetary equili-
brium since it uses only n-1 shops as opposed to the n(n-1)/2 shops
needed to support the barter equilibrium, and using the least cost
exchange intermediary obviously allows the most to be consumed
of the money commodity.
Howitt and Clower show that this model is capable of self-orga-
nization under a wide set of parameter values. Specifically, they
report the results of 6,000 simulation runs. Each run starts in
autarky, with no shops and hence no trading relationships in place,
and continues for 20,000 weeks or until a monetary equilibrium has
been reached. They find that in almost all runs an absorbing state is
reached unless fixed costs were set too high or too low.3 Further-
more, they find that the only absorbing states that ever emerge are
monetary equilibria. This latter result arises from the “network
externality” implicit in the above sketch. That is, once a few shops
trading the same complementary good have emerged, the survival
chances of other shops are greatly enhanced if they also trade that
complementary good since this allows them to attract more
suppliers/customers and hence makes it easier for them to defray
the fixed cost while offering competitive prices. The fact that the
same model that was capable of “growing” market organization
also happened to exhibit a feature of all economies of record that
orthodox theories have trouble accommodating without artificial
3. The problem with low fixed costs appears to be that they weaken the network externality
that helps to promote the achievement of the efficient monetary equilibria.
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of this model’s account of self-organization.
2. The multiplier process
One implication of the above account of self-organization is that
there is more that can go wrong with the trading process than just
having disequilibrium prices. In particular, the failure of a business
firm will always disrupt the economy at least locally for some time,
and there is nothing much that speedy price adjustment can do to
compensate for this shock because the disappearance of a shop
constitutes a loss of organizational capital, which can only be recti-
fied by the successful entry of a new replacement shop regardless of
the prices that are charged by the surviving shops.
Indeed, the random nature of the entry process can lead to a
shakeout period that makes failure more likely for other firms,
causing a cumulative contraction or multiplier process in the
economy. This is because a supplier of shop A that disappears will
also be the customer of some other shop B. If several of those
suppliers suddenly lose their source of income, then shop B will be
faced with a drop in demand that threatens its existence. If it was on
the verge of making losses, then this might be enough to put it
under as well.
Howitt (2006) showed more systematically how this can happen
in a slightly modified version of the Howitt-Clower model. In this
modified model, it was assumed that a convention had already been
reached that good 1 was the universal medium of exchange. Thus an
entrepreneur of type (i, j) can only open a shop of type (i, 1). The
model was started in a monetary equilibrium and subjected to a real-
locative shock of the sort that occurs when people reduce their
demands for some products, without immediately signaling to
anyone what they are planning to demand instead of these
products. This is the classic coordination problem that Keynes
wrestled with. Consumers may decide to spend less than their
income, but this does not amount to a specific demand for future
consumption. Instead, their future demands remain latent, and
entrepreneurs must somehow discover them through trial and error.
Likewise, unemployed workers’ notional demands remain undisco-
vered until some entrepreneurs find it in their interest to employ the
Quamrul Ashraf, Boris Gershman & Peter Howitt56workers and thereby provide them with the means of making their
demands effective.
To portray such a shock in the above system, Howitt supposed
that at a certain date some fraction of the population switches from
consuming one good to another. To preserve the aggregate struc-
ture, he supposed that the total number of each type remains
constant, so that for every i-consumer that becomes a j-consumer
there is a j-consumer that switches to i. At the time of this shock,
each switcher is suddenly without a source, and his former source
loses a customer. The switcher may continue to sell his endowment
to his outlet but he does not spend his sales proceeds. GDP falls
because of the reduced goods consumption of the switchers that no
longer show up to their former sources, and because of the reduced
good-1 consumption of the entrepreneurs whose operating surplus
in good 1 suddenly falls.
Figure 1 below shows the average impulse response, over 10,000
runs, of aggregate real GDP relative to the full-capacity level
achieved in the initial equilibrium, in the case where 12 percent of
the population made the switch. The blue curve in this figure repre-
sents the actual impulse-response of HP-filtered GDP under the
univariate AR(2) model estimated by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2000), assuming 50 weeks per year. As it turns out, this simple
model, where deviation amplification comes just from the cumula-
tive process of shop failures, does a good job of tracking the actual
hump-shaped impulse response pattern of US GDP!
Howitt verified that this hump-shaped impulse response pattern
arises from the cumulative process of shop failures by showing that
if shop exits were eliminated (by modifying the code to set the exit
probability of a loss-making firm equal to zero), then the economy
always snapped back into equilibrium within a short number of
weeks. Moreover, as Figure 2 demonstrates, there was a strong posi-
tive correlation between the size of the displacement in GDP and the
number of shop failures in the 5 years following the shock. He also
demonstrated that allowing for greater wage-and-price flexibility by
having a higher speed of adaptation in delivery estimates did
nothing systematically to reduce the amplitude of the impulse
response.
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Source: Howitt, 2006.
Figure 2. Maximum GDP gap and shop failures following the shocks
Source: Howitt, 2006.
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Ashraf, Gershman, and Howitt (2012) have built a somewhat less
stylized version of the Howitt-Clower model to analyze one of the
important policy issues that has proven particularly intractable for
orthodox theory. Specifically, they address the question of the
extent to which an economy’s macro performance is enhanced by
having a lower trend rate of inflation. 
According to conventional theory, the answer to this question is
“not much.” The case for low inflation in modern macro theory
comes from various DSGE studies that have confirmed the optima-
lity of Friedman’s rule, which is to reduce inflation to the point
where the nominal rate of interest equals zero. But the saving that
would arise in principle from following this rule consists of the
elimination of a tax on non-interest-bearing money holdings, a
saving that almost all published research estimates to be a trivial
fraction of GDP because the base of this tax is just a tiny fraction of
total wealth in any advanced economy.
New Keynesian DSGE models, in which money as a means of
exchange and store of value plays no essential role, offer another
possible reason for targeting low inflation, namely the inefficiency
that comes from having a wider dispersion of relative prices for no
reason other than the fact that different sellers are at different stages
of the price-change cycle; those with more recent price changes will
tend to have higher relative prices because they have made the most
recent adjustment to inflation. In these models, the optimal trend
rate of inflation is clearly zero, except possibly for second-best public
finance reasons (Phelps, 1972) or risk-sharing considerations
(Levine, 1991) that might argue for a positive rate.
Howitt and Milionis (2007) show that this argument is especially
dependent on the Calvo pricing model that everyone agrees is parti-
cularly unconvincing. Specifically, in a conventionally calibrated
model, once the trend inflation rate reaches 10 percent, over
35 percent of aggregate output is produced by the 0.3 percent of
firms that are selling at a price below marginal cost! These firms
would certainly want to either raise their price or curtail production
if it were not for the fact that they have not recently been visited by
the Calvo fairy, but the model requires them anyway to produce
however much is demanded at their obsolete prices. Replacing the
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between price changes gets rid of this counterintuitive feature of the
model and has no firms selling below marginal cost, but it also
reduces the cost of a 10 percent rate of inflation to about 1.5 percent
of aggregate consumption. Moreover, if one keeps the assumption of
Calvo pricing but reinserts lagged inflation in the Phillips Curve, as
central bank DSGE models typically do, by invoking the usual
indexation story that price setters not visited by the Calvo fairy
adjust their prices as a function of lagged inflation, then the cost of
inflation in DSGE models is almost entirely eliminated, because
indexation greatly reduces the extent to which inflation raises price
dispersion (Billi, 2011).
Despite the failure of conventional theory to account for signifi-
cant costs, central bankers around the world continue to attach the
highest priority to maintaining very low inflation. Before conclu-
ding that central bankers are being wrongheaded, we believe that
one needs to explore non-conventional theoretical reasons why
inflation might be costly. In particular, we have used a much-
expanded version of the Howitt-Clower model to explore the
suggestion by Heymann and Leijonhufvud (1995) to the effect that
inflation impedes the coordination mechanism that Howitt and
Clower focus on and that conventional theory takes as functioning
perfectly at all times at no cost.
In particular, the results of the preceding section concerning the
cumulative process of shop failures suggest an unconventional
mechanism through which inflation might really matter for macro
performance. Specifically, the higher is the rate of inflation the more
difficult it is for the firms that operate markets to remain in business,
because of the well-known tendency of inflation to induce noise
into the price system. Thus, an environment with higher inflation is
likely to have a higher incidence of such cumulative contractions
and, hence, a worse overall macro performance.
The changes made by Ashraf, Gershman, and Howitt (2012)
include making the goods durable, allowing each household to have
two consumption goods, introducing fiat money instead of commo-
dity money, having staggered price setting (but making it state
dependent instead of having a Calvo-type Poisson process delivering
price change opportunities), having government bonds and a central
bank that conducts open market operations using a Taylor rule,
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on the government debt, and having continual shocks and high
enough animal spirits that there is no absorbing state for the
economy. Moreover, parameter values were (roughly) calibrated to
US economic data. In this model, peoples’ endowments of any good j
are interpreted as a type of labor services capable of producing good j,
so that people without an outlet can be interpreted as unemployed.
The trend rate of inflation in the model is the inflation target
implicit in the central bank’s Taylor rule. In the baseline calibration,
this inflation target was set equal to 3 percent, and the economy
achieved almost exactly 3 percent inflation on average across all
runs and all years. To address the issue of the macro consequences of
trend inflation, the paper simulated the artificial economy 10,000
times for each integer value of the inflation target from 0 to 10
percent. The main results are depicted in Figure 3 below. As shown
in this figure, the median performance of the economy deteriorates
steadily by all reported measures when trend inflation rises above 3
percent. It also shows that this deterioration is highly significant in
economic terms when trend inflation reaches the 10 percent level.
We know of no conventional analysis that provides such powerful
support for the idea that a central bank can improve an economy’s
performance simply by choosing a low inflation target.
Ashraf, Gershman, and Howitt use the model to explore the
reasons for this effect of inflation, and find strong evidence that the
above mentioned link between inflation, price dispersion, and shop
failure was at work. In particular, as Figure 4 shows, increases in
trend inflation produce monotonic increases in price dispersion and
monotonic decreases in the median number of shops in existence.
They also show that the effects work even if the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates is suppressed and even if efforts are made
to take into account the Lucas critique by allowing critical parame-
ters in peoples’ decision rules, like the markup parameter in price
setting, to vary systematically with the inflation rate. In short, it
seems that, according to this particular ACE model, inflation does
create a big macroeconomic cost by impairing the self-organizing
capacity of the economic system.
Macroeconomics in a self-organizing economy 61Figure 3. Economic performance and target inflation
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Figure 4. Price dispersion, number of shops, and target inflation
Source: Ashraf, Gershman and Howitt, 2012.
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In Ashraf, Gershman, and Howitt (2011), we explored the role of
banks in a self-organizing economy. Banks are of course a kind of
shop in themselves, being intermediaries between buyers and sellers
of credit. But they also play a critical role in the creation and
destruction of the other shops in an economy’s trading network by
providing or withholding finance. In this paper, we explored the
effect that banks have on macro performance, much as we did in the
other paper where we explored the effects of trend inflation.
The model used in this paper was a further extension of the one
used to study inflation. We added a fixed number of banks, who
make commercial loans to shops, with full recourse, secured by
collateral in the form of fixed capital and inventories. The banks
charge a fixed spread over their deposit rate, and always allow custo-
mers to borrow up to a regulatory maximum loan-to-value ratio. The
banks also invest in government bonds. Households hold their non-
money wealth in the form of bank deposits, which bear the same
interest rate as government bonds. Banks are also subject to capital
requirements, and are sanctioned when their capital is inadequate.
The government in this extended model acts not just as central bank
and fiscal authority but also as bank regulator and deposit insurer.
When a bank is found to be insolvent, the government injects
enough capital to make all deposits good and to restore its capital
adequacy, and finds a new owner for the bank, much as the FDIC
now does routinely for small banks that fail in the United States.
What this paper shows is that banks matter a great deal for
economic performance. The baseline model is calibrated to US data
and simulated 10,000 times, first with and then without banks. The
difference is remarkable. With banks, the median simulation run
had an annual average unemployment rate of 5.9 percent. Without
banks it was 11 percent. Similarly, the volatility of the output gap
was 2.8 percent with banks and 6.2 percent without.
We also explored in this paper one of the aspects of economic
performance that almost always escapes orthodox DSGE analysis,
namely the prospect that an economy can perform reasonably well
most of the time but can, on occasion, go completely out of control.
On average, across all 10,000 runs, the rate of inflation and the
output gap were roughly constant after a 20-year initialization
Macroeconomics in a self-organizing economy 63period. In the case of most individual runs, the output gap never
deviated by more than 20 percent from its average value. But in a
small fraction of runs (about 5 percent) the economy at some point
diverged radically from this pattern and exhibited wild fluctuations
of the output gap, with GDP falling in some cases even to zero.
In an attempt to contribute to the literature on “macropruden-
tial” regulation, we used this model to explore the ways in which
bank regulation affects the economy. In particular, we ran experi-
ments in which we varied either the maximal loan-to-value ratio
(LTV) or the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). What we found surprised
us somewhat in two senses. First, in terms of median results, neither
of these regulatory parameters seemed to matter. For example we
compared the median results of our baseline model, with LTV = 0.5
and CAR = 0.08, to those from a “risky” scenario in which LTV = 0.9
and CAR = 0.02. The median results were quite similar across scena-
rios in terms of all macro indicators except bank failures. Thus, it
seems that in “normal times” the economy is not much affected by
bank regulations.
But when we sorted the 10,000 runs by average GDP over the
40 years of each run, we found another surprise. In the worst decile
of runs (the 10 percent of runs with the lowest average GDP), we
found that the regulatory parameters mattered a lot, and that in fact
these “bad times” were a lot less bad under the “risky” scenario!
Thus, what would normally seem like risky bank regulation from a
microprudential point of view turned out to alleviate the problems
that arise in those small number of cases where the economy was
spinning out of control. For example, the average unemployment
rate in the worst decile of runs was 7.2 percent in the “risky”
scenario versus 8.9 percent in the baseline, and output volatility was
3.4 percent versus 5.2 percent.
Exploring the source of this last surprise, we discovered that it
worked the way it did because banks provide the self-organizing
economy with not just a financial accelerator, as emphasized by the
literature started by Williamson (1987) and Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), but also with a financial stabilizer. That is, when the
economy is starting to become disorganized it has a critical need for
entrepreneurship to replace shops that have failed. Bank finance is
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heavily regulated they are less able to provide this finance just when
it is most needed, that is, just when firms are running short of unple-
dged collateral and banks are finding themselves short of capital.
The more of their capital they are able to devote to financing entre-
preneurship and the less collateral entrepreneurs are required to put
up, the more banks can play this essential role of averting a cumula-
tive collapse to the economy’s trading network.
Of course, all of these results must be heavily qualified by noting
in particular that we have postulated banks that do not engage in
proprietary trading, and are not influenced by the moral hazard
issues associated with too-big-to-fail. Nevertheless, the results do
illustrate the potential for properly regulated banks to help prevent
an economy from leaving what Leijonhufvud (1973) calls the
“corridor” of stability. The results also illustrate the new perspective
that can be had from looking at economic fluctuations from the
point of view of a self-organizing economy.
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The Great Recession seems to be a natural experiment for macroeconomics
showing the inadequacy of the predominant theoretical framework—the New
Neoclassical Synthesis—grounded on the DSGE model. In this paper, we present
a critical discussion of the theoretical, empirical and political-economy pitfalls
of the DSGE-based approach to policy analysis. We suggest that a more fruitful
research avenue to pursue is to explore alternative theoretical paradigms, which
can escape the strong theoretical requirements of neoclassical models (e.g., equi-
librium, rationality, representative agent, etc.). We briefly introduce one of the
most successful alternative research projects—known in the literature as agent-
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methodological status of ACE, as well as the (many) problems it raises.
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“Tous les événements sont enchaînés dans
le meilleur des mondes possibles."
Voltaire, Candide
At the dawn of 2008 a large number of contributions claimed
that monetary—and, more generally, economic—policy was
finally becoming more of a science (Mishkin, 2007; Galí and
1. Thanks to Herbert Dawid, Antoine Mandel, Mauro Napoletano, Julia Taddei, an anonymous
referee and to the participants to the GSDP Workshop, Paris, September 2011 for their
comments. All usual disclaimers apply.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
Giorgio Fagiolo and Andrea Roventini68Gertler, 2007; Goodfriend, 2007; Taylor, 2007). Almost at the end
of the Great Moderation, these authors argued that both the
academic world and central banks had finally reached an overall
consensus not only on the contingency rules to implement in
alternative situations, but also on the fact that ''the practice of
monetary policy reflects the application of a core set of ''scientific
principles'' (Mishkin, 2007, p.1). These scientific principles, in
turn, derived from the so-called New Neoclassical (Goodfriend,
2007; Woodford, 2009) grounded upon Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models2. What is more, the available
toolbox of economic policy rules was deemed to work exception-
ally well not only for normative purposes, but also for descriptive
ones. For example, Taylor (2007) argued that ''while monetary
policy rules cannot, of course, explain all of economics, they can
explain a great deal'' (p.1) and also that ''although the theory was
originally designed for normative reasons, it has turned out to
have positive implications which validate it scientifically''
(abstract). Given these Panglossian premises, scientific discussions
on economic policy seemed therefore to be ultimately confined to
either fine-tuning the ''consensus'' model, or assessing the extent
to which elements of art (appropriable by the policy maker) still
existed in the conduct of monetary policy (Mishkin, 2007)3.
Unfortunately, as it happened with two famous statements
made, respectively, by Francis Fukuyama 1992 about an alleged
''end of history'', and by many physicists in the recent debate on a
purported ''end of physics'' (see, e.g., Lindley, 1994), these posi-
tions have been proven to be substantially wrong by subsequent
events. The ''perfect storm'' which followed the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 brought financial
markets on the edge of collapse causing in turn the worst recession
developed economies have ever seen since the Great Depression. In
2012, the risks for the world economic system have not finished
yet as the crisis is now menacing the sovereign debt of European
countries and the very survival of the Euro.
2. For an introduction, see Clarida et al. (1999), Woodford (2003) and Galí and Gertler (2007).
Cf. also Colander (2006c) for an historical perspective.
3. At the opposite, according to Howitt (2011) ''macroeconomic theory has fallen behind the
practice of central banking'' (p. 2). On the same camp, Mankiw (2006) thinks that
macroeconomists should not behave as scientist but as engineers trying to solve practical
problems. See also Summers (1991) for an extremely pessimistic view on the possibility of taking
any economic model seriously econometrically. On these points see also Mehrling (2006).
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appear to be badly equipped to deal with the big turmoil we are
facing. As Krugman (2011) points out, not only orthodox macroe-
conomists did not forecast the current crisis, but they did not even
admit the possibility of such event and, even worse, they did not
provide any useful advice to policy makers to put back the
economy on a steady growth path (see also Stiglitz, 2011). On the
same line, Delong (2011) reports that when the former U.S. secre-
tary Lawrence Summers was recently asked what economics can
offer to understand the crisis, he quoted the works of Bagehot,
Minsky and Kindleberger, three dead men whose most recent book
is 33 years old. This is so because the DSGE approach ''has become
so mesmerized with its own internal logic that it has begun to
confuse the precision it has achieved about its own world with the
precision that it has about the real one'' (Caballero, 2010, p. 85).
In that respect, the Great Recessions has revealed to be a natural
experiment for economic analysis, showing the inadequacy of the
predominant theoretical frameworks. Indeed, an increasing
number of leading economists claim that the current ''economic
crisis is a crisis for economic theory'' (Kirman, 2010; Colander et
al., 2009; Krugman, 2009, 2011; Caballero, 2010; Stiglitz, 2011;
Kay, 2011; Dosi, 2011; Delong, 2011). The basic assumptions of
mainstream DSGE models, e.g. rational expectations, representa-
tive agents, perfect markets etc., prevent the understanding of
basic phenomena underlying the current economic crisis4.
In this paper, we argue that instead of performing Ptolemaic
exercises (Stiglitz, 2011; Dosi, 2011; Caballero, 2010) trying to add
additional ''frictions'' to fix the problems of DSGE models, econo-
mists should consider the economy as a complex evolving system, i.e.
as an ecology populated by heterogenous agents whose far-from-
equilibrium interactions continuously change the structure of the
system (more on that in Kirman, 2010; Dosi, 2011; Rosser, 2011).
This is the starting point of agent-based computational economics
4. More precisely, in Section 3 we argue that the DSGE policy apparatus is plagued by a long
list of serious problems concerning theoretical issues (i.e., having to do with formal
inconsistencies of the model—given its assumptions), empirical difficulties (i.e., related to
empirical validation of DSGE models) and political-economy issues (i.e., concerning the absence
of any justification for the often unrealistic and over-simplifying assumptions used to derive
policy implications). See also Colander (2006b).
Giorgio Fagiolo and Andrea Roventini70(ACE, Tesfatsion, 2006a; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008). Bounded
rationality, endogenous out-of-equilibrium dynamics, direct inte-
ractions, are the tenets of ACE which allow to catch many of the
features of the current crisis (e.g. asset bubbles, resilience of inter-
bank network, self-organized criticality, financial accelerator
dynamics, etc; see Section 4 for more details).
On the normative side, due to the extreme flexibility of the set
of assumptions regarding agent behaviors and interactions, ACE
models (often called agent-based models, ABMs) represent an
exceptional laboratory to perform policy exercises and policy
design. Indeed, as Section 4 shown, an increasing number of
macroeconomic policy applications have been already devised and
explored concerning fiscal and monetary policies, bank regulation
and central bank independence.
Certainly, also in the ACE approach there are still open issues
that should be addressed. The most important ones concern empi-
rical validation, over-parametrization, estimation and calibration.
Nevertheless, the success of ACE models in delivering policy impli-
cations while simultaneously explaining the observed micro and
macro stylized facts are encouraging for the development of a new
way of doing macroeconomic theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 surveys
the approach to policy of the New Neoclassical Synthesis. In
Section 2 we discuss the main theoretical and empirical difficulties
of DSGE models. In Section 3 we instead introduce the ACE para-
digm and in Section 4 we briefly review some policy macro-
economic applications in this field. Section 5 concludes by telegra-
phically accounting for some methodological issues related to
policy in ACE models and the ensuing research avenues that these
problems open up.
1. Policy in the DSGE framework
Let us begin by presenting how policy analysis is usually carried
out in DSGE models.
The clash between the two competing business cycle theories—
the Real Business Cycle (RBC) perspective (see e.g. King and Rebelo,
1999) and the New Keynesian paradigm (cf. Mankiw and Romer,
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Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS)5. In a nutshell, the canonical model
employed by the NNS paradigm is basically a RBC dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopolistic
competition, nominal imperfections and a monetary policy rule
(see Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003: Galí and Gertler, 2007,
for a more detailed exposition of the NNS approach).
In line with the RBC tradition, the starting point of the new
vintage models is a stochastic version of the standard neoclassical
growth model with variable labor supply: the economy is popu-
lated by an infinitely-lived representative household, who
maximizes its utility under an intertemporal budget constraint,
and by a large number of firms, whose homogenous production
technology is hit by exogenous shocks. All agents form their expec-
tations rationally (Muth, 1961). The New Keynesian flavor of the
model stems from three ingredients: money, monopolistic compe-
tition and sticky prices. Money has usually only the function of
unit of account and its short-run non-neutrality is guaranteed by
the nominal rigidities introduced by sticky prices. As a conse-
quence, the central bank can influence the real economic activity
in the short run by manipulating the interest rate. The RBC scaf-
fold of the model allows one to compute the ''natural'' level of
output and of the real interest rate, that is the equilibrium values of
the two variables under perfectly flexible prices. The ''natural''
output and interest rate constitute a benchmark for monetary
policy: the central bank cannot persistently push the output and
the interest rate away from their ''natural'' values without creating
inflation or deflation. Note that the assumption of imperfect
competition (and of other real rigidities) implies that the ''natural''
level of output is not socially efficient.
Analytically, the NNS model can be represented by three equa-
tions:6 the expectation-augmented IS equation, the New Keynesian
Phillips (NKP) curve, and a monetary policy rule. The expectation-
5. This term was first introduced by Goodfriend and King (1997). Woodford (2003) labeled the
approach as ''Neo Wicksellian''. As stated by Galí and Gertler (2007)  the term ''New Keynesian''
is the most used, even if earlier New Keynesian models were very different from the ones of the
New Neoclassical Synthesis.
6. For a formal derivation of the NNS model see Goodfriend and King (1997); Clarida et al.
(1999); Woodford (2003); Galí (2008).
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block of the NNS model. Assuming perfect capital markets and
taking a log-linear approximation around the steady state, one can
derive the IS equation from the goods market-clearing condition
and the Euler equation of the representative household: 
(1)
where  is the output gap (i.e., the percentage gap between real
output and its ''natural'' level), σ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption, i is the nominal interest rate, π is
inflation, rn is the ''natural'' interest rate and Et stands for the
(rational) expectation operator taken at time t. Note that in line
with the traditional IS-LM model, the IS equation postulates a
negative relation between the output gap and the interest rate gap.
The aggregate-supply building block of the NNS model boils
down to a New Keynesian Phillips curve. Starting from the Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition and the
Calvo (1983) model of staggered prices (with constant probability
of price adjustment), one gets that in any given period firms
allowed to adjust prices fix them as a weighted average of the
current and expected future nominal marginal cost. The NKP curve
can be obtained by combining the log-linear approximation of the
optimal price-setting choice, the price index and the labor-market
equilibrium: 
(2)
where β is the subjective discount factor of the representative
household and Κ depends both on the elasticity of marginal cost
with respect to output and on the sensitivity of price adjustment to
marginal cost fluctuations (i.e., frequency of price adjustment and
real rigidities induced by price complementarities). The term u is
usually considered a ''cost-push shock'': it captures the fact that the
natural level of output may not coincide with the socially efficient
one for the presence of real imperfections such as monopolistic
competition, labor market rigidities, etc. The presence of u implies
that inflation does not depend only on the presence of a positive
output gap, but also on other factors affecting firms' real marginal
costs (the output gap appears in Equation (2) because in the under-
σ π+ +− − −  1 1= ( ),nt t t t t t ty E y i E r
y
π κ β π ++ + 1= ,t t t t ty E u
Macroeconomic policy in DSGE and agent-based models 73lying model there is a positive relation between  and the log
deviation of real marginal cost from its natural level).
The model just sketched leads to a system of two difference
equations (cf. Equations 1 and 2) and three unknowns: the output
gap, inflation, and the nominal interest rate. In order to solve the
system, one has to append a rule to determine the nominal interest
rate. This is the role reserved to monetary policy. The choice of the
optimal monetary policy rule is usually carried out adopting a
welfare criterion: taking a second-order Taylor series approxima-
tion of the utility of the representative household, one can derive a
welfare loss function for the central bank that is quadratic in infla-
tion and in deviations of output from its socially efficient level (see
Woodford, 2010). The NNS model is often closed with ''simple''
rules such as the Taylor (1993) rule7 (see Taylor and Williams,
2010, for a survey; more on that in Section 2.3 below):
(3)
where iτ is the interest rate target of the central bank, φy > 0 and
φπ > 1.
Medium scale DSGE models (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2005;
Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007) are usually expanded to account
for investment dynamics. Moreover, given the strong interactions
between financial markets and the real economy showed by the
Great Financial crisis, a new vintage of DSGE models (see e.g.
Curdia and Woodford, 2010, 2011; Christiano et al., 2011; Gertler
and Kiyotaki, 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011) has tried to embody
the credit market into the canonical model.
Before performing policy exercises with DSGE models, one
should assess their empirical performance and calibrate their para-
meters. At this stage, different type of shocks (e.g. government
spending and private consumption disturbances) are usually added
to the model to improve the estimation. Since the assumption of
forward-looking agents implies that standard DSGE models are not
able to match the econometric evidence on the co-movements of
nominal and real variables (e.g., the response of output and infla-
7. Originally, the Taylor rule was just designed for normative purposes, i.e. to provide
recommendations on how monetary policy should be carried out (Taylor, 2007). Later the
Taylor rule assumed a positive role given its good explanatory and predictive power.
y
τ
πϕ π ϕ+ + = ,nt t t y ti r y
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adjustment showed by the corresponding empirical impulse-
response functions), they are usually extended introducing a great
deal of ''frictions''—often not justified on the theoretical ground—
such as predetermined price and spending decisions, indexation of
prices and wages to past inflation, sticky wages, habit formation in
preferences for consumption, adjustment costs in investment,
variable capital utilization, etc..
From an econometric perspective, the Equations (1-3) of the
DSGE model are naturally represented as a vector auto-regression
(VAR) model. The estimation of the resulting econometric model is
usually carried out either with a limited information approach or
by full-information likelihood-based methods.
Limited information approach. The strategy of the limited infor-
mation approach to estimate and evaluate DSGE models is usually
the following (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999; Christiano et
al., 2005):8  
1.  Specify the monetary policy rule and the laws of motion for the
shocks. 
2.  Split the parameters in two sets and calibrate the parameters in
the first set providing some theoretical or empirical justifica-
tions for the chosen values. 
3.  Fix the timing of the endogenous variables in order to allow the
interest rate to respond to contemporaneous output and infla-
tion, while the latter variables are only affected by lagged interest
rate. Under this assumption one can estimate via OLS the coeffi-
cients of the monetary policy rule and the impulse-response
functions of the three variables to a monetary policy shock. 
4.  Recover the second set of parameters by minimizing the
distance between the model-generated and empirical impulse-
response functions. 
5.  Finally, given the structural parameter values and the VAR,
identify the other structural shocks by imposing, if necessary,
additional restrictions. 
The empirical performance of the model is then measured by
comparing the impulse-response functions generated by the model
with the empirical ones.
8. See also Christiano et al. (2010) for a limited information Bayesian approach.
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initially discarded to estimate DSGE models because maximum
likelihood methods deliver implausible estimates. However, with
the introduction of Bayesian techniques, the full information
approach regained popularity and it is now commonly employed
(see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007). Bayesian estimation is
carried out according to the following steps9:  
1.  Place if necessary some restrictions on the shocks in order to
allow later identification. For instance Smets and Wouters
(2003) assume that technology and preference shocks follow an
independent first-order autoregressive process with i.i.d. Gaus-
sian error terms, whereas ''cost-push'' and monetary policy
shocks are i.i.d. Normal white noise processes. 
2.  Employ the Kalman filter to compute the likelihood function of
the observed time series. 
3.  Form the prior distribution of the parameters by choosing their
initial values through calibration, preliminary exploratory exer-
cises, and/or to get some desired statistical properties. 
4.  Combine the likelihood function with the prior distribution of
the parameters to obtain the posterior density, which is then
used to compute parameter estimates. 
 One can then assess the empirical performance of the esti-
mated DSGE model comparing its marginal likelihood10 with the
one of standard VAR models (i.e. the Bayes factor) and the model-
generated cross-covariances vis-á-vis the empirical ones.
 Once one has recovered the parameters of the model by estima-
tion or calibration and has identified the structural shocks, policy-
analysis exercises can finally be carried out. More specifically, after
having derived the welfare loss function, one can assess the perfor-
mance of the subset of ''simple'' policy rules that guarantee the
existence of a determinate equilibrium or the more appropriate
9. See Schorfheide (2011) for a discussion of recent advances in the econometrics of DSGE
models, current challenges, and possible ways of future research.
10. Following Smets and Wouters (2003), the marginal likelihood of a model A is: 
, 
where p(θ ⎪ A) is the prior density for model A and p(YT ⎪ θ A) is the likelihood function of the
observable time series, YT conditional on model A and the vector of parameter θ.
θ
θ θ θ∫ ( | ) ( | )Tp A p Y A d
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This can be done via simulation, by buffeting the DSGE model
with different structural shocks and computing the resulting vari-
ance of inflation and the output gap and the associated welfare
losses of the different monetary policy rules and parameterizations
employed (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999; Galí and
Gertler, 2007). In practice, assuming that the DSGE model is the
''true'' data generating process of the available time series, one is
evaluating how the economy portrayed by the model would react
to the same structural shocks observed in the past if the monetary
policy followed by the central bank were different.
2. Policy with DSGE models: A safe exercise?
DSGE models are plagued by at least three classes of problems
which could potentially undermine the usefulness of performing
policy-analysis exercises in such a framework. More specifically,
DSGE models are subject to theoretical, empirical, and political-
economy problems that we shall discuss in the next sections.
2.1. Theoretical issues
From a theoretical perspective, DSGE models are general equili-
brium models (GE) rooted in the Arrow-Debreu tradition with
some minor non-Walrasian features (e.g., sticky prices). Hence,
they share with traditional GE models their same problems and
weaknesses. Even if there is a vast and widely-known literature
within the neoclassical paradigm dealing with the theoretical
issues affecting GE models (see e.g. Kirman, 1989), we briefly recall
what are the major problems at hand.
To begin with, sufficient conditions allowing for the existence
of a general equilibrium do not ensure neither its uniqueness nor
its stability. In addition, the well-known results obtained by
Sonnenschein (1972), Debreu (1974) and Mantel (1974) show that
one can never restrict agents' characteristics (e.g., endowments,
preferences, etc.) in such a way to attain uniqueness and stability.
What is more, Kirman and Koch (1986) show that even if agents
are almost identical (i.e., same preferences and almost identical
endowments), uniqueness and stability cannot be recovered.
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mists to get stable and unique equilibria is to introduce a
representative agent (RA). If the choices of heterogeneous agents
collapse to the ones of a representative individual, one can circum-
vent all the problems stemming from aggregation and provide GE
macroeconomic models with rigorous Walrasian micro-founda-
tions grounded on rationality and constrained optimization.
However, the RA assumption is far from being innocent: there are
(at least) four reasons for which it cannot be defended (Kirman,
1992).11 First, individual rationality does not imply aggregate
rationality: one cannot provide any formal justification to support
the assumption that at the macro level agents behave as a maximi-
zing individual. Second, even if one forgets the previous point and
uses the RA fiction to provide micro-foundations to macroeco-
nomic models, one cannot safely perform policy analyses with
such models, because the reactions of the representative agent to
shocks or parameter changes may not coincide with the aggregate
reactions of the represented agents. Third, even if the first two
problems are solved, there may be cases where given two situations
a and b, the representative agent prefers a, whereas all the repre-
sented individuals prefer b.
Finally, the RA assumption introduces additional difficulties at
the empirical level, because whenever one tests a proposition deli-
vered by a RA model, one is also jointly testing the RA hypothesis.
Hence, the rejection of the latter hypothesis may show up in the
rejection of the model proposition that is being tested. This last
point is well corroborated by the works of Forni and Lippi (1997,
1999), who show that basic properties of linear dynamic micro-
economic models are not preserved by aggregation if agents are
heterogeneous (see also Pesaran and Chudik, 2011). To cite some
examples, micro-economic co-integration does not lead to macroe-
conomic co-integration, Granger-causality may not appear at the
micro level, but it may emerge at the macro level, aggregation of
static micro-equations may produce dynamic macro-equations. As
a consequence, one can safely test the macroeconomic implica-
11. A discussion of the limits of the representative assumption in light of the current crisis is
contained in Kirman (2010).
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modeling of agents' heterogeneity is carried out.
The fact that solving DSGE models leads to a system of differ-
ence equations may potentially add another problem to those
discussed above. More specifically, one has to check whether the
solution of the system of equilibrium conditions of a DSGE model
exists and is determinate. If the exogenous shocks and the fluctua-
tions generated by the monetary policy rule are ''small'', and the
''Taylor principle'' holds (φπ > 1, see Equation 3), one can prove
existence and local determinacy of the rational expectation equi-
librium of the DSGE model presented in Section 1 (Woodford,
2003).12 This result allows one to perform comparative ''dynamics''
exercises (i.e. to compute impulse-response functions) in presence
of ''small'' shocks or parameter changes and to safely employ log-
linear approximations around the steady state. Unfortunately, the
existence of a local determinate equilibrium does not rule out the
possibility of multiple equilibria at the global level (see e.g.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000; Benhabib et al., 2001; Ascari and
Ropele, 2009). This is a serious issue because there is always the
possibility, for instance if the laws of motion of the shocks are not
properly tuned, that the DSGE model takes an explosive path, thus
preventing the computation of impulse-response functions and
the adoption of the model for policy analysis exercises.
2.2. Empirical issues
The second stream of problems is related to the empirical vali-
dation of DSGE models. As remarked by Canova (2008), estimation
and testing of DSGE models are performed assuming that they
represent the true data generating process (DGP) of the observed
data. This implies that the ensuing inference and policy experi-
ments are valid only if the DSGE model mimics the unknown DGP
of the data.
As mentioned in Section 1, DSGE models can be represented as
a VAR of the form:
(4)
12. Of course, also other monetary policy rules different from the Taylor rule (cf. eq. 3) can lead
to a local determinate rational-expectation equilibrium.
ϕ ϕ ϕ
−
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Macroeconomic policy in DSGE and agent-based models 79where x are both endogenous and exogenous variables, φ is the
vector of the parameters of the model and  E contains the errors. If
the matrix A0 is invertible, one can obtain a reduced-form VAR
representation of the DSGE model.
Following Fukac and Pagan (2006), the econometric perfor-
mance of DSGE models can be assessed along the identification,
estimation and evaluation dimensions. Before going in depth with
this type of analysis, two preliminary potential sources of problems
must be discussed. First, the number of endogenous variables
contemplated by DSGE models is usually larger than the number of
structural shocks. This problem may lead to system singularity and
it is typically solved by adding measurement errors. Second, H1 and
H2 are reduced rank matrixes. This problem is circumvented by
integrating variables out of the VAR (eq. 4) as long as H1 and H2
become invertible. This process leads to a VARMA representation
of the DSGE model. This is not an innocent transformation for two
reasons: i) if the moving average component is not invertible, the
DSGE model cannot have a VAR representation; ii) even if the VAR
representation of the DSGE model exists, it may require an infinite
number of lags (more on that in Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2005;
Ravenna, 2007; Alessi et al., 2007).
Identification. Given the large number of non-linearities present
in the structural parameters (θ ), DSGE models are hard to identify
(Canova, 2008). This leads to a large number of identification
problems, which can affect the parameter space either at the local
or at the global level. A taxonomy of the most relevant identifica-
tion problems can be found in Canova and Sala (2005).13 To sum
them up: i) different DSGE models with different economic and
policy implications could be observationally equivalent (i.e., they
produce indistinguishable aggregate decision rules); ii) some DSGE
models may be plagued by under or partial identification of their
parameters (i.e., some parameters are not present in the aggregate
decision rules or are present with a peculiar functional form); iii)
some DSGE may be exposed to weak identification problems (i.e.,
the mapping between the coefficients of the aggregate decision
rules and the structural parameters may be characterized by little
13. See also Beyer and Farmer (2004).
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increasing the sample size.
Identification problems lead to biased and fragile estimates of
some structural parameters and do not allow to rightly evaluate the
significance of the estimated parameters applying standard asymp-
totic theories. This opens a ridge between the real and the DSGE
DGPs, depriving parameter estimates of any economic meaning
and making policy analysis exercises useless (Canova, 2008). For
instance, Schorfheide (2008) finds that the parameters of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve estimated in 42 DSGE models published
in academic journals range from zero to four. In most of the cases,
identification problems can only be mitigated by appropriately re-
parameterizing the model.14
Estimation. The identification problems discussed above partly
affect the estimation of DGSE models. DSGE models are very hard
to estimate by standard maximum likelihood (ML) methods,
because ML estimator delivers biased and inconsistent results if the
system is not a satisfying representation of the data. This turns out
to be the case for DSGE models (see the evaluation section) and it
helps to explain why ML estimates usually attain absurd values
with no economic meaning and/or they are incompatible with a
unique stable solution of the underlying DSGE model.
A strategy commonly employed when the DSGE model is esti-
mated following the limited-information approach (cf. Section 1)
consists in calibrating the parameters hard to identify and then esti-
mating the others. Given the identification problems listed above,
Canova (2008) argues that this strategy works only if the calibrated
parameters are set to their ''true'' values. If this is not the case, esti-
mation does not deliver correct results that can be used to address
economic and policy questions (see also Canova and Sala, 2005).
As we mentioned in Section 1, Bayesian methods are now
commonly employed to estimate DSGE models. They apparently
solve the problems of estimation (and identification) by adding a
(log) prior function to the (log) likelihood function in order to
increase the curvature of the latter and obtain a smoother func-
14. Fukac and Pagan (2006) also argue that identification problems are usually partly mitigated
by arbitrarily assuming serially correlated shocks.
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function is flat—and thus conveys little information about the
structural parameters—the shape of the posterior distribution
resembles the one of the prior, reducing estimation to a more
sophisticated calibration procedure carried out on an interval
instead on a point (see Canova, 2008; Fukac and Pagan, 2006).
Unfortunately, the likelihood functions produced by most DSGE
models are quite flat (see e.g. the exercises performed by Fukac and
Pagan, 2006). In this case, informal calibration is a more honest
and internally consistent strategy to set up a model for policy
analysis experiments (Canova, 2008).
All the estimation problems described above stem also from the
fact that DSGE models are not conceived to simplify the estimation
of their parameters (Canova, 2008). As a consequence DSGE
models put too much stress upon the data, using for instance more
unobservable that observable variables (Fukac and Pagan, 2006).
This requires strong assumptions about the variances in order to
get identification and to employ Kalman filter to obtain the likeli-
hood function. The likelihood functions produced by the Kalman
filter are correct only if observations are Gaussian, but macroeco-
nomic time series are typically not normally-distributed (Fagiolo et
al., 2008).
Evaluation. Evaluating DSGE models means assessing their capa-
bility to reproduce as many empirical stylized facts as possible. For
instance, following Fukac and Pagan (2006), one can check: i)
whether variables with deterministic trend cotrend; ii) whether
I(1) variables co-integrate and the resulting co-integrating vectors
are those predicted by the model; iii) the consistency (with respect
to data) of the dynamic responses (e.g., autocorrelation, bivariate
correlations); iv) the consistency of the covariance matrix of the
reduced form errors with the one found in the data; v) the discre-
pancies between the time series generated by the model and real-
world ones. In light of the Great Recession, the last point is particu-
larly important: can DSGE models account for the occurrence of
rare large shocks?
Fukac and Pagan (2006) perform such exercises on a popular
DSGE model. First, they find that co-trending behaviors cannot be
assessed because data are demeaned (a practice commonly followed
by DSGE modelers). However, the computation of the technology
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shows that the possibility of technical regress is very high. Second,
there are no co-integrating vectors, because output is the only I(1)
variable. Third, the model is not able to successfully reproduce the
mean, standard deviations, autocorrelations, bivariate correlations
observed in real data. In addition, the DSGE model predicts the
constancy of some ''great'' ratios (in line with the presence of a
steady state of the economy), but this is not confirmed by real data.
Fourth, many off-diagonal correlations implied by the covariance
matrix of the errors are significantly different from zero, contradic-
ting the DSGE model assumption of uncorrelated shocks. Fifth, the
tracking performance of the model depends heavily on the
assumed high serial correlation of the shocks.
Finally, DSGE models are not able to account for the occurrence
of rare economic crises (see Section 2.3 below for a theoretical
explanation). This is not surprising since macroeconomic time
series distributions are well approximated by fat tail densities
(Fagiolo et al., 2008) and DSGE models typically assume Gaussian
distributed shocks.15 Moreover, Ascari et al. (2012) find that even
assuming fat-tailed Laplace shocks, the distributions of the time
series generated by DSGE models have much thinner tails than
those observed in real data.
The results just described seem to support Favero (2007) in clai-
ming that modern DSGE models are exposed to the same criticisms
advanced against the old-fashioned macroeconometric models
belonging to the Cowles Commission tradition: they pay too much
attention to the identification of the structural model (with all the
problems described above) without testing the potential misspeci-
fication of the underlying statistical model (see also Johansen,
2006; Juselius and Franchi, 2007).16 In DSGE models, ''restrictions
are made fuzzy by imposing a distribution on them and then the
relevant question becomes what is the amount of uncertainty that
we have to add to model based restrictions in order to make them
15. An exception is Curdia et al. (2011) where shocks are drawn from a Student-t distribution.
16. On the contrary, the LSE-Copenhagen school follows a macroeconometric modeling
philosophy orthogonal to the one followed by DSGE modelers. Scholars of the LSE-Copenhagen
approach have concentrated their efforts on improving the statistical model in order to
structure data with an identified co-integrated VAR that could then be used to produce stylized
facts for theoretical models (Johansen and Juselius, 2006; Juselius and Franchi, 2007).
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tricted VAR representation of the data'' (Favero, 2007, p. 29). There
are many signals of the potential misspecification of the statistical
model delivered by DSGE models: the presence of many persistent
shocks, the fact that theory-free VAR models of monetary policy
need to include additional variables such as commodity price
index to match the data, the absurd estimates produced by stan-
dard maximum likelihood estimation, etc. (Fukac and Pagan, 2006;
Favero, 2007). If the statistical model is misspecified, policy
analysis exercises lose significance, because they are carried out in
a ''virtual'' world whose DGP is different from the one underlying
observed time-series data.
2.3. Political-economy issues
Given the theoretical problems and the puny empirical perfor-
mance of DSGE models, one cannot accept the principles of the
positive economics approach summarized by the ''as if'' argument
of Milton Friedman (1953). The assumptions of DSGE models can
no longer be defended invoking arguments such as parsimonious
modeling or matching the data. This opens a Pandora's box,
forcing us to consider how policy-analysis exercises performed
with DSGE models are influenced and constrained by the legion of
underlying assumptions.
DSGE models presume a very peculiar and un-realistic
framework, where agents endowed with rational expectations (RE)
take rational decisions by solving dynamic programming problems.
This implies that: i) agents perfectly know the model of the
economy; ii) agents are able to understand and solve every problem
they face without making any mistakes; iii) agents know that all
other agents behave according to the first two points. In practice,
agents are endowed with a sort of ''olympic'' rationality and have
free access to the whole information set. Note, however, that while
rational expectations is a property of the economic system as a
whole, individual rationality is not a sufficient condition for letting
the system converge to the RE fixed-point equilibrium (Howitt,
2011). It is also unreasonable to assume that agents possess all the
information required to attain the equilibrium of the whole
economy (Caballero, 2010), especially in periods of strong struc-
tural transformation, like the Great Recession, that require policies
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the learning process of agents introduces further non-stationarity
into the system preventing the economy to reach an equilibrium
state (Hendry and Minzon, 2010). No surprise that empirical tests
usually reject the full-information, rational expectation hypothesis
(see e.g. Guzman, 2009; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2011). Assu-
ming agents behaving according to what suggested by the
psychological and sociological evidence allow to build models
which better account for macroeconomic phenomena (Akerlof,
2002) including the current crisis (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). 
The representative-agent (RA) assumption prevents DSGE
models to address distributional issues, which are one of the major
cause of the Great Recession and they are fundamental for
studying the effects of policies. Indeed, increasing income inequa-
lities induced households to indebt more and more over time
paving the way to the subprime mortgage crisis (Fitoussi and Sara-
ceno, 2010; Stiglitz, 2011). In this framework, redistribution
matters and different policies have a different impact on the
economy according to the groups of people they are designed for
(e.g. unemployed benefits have large multipliers than tax cuts for
high-income individuals, see Stiglitz, 2011). Moreover, the RA
assumption coupled with the implicit presence of a Walrasian
auctioneer, which sets prices before exchanges take place, rule out
almost by definition the possibility of interactions carried out by
heterogeneous individuals.
Besides being responsible for the problems analyzed in Sections
2.1 and 2.2, the RE and RA assumptions strongly reduce the realism
of DSGE models. This is not a minor issue when one has to perform
policy analyses (on this point cf. also Colander, 2006a, p. 5).
As a consequence of the ''as if'' methodology, the macroecono-
mics of DSGE models does not appear to be truly grounded on
microeconomics (Stiglitz, 2011). For instance, DSGE models do not
take into account the micro and macro implications of imperfect
information. Moreover, the behavior of agents is often described
with arbitrary specification of the functional forms. The common
employed Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) utility function provides a bad
description of agents' behavior toward risk. Similarly, the Cobb-
Douglas production function is not suited for studying income
distribution issues.
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a sort of internal contradiction. On the one hand, strong assump-
tions such as rational expectations, perfect information, complete
financial markets are introduced ex-ante to provide a rigorous and
formal mathematical treatment of the problems and to allow for
policy recommendations. On the other hand, many imperfections
(e.g., sticky prices, rule-of-thumb consumers) are introduced ex-
post without any theoretical justification only to allow DSGE
models to match the data.17 This process is far from being inno-
cuous, for instance Chari et al. (2009) point out that the high level
of arbitrariness of DSGE models in the specifications of structural
shocks may leave them exposed to the Lucas critiques, preventing
them to be usefully employed for policy analysis. Adopting less
stringent—but in tune with the microeconomic statistical evidence
—assumptions may contribute to jointly solve many empirical
puzzles without introducing an army of ad hoc imperfections.
There are a couple of other internal inconsistencies which could
potentially undermine the reliability of the policy prescriptions
developed following the DSGE approach. The first one is related to
the marginal role (in the best case) that DSGE models reserve to
money and banks. This bizarre situation in which models designed
for monetary policy analyses do not include money stems from the
simplifying assumption that the representative agent behaves
respecting the transversality (or No Ponzi Game) condition, i.e. she
is perfectly creditworthy and never default (Goodhart, 2009). As a
consequence, agents face the same interest rate (no risk premia)
and all transactions can be undertaken in capital markets without
the need of banks. Moreover, since agents can swap IOUs without
facing any credit risk, money has only the function of unit of
account and it can be ruled out from DSGE models.18 The abstrac-
tion from default risks does not allow DSGE models to contemplate
17. Citing a very provocative sentence of a famous evolutionary economist, this way of
theorizing is like claiming that biology stems from thermodynamics equilibrium with some
imperfections.
18. When money is present in the utility function of consumers, the transactions requiring
money are assumed to be sufficiently unimportant, so for ''reasonable'' calibrations, money-
augmented DSGE models deliver almost the same results of the standard ones (Woodford, 2003,
chapter 2). Of course, the unimportance of transactions requiring money, the calibration
reasonability and the quantitative discrepancies between standard and money-augmented
DSGE models is debatable and subject to the judgement of policymakers.
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always face (Howitt, 2011):19 they just care about the nth-order
distortions caused by price misallignments which can eventually
result in inflation without considering the huge costs of financial
crisis (Stiglitz, 2011). No surprise that DSGE models work fine in
normal time but they are unequipped not only to forecast but also
to explain the current crisis (Goodhart, 2009; Krugman, 2011).
The second potential inconsistency concerns how business
cycles arise in the DSGE framework. DSGE models can be employed
to assess the impact of different monetary policies because they are
genuine business cycle models. However, the theory of business
cycles embedded in DSGE models is exogenous: the economy rests
in the steady state unless it is hit by a stream of exogenous
stochastic shocks. As a consequence, DSGE models do not explain
business cycles, preferring instead to generate them with a sort of
deus-ex-machina mechanism. This could explain why even in
normal times DSGE models are not able to match many business
cycle stylized facts or have to assume serially correlated shocks to
produce fluctuations resembling the ones observed in reality (cf.
Zarnowitz, 1985, 1997; Cogley and Nason, 1993; Fukac and Pagan,
2006).20 Even worse, the subprime mortgage crisis and the ensuing
Great Recession clearly shows how bubbles and, more generally,
endogenously generated shocks are far more important for unders-
tanding economic fluctuations (Stiglitz, 2011). How policymakers
can assess the impact of policies in models not explaining business
cycles is an open issue. For instance, the Great Recession revealed
that the FED's doctrine about cleaning up afterward asset bubbles
bursts was patently wrong.
Moving to the normative side, one supposed advantage of the
DSGE approach is the possibility to derive optimal policy rules.
However, policymakers adopting optimal policy rules face certain
costs—the strict assumptions at the root of DSGE models—but
19. As Howitt (2011) puts it, financial accelerator dynamics have recently been introduced in
some DSGE models (see Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Brunnermeier et al., 2011, for a survey) just
to analyze how shocks can be amplified by financial considerations without any reference to the
price-stability trade-off.
20. The highly persistency of the estimated shock processes and the fact that their path is very
akin to the path of one of the observable raises concerns about whether shocks capture
aggregate uncertainty or mispecification (Schorfheide, 2011).
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policy rules cannot be used in practice, because they require the
knowledge of the ''true'' model of the economy, the exact value of
every parameter, and the real time value of every shocks.
Moreover, when the ''true'' model of the economy and the appro-
priate loss function are not know, rule-of-thumb policy rules may
perform better than optimal policy rules (Brock et al., 2007; Orpha-
nides and Williams, 2008).
2.4. Any ways out?
Given the theoretical and empirical problems of DSGE models
discussed above, the positive economics approach advocated by
Milton Friedman would suggest to remove or change the plethora
of underlying assumptions in order to improve the performance of
the model.
This recommendation is reinforced by two related observations.
First, the assumptions underlying DSGE models become a sort of
strait jacket that preclude the model to be flexible enough to allow
for generalizations and extensions. Second, the un-realism of these
assumptions prevent policymakers to fully trust the policy pres-
criptions developed with DSGE models.
It is far from clear why within the mainstream DSGE paradigm
there is a widespread conservative attitude with no significative
attempts to substitute the ''Holy Trinity'' assumptions of rationa-
lity, greed and equilibrium (Colander, 2005) with more realistic
ones. For instance, Akerlof (2007) argues that a broader definition
of agents' preferences which take into account the presence of
realistic norms can violate many neutrality results of neoclassical
economics without recurring to imperfections. Moreover, introdu-
cing heterogeneous agents or substituting the rationality
assumption with insights coming from behavioral economics
could substantially change the working of DSGE models, ''making
monetary policy more of a science'' (Mishkin, 2007).
In any case, if neoclassical economists truly enlist themselves
among those advocating an instrumentalist approach to scientific
research, they should agree that when models display estimation
and validation (descriptive) problems such as those exhibited by
DSGE ones, the only way out would be to modify the models'
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instrumentalist researcher would provide if, in addition, the
model, as happens in the DSGE case, would also display problems
on the normative side.
This is exactly the research avenue that a growing number of
scholars have been pursuing in the last two decades. Dissatisfied
with standard macroeconomic, micro-founded, general- equili-
brium-based neoclassical models like those discussed above, they
have begun to devise an entirely new paradigm labeled as ''Agent-
Based Computational Economics'' (ACE).21 The basic exercise ACE
tries to perform is building models based on more realistic assump-
tions as far as agent behaviors and interactions are concerned,
where more realistic here means rooted in empirical and experi-
mental micro-economic evidence. For example, following the
body of evidence provided by cognitive psychologists (see for
example, among a vast literature, Kahneman and Tversky, 2000),
the assumptions of perfect rationality and foresight are replaced
with those of bounded rationality and adaptive behavior. More
generally, ACE scholars share the view that agents in the model
should have ''the same information as do the economists modeling
the economy'' (Colander, 2006a, p. 11). Similarly, insights from
network theory (e.g., Albert and Barabasi, 2002) and social interac-
tions (e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2001) suggest to move away from
the unrealistic and oversimplifying assumptions concerning
agents interactions typically employed in neoclassical models and
allow for direct, non-trivial interaction patterns. Finally, the wides-
pread evidence on persistent heterogeneity and turbulence
characterizing markets and economies indicate to abandon crazy
simplifications such as the representative agent assumption, as
well as the presumption that economic systems are (and must be
observed) in equilibrium, and to focus instead on out-of-equili-
brium dynamics endogenously fueled by the interactions among
heterogenous agents.
21. The philosophical underpinnings of ACE largely overlap with those of similar,
complementary, approaches known in the literature as ''Post Walrasian Macroeconomics''
(Colander, 2006b) and ''Evolutionary Economics'' (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi and Nelson,
1994).The overlap is often so strong that one might safely speak of an emerging ''heterodox
synthesis''. Historically, the first attempt to develop agent-based economics can be traced back
to Marshal (Leijonhufvud, 2006).
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of economies thought as complex evolving systems (Tesfatsion,
2006a). Notice that neoclassical economics, on the contrary, typi-
cally deals with economies conceived as simple, linear,
homogeneous and stationary worlds. It should not come as a
surprise that the class of models used by ACE to explore the proper-
ties of markets, industries and economies (called agent-based
models, ABMs) are far more complicated—and harder to analyze—
objects than their neoclassical counterparts. In the following
Section we will therefore begin by outlying the basic building
blocks of ABMs. Next, we will address the question how ABMs can
be employed to deliver normative implications. Then, we will
briefly review some examples of policy exercises in ABMs. Some
final remarks about pro and cons of using ABMs for policy analysis
will be left for the concluding section.
3. Agent-Based Models and economic policy 
3.1. Building blocks of ABMs
The last two decades have seen a rapid growth of agent-based
modeling in economics. An exhaustive survey of this vast literature
is of course beyond the scope of this work.22 However, before
proceeding, it is useful to introduce the main ten ingredients that
tend to characterize economic AB models.
1.  A bottom-up perspective. A satisfactory account of a decentra-
lized economy is to be addressed using a bottom-up
perspective. In other words, aggregate properties must be
obtained as the macro outcome of a possibly unconstrained
micro dynamics going on at the level basic entities (agents).
This contrasts with the top-down nature of traditional neoclas-
sical models, where the bottom level typically comprises a
representative individual and is constrained by strong consis-
tency requirements associated with equilibrium and hyper-
rationality.
22. This and the following subsections heavily draw Pyka and Fagiolo (2007) and Fagiolo et al.
(2007b). For further details see, among others, Dosi and Egidi (1991), Dosi et al. (2005), Lane
(1993), Tesfatsion and Judd (2006), Colander (2006a) and Tesfatsion (2006b).
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almost all their characteristics.
3.  The evolving complex system (ECS) approach. Agents live in
complex systems that evolve through time. Therefore, aggre-
gate properties are thought to emerge out of repeated
interactions among simple entities, rather than from the
consistency requirements of rationality and equilibrium
imposed by the modeler.
4.  Non-linearity. The interactions that occur in AB models are
inherently non-linear. Additionally, non-linear feedback loops
exist between micro and macro levels.
5.  Direct (endogenous) interactions. Agents interact directly. The
decisions undertaken today by an agent directly depend,
through adaptive expectations, on the past choices made by
other agents in the population.
6.  Bounded rationality. The environment in which real-world
economic agents live is too complex for hyper-rationality to be
a viable simplifying assumption. It is suggested that one can,
at most, impute to agents some local and partial (both in time
and space) principles of rationality (e.g., myopic optimization
rules). More generally, agents are assumed to behave as boun-
dedly rational entities with adaptive expectations.
7.  The nature of learning. Agents in AB models engage in the open-
ended search of dynamically changing environments. This is
due to both the ongoing introduction of novelty and the gene-
ration of new patterns of behavior; but also on the complexity
of the interactions between heterogeneous agents (see point 5
above).
8.  ''True'' dynamics. Partly as a consequence of adaptive expecta-
tions (i.e., agents observe the past and form expectations about
the future on the basis of the past), AB models are characte-
rized by true, non-reversible, dynamics: the state of the system
evolves in a path-dependent manner.23
9.  Endogenous and persistent novelty. Socio-economic systems are
inherently non-stationary. There is the ongoing introduction
23. This has to be contrasted with the neoclassical approach, where agents hold rational
expectations and, as Mehrling (2006, p. 76) puts it, "the future, or rather our ideas about the
future, determines the present".
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patterns of behavior, which are themselves a force for learning
and adaptation. Hence, agents face ''true (Knightian) uncer-
tainty'' (Knight, 1921) and are only able to partially form
expectations on, for instance, technological outcomes.
10.  Selection-based market mechanisms. Agents typically undergo a
selection mechanism. For example, the goods and services
produced by competing firms are selected by consumers. The
selection criteria that are used may themselves be complex and
span a number of dimensions. 
3.2. The basic structure of ABMs
Models based on (all or a subset of) the ten main ingredients
discussed above typically possess the following structure. There is a
population—or a set of populations—of agents (e.g., consumers,
firms, etc.), possibly hierarchically organized, whose size may
change or not in time. The evolution of the system is observed in
discrete time steps, t = 1,2,…. Time steps may be days, quarters,
years, etc.. At each t, every agent i is characterized by a finite
number of micro-economic variables xi,t (which may change across
time) and by a vector of micro-economic parameters θi (that are
fixed in the time horizon under study). In turn, the economy may
be characterized by some macroeconomic (fixed) parameters Θ.
Given some initial conditions xi,0 and a choice for micro and
macro parameters, at each time step t > 0, one or more agents are
chosen to update their micro-economic variables. This may
happen randomly or can be triggered by the state of the system
itself. Agents selected to perform the updating stage collect their
available information about the current and past state (i.e., micro-
economic variables) of a subset of other agents, typically those
they directly interact with. They plug their knowledge about their
local environment, as well as the (limited) information they can
gather about the state of the whole economy, into heuristics,
routines, and other algorithmic, not necessarily optimizing, behav-
ioral rules. These rules, as well as interaction patterns, are designed
so as to mimic empirical and experimental knowledge that the
researcher may have collected from his/her preliminary studies.
After the updating round has taken place, a new set of micro-
economic variables is fed into the economy for the next-step itera-
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averaging individual characteristics. Once again, the definitions of
aggregate variables closely follow those of statistical aggregates
(i.e., GDP, unemployment, etc.).
The stochastic components possibly present in decision rules,
expectations, and interactions will in turn imply that the dyna-
mics of micro and macro variables can be described by some
(Markovian) stochastic processes parameterized by micro- and
macro-parameters. Hoverer, non-linearities which are typically
present in decision rules and interactions make it hard to analyti-
cally derive laws of motion, kernel distributions, time-t probability
distributions, etc. for the stochastic processes governing the evolu-
tion of micro and macro variables.
This suggests that the researcher must often resort to computer
simulations in order to analyze the behavior of the ABM at hand.
Notice that in some simple cases such systems allow for analytical
solutions of some kind. Needless to say, the more one injects into
the model assumptions sharing the philosophy of the building
blocks discussed above (cf. Section 3.1), the less tractable turns out
to be the model, and the more one needs to resort to computer
simulations. Simulations must be intended here in a truly
constructive way, e.g. to build and "grow" a society "from the
bottom up", in the spirit of object-oriented programming.
3.3. Descriptive analysis of ABMs
When studying the outcomes of ABMs, the researcher often
faces the problem that the economy he/she is modeling is by defi-
nition out-of-equilibrium. The focus is seldom on static equilibria
or steady-state paths. Rather, the researcher must more often look
for long-run statistical equilibria and/or emergent properties of
aggregate dynamics (that is, transient statistical features that last
suffficiently long to be observed and considered stable as
compared to the time horizon of the model; see Lane, 1993, for an
introduction). Such an exploration is by definition very compli-
cated and it is made even more difficult by the fact that the
researcher does not even know in advance whether the stochastic
process described by its ABM is ergodic or not and, if it somehow
converges, how much time will take for the behavior to become
sufficiently stable.
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preliminary simulation study or from some ex-ante knowledge
coming from the particular structure of the ABM under study) that
the dynamic behavior of the system becomes sufficiently stable
after some time horizon T* for (almost all) points of the parameter
space. Then a possible procedure that can be implemented to study
the output of the ABM runs as the one synthetically depicted in
Figure 1.
Given some choice for initial conditions, micro and macro
parameters, assume to run our system until it relaxes to some
stable behavior (i.e., for at least T > T* time steps). Suppose we are
interested in a set S = {s1,s2,…} of statistics to be computed on
micro and macro simulated variables. For any given run the
program will output a value for each statistic. Given the stochastic
nature of the process, each run will output a different value for the
statistics. Therefore, after having produced M independent runs,
one has a distribution for each statistic containing M observations,
which can be summarized by computing its moments.
Recall, however, that moments will depend on the choice made
for initial conditions and parameters. By exploring a sufficiently
large number of points in the space where initial conditions and
parameters are allowed to vary, computing the moments of the
statistics of interest at each point, and by assessing how moments
Figure 1. A schematic procedure for studying the output of an AB model
S
S
S
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knowledge of the behavior of the system (see Figure 1).
3.4. Model selection and empirical validation
From the foregoing discussion it clearly emerges that in agent-
based modeling (as in many other modeling endeavors) one often
faces a trade-off between descriptive accuracy and explanatory
power of the model. The more one tries to inject into the model
''realist'' assumptions, the more the system becomes complicated
to study and the less clear the causal relations going from assump-
tions to implications are. ABM researchers are well aware of this
problem and have been trying to develop strategies to guide the
process of assumption selection. For example, one can try to solve
the trade-off between descriptive capability and explanatory power
either by beginning with the most simple model and complicate it
step-by-step (i.e., the so-called KISS strategy, an acronym standing
for ''Keep It Simple, Stupid!") or by starting with the most descrip-
tive model and simplify it as much as possible (i.e., the so-called
KIDS strategy, "Keep It Descriptive, Stupid!"). A third, alternative
strategy prescribes instead to start with an existing model and
successively complicate it with incremental additions (this strategy
might be labeled TAPAS, which stands for ''Take A Previous model
and Add Something'').
In all these procedures, the extent to which the ABM is able to
empirically replicate existing reality should play a crucial role in
discriminating the point at which any procedure should stop.24
Notice that the very structure of ABMs naturally allows one to
take the model to the data and validate it against observed real-
world observations. Indeed, an ABM can be thought to provide a
DGP, which we think real-world observations being a realization
of. More precisely, let us suppose that we believe that observed
data are generated by an unknown (to us) colossal DGP, with an
almost infinite number of parameters, which we can label as real-
world DGP (rwDGP). Suppose further that such rwDGP can be
broken in reasonable smaller weakly-exogenous components, each
one with a reasonable number of parameters, and each one descri-
24. For a more in-depth discussion of empirical validation in ABMs, we refer the reader to
Fagiolo et al. (2007a), Pyka and Werker (2009) and papers therein. 
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of a small set of other variables. Building an ABM means attemp-
ting to approximate one of those small rwDGPs. Due to its
stochastic structure, an ABM actually mimics the small rwDGP we
are studying by a theoretical DGP that generates the same variables
each time we run the model. Of course, we only have one observa-
tion generated by the rwDGP, and this makes any inference very
difficult (but this has to do with another story, which philosophers
call the problem of induction).
Many approaches to empirical validation (and selection) of
ABMs can be in principle taken, and the debate is very open
here.25 For example, one might select among ABMs (and within
different parameter setups of the same ABM) with respect to the
number of stylized facts each of them is able jointly to replicate. A
typical procedure to be followed starts with asking whether a
particular model can simultaneously reproduce some set of styl-
ized facts for a given parametrization (a sort of ''exercise in
plausibility''); then explore what happens when the parameter
setup changes; finally, investigate if some meaningful causal
explanation can be derived out of that step-by-step analysis. Alter-
natively, one can first select among parameters by calibrating the
model (e.g., by directly estimate parameters, when possible, with
micro or macro data) and then judge to which extent the cali-
brated model is able to reproduce the stylized facts of interest. A
recent stream of literature tries to recover the parameters of ABMs
by indirect estimation (see e.g. Gilli and Winker, 2003; Alfarano et
al., 2005; Winker et al., 2007). Notice that, unlike economists
supporting the NNS approach— who hold strong theoretical priors
rooted in the DSGE model— ACE scholars are more interested in
developing plausible theories, which however are not dogmati-
cally deemed to be the ''correct'' ones (on this point, see also
Colander, 2006a).
No matter the empirical validation procedure actually
employed, its basic goal is often to restrict the size of the set of free
parameters. In fact, over-parameterized models are difficult to
interpret and analyze, because no one knows whether the same
25. Cf. the special issues edited by Fagiolo et al. (2007a) in Computational Economics and by
Pyka and Werker (2009) in the Journal of Artificial Socities and Social Simulations.
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rized model. Even if empirical validation allows one to restrict the
set of free parameters to a reasonably-sized one, many methodolo-
gical problems still remain when the model is used to perform
policy experiments. If any parametrization represents an alterna-
tive world, which one should be employed to assess policy
performance? What is the role of initial conditions? We shall
briefly come back to these issues in the concluding remarks.
For the moment it is important to notice that the methodolo-
gical debate within the agent-based community is very lively.
Among many interesting lines of methodological research, one of
the most crucial ones concerns the issue of realism of the assump-
tions in economic models (for a more general appraisal, see
Schlefer, 2012). Indeed, whereas many ABM scholars argue that
their approach allows for more realism in the way individual beha-
viors and interactions are accounted for in theoretical models (as
opposed to neoclassical ones), others have maintained that ABM
must as well trade off between successful model building and
empirical accuracy of assumptions (Deichsel and Pyka, 2009).
Therefore, in order to provide ABMs that deliver meaningful statis-
tical implications, agent-based researchers must often employ
assumptions that are not the most descriptively accurate ones.
3.5. Policy experiments in ABMs: Some considerations
ABMs configure themselves as a very powerful device to address
policy questions in more realistic, flexible and modular
frameworks. Indeed, as far as economic policy is concerned, ABMs
have many advantages as compared to neoclassical tools as the
DSGE models, which we organize in what follows into two classes:
theory and empirics.
Theory. ABMs, contrary to neoclassical ones, do not impose any
strong theoretical consistency requirements (e.g., equilibrium,
representative individual assumptions, rational expectations). This
is because they are not required ex-ante to be analytically solvable.
Such no-strait-jacket condition allows for an extremely higher flex-
ibility in model building. If this is coupled with a serious empirical-
validation requirement (see below), we are in presence of a semi-
instrumentalist approach, where bad (but empirically-plausible)
assumptions can be replaced with better (and empirically-plau-
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that in absence of strong consistency conditions, assumptions can
be replaced in a modular way, without impairing the analysis of
the model. Indeed, in standard neoclassical models one cannot
simply replace the optimization assumption with another one just
because the model does not behave well, as that would possibly
destroy its analytical solvability. This is not so in ABMs: assump-
tions—or simply small elements of them—can be taken out of the
shelf and easily implemented in the model thanks to the flexibility
of computer programming languages.
Empirics. As discussed above, ABMs can be thought as generators
of alternative worlds, i.e. theoretical DGPs that approximate the
unknown one. Contrary to neoclassical models, the structure of
ABMs allows to take them to the data more easily. This can be done
in two ways. First, one can validate the inputs of ABMs, i.e. fine-
tune modeling assumptions about individual behaviors and inter-
actions to make them more similar to the observed ones. Second,
one can validate the model on the output side, by e.g. restricting
the space of parameters, individual behaviors and interactions, and
initial conditions to those that allow the model to replicate the
stylized facts of interest. This allows for a degree of realism that is
much higher than that exhibited by e.g. DSGE models. Further-
more, thanks to the theoretical flexibility discussed above, the set
of stylized facts that one can target can include more than one
piece of evidence, as instead happens in neoclassical models. In
other words, each neoclassical model is typically built—in order to
retain analytical solvability—to explain one or two single stylized
facts (see the discussion in Aoki, 2006, for more details). On the
contrary, each ABM can easily explain a great deal of pieces of
empirical evidence at the same time.
 But how can one actually conduct policy experiments in
ABMs? In a very natural way, indeed. Take again the procedure for
ABM descriptive analysis outlined in Figure 1. Recall that micro
and macro parameters can be designed in such a way to mimic real-
world key policy variables like tax rates, subsidies, interest rates,
money, etc. and other key behavioral measures affecting indivi-
dual incentives in growth, innovation or technologically-related
policies. Moreover, initial conditions might play the role of initial
endowments and therefore describe different distributional setups.
Giorgio Fagiolo and Andrea Roventini98In addition, interaction and behavioral rules employed by
economic agents can be easily devised so as to represent alternative
institutional, market or industry setup. Since all these elements
can be freely interchanged, one can investigate a huge number of
alternative policy experiments and rules, the consequences of
which can be assessed either qualitatively or quantitatively (e.g.,
by running standard statistical tests on the distributions of the
statistics in S). For example, one might statistically test whether
the effect on the moments of the individual consumption distribu-
tion (average, etc.) will be changed (and if so by how much) by a
percentage change in any given consumption tax rate. Most
importantly, all this might be done while preserving the ability of
the model to replicate existing macroeconomic stylized facts (e.g.
some time-series properties of observed aggregate variables such as
persistence of output growth-rate fluctuations, relative standard
deviations, cross-correlations, etc.), as well as microeconomic
empirical regularities (e.g. firm size distributions, firm productivty
dynamics, firm investment patterns, etc.).
4. Macroeconomic policy in ABMs: A survey
Thanks to their flexibility, the number of agent-based models
dealing with policy issues is increasing fast over time.26 This
success is partly due to the fact that policy makers appear to be
more and more willing to believe in results stemming from
detailed simulation models (such as ABMs), where the underlying
economic structure can be observed,27 rather than in general
insights produced by quite abstract mathematical models such as
DSGE ones.
The number of ABMs addressing policy issues is becoming so
large, that a survey of the whole literature would be beyond the
scope of this paper. ABMs have indeed been employed in many
different policy arenas such as economic growth, industrial
dynamics, market design, environmental regulation, traffic
management, etc. We then decide to restrict our attention to ABMs
26. See for example the papers contained in the special issue ''Agent-Based Models for
Economic Policy Design'' edited by Dawid and Fagiolo (2008).
27. Moss (2002) discusses the importance of involving the actual decision makers in the process
of the generation of agent-based models for policy evaluation.
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what the agent-based literature can say on the current Great
Recession and to provide a straightforward comparison with DSGE
models. More specifically, in what follows we classify agent-based
models in four macroeconomic policy areas, namely fiscal policy,
monetary policy, bank regulation, and central bank independence.
Fiscal policy. The Great Recession has rewaked interest for
employing fiscal policies to tackle economic downturns. An advan-
tage of agent-based models vis-à-vis mainstream ones is the possi-
bility to jointly study the short- and long-run impact of fiscal
policies. Dosi et al. (2010) try to do so developing an ABM, bridging
Keynesian theories of demand-generation and Schumpeterian
theories of technology-fueled economic growth (the K+S model).
The model is populated by capital-good firms, consumption good-
firms, consumers/workers and a public sector. Capital-good firms
perform R&D and sell heterogeneous machine tools to consump-
tion-good firms. Consumers supply labor to firms and fully
consume the income they receive. The government levies taxes
and it provides unemployment benefits. The model is able to endo-
genously generate growth and business cycles and to replicate an
ensemble of stylized facts concerning both macroeconomic dyna-
mics (e.g. cross-correlations, relative volatilities, output distribu-
tions) and microeconomic ones (firm size distributions, firm
productivity dynamics, firm investment patterns). After having
been empirically validated according to the output generated, the
K+S model is employed to study the impact of fiscal policies (i.e.
tax rate and unemployment benefits) on average GDP growth rate,
output volatility and unemployment rate. The authors find that
Keynesian fiscal policies are a necessary condition for economic
growth and they can be successfully employed to dampen
economic fluctuations.28 Moreover, Dosi et al. (2012) find a strong
interaction between income distribution and fiscal policies: the
more income distribution is skewed toward profits, the greater the
effects of fiscal policies.
The assessment of alternative uses (demand vs. supply policies)
of resources collected through taxation is explored in Russo et al.
28. More generally, the model of Dosi et al. (2010) highlights a strong complementarity
between Keynesian policies affecting demand and Schumpeterian policies affecting innovation.
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boundedly-rational firms and consumers/workers interact accor-
ding to random matching protocols. The model delivers sustained
growth characterized by fluctuations and reproduce micro and
macro regularities such as Beveridge, Phillips and Okun curves,
firm growth-rate distributions, etc. On the policy side, they find
that average output growth rate is non-monotonically linked to
the tax rate levied on corporate profits if revenues are employed to
finance R&D investment, whereas growth is negatively affected if
the money raised through taxes is employed to provide unemploy-
ment benefits.
Finally, the interactions between different expectation-forma-
tion mechanisms and fiscal and monetary policies is studied in the
ABM developed by Haber (2008). The model is characterized by the
presence of households, firms, banks, a government and a central
bank, and it is calibrated in order to produce ''reasonable'' time
series for GDP, consumption, unemployment and the inflation
rate. The presence of positive fiscal (lower tax rate) and monetary
shocks (higher money target) increases GDP growth and inflation
and reduce unemployment. The introduction of more sophisti-
cated assumptions about expectations reduce the effects of fiscal
policy, whereas it increases the impact of monetary policy.
Monetary policy. DSGE models mostly deal with monetary
policy, searching for the best monetary rule. At the same time the
current Great Recession has showed that monetary policy alone is
not sufficient to put economies back on their steady growth path.
Agent-based models can be employed to assess the effects and the
limits of monetary policy and to compare the ensuing results with
policy prescriptions suggested by DSGE models.
Dosi et al. (2012) extend the K+S model introduced above by
adding a bank which collects the deposits of firms and provides
(costly) loans to financially constrained firms on a pecking-order
basis. The model is then employed to assess the effects of monetary
policy through changes in the interest rate and the impact of diffe-
rent bank regulatory frameworks (see the section below) preserving
its capability to reproduce macro and micro empirical regularities.
Simulation results show that higher economic inequalities increase
the volatility of output, the unemployment rate and the likelihood
of a severe crises, supporting the conjecture advanced by Fitoussi
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economic inequalities are at the root of the Great Recession. The
characteristics of the income distribution also affect the effecti-
veness of monetary policy. Monetary policy is very effective when
inequality is low and interest rates can have significant impact
both on output volatility and long-run growth. When income
inequality is high, however, the economy is stuck into a liquidity
trap where monetary policy is totally ineffective. Similarly,
Lengnick (2011) employs a short-run ABM to assess the short- and
long-run neutrality of money. More specifically, after checking the
capability of the model to reproduce some statistical regularities
(e.g. Phillips and Beveridge curves), a series of policy experiments
are run by stochastically increasing the money stock. The model
shows that money is neutral in the long-run but it affects output in
the short-run.
A growing set of agent-based models (Delli Gatti et al., 2005;
Oeffner, 2008; Raberto et al., 2008; Mandel et al., 2010) employ
Taylor rules to explore the effects of monetary policy on the
economy. In this respect, such policy analyses exercises are similar
to the ones conducted with DSGE models, but the complexity-
rooted approach of ABM can bring new insights. Delli Gatti et al.
(2005) build an artificial economy populated by firms, workers and
a central bank. The latter performs monetary policy employing
either a commitment strategy (i.e. fixed parameter Taylor rule) or
an adaptive, discretionary strategy (i.e. the parameters of the
Taylor rule change according to a genetic algorithm, mimicking a
learning process). Pervasive capital market imperfections imply
that monetary policy affects the economy through the credit
channel and that money is not neutral in the long-run. Simulation
results show that the Taylor principle does not hold and that the
adaptive rule outperforms the commitment one according to the
standard loss function criterium. Similarly, Raberto et al. (2008)
compare the effectiveness of a random monetary policy rule vis-á-
vis an output gap targeting one, finding that the latter rule can
improve social welfare and it outperforms the first one in stabili-
zing inflation. Oeffner (2008) engages in an accurate input-output
empirical validation procedure to study the properties of a mone-
tary ABM which embeds both Keynesian and Wicksellian features
(i.e. Taylor rule). He finds that monetary policy has real effect also
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trap endogenously generated by the model. Mandel et al. (2010)
develop a multi-sector, heterogenous-agent model, initialized
according to input-output tables, and they show that monetary
policy performed according to Taylor rule may lead to higher insta-
bility in the economy.
Finally, the effects of unconventional monetary policy are
explored in Cincotti et al. (2010). They develop and ABM based on
the EURACE platform to assess the effects of quantitative-easing
monetary policy, i.e. central bank finances government deficit
buying treasury bonds. The EURACE29 is a large-scale ABM aiming
at capturing the main characteristics of the European economy
and addressing European policy analyses (Deissenberg et al., 2008;
Dawid et al., 2011). Simulation results show that the performance
of the economy improves when expansionary fiscal policy and
quantitative-easing monetary policy are implemented. However,
such expansionary policies raise inflation and lead to higher
output volatility in the long-run.
Bank regulation. The flexibility of agent-based models is extre-
mely useful when policy maker want to test the impact of different
regulation frameworks on banks' behavior. For instance, one can
assess how different regulations affect the liquidity of the inter-
bank payment system or how alternative micro-prudential rules
impact on macroeconomic stability. The latter policy question is
addressed by Ashraf et al. (2011) with an ABM where heterogenous
firms interact with banks providing them credit. Banks are subject
to various regulations, such as capital-adequacy ratio and limits to
loan-to-value ratios. Simulations of the model, calibrated to U.S.
data, show that the economy can be hit by ''rare disasters'', where
the behavior of banks strongly affect macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Banks indeed can be an important ''financial stabilizers'' of
the economy, easing the entry of new firms and avoiding the
incumbents to go bankrupt. As a consequence, less strict micro-
prudential bank regulation (i.e. higher loan-to-value ratios and
lower capital-adequacy ratios) allows the economy to recover faster
29. More information are available on http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/vpl1/projects/eurace.
html. See also http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/vpl1/research/eurace-unibi.html for the current
Eurace@Unibi model.
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bank-augmented K+S model, higher loan-to-value ratios positively
affect macroeconomic growth when firms can rely less on internal
funds. Finally, employing the EURACE model, Raberto et al. (2011)
find that lower capital-adequacy ratios can spur growth in the
short-run, but the higher stock of private debt can lead to higher
firm bankruptcies, credit rationing and more serious economic
downturns in the long-run.
The modeling of the network structure of an economy has
never been embedded in DSGE models. This lack of consideration
has prevented these models to explain the emergence, the depth
and the diffusion of the current crisis, where the topological
properties of the credit market network have a fundamental role.
On the contrary, ABMs have started to study the links between
alternative network setups and macroeconomic performance. Delli
Gatti et al. (2010) develop an ABM populated by banks, financially
constrained downstream and upstream firms to study the proper-
ties of network-based financial accelerator. The topology of the
network is continuously evolving because firms can switch their
partner trying to finding better credit conditions (i.e. lower interest
rates). Simulation results show that the interactions of financially
constrained agents, occurring through the evolving credit
network, give rise to business cycles and to financial crises. Hence,
policy makers can try to design a structure for the credit network in
order to reduce the magnifying effect of the financial accelerator.
The resilience of the banking system to liquidity shocks is
studied by Gai et al. (2011) developing an agent-based model of the
interbank lending network where heterogenous banks are
randomly connected together though unsecured claims and repo
activity. The impact of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are then
analized for different network configurations, degrees of connecti-
vity between banks, haircut assumptions, and balance sheet
characteristics of financial institutions. The model shows that
greater degree of complexity and concentration in the bank
network augment the fragility of system, increasing the probability
of contagion phenomena and liquidity crises similar to the ones
experienced in the Great Recession. Policy experiments show
possible ways (e.g. tougher micro-prudential liquidity regulation,
countercyclical liquidity requirements) to reduce the network
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larly, Galbiati and Soramaki (2011) studied the efficiency of the
interbank payment system under alternative system configura-
tions. Their model shows that the efficiency of the payment
system increases if the number of banks is small and if they are
encouraged to provide more liquidity. Moreover, there are strong
economies of scale in payment activity (higher volumes reduce
total payment costs) calling for higher level of coordination and
regulation.
Central bank independence. Agent-based models can be employed
to study political economy issues related to the evolution of the
institutional role of central banks and to the way monetary policy
is announced to the public. Rapaport et al. (2009) study why
during the nineties many governments decided to delegate autho-
rity to their central banks, employing an ABM where heterogenous
countries decide whether introducing central bank independence
taking into account the behavior of their neighbors. Simulation
results, conducted under a Monte Carlo exploration of the para-
meter space, show that the emergence and the rate of adoption of
central bank independence is positively related to the size of the
zone of influence of the other countries.
The time-inconsistency problem faced by central banks is
analyzed in a more general framework by Arifovic et al. (2010)
using an ABM where the interaction between a boundedly-
rational, evolutionary learning policy maker and a population of
heterogenous agents determines the actual inflation rate. The
agents can either believe the inflation rate announced by the
central bank or employ an adaptive learning scheme to forecast
future inflation. The simulations of the calibrated model show that
the central bank learns to sustain an equilibrium with a positive,
but fluctuating fraction of ''believers'' and that this outcome is
Pareto superior to the equilibrium determined by standard models.
5. Concluding remarks 
The subprime mortgage crisis and the ensuing Great Recession
have prompted a debate about the state of macroeconomic theory.
Certainly, we stand in the camp of those arguing that macroecono-
mics have entered in a Dark Age (Krugman, 2011). Indeed, as
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dramatic problems and difficulties concerning their inner logic
consistency, the way they are taken to the data, the extent to
which they are able to replicate existing reality, and the realism of
their assumptions. These problems are so deep that impede DSGE
models even to conceive the possibility of the current crisis and to
propose possible solutions to policymakers. We think that such
difficulties are so hard to solve within the neoclassical paradigm
that a different research avenue, which attempts to replace the
basic pillars of neoclassical economics (rationality, equilibrium,
etc.), would be more fruitful.
This alternative paradigm does actually exist and it is called
agent-based computational economics (ACE). Section 3 has been
devoted to a (necessarily) brief discussion of its philosophical
underpinnings, building blocks and policy applications. As our
synthetic survey shows (cf. Section 4), the number of areas where
ACE policy experiments have been already applied with success is
rather vast and rapidly increasing. The discussion of Section 4 has
also outlined the most prominent values added deriving from
performing policy experiments within an ACE approach. These
include ACE's extreme modeling flexibility; the friendly relation of
agent-based models with empirical data; the easiness of carrying
out empirical-validation exercises; the almost infinite possibility of
experimentation; and, last but not least, the positive impact that a
more realistic and algorithmically-structured model can have on
political decision makers—as compared to obscure and un-intui-
tive mathematical neoclassical models.
Of course, as happens for the New Neoclassical Synthesis, many
issues are still far from being settled and the debate is very open.
Here, by a way of conclusion, we recall just three of them.
The first issue—which we can label as the problem of over-
parametrization—has to do with the role played by micro and
macro parameters in ABMs. As mentioned, ABMs are often over-
parameterized, for one typically injects in the specification of
agents' behavioral rules and interaction patterns many ingredients
in order to meet as much as possible what he/she observes in
reality. Suppose for simplicity that initial conditions do not
matter. Even if empirical validation can provide a way to reduce
free parameters, the researchers are almost always left with an ABM
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tions naturally arise. How can one interpret these different
parameterizations? Which one should be used if one employs the
model to deliver policy implications? Should one perfectly cali-
brate (if possible) the model using the data so that no free
parameters are left? Should policy implications be robust to alter-
native parameterizations instead? Notice that this issue is closely
related to a common critique that ABMs usually face: if an ABM
contains many free parameters and it is able to reproduce a given
set of stylized facts, how can one be sure that it represents the
minimal mechanisms capable of reproducing the same set of styl-
ized facts? This point reminds the ''unconditional objects'' critique
in Brock (1999) and it is certainly true for ''oversized'' ABMs. In
practice, however, ACE researchers are well aware of the problem
and always try to simplify as much as possible their model by using
empirical validation techniques and a KISS or TAPAS approach.
Even if it is very difficult to show that a given ABM is the minimal
model describing a set of stylized facts, the more stylized facts a
model can reproduce, the more one is able to restrict the class of
theoretical mechanisms that can do the job.
The second issue concerns the role played by initial conditions.
Recall that (if random ingredients are present in the model) any
ABM can be considered as an artificial (stochastic) data generation
process (mDGP) with which we try to approximate the one that
generated the data that we observe (i.e., the rwDGP). The question
is: is the rwDGP ergodic or not? If the underlying real-world rwDGP
is thought to be non-ergodic (as well as the theoretical mDGP
described in the AB model), then initial conditions matter. This
raises a whole host of problems for the modeler. The modeler
needs to identify the ''true'' set of initial conditions in the empirical
data, generated by the rwDGP, in order to correctly set the initial
parameters of the model. Even if the ''perfect database'' would exist,
this is a very difficult task. How far in the past does one need to go
in order to identify the correct set of initial values for the relevant
micro and macro variables? There is a possibility of infinite regress.
If this is the case, then one may need data stretching back a very
long time, possibly before data started to be collected.
This issue is closely related to a third (and final) one, regarding
the relation between simulated and real-world data. While in prin-
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like, in practice we may only have a few of such empirical realiza-
tions (possibly only one!). If we believe that the empirical
observations come from an underlying DGP that could have been
''played twice'' (i.e., could have generated alternative observations,
other than the one we have) the problem of comparing simulated
with empirical data becomes very complicated.
It must be said that all three issues above are the subject of
never-ending debates among philosophers of science, since they
raise fundamental questions related to probability, modeling, infe-
rence, etc. (see, e.g., Fagiolo et al., 2007b). As such, they might (and
do) affect any stochastic, dynamic (economic) model, DSGE-based
ones included. Nevertheless, the large majority of those advocating
the New Neoclassical Synthesis approach seems not to care about
them. In our view, the fact that they instead occupy center stage in
the current ACE debate is another signal of the vitality of this
young but promising paradigm.
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The restrictive assumptions imposed by the traditional methods of aggrega-
tion prevented so far a sound analysis of complex system of feedback between
microeconomic variables and macroeconomic outcomes. This issue seems to be
crucial in macroeconomic modelling, in particular for the analysis of financial
fragility, as conceived in the Keynesian and New Keynesian literature. In the
present paper a statistical mechanics aggregation method is applied to a finan-
cial fragility model. The result is a consistent representation of the economic
system that considers the heterogeneity of firms, their interactive behaviour and
the feedback effects between micro, meso and macro level. In this approach, the
impact of micro financial variables can be analytically assessed. The whole dyna-
mics is described by a system of dynamic equations that well mimics the
evolution of a numerically solved agent based model with the same features.
Keywords: Financial Fragility, Markov Dynamics, Heterogeneity, Mean-Field Interaction, Master Equation
The Representative Agent (RA) assumption is a methodolo-
gical shortcut to bypass the problem of dimensionality which arises
in heterogeneous agents model. The reasons for dissatisfaction
with the RA assumption are well known and have been forcefully
1. The authors gratefully acknowledge the insightful suggestions of an anonymous referee
which have improved the quality of the paper and led it to the present version.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
D. Delli Gatti, Di Guilmi, M. Gallegati and S. Landini 118discussed in Kirman (1992) and Keen (2011). The efforts to over-
come the limits of the exact aggregation (Gorman, 1953) led to
methods, such as Lewbel (1992), that are still too restrictive in their
basic assumptions to realistically depict an economic system.2
As a consequence of the dissatisfaction with the RA approach, a
few analytical frameworks have been developed to cope with the
dimensionality problem mentioned above. One of the most promi-
sing methods has been introduced by Duncan Foley and Masanao
Aoki who borrowed from statistical mechanics the concept of
mean-field interaction and imported it into economics.3
In the mean-field interaction approach, agents are classified
into clusters or sub-systems according to their state with respect to
one particular feature (the so-called micro-state, e.g. the level of
production for a firm on a scale of production levels). This cluste-
ring determines the characteristics and the evolution of the
aggregate (the macro-state, e.g. the total level of output).4 The
focus is not on the single agent, but on the number or fraction of
agents occupying a certain state of a state-space at a certain time.
These numbers or fractions are governed by a stochastic law, that
also defines the functional of the probability distributions of aggre-
gate variables and, if they exist, their equilibrium distributions.
The stochastic aggregation is then implemented through master
equation techniques, that allow for a description of the dynamics
of probability flows among states on a space. These probability
flows are originated by the changes in the conditions of agents and
determine the aggregate outcomes.5
This paper presents an application of mean-field interaction
and master equation on a model in which firms are heterogeneous
in terms of financial fragility, along the lines of Di Guilmi et al.
(2010). The degree of financial fragility, modelled à la Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1993) (GS henceforth), is the clustering device to clas-
sify firms and to develop the analytical solution of the model. The
2. For a review on aggregation methods see Gallegati et al. (2006) and Di Guilmi (2008).
3. See Foley (1994); Aoki (1996, 2002); Aoki and Yoshikawa (2006). Further developments of
these contributions are: Landini and Uberti (2008), Di Guilmi (2008) and Di Guilmi et al. (2011).
4. An early economic application of mean-field theory is Brock and Durlauf (2001).
5. Other applications of master equation in economics, besides the works cited above, can be
found in Weidlich and Braun (1992) and Garibaldi and Scalas (2010) among others. Alfarano
et al. (2008) and Alfarano and Milakovic (2009) offers a further contribution, in particular with
reference to agent based pricing models.
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with a higher order of heterogeneity and provides insights on the
interactions among the micro-units in the system. The analytical
solution to agent based models is the result of a functional-inferen-
tial method which identifies the most probable path of the system
dynamics. The method considers the heterogeneity, representing a
large number of agents, and the interaction among them, which
originates fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables about a
deterministic trend. Individual direct interaction is replaced by
indirect mean-field interaction between sub-systems, expressed in
terms of the transition rates of the master equations. In particular,
according to the local approximation method detailed below, an
explicit solution for the master equation is obtained. It yields the
analytical identification of an ordinary differential equation,
which describes the dynamics of the system trend, and a stochastic
differential equation, which quantifies the dynamics of the proba-
bility distribution of fluctuations. 
The successful application of the aggregation method can be a
contribution toward the adoption of a realistic new economic
paradigm in the direction suggested by Aoki. As shown in the last
section, in fact, the numerical simulation of a similar agent based
structure is well reproduced by the stochastic dynamics generated
by the master equation.6
The structure of the paper is the following: first, we specify the
hypotheses for the stochastic structure of the system (section 1)
and for the firms that compose it (section 2). In section 3, we
develop the framework, setting the dynamical instruments needed
for aggregation, and solve the model, determining the two equa-
tions that drive production trend and business fluctuations.
Section 4 presents a further result coming from the solution of the
master equation, stressing the relevance of indirect interaction
among agents in shaping macroeconomic outcomes. In section 5,
some results of computer simulations are presented. Section 6
concludes.
6. On this point see also Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011).
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The economy is populated by a fixed number N of firms, each
indexed by the subscript i. Agents clusters into micro-states accor-
ding to a quantifiable individual variable. Two micro-states are
defined. State 0 denotes agents characterised by a level of a chosen
feature above (or equal to) a certain threshold and 1 labels the state
of the rest of the population. In each cluster, therefore, there will
be a certain number (the so-called occupation number) of agents.
The occupation number of cluster j is Nj, j = 0,1. The occupation
numbers (N0(t), N1(t)) define the macro-state of the system. The
fraction of firms in micro-state j is nj = Nj / N where N0(t) + N1(t).
For the sake of tractability, within each cluster individual levels of
a certain variable are approximated by their mean-field values, i.e.
a specific statistic of the distribution of the variable itself.7 There-
fore, within each cluster heterogeneous agents (characterised by
different individual levels) are replaced with an homogeneous
agent characterised by this statistic (mean field approximation).
The notation adopted uses a continuous time reference because
it is more appropriate for complex systems settings, as remarked
among others by Hinich et al. (2006). Continuous time functionals
are appropriate at system level if we assume that the density of
discrete points is large enough within a sufficiently small reference
interval of time. This is due to the so-called principle of limiting
density of discrete points, introduced by Jaynes (1957) to match
Shannon's entropy with continuous distributions in information
and probability theory.8 For computational necessity, the nume-
rical simulations must refer to discrete time and, accordingly,
occupation numbers, as any other observable, become a discrete
time stochastic process. 
The probability for a firm of being in micro-state 1 is η: p(1) = η,
hence p(0) = 1 – η. In order to model the probabilistic flow of firms
7. For example, in our simulations, we adopt the median within each group, as specified in
section 5.
8. On this topic other interesting references are Smith (1993) and Milakovic (2001). Besides
the principle of limiting density of discrete points, modelling discrete time observables with
continuous time tools is acceptable when the simulation time, say T, is long enough such that
the calendar can be partitioned with sufficiently dense adjacent reference intervals of time of
order o(T) w.r.t. the calendar. This conjecture is considered as appropriate due to consistency of
analytical trajectories from master equations to experimental simulations.
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transition rates must be defined. The functional specification of
transition rates, i.e. transition probabilities per vanishing reference
unit of time, allows the occupation numbers to be modeled with
jump Markov processes.
The transition probability is the probability for a firm to switch
from one microstate to the other in a given instant. The transition
probability of moving from 0 to 1 is ζ while ι indicates the proba-
bility of the opposite transition. The transition rates quantify the
probability of observing a jump of one agent from one microstate
to another, conditional upon the initial microstate through time.
A transition rate is then given by the probability of a firm changing
state weighted by the probability of being in one particular starting
state. With reference to state 1, the transition rate for entry (from
state 0 into state 1) is indicated with λ while the one for exit (from
state 1 to state 0) is γ, defined as follows: 
λ = ζ(1 – η)
γ = ιη
(1)
This representation is phenomenological. Indeed, it allows
either for λ, γ and η to be constants or functionals of some state
variable.9 In case of only two micro-states, N being constant
through time, the attention is focused on only one occupation
number (for instance N1) to characterise the macro state of the
entire economy in a given instant, 1 ≤ Nk ≤ N: a realisation of the
stochastic process N1(t) on its support is denoted with N1(t) = Nk .
The transition rates determine the probability of observing a
certain occupation number at the aggregate level, i.e. a certain
macrostate of the system. Being N1(t) = Nk , within the length of a
vanishing reference unit of time Δ → 0+, the expected number of
transitions into the macrostate N1 is λ (N – Nk ) while the expected
number of transitions from macrostate N1 is γNk ; therefore, the
transition rates can be written as follows 
b(Nk ) = P (N1(t + Δ) = Nk +1 (t’) ⎜N1(t) = Nk (t)) = λ (N – Nk )
d(Nk ) = P (N1(t + Δ) = Nk –1 (t’) ⎜N1(t) = Nk (t)) = γ Nk (2)
9. In Appendix A the stochastic model results are discussed for both cases.
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''deaths'' (Nk –1 ← Nk ) rate functions of the stochastic process and
t’ – t = Δ.
2. Firms
This section presents the assumptions for the microeconomic
units of the system. The approach is the one pioneered by GS, and
implemented in a heterogeneous agents framework by Delli Gatti
et al. (2005). If not otherwise specified, variables indicated by small
letters refer to single firms while symbols in capital letters stand for
aggregate quantities, within the state if followed by the supers-
cripts 0 or 1 and economywide otherwise. 
2.1. Financial fragility as a clustering device
We assume that financially constrained firms are subject to iid
shocks to revenue and, therefore, they run the risk of bankruptcy if
revenue fall short of pre-incurred costs. In this setting the optimal
scale of activity for the firm is constrained by its net worth due to
bankruptcy risk. The firm's probability of bankruptcy depends
upon its equity ratio, i.e. the ratio of net worth to assets.
In the present paper this approach has been followed in a
somewhat stylised way. The economy is populated by a fixed
number N of firms which agglomerate into clusters depending on
the level of individual equity ratio αi = ai / ki , i = 1, 2,... N, where ai
is net worth10 and ki total assets (physical capital). The threshold
 divides the populations of firms in two clusters: firms in state 0
(whose occupation number is N0), characterised by , are
financially robust while firms in state  (whose occupation number
is N1). characterised by , are financially fragile and exposed
to the risk of bankruptcy. Within each cluster, individual levels of
the equity ratio are approximated by their mean-field values α0
and α1 respectively.
In order to keep the number of firms N constant, each
bankrupted firm is replaced by a new one which, by assumption,
enters the system in state 1. The probability of being fragile is η
10. Equity or own capital are assumed synonyms of net worth.
α
αα ≥i
αα <i
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the economy. Hence the rate of exit from the system is μη. Of
course, due to the one-to-one replacement assumption, μη repre-
sents also the rate of entry into the system.
2.2. Technology, costs and prices
Each firm employs physical capital as the only input in produc-
tion. Therefore, the production function of the i-th firm is: 
qi (t) = (2ki (t))1/2 (3)
and the capital requirement function is: 
ki (t) = 1/2 (qi (t)/2 (4)
 Firms can finance capital with previously retained profits (net
worth). When internal funds are not sufficient, firms resort to
loans: bi (t) = ki (t) – ai (t). Debt commitments in real terms are
rbi (t), where r is the real interest rate.11 For the sake of simplicity
the interest rate is constant and uniform across firms.
The firm has no market power (it is a price taker) but is opera-
ting in an uncertain environment. The price  Pi (t’) of the t’-th firm
at time t’—i.e. when the output is actually sold—is equal to the
average or market price P(t) at time t—i.e. when the output is
produced and ready for sale—subject to an idiosyncratic multipli-
cative shock : 
(6)
The random variable  s.t. u1 > u0 > 0 and
. Its support can be any positive neighbourhood of 1: in
this paper it has been chosen to set  within [u0 = 0.75;
u1 = 1.25].12
2.3. Profit, net worth and bankruptcy
The law of motion of net worth (in real terms) is: 
ai (t’) = ai (t) + πi (t’) (7)
11. By hypothesis, the return on own capital is equal to the interest rate r, so that the firm's
financing costs are:  
r(bi (t) + ai (t)) = rki (t) (5)
12. Due to the normalisation procedure detailed below, the choice of the support for  does
not affect probabilities.
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(8)
A firm goes bankrupt when ai (t’) reaches the zero threshold, i.e.
when 
πi (t’) = –ai (t) (9)
Substituting (8) into (9), and solving for (t’), the bankruptcy
threshold level of the shock is 
(10)
Notice that, by construction, the threshold level of the shock
occurring at t’ is a function of variables defined at time t’. If the
shock , then equity becomes negative (or zero) and the
firm goes bankrupt.
Since , and recalling (4), Equation (10) reads as:
(11)
The random variable  has support [0.75;1.25], therefore,
denoting with F the cdf of (t’), the probability of bankruptcy μi
for firm i is 
(12)
Every firm which goes bankrupt has to bear bankruptcy costs
Ci (t), non-linearly increasing with firm size, 
Ci (t) = c(qi (t))2      0 < c < 1 (13)
As discussed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990), bankruptcy costs
hold to the borrower. They are due to legal and administrative
costs incurred during the bankruptcy procedure and to the reputa-
tional costs for the managers of a firm which goes bankrupt. These
reputational costs are assumed to be increasing with the scale of
production.
2.4. Output
Following GS, we assume that at time t the firm (optimally)
decides the quantity to produce which will be sold at t’ in condi-
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problem of the firm at t consists in maximising an objective func-
tion V which is equal to expected profits at t’, net of bankruptcy
costs, subject to the production function (3): 
(14)
(15)
Since  assuming that agents consider the expected
probability of bankruptcy at time t’ equal to the one at time t, the
problem above boils down to the following: 
(16)
(17)
where the time index has been removed to simplify notation.
Firms in state 0 know that their probability of bankruptcy is
. Hence, for financially robust firms, the problem is: 
(18)
(19)
which solves with q0 = r–1 being r given and q0 constant
through time. Financially fragile firms know that they run the risk
of bankruptcy. Due to the mean-field approximation, the probabi-
lity of bankruptcy for firms in state 1 is constant across agents.
Hence the optimisation problem becomes: 
(20)
(21)
and the solution is  
q1 = (r + 2cμ)–1 (22)
Note that μ is indeed defined at time t and time dependent so
that also  q1  is time dependent. Aggregate production is: 
Y = Y1 q1 + N0 q0  (23)
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numbers. Plugging the above obtained results into this definition,
aggregate output can be expressed as 
(24)
From Equation (24), it is clear that business fluctuations are
driven by (i) the probability of bankruptcy μ and (ii) the dynamics
of the occupation numbers. The impact of financial fragility on the
aggregate may be better appreciated by reformulating Equation
(24) as follows 
(25)
where . 
While N and r are given, each factor in the product ξ V1 is defined
at time t and time dependent. N1 can be considered a macroeco-
nomic indicator of the financial fragility of the system; in (25) it is
weighted by ξ, which is a function of the probability μ. Therefore,
the dynamics of aggregate production appears to be determined by
the micro and macro level of financial distress of the economy.
2.5. Transition probabilities
The probability of bankruptcy μi can be expressed as 
(26)
By assumption, only firms in state 1 are exposed to the risk of
bankruptcy. It is expected firms lumped in cluster 1, the group of
financially fragile firms, have the following bankruptcy threshold: 
(27)
Hence 
According to equation (26), it is possible to quantify the equity
ratio threshold , which is the minimum level of the equity ratio
that ensures the firm's survival (i.e. μ = 0),13  and can be expressed
as
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Since q1 is time dependent, the threshold  also evolves over
time.
The transition probabilities ζ (i.e. the probability of moving
from 0 to 1) and ι (i.e. the probability of moving from 1to 0) can be
expressed as variables depending on the price shock , with
the appropriate critical values  and 
(29)
The explicit formulation for transition probabilities is therefore 
(30)
(31)
3. Dynamic analysis and solution
This section introduces the master equation, which is the
fundamental tool in the analytical solution process, and the main
result of its asymptotic solution.
13. It is now straightforward identifying an upper bound for the total credit demand
B = B0 + B1, where B0 and B1 are the total demands for each group of firms. Given the optimal
levels of capital for each cluster of firms, namely k1 and k0, the quantity of credit demanded
reaches its maximum when α1 and α0 reach their minimum. Note that α1 cannot go below r –
2.5/q1, at which value μ becomes equal 1. By definition, the minimum level for α0 is
. For these values it follows that: 
Consequently, the demand of credit must be smaller than or equal to: 
that cannot grow indefinitely since q0= 1/r and q1 < q0 as shown below.
1= 1.5 /r qα −
( )
( )1211
)1(min1
1
20
0
0
2.5/1
2
)(=lim
1.5/1
2
)(=lim
qrqB
qrqB
+−
+−
→
→
αα
αα
0 2 1 2
0 1
1 1
( ) 1.5 ( ) 2.5( ) = 1 1
2 2
q qmax B N r N r
q q
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
− + + − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎜
1
21
1
0
0 2.51
2
)1.(=)(max
q
rqB
1
1.5=
q
r −α
α
)(~ tui
)(tuζ )(tuι
[ ]
[ ] )()()(
2
)(>)(~
)()()(
2
)()(~
1
1
0
0
tuttrtqtu
tuttrtqtu
i
i
ι
ζ
αα
αα
≡−+
≡−+≤
1.5)(2=))()(~(=)( −≤ tututupt ζζζ
2.5)(2=))()(~(1=)( +−≤− tututupt ιιι
D. Delli Gatti, Di Guilmi, M. Gallegati and S. Landini 1283.1. Aggregate dynamics
The solution of the model requires the specification of aggre-
gate output dynamics. As shown by equations (24) and (25),
aggregate output depends on a stochastic process, whose outcome
is given by the occupation numbers N0 and N1. It is assumed that
the stochastic process is a jump Markov process and its macro
dynamics is analytically explored by means of the master equa-
tion, i.e. a differential equation that describes the dynamics of the
probability distribution of a system of agents over its state space
through time. The master equation can be primarily specified as a
balance flow equation between probability inflows and outflows in
and from a generic macro-state.
The state variable N1 (t) = Nk  is the number of fragile firms,
those in state 1. The variation of probability in a vanishing refe-
rence unit of time is 
(32)
with boundary conditions: 
(33)
The variation of probability defined in the equation above is
defined as the sum of inflow-births from Nk –1 and inflow-deaths
from Nk +1 less outflows from Nk  due to births and deaths. Finally,
the boundary conditions ensure a consistent value for the probabi-
lity P(Nk ). Therefore, in order to identify the dynamics of firms
and production, Equation (32) must be solved.
3.2. Master equation's solution: stochastic dynamics of trend 
and fluctuations
As shown by (Gardiner, 1985; Risken, 1989), a direct solution of
the master equation is possible only under restrictive assumptions.
Inspired by van Kampen (2007), Aoki (1996, 2002) and Aoki and
Yoshikawa (2006) suggest a method to overcome this problem
which consists in splitting the control variable into the drift and
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of this method appears of particular interest in this context as it
allows to analytically identify both the trend and the fluctuations
distribution of aggregate production. More precisely, the fraction
of firms in state 1 in a given instant is assumed to be determined by
its expected value (m), the drift, and an additive fluctuations
component of order  N1/2  around this value, that is the spread: 
(35)
Once the master equation has been modified accordingly, that
is in terms of s rather than of Nk , it can be solved using approxima-
tion methods. As shown in Appendix A, the asymptotically
approximated solution of the master equation is given by the
following system of coupled equations: 
(36)
(37)
where Q(s(t),t) = P(N1(t),t) is substituted into (32) to reformulate
the master equation as a function of the spread s. Equation (35) is
an ordinary differential equation which displays a logistic dyna-
14. The authors are aware that this method presents some drawbacks. First of all, van
Kampen's method develops a local approximation suitable to be applied only when the
underlying observable has a unimodal distribution, as the case under study in this paper.
Secondly, by allowing for a second order approximation it ends up with a Fokker-Planck
equation which solves into a Gaussian distribution for fluctuations: in the present paper it is
shown that this is not the distribution for the state variable but only for its spreading
fluctuations about the drift. Thirdly, when fluctuations are not of the order of the square root
of N, higher order moments might not vanish asymptotically and thus leading to non-
Gaussian distributions. This last aspect can be found when dealing with microscopic models
grounded on global interactions, which is not the case under study, or when mean-field
approached are not very suitable, see Castello et al. (2006) and Stauffer et al. (2006) on this
issue. Despite these limits, this method is adopted for different reasons. First of all it is
relatively easy to handle, as shown in the present paper. In particular, if one is interested in
macroscopic dynamics of a given quantity or an aggregation procedure, it does not require to
provide a solution to the master equation in terms of the probability distribution of the state
variable. The aim is to find the equations for the drift and spread only. Secondly, it allows for a
complete description of the stochastic aggregate dynamics in terms of transition rates and
related parameters, such as transition probabilities at micro-level, which can be analytically
obtained from the underlying agent based model. Third: if one is allowed to assume the van
Kampen's ansatz (34) and mean-field interaction, rather than global, is considered, then the
needed condition for a suitable second order approximation are met. The method is here
developed following Landini and Uberti (2008) and Di Guilmi et al. (2011).
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D. Delli Gatti, Di Guilmi, M. Gallegati and S. Landini 130mics for the drifting component. Equation (36) is a second order
partial differential equation, known as the Fokker-Planck equation,
that drives the density of the spreading component s. The dyna-
mics converge to the steady state values: setting the l.h.s. of (35) to
0, the stable steady-state value for m is 
(37)
Then, by integration of (35) with an initial condition
m(0) = m0 we get: 
(38)
This equation describes the dynamics of the fraction m of firms
occupying state 1 at each point in time. It is fully dependent on
transition rates. The stationary solution of the equation for the
spread component (see Appendix B) yields the distribution func-
tion Q for the spread s, thus determining the probability
distribution of fluctuations: 
(39)
which looks like a Gaussian density, dependent only on transition
probabilities. Given the relationship among m and total produc-
tion, the dynamics of our economy is now fully described by
having at hands a differential equation for output dynamics, its
equilibrium value, and a probability function for business fluctua-
tions around the trend.
4. Interaction and output dynamics: the stochastic financial 
contagion
This section shows how the transition rates provide a functional
representation of the interaction of firms within each cluster and
of the feedback effects between the macro and the micro-level of
our stylised economy. The first subsection proposes and endoge-
nous formulation for the probability η, which makes possible a re-
interpretation of the formula for aggregate output and the transi-
tion rates, as illustrated in the second subsection.
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An important result derived by the asymptotic solution of the
master equation concerns the theoretical probability η of being in
state 1. In particular it is possible to identify a functional form that
quantifies the impact of indirect interaction among firms. By defi-
nition, the steady-state condition implies that the probability of
in-flows is equal to the probability of out-flows for all possible
states. Analytically it means a null value for the r.h.s. of the master
equation. This condition is defined as detailed balance.15 Provided
that detailed balance holds for each pair of macro-states, Appendix
C shows that the stationary probability for a given macro state
Pe (Nk ) is 
(40)
The probability Pe (Nk ) can be also expressed in Gibbs form,16
and a Gibbs functional form for the probability η  is 
(41)
where: 
(41’)
The symbol  stands for the average production Y(t) / N. The
probability of being in state 1 in a given instant depends on three
factors: the number of firms already occupying the state, N1; the
parameter β, which measures the impact on total output of the
relative financial distress of firms; the function g(N1), which quan-
tifies the average difference in the optimal levels of production.
The circular feedback effects are displayed by Equation (41): the
macro-to-micro effect captures the link of the behaviour of a firm
15. It is worth stressing that the detailed balance does not imply that agents do not switch
between the micro-states, but that inflows and outflows for each micro-state balance out.
16. The equivalence is demonstrated by the Hammersley and Clifford theorem which states
that for each Markov random field there exists one and one only Gibbs random field (Clifford,
1990).
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D. Delli Gatti, Di Guilmi, M. Gallegati and S. Landini 132to the state of the economy; the bottom-up or micro-to-macro
effect, on the other hand, determines the aggregate performance
by the number of firms with lower output and by the relative diffe-
rence in optimal outputs, captured by g(N1) and β. Therefore, by
means of equation (41), the whole dynamics of the system can be
interpreted as the result of indirect interaction among firms and of
the feedback effects between macro, meso and micro level.
4.2. Output dynamics
Making use of equations (25) and (37), the steady-state value of
aggregate production, Ye, can be expressed as: 
(42)
Equation (42) highlights two factors that influence production
dynamics: the difference between firms' optimal production levels
and the transition rates. The first component is determined by the
exogenous parameter c, that reflects institutional conditions, and
by the probability of bankruptcy μ, that is the result of the relative
financial condition of financially distressed firms, being a function
of the difference between their equity ratio α1 and the ''safety''
level α.
The transition rates component is the result of a micro factor
(the relative financial conditions of the two types of firms) and of a
macro factor (the general financial situation of the system,
revealed by the number of firms in each state), as shown by equa-
tions (1) and (30). The formulation of λ and γ under detailed
balance condition helps in clarifying further the point. Substitu-
ting equations (30) and (41) in equations (1), we obtain: 
(43)
(44)
The micro factor is quantified by  and , that, as shown in
equations (29), reflect the difference between  and the mean-
field variables α1 and α0. This effect is amplified by the macro
factor  that, in turn, is dependent on the occupation numbers and
on the relative difference in optimal levels of production. The
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Reconstructing aggregate dynamics in heterogeneous agents models 133joint effect of these variables gives rise to a mechanism that can be
defined as stochastic financial contagion, given that a worsening
in micro financial conditions raises both the probability of
bankruptcy and the probability of entering state 1. 
The solution reveals that the dynamics of the economy is
dependent on the distribution of agents and on its evolution.
Given the inherent uncertainty of these dynamics, all the func-
tional relationship are expressed as probability functions.
Therefore, the dynamics of the system appears to be fully
stochastic, and the steady-state level of production cannot be
considered as a natural equilibrium.
5. Simulations
In order to visualize the actual dynamics of the system and
check the reliability of the stochastic approximation, Monte Carlo
simulations have been performed. The agent based model have
been simulated with fully heterogeneous firms according to the
hypothesis detailed in section 2. Then mean-field variables α1 and
α0 as the medians of the equity ratios within each cluster have
been calculated. These values are the input of the stochastic dyna-
mics procedure, performed according to the structure of section 1.
The simulation has been repeated 1000 times, drawing a new set of
random numbers for each replication. The number of firms is
N = 300 and the parameter c is set equal to 1.
To appreciate the volatility endogenously generated by the
system, figure 1 displays the symmetric dynamics of low-equity
firms and aggregate production for a single replication. The
convergent evolution of n1 is driven by equation (38) with fluctua-
tions around the trend distributed according to (39). Its dynamics
fully explains the growth of aggregate production and the business
fluctuations. The higher volatility in the series of output is due to
the shocks in price.
Figure 2 compares the agent based results with its stochastic
approximation in the initial stages of the adjustment process.
Agent based trend dynamics are well mimicked by the stochastic
approximation. The fluctuations generated by the two procedures
cannot match, as in the latter they are the outcome of a random
variable. Nevertheless, the amplitudes of volatility are comparable.
D. Delli Gatti, Di Guilmi, M. Gallegati and S. Landini 134The result is satisfactory as the average variance of the time series is
.0068 for agent based and .0063 for the stochastic approximation.
Figure 1. Trends and fluctuations for value of aggregate production (left scale) 
and n1 (right scale). Single replication 
Figure 2. Dynamics for n1 for agent based simulation (red dotted line) 
and stochastic approximation (black dashed line for trend and continuous blue line 
for fluctuations). Single replication
Reconstructing aggregate dynamics in heterogeneous agents models 135The dynamics of the two series obtained by the Monte Carlo
simulation over 1000 replications are displayed in figure 3. They
overlap for almost all the periods, although the adjustment process
to the steady state is shorter for the stochastic approximation. Their
significant correlation is .96. Thus, the stochastic dynamics proves
reliable for an analytical representation of more complex and diver-
sified structure. The simplification to the two states approximation
does not seem to reduce the accuracy of the solution.
Figure 3. Dynamics for n1 for agent based simulation (red dotted line) 
and stochastic approximation (black continuous line). Monte Carlo simulation 
with 1000 replications
Figure 4. Relationship between β  and n1
D. Delli Gatti, Di Guilmi, M. Gallegati and S. Landini 136The variable β, which enters the definition of transition rates, is
inversely related to the number of financially fragile firms, as
shown by figure 4. Hence, it represents an inverse index of the
systemic financial fragility. According to Equation (42), the aggre-
gate output is expected to be higher for lower level of N1 and, thus,
higher β. This result is confirmed by the simulation and illustrated
in figure 5. The same graph reveals that the performance of the
economy is also dependent on the shape of the distribution of the
net worth, as lower levels of standard deviation for a appear to be
associated to a larger aggregate production.
6.   Concluding remarks
This work proposes a solution to the problem of the aggregation
of heterogeneous agents in a dynamical context by applying a
method which analytically identifies the components of macroe-
conomic dynamics, namely, trend and fluctuations. It is worth
stressing that the long run steady-state of production cannot
properly be defined as natural equilibrium. From the methodolo-
gical point of view, the main contribution of the present work is
the identification of a differential equation for trend and a proba-
bility distribution function for the fluctuations of the aggregate
production by means of the asymptotic solution of the master
equation. All the variables that appear in these two formulations
Figure 5. Countour plot of the aggregate output as a function of the standard 
deviation of net worth distribution and β
Reconstructing aggregate dynamics in heterogeneous agents models 137are endogenous and provide an analytical representation of the
interaction among agents and the feedback effects that arise
among the different levels of aggregation within the system. In
particular, both the probability for a firm to reduce its production
as a consequence of the risk of failure and the actual probability of
bankruptcy are dependent on the financial distress of the other
firms in the system, measured by the number of firms with low
equity ratio and by the mean-field approximations of the equity
ratios. Aggregate production is itself dependent on the ratio among
debt and equities of each firm, and this gives rise to feedback
effects between micro and macro levels of the system. The overall
effect can be defined as stochastic financial contagion. 
 This methodology appears as particularly suitable for models
where the micro financial variables have a relevant impact on the
macroeconomy. In such a way, the modelling of the links among
financial fragility, business cycles and growth dynamics can be
consistently microfounded, taking into account the heterogeneity
of firms' financial variables and the interaction among agents and
between agents and the macro level of the system. However, the
actual range of application of this body of tools extends to all the
contexts in which the heterogeneity of agents and their interac-
tion cannot be neglected or reduced in order to represent, e. g., the
efficacy of an economic policy measure or the transmission mecha-
nism of a shock. All in all, the whole of macroeconomics.
The limitation to the heterogeneity does not seem to impact on
the performance of the model that proves capable to replicate the
behaviour of an analogous agent based model, with no restrictions
on the heterogeneity of firms.
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This appendix develops the method involved to reach a mean-
filed system of coupled equations for the drift and the spread of the
state variable in the master Equation (32). According to (34) for a
fixed  it follows that 
(A.1)
Accordingly, the master equation (ME) (32) can be rewritten a
function of the state variable s. The fact that Nk is fixed does not
mean that it is constant but just that we focus out attention on it as
a specific realization of N1(t); Accordingly, from (A.1) it follows that
(A.2)
hence the l.h.s. of (32) reads as 
(A.3)
being P(N1(t) = Nk ) = Q(s(t)). In order to find a suitable expression
for the r.h.s. of (32), transition rates are written as follows 
(A.4)
(A.5)
where θ = 0 means outflow and θ = 1 inflow, consistently with the
phenomenological ME (32).
The lead (+) and lag (–) operators are defined as
(A.6)
where 
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Hence it follows that 
(A.9)
(A.10)
 Therefore, by using (A.9) and (A.10) into the r.h.s. of (32) it
follows that 
(A.11)
which is the ME to be solved. The solution is approximated as (A.6)
involves Taylor's polynomials to approximate probability flows
about Nk.
Rescaling time as , with a second order approxi-
mation it follows 
(A.12)
where, for notation convenience, t stands for r. Expression (A.12) is
a Fokker-Planck equation, equivalent to the approximation one
gets with the Kramers-Moyal expansion if Pawulas' theorem does
not allow for a closed form solution (see Risken, 1989; Gardiner,
1985; Di Guilmi et al., 2011), and coefficients are given by 
(A.13)
Case 1. If transition rates in (2) have birth (λ) and death (γ) rates
constant through time, by substituting (A.13) into (A.12) accor-
ding to (A.4) and (A.5) with θ = 0, after having computed
derivatives and collected terms with powers of N, it happens that
as  N−p/2 → 0 as N → ∞ ∀p≥ 2 hence, by using the polynomial iden-
tity principle, it can be found that 
(A.14)
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macroscopic equation: its solution provides the most probable drif-
ting path trajectory for . The (A.14–ii) is the Fokker-
Planck equation for the probability distribution of spreading fluc-
tuations about the drift. Both admit a closed form solution
allowing for a solution of the ME (A.11) equivalent to (32).
Case 2. In the case of this model, the transition rates have birth
and death rates which change over time. Therefore, the following
externality functions are introduced in order to model their
evolution
(A.15)
(A.16)
Therefore, since N1(t) = Nk , (A.15) and (A.16) can be substituted
into (A.4) and (A.5) with θ = 0 to get an expression for (A.13) with
the modification of transition rates just highlighted. Subse-
quently, after the derivatives have been computed, the terms with
the same order of powers for N are collected such that N−p/2 → 0 as
N→ ∞ ∀p≥ 2. By applying the polynomial identity principle it
then follows that 
(A.17)
where the macroscopic equation (A.17–i) gives a logistic dynamics.
The non linearity is due to the rate functions (A.15) and (A.16)
which account for external field effects on transition rates (A.4)
and (A.5).
The macroscopic equation (A.17–i) is an ODE, hence with an
initial condition  m(0) = m0 = N1(0)=N  it allows for a logistic dyna-
mics with multiple equilibria: . The stable equilibrium
is  and the general solution is 
(A.18)
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i.e. most probable, drifting path.   
Appendix B
 Herein a solution for the Fokker-Planck equation (A.17–ii) is
found in terms of Q(s). Using  to indicate the stationary proba-
bility for , by setting  it follows that 
By direct integration it gives
(B.1)
By substituting for  m* =  ζ  / ζ + ι) it can be found that
(B.2)
being  a normalization constant. 
Since the variance is a function of ζ and ι, which are time depen-
dent, this representation allows for stochastic determinism. That is,
the stationary solution for the distribution of spreading fluctua-
tions still performs some vibrating volatility due to the exchange of
agents between the two states. These exchanges let the volumes
almost constant on expectation through time when approaching
the stable equilibrium, but fluctuations depend on who is jumping
because agents jump from one state to another carrying their own
characteristics and endowments. Unfortunately these individual
jumps are unobservable, and agents are indistinguishable, from a
macroscopic point of view. Nevertheless, it known it happens and
this let macroscopic observables to vibrate about some equilibrium
path. On the other hand, equilibrium itself is a state of nature for
the system as a whole, it is not a property of its elementary consti-
tuents; equilibrium is a probability distribution for agents over a
space of states and not a point of balance of two forces.
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The basic steps for deriving of the steady state probability are
here sketched, referring the interested reader to the cited refe-
rences. Stationary probability can be obtained by applying Brook's
lemma (Brook, 1964) which defines local characteristic of conti-
nuous Markov chains. Hammersley and Clifford demonstrate that,
under opportune conditions, for each Markov random field there
is one and only one Gibbs random field, and define the functional
form for the conjunct probability structure once the neighbou-
rhood relations have been identified (Clifford, 1990). The expected
stationary probability (40) of the Markovian process for N1, when
detailed balance holds, can be expressed by: 
(C.1)
where U(x) is the Gibbs potential and can be defined as a func-
tional of the local dynamic characteristics of the state variable Nk .
In particular: 
(C.2)
The above formulation leads (Aoki, 2002) to an explicit formu-
lation for the probability η as a function of the state variable N1: 
(C.3)
where g(N1) is a function that evaluates the relative difference in
the outcome as a function of N1. β may be interpreted as an inverse
measure of the system uncertainty. The uncertainty among the
different possible configurations in a stochastic system can be
evaluated through a statistical entropy measure (Balian, 1991). The
quantification of the parameter β can be obtained by maximising
the statistical entropy of the system (Jaynes, 1957). In the present
case the problem is configured as follows: 
(C.4)
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probability function. The second ensures that all the wealth in the
system is generated by firms in the two kind of states. The solution
of the maximisation problem (for details see Di Guilmi, 2008)
yields 
(C.5)
Large values of β associated with positive values of g(N1) cause
η(N1) to be larger than 1 –η(N1), making the transition from state 0
to state 1 more likely to occur than the opposite one. In binary
models and for great N, the equation of the potential is: 
where  is the Shannon entropy with  . In order
to find the stationary points of probability dynamics we need to
individuate its peak (if it exists). β is an inverse multiplicative
factor for entropy: a relative high value of β means that the uncer-
tainty in the system is low, with few firms exposed at bankruptcy
risk. For values of β around 0, and a more relevant volatility in the
system, in order to find the peak of probability dynamics we need
to find the local minimum of the potential. Aoki (2002) shows that
the points in which the potential is minimized are also the critical
point of the aggregate dynamics of Pe (Nk ). Deriving the potential
with respect to  N1 and then setting U’ = 0: 
(C.6)
and using equation (C.5),an explicit formulation for g(N1) is found
in stationary conditions: 
that quantifies the mean difference (for states) of the output. 
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OF ANTS AND VOTERS
MAXIMUM ENTROPY PREDICTION OF
AGENT-BASED MODELS WITH RECRUITMENT1
Sylvain Barde
School of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury
OFCE
Maximum entropy predictions are made for the Kirman ant model as well
as the Abrams-Strogatz model of language competition, also known as the voter
model. In both cases the maximum entropy methodology provides good predic-
tions of the limiting distribution of states, as was already the case for the
Schelling model of segregation. As an additional contribution, the analysis of
the models reveals the key role played by relative entropy and the model in
controlling the time horizon of the prediction.
Keywords: Information entropy, Agent-based models, Voter models.
The maximum entropy (MaxEnt) methodology was first intro-
duced as a general method of statistical prediction by (Jaynes
1957a,b), who showed that its use in predicting the dynamic
evolution of an unobserved system could be extended beyond its
initial use in physics. This insight was incorporated into the baye-
sian image reconstruction framework of Cornwell & Evans (1985),
Narayan & Nityananda (1986) and Skilling & Gull (1991). Assu-
ming that the received data d about a signal is noisy or distorted,
the observer is interested in obtaining a reconstruction μ of the
original clean signal. If p(x) is the probability measure for x, the
1. The author is grateful for the suggestions received at an OFCE seminar in June 2011,
relating to applications of the methodology to the two models investigated here. Any errors are
of course the author’s.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
Sylvain Barde148best reconstruction satisfies the maximum a posteriori criteria
max p(μ | d). Bayes' theorem states that this should be proportional
to a prior probability on the reconstruction, p(μ), multiplied by the
likelihood p(d|μ) that the observed data originated from the
reconstructed signal.
The MaxEnt methodology assumes an entropic prior of the
form p(μ) ∝ exp(S(μ ⎪m)), where S(μ ⎪m) is the relative Shannon
(1948) entropy between the reconstruction μ and a model m,
which is the observer's ex ante guess of the reconstruction, based
on the data d. This choice of prior in the image restoration litera-
ture is underpinned by the rigorous bayesian formulation of Shore
and Johnson (1980), who provide an axiomatic proof that the
entropy measure S is the only prior that does not introduce biases
into the reconstruction. As a result, the reconstruction can be iden-
tified as the one that maximises the following expression, where
ℓ(d ⎪μ) is the log-likelihood log(p(d ⎪μ)):2
p(μ ⎪d ) ∝ exp(αS(μ ⎪m) + ℓ(d ⎪μ))  (1)
The MaxEnt methodology was initially introduced in econo-
mics by Foley (1994) and extended by Toda (2010) as a way of
deriving the statistical equilibrium of a market, i.e. the equilibrium
distribution of endowments over agents. In a companion paper to
the present study, Barde (2012) shows that the problem of alloca-
ting goods between rational agents can be modeled as a congestion
game that possesses the finite improvement property. This means
that any initial condition is linked to a Nash equilibrium by a finite
path. Because each step on this path is the result of agents perfor-
ming welfare-increasing trades, the reversed improvement path
(which starts at the Nash equilibrium and ends at the initial condi-
tion) can be interpreted as a noise process, where agents make
systematic mistakes. This is shown to imply that the problem of
predicting the Nash equilibrium from the initial condition is
formally equivalent to the problem of retrieving an image that has
been corrupted by noise.
2. The multiplicative α term allows for the fact that the entropic prior p(μ) is defined only up
to a multiplicative constant. α therefore effectively serves as a lagrangian parameter for the
maximisation.
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on the existence of a finite improvement path linking initial and
final states, suggests that the use of relative entropy in the prior
increases the flexibility of the methodology compared to Shannon
(1948) entropy suggested in Foley (1994). This is because prior
knowledge of the initial condition and of the fact that the initial
and final states are linked by a finite path reduces the uncertainty
of the observer with respect to the final state. This should be
reflected in the entropy measure uncertainty by the inclusion of a
correction term for this prior knowledge, embodied in m. A specific
aspect of this, raised in Barde (2012), is that the model term m
should reflect the length of the finite improvement path. If the
improvement path is known to be short, the model should be
strongly peaked around the initial condition. Conversely, if the
path is long, the model should be flatter, reflecting the fact that
the initial condition is no longer informative as to the final
equilibrium.
In Barde (2012) the use of MaxEnt image reconstruction as a
prediction methodology is investigated by applying it to the Schel-
ling (1969, 1971) model of segregation. This empirical application
was chosen specifically because for a given set of parametrisations
the Schelling model is known to possess the finite improvement
property, where every initial condition leads to a Nash equilibrium
in a finite number of steps. The Schelling model thus provides an
ideal setting for illustrating the image reconstruction interpreta-
tion detailed above.
The purpose of this companion paper is to investigate the
MaxEnt methodology further, by attempting to predict the
outcome of two agent-based models with recruitment, the Kirman
(1993) model of ants and the Abrams and Strogatz (2003) model of
language competition, a type of voter model. In both of these
models there exists different populations, and agents within them
can be recruited, i.e. convinced to switch group, by social pressure
from members of other groups. As a result, the growth of one type
of population depends on the size of the other populations. This
setting is more complicated to predict than that of the Schelling
model, as population sizes are not constant and a final absorbing
state may not even exist. Nevertheless, our first central finding is
that MaxEnt can predict the evolution of these models. The second
Sylvain Barde150important finding, which stems from the image reconstruction
interpretation of MaxEnt presented above, is the confirmation that
the width of the underlying model m does indeed play a role in
controlling the time horizon of the MaxEnt prediction, which
strongly supports the use of relative entropy rather than absolute
Shannon (1948) entropy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1
first presents the Kirman model of ant recruitment and then inves-
tigates the effectiveness of the MaxEnt methodology. Section 2
does the same on the voter model, and finally section 3 concludes.
1. The one-dimensional problem: Kirman's model of ants
The Kirman (1993) model of ant recruitment was initially deve-
loped to provide a theoretical explanation for a curious empirical
puzzle in an experiment involving ants feeding from two different
food sources. In the wild, ants that encounter a food source recruit
other ants, quickly causing a large amount of ants to feed from that
source. The experimental puzzle came from the ''cascading'' beha-
viour exhibited by the ants, where most ants used a single source of
food for a period of time, and then suddenly switched to the other
in a very short period. The central advantage of starting with this
model is that because of the simple recruitment process that
governs the evolution of the system, the limit distribution of the
system is well known, which facilitates the process of verifying the
improvement in prediction brought by the use of the MaxEnt
methodology.
1.1. Kirman's model of ants
In this model, two sources of food are available to a group of N
ants, which are denoted ''black'' and ''white''. Describing the state
of the system is simple: at any point in time, let k ∈  be the
number of ants feeding from the black source, with the remaining
N – k ants feeding from the white source. In the following discus-
sion, it will be convenient to refer to x = k/N as the share of the ant
population feeding at the black source, with 1 – x = (N – k)/N the
share feeding from the white source. By extension, we will refer
directly to the color of the ant as identifying the food source it
uses.
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time, either spontaneously (by making a mistake, for instance), or
because they are recruited by an ant of the other color. Because of
this, the system will evolve over time. If ε is the probability of an
ant spontaneously changing color and 1 – δ the probability of an
encounter between two differently coloured ants leading to a
successful recruitment, then the dynamic evolution of the system
is governed by the following probabilities:
 (2)
Figure 1. Time evolution of the share of black ants x
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(a) ε =  0.02 
  (b) ε = 0.005 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
x105
x105
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
= 1 1
1
= 1
1
w b
b w
k kp k
N N
k N kp k
N N
ε δ
ε δ
→
→
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
− + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎪
−⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎨
−⎛ ⎞⎪ + −⎜ ⎟⎪
−⎝ ⎠⎩
Sylvain Barde152At every point in time, the number of black ants k can therefore
jump, either k → k + 1 with probability pw→b, or conversely k → k –1
with probability pb→w. One can see that for large values of the ant
population N, the share of black ants x = k/N can be approximated
by a continuous interval [0,1], which allows us to rewrite the transi-
tion probabilities (2):
 (3)
As is the case in Kirman (1993), we assume as a simplification
that δ = 2ε, which allows the simulations to depend on a single
parameter. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the state of N = 100 ants
over time for the two main parametrisations of ε used by Kirman
(1993). Of the two, the second case, where ε = 0.005 is the most
interesting, as it displays the cascading transitions mentioned
previously.
The research question initially addressed by Kirman (1993) was
to find the limit distribution μ(k) of the proportion of time the
system spends in a state k. We show below that the MaxEnt metho-
dology can not only replicate this finding, but in fact provide a
more general prediction of the time-density of the system for any
number of steps τ.
1.2. Prior model and likelihood
We start by specifying a model m(x,τ) for the relative entropy
term in (1). As stated in the introduction, one would intuitively
expect this to change depending on the desired time-horizon of the
prediction. For low values of τ (short horizons), one would expect
the model to be peaked around the initial condition x0. Conversely,
for large values of τ (long horizons) the system will be able to
explore large areas of the state space, and the model should be
flatter.3 This movement away from the initial condition x0 after τ
steps is modeled by the diffusion process of 1-dimensional stopped
random walk. Given the transition probabilities (3), at any point in
time the probability that a jump occurs is pj (x) = pw→b (x) + pb→w (x),
while the system remains unchanged with probability 1 – pj(x) .
3. As pointed out in Barde (2012), if the system is ergodic, then in the limit τ → ∞, the model
should be a uniform distribution, as all states become accessible.
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Comparing equations (4) and (3), one can see that in the limit
ε → 0, we have pw→b (x) = pb→w (x) = pj(x)/2. This also holds for all
values of ε if x = 0.5. As a result, the diffusion away from a known
initial state x0 after τ units of time have elapsed can be approxi-
mated by a one-dimensional random walk where pj(x0)τ jumps
occur, each of which takes values {+ 1/N, – 1/N} with equal proba-
bility. The standard result for such a process is that the probability
at time τ of having moved a specified distance is given by a bino-
mial distribution with probability parameter 1/2. Because the
prediction μ(x, τ) relates to the predicted share of time system will
spend in each state, the model is obtained by averaging the bino-
mial density over the expected pj(x0)τ jumps for each value of x
4
 (5)
Clearly this is an imperfect representation of the diffusion gene-
rated by the recruitment process (3), as one can immediately see
from Table 3 in appendix A that after min(k0, N – k0) jumps, there
is a non-zero probability that the random walk process has gone
beyond the [0,1] bound for x. This is because the model (5) assumes
that probability of a jump pj (x0) is constant, and the probability of
a positive and negative jump is always equal to 1/2. This is not the
case in the actual process (3), as the transition probabilities adjust
to guarantee the process remains within the bounds. It will be
shown, nevertheless, that this simple random walk diffusion (5)
provides a reliable model for the MaxEnt prediction.
The likelihood term for the MaxEnt program (1) can be
obtained from the net transition probabilities. The intuition is that
the transition probabilities (3) provide a stochastic growth process
for each population, which can be integrated to provide an
expected time path. However, given the fixed overall number of
ants, it must be that these expected time paths of both populations
4. The specification used for calculating the time-average of the binomial density is explained
in appendix A.
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Sylvain Barde154cancel out for the limiting distribution. As mentioned previously,
an attractive aspect of the ants model is that the transition proba-
bilities in fact allow for direct derivation of the limit distribution as
τ → ∞. A particularly elegant derivation is provided in the
appendix of Alfarano and Milakovic’ (2009), which uses a model of
herding that is very similar to Kirman (1993).
As shown by Alfarano and Milakovic’ (2009), deriving the limit
distribution directly requires a second order approximation of the
transition process, using a drift and a diffusion term obtained
through a Taylor expansion of the transition process.5 The likeli-
hood obtained below uses only the drift term, i.e. a first-order
approximation of the process. Given the number of black ants k,
the share of black ants x, the transition probabilities (3) lead to the
following expected state after a jump:
(6)
Assuming that an interval of time [t, t + 1] is short enough that
a only single jump is expected to occur, this expected jump directly
determines the expected change in the share of black agents x:
 (7)
One can see from this expression that assuming a minority of
black ants (x < 1/2) the expected change in the share of black ants
is positive. Conversely, if x > 1/2 and a majority of ants are black,
one would expect to see the share of black ants k fall. Thus, the
expectation is that the transition probabilities will bring the state
towards x = 1/2 over time.6 Dividing on both sides by x gives the
expected growth rate of the black ant population during over the
time interval:
 (8)
5. This is outlined in appendix B.
6. Expression (7) helps to clarify the simplifying assumption that δ = 2ε. Because in (3) the
probability of a black ant recruiting a white ant is equal to the probability of a white ant
recruiting a black ant, the expected effects cancel out and δ does not enter the expected change
in population (6).
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 = 1 2w b b w jk p x k p x k p x k xε→ →+ + − + − + −
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ants x ∈ [0, 1] can be treated as a continuous variable. As a result,
the left hand side of this expression can be expressed as the time-
derivative of a logarithm, ∂ln x/∂t, leading to an ordinary differen-
tial equation. For τ units of time, the expected time path of the
black ant population is approximated following expression, where
μ(x, τ) is the share of time spent in state x and ln x is the expected
time path in that state:
(9)
Given the inherent symmetry of the system, it is possible to
obtain a similar expression involving μ(x, τ )ln(1 – x) for the
expected time path of the white ant population.7 Furthermore,
because the overall number of ants is fixed at N and growth of one
population implies an equivalent reduction in the other, the sum
of the two time paths should cancel out. This is used for formulate
the following likelihood for a candidate prediction μ:8
 (10)
Given the model (5) and likelihood (10), the MaxEnt program
for the share of time τ spent in state x in the ants recruitment
model is given by:
 (11)
The first order condition of (11) provides the predicted value of
μ(x, τ). As explained in Barde (2012), one can see that this is effecti-
vely a mixture density between the model (5) and the limit
distribution, which in this case is a symmetric beta distribution:
 (12)
The alpha parameter in (12) is effectively the Lagrange para-
meter from the maximisation problem (11), and controls the
relative weight of the entropy and likelihood terms. In this case,
7. In fact, there is no a priori reason for the state of the system to be measured using the
number of black ants k. Intuitively, using instead the number of white ants N – k as the state
variable should not change the predictions that an observer can make about system.
8. One can see that this expression exhibits the important properties of a log-likelihood: given
a candidate distribution μ and x ∈ [0, 1] it will be negatively valued, and for the limit beta
distribution obtained below, it reaches a maximum value of zero.
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Sylvain Barde156one can see that as τ → ∞ and the model term m(x, τ ) becomes a
uniform distribution, the value of α also controls the exponent of
the limit beta distribution. As shown in appendix B, the limit distri-
bution is is simply xNε–1(1 – x)Nε–1, which corresponds with the one
identified in Kirman (1993). We therefore set α = –1/( Nε – 1).
Figure 2. Time evolution of the MC frequencies vs. MaxEnt prediction,  
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Of ants and voters: Maximum entropy prediction of agent-based models... 1571.3. Maximum entropy prediction of the ants model
The reliability of the mixture density (12) in predicting the
proportion of time τ the system spends in each state x is assessed
by comparing the MaxEnt prediction to a Monte-Carlo simulation
of the system defined by the transition probabilities (3), using the
same values of ε as for figure 1. In both cases, N = 100 and the
initial condition was set to x0 = 0.25, in order to explicitly examine
how the system moves from an asymmetric initial condition to its
symmetric limit distribution.9
In both figures 2 and 3, the Monte-Carlo frequencies are repre-
sented by the sequence of triangular markers, while the solid line
represents the MaxEnt prediction (12). As an illustration of how
the mixture density is reached, the dashed lines represent the
components of this prediction, with the thin dash representing the
model (5) and the thicker dash showing the limit beta distribution.
Goodness-of-fit statistics are displayed in Table 1 for both parame-
trisations, and report the Spearman rank correlation ρ and mean
square error of the prediction (12) relative to the variance of the
Monte-Carlo frequency of the for each of the time steps in the
figures.
The first case, shown in figure 2, uses the setting that produced
the path shown in figure 1a. As expected, in the early stages of the
process, for low values of τ, the prediction is dominated by the
model term (5), and over time it gradually converges to the limit
beta distribution. For intermediate values of τ (particularly
τ = 5 x 103 and  τ = 104), one can see that the empirical frequencies
are converging towards the limit distribution faster than suggested
by the prediction. Nevertheless, the mean square error of the
prediction relative to the variance of the Monte-Carlo frequencies
remains low even for these intermediate values of τ. Furthermore,
an important aspect is that the prediction successfully captures the
asymmetry in the empirical frequencies about x0 whenever the
initial condition is not located at 1/2.
9. The number of Monte-Carlo iterations R carried out for a given time-horizon τ  is R = 108/
τ. The implication is that the resulting time-averages in figures 2 and 3 are all calculated over
108 time steps, the only difference between sub-figures being that the system is essentially reset
to the initial condition x0 every τ steps. This this is done to ensure that the goodness-of-fit
statistics, which are based on the variance of the Monte-Carlo frequencies, are comparable
across time horizons τ.
Sylvain Barde158Figure 3. Time evolution of the MC frequencies vs. MaxEnt prediction, 
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in figure 1b. As for the previous setting of ε, the goodness-of-fit is
shown in the second set of rows in Table 1. The qualitative beha-
viour is similar, with the model component of the prediction
dominating in the early stages and a convergence to the limit
distribution for large values of τ. Again, the predicted and Monte-
Carlo frequencies deviate slightly for intermediate values of τ
(τ = 103 in this case), but the relative mean square error is low and
as for the previous case the methodology correctly predicts the
asymmetry involved in shifting from an early distribution that is
practically symmetric about x0 to a limit distribution that is
symmetric about 1/2.
Two important observations stem from these results. The first is
that the MaxEnt methodology produces a good prediction of the
proportion of elapsed time τ the system will spend in each state x,
for all values of τ, and not just in the limit τ → ∞. This provides an
improvement with respect to Kirman (1993), as it allows a descrip-
tion of all the phases of the adjustment from an initial condition to
the limit distribution. The MaxEnt prediction is even able to
capture the asymmetry in the distribution caused by the adjust-
ment from an arbitrary distribution to the symmetric limit. While
this adjustment to the limit distribution can also be obtained using
a traditional Monte-Carlo approach, the MaxEnt result can be
obtained at a greatly reduced computational cost.
The second observation, which results from this ability to
predict over a wider range of time horizons, is that when observed
over short horizons the ant recruitment process (3) behaves very
much like a simple random walk (5). Indeed the early stages of the
Table 1. Goodness of fit, MaxEnt prediction vs. MC frequencies
τ = 102 τ = 103 τ = 5x103 τ = 104 τ = 105 τ = 106
ε = 0.02
Spearman ρ 0.9418 0.9985  0.9975 0.9969 0.9537 0.9917
 p-value 5.74x10 -49 0 0 0 0 0
 MSE/var 0.0011 0.0154  0.0669 0.1183 0.0553 0.0092
ε = 0.005
Spearman ρ 0.9333 0.9716  0.9923 0.9989 0.8816 0.9523
 p-value 3.96x10 -46 0 0 0 0 0
 MSE/var 0.0015 0.1378  0.0664 0.0098  0.04 0.0224
Sylvain Barde160adjustment, the model term dominates the mixture distribution
completely. It is only over longer time horizons that it converges
to the limit distribution identified in Kirman (1993). This suggests
that in practical terms it might be very difficult to distinguish
recruitment processes from a random walks over short time hori-
zons by looking only at the time density of states.
2. The two-dimensional problem: Voter models
Voter models, also known as consensus models, are similar in
spirit to the ants model seen in the previous section. Typically,
several populations coexist in the same space and members of each
group attempt to convince members of competing groups to
switch over, much like the recruitment process described above.
One of the main attractions of these models is that it is straight-
forward to integrate localised spatial effects that are similar to
those in the Schelling (1971) model, which provides a further
setting for investigating where the predictive power of the MaxEnt
methodology.
2.1. The Abrams-Strogatz model of language competition
In the Abrams and Strogatz (2003) model of language competi-
tion, two languages, W and B are spoken within a population, and
individuals switch from one language to the other according to its
attractiveness. Assuming, as was the case for the ants recruitment
model, that x is the share of individuals speaking language B and
1 – x is the share speaking W, the transition probabilities (13) are
determined by three elements. The first is the intrinsic prestige of
the languages, controlled by a parameter s ∈ [0, 1] for B and 1 – s
for W. The second element is the effect of social pressure, as
measured by the shares x and 1 – x of individuals speaking the
language, and the third is a volatility parameter a which increases
or reduces the effect of social pressure through exponentiation of
this social pressure term:
 (13)
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tion of the system is given by:
(14)
The equilibrium predictions are qualitatively similar to the ones
obtained in Kirman (1993) and shown in figures 2 and 3. The
system displays one interior equilibrium 0 < x < 1 and two corner
Figure 4. Simulated time evolution of a voter model, s = 0.5, a = 2
(a) Initial state
(i) 10000 steps(h) 7500 steps(g) 5000 steps
(f) 2000 steps(e) 1000 steps(d) 700 steps
(c) 500 steps(b) 200 steps
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )11 111=1= −−→→ −−−−−− aawbbw xssxxxxxpxpxdt
dx
Sylvain Barde162solutions at x = 0 and x = 1.10 In the low volatility case, where
a > 1, the corner solutions are stable and the interior solution is
unstable, while the opposite is true of the high volatility case a < 1.
There are several key differences, however, compared to the ant
recruitment model in section 1. These are due to the assumption
that individuals cannot accidentally switch languages, as was the
case in the ants model through the ε term in the transition proba-
bilities (3). As a consequence, once a corner equilibrium x = 0 or
x = 1 is reached in the voter model, the system will remain in that
state, which is not the case in the ant model, as is visible in Figure
1b. This clarifies why in the voter model the discussion centers on
the stability or instability of the three defined equilibria, while the
ant model focuses instead on the share of total time spent in each
state. The absence of a ε term allowing accidental individual
switching also explains the difference in the parameter that
controls the amount of social interaction and thus the stability of
equilibrium or shape of the distribution. In both models, the
probability of an interaction between agents of different colour is
given by x(1 – x). In the ants model, this is translated into a
switching probability through the additive ε term, while in the
voter model this is done by exponentiating the interaction proba-
bility with a – 1.
In an important analysis of this model of language competition,
Stauffer et al. (2007) show that simulations carried out with a finite
number of individuals produces different results compared to the
continuous equations shown above.11 Furthermore, they show
that local interaction matters for understanding the dynamics of
the system and the time until a stable equilibrium is reached. Local
interaction is defined as a situation where the social pressure on
any given agent to switch from language B to W comes from the
share of the agent's direct neighbours that already speak W rather
than the share of the overall population that speaks W, as is the
case in (14).
10. The interior equilibrium is located at 1/2 in the case of two equivalent languages, with
prestige s = 1 – s = 1/2. This is the parameter value that was used in the simulation reported
below.
11. In Stauffer et al. (2007) the continuous version is referred to as a ''mean-field
approximation''.
Of ants and voters: Maximum entropy prediction of agent-based models... 163Stauffer et al. (2007) focus on the case where the languages have
the same prestige (s = 1 – s = 1/2) and the volatility is low (a > 1),
therefore this is the parameter setting that will be used below to
investigate the effectiveness of the MaxEnt predictions. In the
following simulation there are N = 40000 agents arranged in a
200 x 200 lattice. The neighbourhood which determines the local
social pressure to switch language is a 3 x 3 square centered on the
agent of interest. As was the case in the analysis of the Schelling
model in Barde (2012), the space occupied by the agents is
assumed to be toroidal, which means that localised neighbou-
Figure 5. Time evolution of voter model state frequencies, 200 MC iterations
(g) [5000 steps]  
(a) [100 steps] (b) [200 steps] (c) [500 steps]
(d) [700 steps] (e) [1000 steps] (f) [2000 steps]
(i) [10000 steps](h) [7500 steps]
Sylvain Barde164rhood effects can be calculated directly by applying a N x N
circulant matrix A to the state vector, a N x 1 vector recording the
language spoken by each agent. This implies that x, the share of
agents speaking B and 1 – x, the share speaking W in the transition
probability (13) is a local variable that is determined by the 8
closest neighbours of an agent rather than a global variable,
averaged over the overall population.
Figure 4 presents the simulated state of such a system at several
points in time, starting from a random initial condition where half
the agents speak B and half speak and W. One can see that starting
from a dispersed state in the initial condition, relatively few steps
suffice for distinct clusters to appear.12 As the number of steps is
increased, the smaller clusters tend to disappear and the interfaces
between the large clusters of different colours tend to smooth out,
a process which Stauffer et al. (2007) refer to as an increase in the
surface tension of the system. Another characteristic outlined by
their analysis is the existence of long-lived meta-stable equilibria.
This is visible in the last few panels of figure 4, where the two clus-
ters remain similar over a large number of steps. In the limit,
however, the system always ends up in one of two absorbing states,
x = 0 or x = 1.
2.2. Maximum entropy prediction of the voter model
The MaxEnt methodology used to predict the evolution of the
state of the voter model is broadly similar to the one used for the
analysis of the Schelling (1971) model of segregation carried out in
Barde (2012). First of all, a Monte-Carlo analysis was run in order to
obtain a point of comparison for the MaxEnt prediction.
400 random initial conditions were drawn and for each of these
200 separate simulations were run, replicating the process shown in
in figure 4. As an illustration, figure 5 shows the result of running
200 such simulations on the initial condition provided in figure 4a.
Each sub-figure shows the share of runs in which an agent is in state
B  after the specified number of steps.
The setting of the voter model implies that agents do not have
ex-ante preferences for a language, and only determine their state
12. As is the case in Stauffer et al. (2007) one step in time corresponds to one update
opportunity for all N agents to update their state.
Of ants and voters: Maximum entropy prediction of agent-based models... 165relative to the language spoken by neighbouring agents. As a
result, assuming that languages B and W have equal status and
initial populations have equal size, the initial state of any given
agent i does not provide any information that can be used to
directly provide a model for the relative entropy term (1). The best
guess an observer might make is that mi
w = mi
B = 0.5, which is the
uninformative uniform distribution. This situation is effectively
the same as in the Schelling (1971) model, in which agents do not
have any intrinsic preference for a particular location, and the
attractiveness of a location to an agent is only determined by the
state of the agents around that location. As was the case in Barde
(2012), this is dealt with by using the following double-space
entropy, which measures the information entropy of a message
revealing the state of two randomly picked agents i and j:
(15)
The use of a double-space entropy (15) allows the model to
encode correlations across agents: if two agents i and j are located
close to each other, the probability that they both speak a given
language L is higher than if they are far from each other.13 The
model mLi,j, which models the probability that i and j both speak
language L is assumed to be a normal distribution over the distance
between agents, as was the case in the analysis of the Schelling
model in Barde (2012). Because the width of this normal distribu-
tion is determined by its standard deviation σm, this parameter
directly controls the distance over which agent decisions are likely
to be correlated.
The likelihood component of (1) that is used to generate the
prediction is assumed to be Gaussian, following again the metho-
dology used in Barde (2012). This effectively measures the
similarity be the data available in the initial condition and the
MaxEnt prediction for each of the two languages L:
 (16)
13. The reader is referred to the appendix of Barde (2012) for a derivation of double space
entropy.
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Sylvain Barde166Here A is the N x N symmetric adjacency matrix, with entries 0
or 1 in the ith row indicating which J agents are neighbours to i. The
data diL used in the comparison is given by the initial social pressure
dL = Aμ0L, where μ0L ∈ {0, 1} is the vector indicating the language
spoken by each agent in the initial condition, taken from figure 4a.
It is important to point out that given the choice of parameterisa-
tion a = 2, the local interaction term AμL in the likelihood is in fact
a linear approximation of the social pressure term in the transition
probabilities (13).14 It will be shown that this simplification never-
theless produces good predictions of the Monte-Carlo frequencies.
Figure 6. MaxEnt state density prediction of voter model
(g) model width σm = 7  
(a) model width σm = 1 (b) model width σm = 2 (c) [model width σm = 3
(d) model width σm = 4 (e) model width σm = 5 (f) model width σm = 6
(i) model width σm = 9(h) model width σm = 8
Of ants and voters: Maximum entropy prediction of agent-based models... 167Given the relative entropy (15) and likelihood (16), the MaxEnt
program is given below. Its solution, displayed in figure 6 for
increasing values of σm (and therefore increasing model widths) is
obtained numerically using the image reconstruction algorithm of
Skilling and Gull (1991), modified in Barde (2012) to predict the
outcome of the Schelling model.
 (17)
Figure 6 illustrates the MaxEnt predictions obtained with the
initial condition provided in figure 4a for various values of σm.
These are visually comparable with the Monte-Carlo frequencies in
figure 5, also generated from the same initial condition. In addi-
tion, the Spearman rank correlation and mean-square-error
relative to the variance of the Monte-Carlo frequencies were calcu-
lated for each of the 400 sets of predictions and frequencies. The
resulting means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2.
The bold entries in each column indicate identify the value of σm
(row) that best fits the Monte-Carlo frequencies for the relevant
number of steps. The diagonal pattern made up by these bold
entries indicates that the Monte-Carlo frequencies of the system at
successively higher time steps are, up to a point, better predicted
by successively wider models. As was the case for the MaxEnt
prediction of the ants recruitment model in section 1.3, this
supports the suggestion that the width of the model in the relative
entropy term, determined in this case by σm, controls the time-
horizon of the MaxEnt prediction.
A further observation that can be made from Table 2, however,
is that the predictive power of the MaxEnt methodology falls as the
width of the model is increased. Indeed, the bold entries in each
column show a gradual reduction in the correlation coefficient ρ
and an increase in the size of the mean-square error as the number
of steps is increased, coupled with a widening of the standard
deviations around the means of the two statistics. 
14. This is intended as a simplification: using dL = (Aμ0L)2 and (AμL)2 in (16) produces a Hessian
matrix for the MaxEnt methodology where all N x N entries are non-zero, requiring an
intractable amount of storage and computation time. Using instead the linear approximation
produces a Hessian matrix that is basically A x A, and therefore can be stored and manipulated
efficiently using sparse matrix algorithms.
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Sylvain Barde168Table 2. Goodness of fit, predicted vs. MC voter model state densities
(standard deviations in parenthesis)
 Steps 
σm 100 200 500 700 1000 2000 5000 7500 10000
1
  ρ 0.859 0.740 0.562 0.498 0.434 0.325 0.215 0.179 0.157 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
MSE 0.291 0.518 0.865 0.992 1.120 1.340 1.561 1.635 1.678 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.033) (0.037) (0.042) (0.049) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) 
2
  ρ 0.950 0.921 0.810 0.752 0.685 0.548 0.383 0.323 0.287 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.034) (0.042) (0.045) (0.047) 
 MSE   0.114   0.167  0.376  0.487  0.618  0.888  1.217  1.337  1.411 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.028) (0.036) (0.046) (0.065) (0.082) (0.088) (0.094) 
3
  ρ 0.887 0.918 0.898 0.869 0.826 0.713 0.538  0.465  0.417 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.036) (0.052) (0.059) (0.064) 
 MSE  0.228  0.170   0.205  0.259  0.340  0.557  0.901  1.047  1.142 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.023) (0.031) (0.041) (0.066) (0.101) (0.115) (0.127) 
4
  ρ 0.813 0.861 0.890 0.884 0.865 0.791 0.638 0.564 0.513 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.035) (0.056) (0.066) (0.074) 
MSE 0.366 0.274 0.217 0.228 0.263 0.403 0.698 0.845 0.945 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.031) (0.040) (0.064) (0.106) (0.128) (0.145) 
5
  ρ 0.753 0.801 0.850 0.857 0.855 0.815 0.694 0.626 0.577 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.037) (0.058) (0.070) (0.080) 
MSE 0.480 0.387 0.290 0.276 0.280 0.355 0.586 0.719 0.815 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.038) (0.045) (0.066) (0.109) (0.134) (0.153) 
6
  ρ  0.708  0.747  0.801  0.814  0.821  0.806  0.717  0.659  0.615 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.041) (0.061) (0.073) (0.083) 
 MSE  0.566  0.489  0.383  0.356  0.341  0.370  0.539  0.653  0.740 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.042) (0.047) (0.055) (0.075) (0.114) (0.139) (0.159) 
7
  ρ  0.675  0.701  0.750  0.766  0.779  0.779   0.718   0.669   0.630 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.037) (0.047) (0.065) (0.076) (0.086) 
 MSE  0.630  0.577  0.479  0.447  0.422  0.420   0.538   0.632   0.708 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.050) (0.057) (0.066) (0.087) (0.123) (0.145) (0.164) 
8
  ρ  0.652  0.663  0.702  0.718  0.732  0.742  0.700  0.660  0.627 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.033) (0.037) (0.042) (0.054) (0.071) (0.081) (0.090) 
 MSE  0.675  0.651  0.571  0.540  0.512  0.491  0.571  0.649  0.714 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.059) (0.068) (0.078) (0.100) (0.134) (0.154) (0.172) 
9
  ρ  0.635  0.632  0.658  0.672  0.686  0.700  0.673  0.641  0.613 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.036) (0.042) (0.048) (0.060) (0.076) (0.084) (0.092) 
 MSE  0.709  0.712  0.657  0.629  0.601  0.572  0.624  0.687  0.743 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.066) (0.077) (0.089) (0.113) (0.144) (0.162) (0.177) 
Of ants and voters: Maximum entropy prediction of agent-based models... 169The visual comparison of figures 5 and 6 also supports this: As
the model with is increased the prediction gradually becomes more
''grainy'', to the point where it becomes difficult to distinguish an
image. The intuitive conclusion that can be drawn from this is that
there is a limit to the time-horizon over which reliable a prediction
can be made.
3. Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis of the Kirman model of ant recruitment and the
locally-interacting Abrams-Strogatz model of language competi-
tion both show that the maximum entropy methodology can be
used to predict the state distributions of agent-based models with
recruitment, where agents can switch groups based on a measure of
social pressure. This provides support for the use of the MaxEnt
image reconstruction methodology as a prediction methodology
in economics. A first aspect is that MaxEnt can reliably predict the
state space of these agent-based models, even in the case where
there is no defined final state, as in the Kirman (1993) model of ant
recruitment, or in the case where the transition of a given agent is
probabilistic rather than a best response, as was the case with the
initial MaxEnt analysis of the Shelling model carried out in Barde
(2012). A second important aspect is the confirmation of the
suggestion made in Barde (2012) that the width of the model term
controls the time-horizon of the prediction, by serving as a proxy
for the length of improvement path between initial and final state.
In methodological terms, the maximum entropy methodology
used here and in Barde (2012) therefore provides a generalisation
of the existing applications of MaxEnt in economics, mentioned in
the introduction. These typically rely on Shannon (1948) entropy
in their analysis, the justification being that this measures the
absolute uncertainty of an observer as to the state of the system. As
was suggested in Barde (2012) and demonstrated here, this impli-
city corresponds to using relative entropy with respect to a
uniform model m. Given the link between model width and time
horizon, this implies that Shannon MaxEnt predicts over a large
time horizon only. The predictions obtained here, using relative
entropy, carry over a much larger range of time. This is potentially
Sylvain Barde170relevant, as dynamic systems may behave differently over different
time horizons.
This last point has potential implications given the suggestion
made in Kirman (1993) as to the relevance of recruitment models
in economics. Indeed, Kirman suggests that recruitment is perva-
sive in many markets, in particular financial markets, where
individual agents make decisions based not only on objective
information, but also based on imitation of surrounding agents.
This point is reinforced by the use Alfarano and Milakovic’ (2009)
make of a very similar model to analyse herding behaviour in
agent-based finance. Importantly, the results in section 1.3 reveal
that even when recruitment is present, such that herding occurs
over long horizons of time, it may be nevertheless very difficult to
detect this process over short time horizons, as the system will be
difficult to distinguish from a standard random walk.
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A.  Time density of states in a stopped random walk
The diffusion model used in section 1.2 is a stopped one-dimen-
sional random walk, with T = τpj(x0) expected jumps of equally
probably size ± 1/N. The probability of having moved distance ± k/N
for the first six steps is shown in Table 3. One can see that these are
simply the relevant binomial coefficient divided by two to the
power of the number of steps. As a result, the general probability of
having moved distance k/N after T steps is given by:
(A-1)
The proportion of the T steps spent at a given distance k/N,
needed for the model (5) is then simply the average over the rele-
vant column in Table 3. The major difference from the standard
''Pascal triangle'' visible in this table is that given the transition
probabilities, even distances can only be reached with an even
number of steps, and conversely, odd distances require an odd
number of steps. As a result, in order to simplify the calculation of
the average over the number of steps, a recurrence rule is deve-
loped that links every other entry in a column. This uses the two
central recurrence rules for binomial coefficients:
 (A-2)
Table 3. Diffusion from initial condition in a random walk model 
  Distance traveled from x0  
Steps  -6/N  -5/N  -4/N  -3/N  -2/N  -1/N  0  1/N  2/N  3/N  4/N  5/N  6/N 
0       1       
1      1/2 0 1/2      
2     1/4 0 2/4 0 1/4     
3    1/8 0 3/8 0 3/8 0 1/8    
4   1/16 0 4/16 0 6/16 0 4/16 0 1/16   
5  1/32 0 5/32 0 10/32 0 10/32 0 5/32 0 1/32  
6 1/64  0 6/64 0 15/64 0 20/64 0 15/64 0 6/64 0 1/64 
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Combining the two and rearranging the indexes provides the
following recurrence rule:
 (A-4)
This rule can be used to link directly adjacent non-zero entries
in a given column of Table 3. By using the formula recursively, one
can eliminate the binomial coefficient from the right hand side,
and express the binomial coefficient for any T and k as a product of
terms generated in the same column for lower values of k, where
k = N ⎢x – x0 ⎢ represents the absolute number of steps the system
has traveled away from the initial condition x0. This allows us to
specify (A-1) as follows:
(A-5)
The first right hand-side element forms the core of the expres-
sion. The third element simply states that the number of time steps
T is also a strict upper bound on the distance than can be traveled
in that time, while the second element states that the probability
of being on this upper bound is given by a negative power of 2.15
In practical terms one starts by computing for each value of k a
vector containing the argument in brackets for all values of
i ∈ {0,1,2,…,⎣(τ pj (x0) – k/2)⎦ – 1}, using the argument of the
product term in (A-5). The cumulative product of this vector
provides all the non-zero probabilities (A-1) in the kth column in
Table 3. The sum of these vector entries, divided by τ pj (x0) + 1,
then provides the required model:
15. These two expressions can be seen directly in Table 3: The top sides of the triangle are
simply formed by increasing powers of 1/2. Above these, the distribution is not defined.
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B. Fokker-Planck derivation of the limit distribution 
of the ant model
Alfarano and Milakovic’ (2009) show, using a Taylor expansion
of the step operator formed by the Markov transition matrix of
transition probabilities (3) that the following Fokker-Planck equa-
tion describes the evolution of the distribution over states:
 (A-7)
The drift term A(x) of the equation corresponds to the expected
jump size (7):
 (A-8)
The diffusion term B(x) corresponds to the probability of a jump
pj (x) given by (4) and used to model the diffusion process away
from the initial condition (5).
 (A-9)
The Fokker-Planck equation (A-7) is a second order differential
equation with variable coefficients, and as shown by Alfarano and
Milakovic’ (2009), the general solution is of the following form,
where c is a constant of integration that can serve to normalise the
probability distribution:
 (A-10)
Replacing δ = 2ε in (A-9) and assuming, as is done both in
(Kirman, 1993; and Alfarano Milakovic’, 2009) that ε → 0 and
N → ∞ in such a way that that Nε remains constant, the diffusion
term can be simplified to B(x) = 2x(1 – x). Replacing the drift term
A(x) and diffusion term B(x) in the general solution gives:
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The integral term is equal to ln x(1 – x), which leads to the limit
distribution identified in Kirman (1993):
 (A-12)
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ASYMMETRIC (S,s) PRICING:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY1
Zakaria Babutsidze
SKEMA Business School, Sophia Antipolis
OFCE
 This paper presents a model of asymmetric (S,s) pricing. We investigate
implications of such a behavior for the effectiveness of the monetary policy. We
discuss two types of asymmetric responses to monetary interventions. One is
the symmetry in the responses to positive and negative monetary shocks. The
other is the variance in responses to monetary shocks during booms and reces-
sions. The conclusion is that first type of asymmetry can be attributed to the
asymmetry in adjustment bands, while the second kind of asymmetry is a result
of firm heterogeneity, and asymmetry of (S,s) bands does not contribute to it. 
Keywords: (S,s) Pricing, Monetary policy, Heterogeneity, Asymmetry.
Pricing behavior of individual firms has implications for the
aggregate price and output movements. The propagation of money
supply shocks crucially depends on pricing patterns. If firms in
every moment in time charge the optimal price and there are no
imperfections on financial markets, it is easy to show that money
supply shocks have no real effects (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985). If
financial markets are imperfect, for example there are information
asymmetries (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2001) or the credit market is
characterized by financial accelerator (Bernanke et al., 1999), money
neutrality disappears. In this paper we abstract from the possibility
of financial market imperfections and concentrate on the possibility
1. The author is grateful to Ricardo Caballero, Maurizio Iacopetta, Batlome Janjgava, Attila
Rátfai, Vladimir Yankov, an anonymous referee and participants of several meeting in Bologna,
Budapest and Maastricht for helpful comments and suggestions.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
Zakaria Babutsidze178of individual price deviations from optimum. We believe that in
real life prices are rarely at the optimum. There are two reasons for
this. One is that there exists costs to price adjustment. The other
one is that firms do not reconsider their prices as regularly as it
would be necessary for keeping them at optimum permanently.
This paper does not go into the discussion of which of these
arguments is more plausible. Instead we assume a specific type of
firm pricing behavior which has been empirically well docu-
mented and try to understand the implications of this behavior for
the effectiveness of monetary policy during equilibrium as well as
during different phases of business cycle. More precisely we assess
the effectiveness of monetary policy during booms and recessions.
We adopt the framework of (S,s) pricing (Caplin and Spulber,
1987) which introduces the inaction interval around the optimal
price. As long as price is within the interval it is optimal for the
seller not to adjust the price. In this type of models money has
been found to be neutral (Caplin and Spulber, 1987). However, this
finding is not robust to asymmetry of inaction bands above and
below optimal price. Asymmetry creates some room for monetary
policy. In asymmetric setup money is not neutral. We build on
empirical finding pointing to the possibility of asymmetry in
adjustment bands around the optimal price and analyze a simple
model. We do not model neither the fine-grained micro behavior
nor non-market interaction among firms. We simply assume asym-
metry of price adjustment bands.2 We also assume that each firm is
2.  Although the present work does not concentrate on the derivation of the optimality of
asymmetric bands, here we provide further possible explanations and a sketch of possible
modeling technique. As we argued before, menu costs and adjustment costs are not exactly the
same. So, adjustment costs can be different for movements of price in different directions. For
example there are some psychological factors that can be at work making adjustment costs
different (Greenslade and Parker, 2012). Then optimality of asymmetric bands can be derived
from the usual monopolist profit maximization problem (Babutsidze, 2006). In principle, the
asymmetric adjustment cost is not the only way to get asymmetric bands of adjustment. Similar
results can be obtained by assuming the asymmetric profit function. Namely, profit function
that is steeper before optimal price and flatter after it. This assumption makes not adjustment,
but rather deviation costs asymmetric. To see this define deviation costs as 
Then if a profit function is flatter when p > p* for the same absolute value of deviation 
Thus, even with symmetric adjustment costs firm’s pricing behavior will feature a longer right
tail and a shorter left one.
2
2
2
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Asymmetric (S,s) pricing: Implications for monetary policy 179hit by an idiosyncratic shock at any point in time that might push
its price outside the inaction interval and induce it to adjust its
price to the optimal level. Besides, government can conduct active
monetary policy that would equally affect all the firms. Firms’
responses to these policies are analyzed in order to assess the effec-
tiveness of the monetary interventions.
Under the assumption of infinitesimally small idiosyncratic
shocks, or alternatively very wide inaction bands, the model can be
solved analytically. We derive a long-run density function of price
level distributions in absence of monetary shocks. This is inter-
preted as equilibrium distribution. The effects of monetary policy
in equilibrium can be also assessed analytically. However, there are
two interesting departures from equilibrium that are worthy of
analysis. One is a moderate size of adjustment bands. This is
because wide adjustment bands imply excessively large adjustment
costs that are not in line with empirical findings. The other depar-
ture is related to the cyclicality of the economy. Any external
aggregate shock that hits the economy may knock it out of the
equilibrium state. As price adjustments are not instantaneous, it
takes a while until the system converges back to the ergodic price
distribution. We try to assess the powers of monetary policy during
this transitional dynamics.
These two exercises cannot be performed using analytic tools.
This is where Agent Based Modeling (AMB) comes in handy. ABM
is a flexible framework that does not require analytical tractability,
which simplifies the task in the present case. It is a bottom-up
modeling framework, which means that modeler can specify beha-
vior of individual agents at the microscopic level and explore its
implications for macroscopic outcomes. Merits of ABM are extensi-
vely discussed in few of the articles in this special issue (e.g. Fagiolo
and Roventini, 2012; Napoletano and Gaffard, 2012). Using
computational tools we set up an ABM equivalent of the model
and explore the behavior of the system in simulated environ-
ments. Using ABM methodology we analyze the effects of the
monetary intervention in presence of non-trivial idiosyncratic
shocks and during booms and recessions.
There are two major findings. One is that in presence of suffi-
ciently large shocks the model is able to reproduce significant
asymmetry in output’s reaction to positive and negative macroeco-
Zakaria Babutsidze180nomic shocks. Asymmetry of adjustment bands plays the crucial
role in this. The second major finding is that model is characte-
rized by asymmetry in responses to similar shocks across different
phases of business cycle. However, the asymmetry on micro level is
not necessary for this. The difference in responses to similar shocks
across booms and recessions seems to be the result of simple exis-
tence of inaction interval, rather than its asymmetry.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews
related strands of literature. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3
presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
1. Related literature
Our work is closely related to two large strands of literature. One
strand is concerned with the pricing behavior of firms and implica-
tions of this behavior for macroeconomics. The second one
discusses the empirical findings about asymmetries on micro and
macro levels.
From wide range of models concerning firms’ pricing behavior
most closely related to the work presented in this paper are sticky
price models. During the last few decades sticky price models have
proved to be of great importance. The empirical findings illustrate
that prices are not flexible enough to always be at the optimum.
The evidence of price stickiness is found in many markets. For
example, Stigler and Kindahl (1970) and Carlton (1986) find
evidence of price stickiness for various industrial goods, Cecchetti
(1986) for magazine prices.3
Sticky price models can be divided into two parts: in one class of
models firms follow a time-dependent policy of price adjustment;
in the other one they follow a state dependent policy. Time-depen-
dent pricing models assume that a firm’s decisions of revising and
modifying the existing price are constrained by some time limits.
For example, in Fisher (1977) and Taylor (1980) models of stag-
gered pricing firms are allowed to set their prices every other
period. In Calvo (1983) the information about the changes in
market conjuncture arrives randomly in time. So, decisions about
3. More recent documentation of price stickiness is due to Levy et al. (1997), Blinder et al
(1998), Wolman (2000), etc.
Asymmetric (S,s) pricing: Implications for monetary policy 181the price changes also follow a random process. These models
imply forward-looking price setting and result into the pheno-
menon called New Keynesian Philips Curve, which differs from the
classical Philips curve that is constructed using backward-looking
pricing. Time dependent price setting models feature money non-
neutrality and some empirical support has been found for them
(Gali and Gertler, 1999; Fabiani et al., 2006). However, they have
also raised some criticism because they do not match wide range of
macroeconomic regularities (see for example Fuhrer and Moore,
1995; Mankiw, 2001) and prompted researchers to propose alterna-
tive models (such as one due Mankiw and Reis, 2002). 
State-dependent pricing models are more intuitive. The baseline
logic here is that firms change prices depending on the state of
economy. In this setup firms may change the price every period or
leave it unchanged for a number of periods. The best representa-
tion of state-dependence is (S,s) pricing (Caplin and Spulber, 1987;
Caplin and Leahy, 1991). The (S,s) rule was first introduced by
Arrow et al. (1951) for inventory management purposes. Later,
Barro (1977) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977; 1983) also applied it
to pricing models. In these models, due to the existence of adjust-
ment costs, the zone of inaction is created around the optimal
price for the firm. As long as the price is inside of the band, it is
optimal not to adjust it. When the price crosses any of the inaction
bands the adjustment to optimal price is observed. More recently
(S,s) pricing models have been used to gain insights into the effects
of monopolistic competition (see for example Caplin and Leahy,
1997). They have also been used successfully in multi-sector
general equilibrium models (e.g. Damjanovic and Nolan, 2007).
All these pricing models allow for agent heterogeneity despite
the fact that the strategies and the incentives of all of them are
usually assumed to be identical. Heterogeneity comes with the
different prices of the producers that are due to the frictions to the
price adjustment. If there were no frictions, all the prices would
coincide and the behavior of the aggregate variables would be the
same as the individual ones (scale adjusted).
Recent years have seen a development of mixed models, or so
called generalized state dependent pricing models (Devereux and
Siu, 2007; Woodford, 2009; Costain and Nakov, 2011). In this
paper we present a model with asymmetric (S,s) bands which
Zakaria Babutsidze182belongs to this later class of general models. We take the asym-
metry of inaction bands as given, based on a well-documented
empirical findings (e.g. Tobin, 1972; Ball and Mankiw, 1994).
The literature on empirics about asymmetries can be divided in
two parts. One part documents asymmetries on micro level, the
other—on macro level. The fact that prices do not change very
often is a well documented fact (Klenow and Malin, 2011; Greens-
lade and Parker, 2012). The present work is based on a more fine-
grained finding which is that individual prices are more rigid
downwards than upwards, but if they decline, they decline by a
higher magnitude relative to price increases. This means that firms’
adjustment policies are asymmetric on microeconomic level. There
are two types of asymmetries observed on aggregate level also. One
is that the aggregate output has low and high response regimes to
the monetary policy (Lo and Piger, 2005; Peersman and Smets,
2001). Namely, the output responds to a somewhat lesser extent to
positive monetary shocks during the recession than during the
normal periods and even lesser than during the booms. Second,
the output response is smaller in magnitude when we have positive
money supply shocks rather than when we have negative ones
(Cover, 1992).
The asymmetry of microeconomic adjustment policies has been
documented long ago. In the 70’s, economists were talking about
the downward rigidity of prices (Tobin, 1972). More resent
research also shows the overwhelming evidence on more frequent
price increases than decreases. For example, Borenstein et al. (1997)
find the microeconomic asymmetry on gasoline and agricultural
products’ markets, Jackson (1997) finds it on bank deposits. To this
Chen et al. (2004) add the documentation of the asymmetry in
price changes in American supermarket chains. 
The asymmetry in the frequency and the magnitude of adjust-
ment is better documented for European countries. Loupias and
Ricart (2004) investigate the pricing behavior of over 1600 French
manufacturing firms and find that positive price changes are more
frequent than negative ones. They also find that the magnitude of
up- and downward price changes are different: they report an
average of 3% for price upgrades in contrast with an average of -5%
for price downgrades. Their findings are supported by another
study of French manufacturing firms’ behavior by Baudry et al.
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support the asymmetry in magnitude of changes, although less
pronounced (+4% versus -5%). Similar relation between frequency
of price change and its magnitude has also been found recently for
the UK (Bunn and Ellis, 2012).
A similar picture emerges in other European countries. In
Belgium, Aucremanne and Dhyne (2005) find no differences in
the frequency, but in the magnitude of price changes: +6.8%
versus -8.7%. For Spain, Alvarez and Hernando (2004) find that
the ratio of price increases to price decreases is 1.6. With regard to
the asymmetry in the magnitude of price changes they report
+8.2% for price increases versus 10.3% of price decreases. For
Portugal, Dias et al. (2004) find no difference in magnitude of
changes but a huge contrast in the frequency of price changes in
different directions; they report the ration of positive to negative
price changes equal to 2.34.4 
Lach and Tsiddon (1992) also find the asymmetry in magni-
tudes of price deviations for Israel. They examine disaggregated
price data of foodstuffs in Israel during 1978-1984. Their main
conclusion is that the asymmetry is more pronounced during high
inflation periods, more precisely when the annual inflation goes
above 130%.
Of course, these findings are not left without attention. Ball and
Mankiw (1994) incorporate the difference in frequency into their
model. They do this by introducing the positive drift in inflation
process justifying this with some kind of Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson effect due to the faster economic integration and the
development of countries. This introduces the asymmetry in price
distribution. Although Ball and Mankiw’s (1994) model is able to
feature more frequent price upgrades than downgrades, still the
magnitudes of changes on the firms level are equal. Thus, antici-
pated positive drift in inflation explains only half of the story.
Tsiddon (1991) presents a simple menu cost model for high
inflationary environment. He introduces the costs for adjustment
that are proportional to the deviation from the optimal price and
4. Further evidence on asymmetry for all EU15 countries is provided by Lunnemann and
Matha (2004).
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author distinguishes between price stickiness and downward rigi-
dity and concludes that the model features the latter. The model
exhibits an asymmetry in the following way. According to the
optimal pricing policy, during the low inflation periods firms
adjust their prices more frequently than during the high inflation
periods. This is due to the fact that high inflation increases the
uncertainty in future optimal price movements and the optimality
is achieved by waiting. A similar result is obtained by Hansen
(1999) who derives the dependence of the "first passage time" func-
tion on the degree of uncertainty. So, in a sense, Tsiddon’s (1991)
model features the difference in the magnitudes of the price adjust-
ment as well as the difference in the frequency of price
adjustment.5 
Although the inflation trend assumed in these models is an
intuitive device for introducing asymmetry, as it aggravates the
effect of a positive shock and mitigates the effect of a negative one,
it is not well matched with the empirical findings. For example,
Peltzman (2000) shows that asymmetry is very pronounced in the
United States in the period 1982-1996, when the positive drift in
inflation was measured to be less than 2%. DeLong and Summers
(1988) find an asymmetry during the Great Depression period
when the price trend was deflationary. All this points to the fact
that trend inflation can not explain even the different frequency of
price up- and downgrades. Some other factors seem to be in work.
The overwhelming majority of sticky price models (e.g. Tsiddon,
1991; Ball and Mankiw, 1994) take the inaction bands lying on an
equal distance from the optimal price. If we take the adjustment cost
to be a menu cost6 type, the symmetry is justified: there is no reason
why the menu costs can be different for changing the prices in diffe-
rent directions. But the problem is that the adjustment cost is a
much wider notion than the menu cost. There are many other
factors that can be regarded as the ingredients of the cost of chan-
ging price. For example, the psychological factor as seeing the
5. There are also the examples of the other kinds of asymmetry in price adjustment derived in
different setups. See for example Danziger (1988) where asymmetry is due to the discounting of
future profits in inflationary environment. There every price spends most of the time being
below the optimal one.
6. See for example Mankiw (1985).
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mers and decreasing profits. This can further propagate to firm’s
large negative jump in purchases of inputs offending the suppliers.
Large discrete downward jumps are better justified: this will probably
result in “stealing” the buyers from competitors and also hoping to
bargain a good discount with a supplier on a larger order due to the
increased output. Recent empirical support for this view is due
Greenslade and Parker (2012) who analyze large sample of UK firms.
The importance of these considerations is outlined in Bowman
(2002). The author presents a model of sticky prices without any
menu costs. In this model for firms it is optimal not to change
prices in response to nominal shocks because doing so increases
their profits by expanding the customer base. Then the non-neutra-
lity of the money is obtained without any kind of menu costs. Some
other kinds of cost seem to deter firms from adjusting prices.
Also, as documented by Kwapil et al. (2005), firm’s decisions
about price upgrades and downgrades depend on different factors.
Research on Austrian manufacturing firms shows that changes in
wage and intermediate goods’ costs are two of the most important
factors for price increases, while changes in competitors’ prices and
technological improvements are the main driving factors for price
reductions. Furthermore, Loupias and Ricart (2004) conclude that
menu costs are absolutely not important for price changes of
manufacturing products. Then, from this point of view, there is
absolutely no reason why the costs of price changes in different
directions have to be the same.
The literature on asymmetries on macro level concentrates on
two major asymmetries. The first one is the asymmetry in responses
of output to the expansionary and contractionary shocks of the
same size. This is a well documented empirical finding for deve-
loped economies. For example, Cover (1992) exploits the quarterly
data spanning 1951:1-1987:4 and finds a very high degree of asym-
metry. He uses three model specifications for the identification of
the asymmetry: the one proposed by Barro and Rush (1980), modi-
fied specification of Mishkin (1982) and his own. Asymmetry is
pronounced in all three models. In Barro-Rush model 73% of a
negative monetary shock is passed to output, while the same indi-
cator for positive shocks is only 1% and it is not significant. In the
modified Mishkin model the same indicator is 66% versus 6% (the
Zakaria Babutsidze186latter again not significant). In Cover’s original model 96% of nega-
tive monetary shock is passed to output, while, although not
significant, the passthrough from positive shocks has the wrong
sign. From these considerations one can conclude that positive
monetary shocks do not have any effect on output and they basi-
cally pass to prices while negative shocks are passed to output to a
larger extent. The more recent study of Ravn and Sola (2004)
confirms the basic conclusions of Cover (1992) about the existence
of asymmetry, but in their case the asymmetry is less pronounced.7
The second type of macro asymmetry is in reaction of output to
monetary shocks during different phases of business cycle. Lo and
Piger (2005) employ a Markov regime-switching model to investi-
gate the asymmetry in output movements after monetary shocks
to different directions. Their finding is that there is a very well
pronounced time variation in output responses that can be
explained by the time varying transition probability model. Basi-
cally, they find that the variation can be explained by inclusion in
the model of a simple dummy variable indicating whether the
economy is in a recession or in a boom. This confirms the authors’
hypothesis that output reaction has two regimes: “low response”
and “high response.” In particular, policy actions taken during
recessions seem to have larger effects on output than those taken
during expansions. 
Similar two-regime character of output responses has been
found for number of economies. For example, Garcia and Schaller
(2002) found asymmetry in US output response a bit earlier than
Lo and Piger (2005). Peersman and Smets (2001) find the same type
of asymmetry for the whole set of European countries. Further-
more, Kaufmann (2002) and Kwapil et al. (2005) document two
regimes of output reaction for Austria.
All in all there is an asymmetry on macro as well as on micro
levels. However, the link between micro- and macroeconomic
asymmetries is complicated. In fact, microeconomic asymmetry in
price adjustment can totally cancel out at the aggregate level, or
macroeconomic asymmetry can be introduced by aggregation of
7. The asymmetry to positive and negative monetary shock responses is also found in other
parts of the world. Karras (1996) finds asymmetry in 18 European countries. Chu and Ratti
(1997) find asymmetry in the Japanese economy.
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properties. A simple model presented by Caballero (1992) is an
excellent demonstration of this point. Caballero (1992) demons-
trates the the link between micro and macro asymmetries has to be
analyzed very carefully. There is no distinct link identified between
these two phenomena. The motivation of the present work is to
contribute to this line of research with aspiration of gaining
further insight into the functionality of monetary policy. In the
next section we provide the baseline model of the present paper.
2. The model
2.1. Setup of the model
We model Chamberlinian monopolistic competition following
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The economy consists of a continuum of
monopolistically competitive firms indexed on [0;1] interval that
produce close (but not perfect) substitutes. This form is chosen
because in a perfect competition setup a positive deviation from
the optimal price results in large losses due to the loss of the entire
market share. This is because, in the case of perfect competition,
the profit function of the firm is not continuous in own price: it
has a discrete jump immediately after the optimal price (Akerlof
and Yellen, 1985). This makes competitive environment useless for
the purposes of this paper.
Consider a monopolistic firm that faces downward sloping
demand of a form 
(1)
where P is the own price of firm’s product, M is the money supply
per firm,  is the aggregate price. The positivity of monopolistic
markup gives the condition η > 1 . The firm operates at a constant
real marginal costs C = βYα, where β can be interpreted as the real
wage per unit of effort (in equilibrium it is constant), α is the
inverse of productivity parameter. Then, the monopolistic profit
maximization problem is
(2)
η−⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
P MY
P P
,
P
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P
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prices of all the goods are equal, the problem results in  and
gives P = GM, where G is constant and is equal to:
.8 
Notice that in this (no adjustment costs) setup the output of a
single firm, and as a consequence of the whole economy, is
constant at a value G.
Taking the natural logarithms of the price-money supply rela-
tionship, denoting the logarithms by lower case letters, we get 
p* = g + m. (3)
 Then, it is apparent that dp* = dm. Thus, the idiosyncratic,
mean-zero shocks in money supply would call for no aggregate
price changes. 
Let’s introduce a variable x that is the deviation of firm’s actual
price from its optimal one, defined as x = p – p*. Note that unlike
other papers (e.g. Hansen, 1999) the negative value of x means that
the actual price is lower and the positive value—that the actual
price is higher than the desired price. We make this assumption
because of simpler tractability of results of the density function of
x derived in the next sub-section.
We also assume that there is a fixed cost of adjustment that is
not necessarily equal for up- and downgrading the price. And there
is a cost of being apart from the optimal price. Following Hansen
(1999) we assume that this cost is incurred at every moment
when  and can be measured as accumulated flow costs. Note
that due to the concavity of the profit function, the cost of being at
non-optimum is the second order. Then an entrepreneur makes a
decision by comparing the two costs. As long as the deviation cost
is sufficiently lower prices do not change. This behavior creates the
zone of inaction that is not necessarily symmetric around the
optimal price.
8. Note that the solution puts stricter requirement on η. It requires η > 1/α for the positivity
of G.
=P P
1
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Asymmetric (S,s) pricing: Implications for monetary policy 1892.2. Deriving the long-run density
In this framework we can derive the long-run density of price
deviations. Define f (x) as the long-run, time-invariant density
function of price deviations. This function can also be interpreted
as the likelihood of having a price deviation equal to x at any parti-
cular moment. For the derivation of the density function we
assume that Brownian motion in money supply has very simple
properties: it is a mean zero process and at every instant dt it can
change x by dx with equal probabilities going up and down. This
means that if we are now at x after one period (dt) we will be at
x + dx with probability 0.5 and at x – dx with probability 0.5. Then,
(4)
as being today at x means being either at x – dx or at x + dx a
moment ago. This is a very convenient property. We can rewrite
(4) as 
Then, division by dx gives 
(5)
 Notice that as  two parts of left hand side of expression
(5) converge to derivatives of f(x) and then whole left hand side is
something like the change in the derivative from point x + dx to
point x9. Then the whole expression (5) is equivalent to the second
derivative of f(x)  being zero 
 
.
Now, as f(x) is a density function, we know that 
(6)
9. In real life this would mean to assume that inaction bands on both sides of the optimal
price are wide in comparison to the average size of an idiosyncratic shock. This assumption is
necessary for deriving analytical results and is relaxed in coming sections when we employ ABM
techniques.
1 1
2 2
= + + −f x f x dx f x dx( ) ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) 0+ − − − − =f x dx f x f x f x dx( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
0+ − − −− =f x dx f x f x f x dx
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2
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−
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(6)
where –a and b are optimal bands of price adjustment. Thus, price
deviation (x) is distributed between –a and b. We also have two
boundary conditions f (–a) = f (b) = 0, by assumption that prices are
adjusted immediately as they reach any of the boundaries, thus
none of them, in principle, are reached. Then we can split the inte-
gral (6) into two parts 
(7)
 From the second derivative of f (x) being zero we know that
both of these parts are linear. From the boundary conditions we
know their crossing points with x axis are x = –a and x = b. Also,
note that f (b) has to reach maximum at x = 0, because has the
highest probability equal to 
(8)
 This is the probability of being either at –dx or at b – dx and
getting a positive shock plus the probability of being either at dx or
at –a + dx and getting a negative shock. Then, two strait lines have to
cross at x = 0, otherwise the density function will not be continuous.
All these conditions together imply that f (x) has a triangular
shape with the base a + b and the height 2/(a + b) (and it reaches
maximum at x = 0). This gives us the solution to the problem 
    (9)
Figure 1. The long-run density funtion
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on Figure 1.10
The shape of the resulting density function has an interesting
implication. The figure is drawn for the case when a < b which
seems to be a realistic scenario given the empirical findings
summarized in section 1 of this paper. This implies difference in an
intensive margin (Klenow and Kryvtsov 2008). From the figure  we
can infer that near the upgrading band (near –a) there are relatively
more firms than near the downgrading band (near b). This demon-
strates the difference in an extensive margin. This result
emphasizes the obscurity of the link between micro- and macro-
asymmetry: although price downgrades are higher in magnitude
there are fewer firms who want to reduce their prices as a result of a
shock. Consequently, it is not obvious that the positive shock in
price deviations11 will induce the aggregate price level to reduce
with higher magnitude than the rise caused by the negative shock
of the same magnitude. In fact, there is a chance that these two
factors completely cancel out each other and we get the same result
as Caballero (1992). 
The long-run density (9) has few interesting characteristics. The
share of firms that hold price under their optimal price is a/(a + b).
Consequently the share of firms holding the price over the optimal
one is b/(a + b). In fact this average price deviation can be calcu-
lated as                                                                                                              
(10)
 which results into 
(11) 
This is interesting as it implies that in case of asymmetry (when
a < b) the average price deviation will be positive. In other words
10. Notice that the original assumption of discretization of a continuous process, mainly that x
can go to only two states, either x + dx or x – dx is not crucial for the form of the density
function. If one assumes many different type of idiosyncratic shock distribution it is easy to
show that the same shape results. A crucial assumption for the shape is that the distribution is
symmetric and centered around zero, which is maintained throughout the whole paper.
11. As shown in the next section a positive shock in price deviations is equivalent to a negative
monetary shock.
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Zakaria Babutsidze192an “average” firm will be holding the price above the optimal level.
This happens without assuming any inflationary expectations.
3. Response to monetary policy
For the analysis of the responses of the system to monetary
policy we setup an ABM equivalent to the model described in
previous section. There are two reasons for this. One is that we
want to depart from the unrealistic assumption of infinitesimally
small idiosyncratic shocks. Recall that this was a necessary assump-
tion for derivation of the long-run density. If idiosyncratic shocks
are not of a negligible size compared to the adjustment bands, the
price deviation density will depart from the one described by equa-
tion (4). In this case larger share of firms will hold prices close (or
equal to) the optimal price.
The second reason for using ABM is that we want to analyze the
implications of the model for the effectiveness of monetary policy
during turbulent periods. We want to check how system responds
to monetary shocks during booms and recessions. Recall one of the
empirical findings regarding marco asymmetry has been that
expansionary monetary policy is more effective during recessions
than during booms. We want to check the implications of our
model in this respect.
3.1. Methodology
In this sub-section we provide essential details of the simulation
methodology. Of course, we can not work with the continuum of
firms any longer. As we work with price deviations we have to
transform the results in terms of price and output responses. Let x0
be an initial price deviation for a single firm x0 = p0 – p*0 . Then
money supply shock of a magnitude ε is also an optimal price
shock of the same magnitude p*1 = p*0 + ε . This gives x1 = p1 – p*1 .
From these identities we get x1 = p1 – p*0 – ε. Then it is apparent
that a positive shock in money supply transforms into a negative
shock in price deviations and vice versa. Intuitively, the immediate
rise in optimal price for the firm means that its relative price has
lowered. Finally, one can express the evolution of the price of a
single firm as 
(12)1 0 1 0− = + −εp p x x
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Then, the evolution of the aggregate price is derived by simply
averaging all the prices in the economy.
For output changes, we proceed with demand functions. Taking
natural logarithms of the original demand function and totally
differentiating gives 
(13)
 From here it is obvious that the output changes for every single
firm depend on the parameter η. But on the aggregate level, note
that by definition
 , as . 
So, the first summand in (13) disappears on the aggregate level and
we are left with 
(14)
where  is a log of aggregate output. So, on the aggregate level the
role of price elasticity of demand disappears. Then, to simplify
calculations, for aggregate output we proceed with the rearrange-
ment of (14), as we know dm and also .
Results of the model depend on the size of she policy and idio-
syncratic shock compared to firms’ inaction band. Therefore, we
fix the size of the inaction band and calibrate monetary policy and
idiosyncratic shocks in corresponding units. We normalize the size
of the inaction band a + b = 100. In this case an idiosyncratic
shock of size w, can be interpreted as the shock of w% of the inac-
tion band. The same is true for monetary policy—its size will be
measured as a corresponding percent of an inaction band. Then,
the asymmetry of the pricing policy can be described by parameter
a. If a = 50, there is no asymmetry in firms’ pricing strategy. If
a < 50 firms tolerate larger price deviations above the optimal price
compared to the deviations below it. If a > 50 situation is reversed.
We assume the idiosyncratic shocks are normally distributed
with zero mean and variance that is measured in units comparable
to the size of the inaction band. Variance being equal to w, means
shock are drawn from Ν (0,σ), which corresponds to the shock
variance being equal to the σ 2 % of the inaction band. If w is small
enough, we have demonstrated that the time invariant price devia-
tion distribution density is given by (9). However, when shock
η= − + −dy dp dp dm dp( ) ( )
=∑ ∑dp dp = ∑dpndp n n
= +dm dp dy
y
dp
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derived analytically. Larger mass of firm’s will be adjusting each
period to optimal price and as a consequence larger mass will be
concentrate at x = 0. In order to permit the system to converge to
the time invariant distribution before starting a policy experiment
we initialize the system with a uniform distribution of x over the
interval [–a;b]  and let the system run without any aggregate shock
for 3000 periods12. Once the system has settled to the time
invariant distribution we conduct a policy experiment—we intro-
duce a monetary shock of certain size and analyze the system’s
response to it.
We study the economy populated by 1000 firms. For reporting
each result we conduct 150 Monte-Carlo simulation and report the
average values across all 150 runs. In all cases standard deviations
are extremely small, therefore they are not reported on graphs
below. 
3.2. Results
A major contribution of the paper to the literature is that we
can discuss the implications of the extent of the asymmetry of the
adjustment bands. Recall that we have normalized a + b = 100.
Then parameter a completely characterizes the adjustment band
asymmetry. Asymmetry of inaction interval (a) is one of the major
parameters in our investigation. This is because the results of a
recent study by Álvarez et al. (2007) that has assembled the
evidence from european countries suggests variation in levels of
asymmetry across countries.
Figure 2  presents the results of agent-based model that demons-
trates the effect of the asymmetry on the effectiveness of the
monetary policy. On the bottom axis the parameter a is plotted,
while on the vertical axes we have plotted the share of the mone-
tary shock passed to output. The value 0.3 on the vertical axis
should be interpreted as 30% of the shock being passed to output
while 70% being absorbed by the prices. The graph is reproduced
12.  Numerous simulations show that in case of sufficiently low variance long-run equilibrium
is indeed the one given by (9). As a consequence, the results reported in this paper are not
dependent on initial conditions unlike, for example, Caplin and Spulber (1987) where initial
distribution is crucial for basic results of the model.
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a low enough level for the time invariant price deviation distribu-
tion to be well described by the analytical one presented by
equation (9). We are usually interested by the left half of the graph
because that half implies a < b which is a realistic case based on the
empirical findings reviewed in this paper.
Figure 2 presents three sequences for three different sizes of the
expansionary monetary policy: for 20, 50 and 80% of the inaction
band. As one can clearly see the asymmetry plays virtually no role
if the magnitude of the monetary policy is small. With increasing
size of the monetary intervention role of asymmetry becomes
prominent. For instance with policy size of 80 greater asymmetry
(going to the left on the graph) implies higher efficiently of the
policy. This is intuitive as larger asymmetry leaves fewer firms at
the right edge of the x distribution which will adjust prices when
policy is implemented. Fewer firms adjusting prices induces larger
share of monetary shock being passed to output.
Another important effect that has been demonstrated by figure 
is the impact of the policy size on its passage to output. This effect
is better demonstrated by the left panel of figure 3. Similar to the
figure , in this figure σ 2 = 1. The model predicts that the size of the
monetary intervention negatively affects its efficiency. The logic
behind this result is that larger monetary shock knocks more firms
out of the inaction bands, induces them to adjust to the optimal
price and as a result drives up the inflation instead of affecting real
economy.
Figure 2. The effect of the adjustment band asymmetry
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discussing expansionary monetary policy, we can in fact draw
conclusions also about the effects of the contractionary policies.
This is due to the symmetry of the results. If a = 50 we do not have
asymmetry in inaction bands and the size of the results of positive
and negative monetary interventions are equal. However, in case
of asymmetry for any given a we can construct a scenario to derive
the corresponding results for the contractionary policy. Consider
an arbitrary a. We know that b = 100 – a. Therefore, the contractio-
nary monetary policy for inaction band asymmetry being
described by a, is exactly equal to the result generated by 100 – a.
This means that in figure 2 the effect of the positive and negative
monetary policy are given by mirroring at a = 50. For example,
when a = 20, 25% of positive monetary shock of size 80 is passes to
output, as documented by the graph. However, contractionary
monetary policy is sterile, which is seen by observing the passage
to output being equal to zero at a = 80 (which is a mirror to a = 20).
The implications of the model in this regard are easily seen on
the left panel of figure 3. In this figure we plot three series, each
corresponding to different values of asymmetry. Two of them
correspond to a = 20 and a = 80 which are the mirror cases compa-
rable to each other. The discrepancy between these two series
implies differential response to positive and negative monetary
shocks. As we know that reality calls for a < 50, and figure presents
results for the expansionary monetary policy, it is intuitive to view
results of a = 20 as response to expansionary monetary policy and
that of a = 80 as contractionary monetary policy.
Figure 3. The effects of the policy size and idiosyncratic shock variance
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policy size grows. The results predict that if there exists an asym-
metry in adjustment bands (of sort that a < b), for large enough
monetary intervention, positive expansionary monetary policies
are more effective than contractionary monetary policies. This is in
line with the empirical findings surveyed above.
Another result concerns the analytical long-run price deviation
distribution derived above and its implications. Recall that for the
derivation of function (9) we had to assume infinitesimally small
idiosyncratic shocks, which in case of numerical simulations
means . As σ  is measured as the constant share of the inac-
tion band size, this effectively means infinitely large inaction
interval. This is, clearly not realistic. Agent-based simulations
present us a chance to explore the effect of relaxing this assump-
tion and exploring the effects on the monetary policy.
The right panel of the figure 3 presents results where we vary
the value of σ 2. As we have anticipated in the text above, larger
variance would imply larger mass of firms leaving adjustment
bands and reseting themselves to the mode of the distribution at
x = 0. This would effectively mean that at any point in time greater
number of firms holding optimal prices and monetary policy being
less effective. As results presented in figure 3 show, this is indeed
the case: for any size of asymmetry effectiveness of monetary
policy is strictly decreasing in idiosyncratic shock variance. This
result stresses the importance of the size of the inaction bands
when taking the decision on the size of the monetary policy. 
Figure 4. Output response during boom and recession
2 0σ →
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Here we present results of our model regarding the asymmetric
response to aggregate monetary shocks during different phases of
business cycle. The current model is a kind of hybrid of sticky and
flexible price models. Everything depends on the distribution of
price deviations and the direction of the monetary shock. For
example, if economy is in a boom, that is, it has been hit with
several positive shocks, the distribution of price deviations shifts to
the left border of inaction interval. And any further positive mone-
tary shock induces a large number of firms to raise their prices. The
model gets closer to flexible price models and the output response
is dampened. But this is only for positive monetary shocks. If, in
this situation, the economy is hit by a negative monetary shock
the distribution will shift to the right and basically no firm will
adjust prices. Then, the model gets closer to sticky price models
and the whole shock is passed to the output. So, the regime of
output responses crucially depends on the direction of the aggre-
gate shock.
Figure 4 presents five series. One of them, termed “equilibrium”
is the series generated the same way as all the series up to now. The
other four series represent responses to expansionary monetary
policy during the different phases of a business cycle. Cycles in our
computational environment are generated artificially by shocking
the economy in several consecutive times. More precisely, early
boom and early recession is generated by introducing policy of size
+1 and -1 respectively, while late boom and recession are generated
by introducing shocks of the same size for 20 consecutive time
periods. After we bring the system to the state of boom or recession
we exercise expansionary monetary policy and calculate the
response that is presented on the figure.
The results are close to linear and conform to our conjectures.
Expansionary monetary policy is becoming increasingly ineffec-
tive as we progress further into the boom and it becomes
increasingly effective as we go deeper into the recession. It is worth
mentioning that this statement is valid only in the case of positive
monetary shocks. For negative ones, the situation is the mirror
image. In case of contractionary policy, it is absorbed by prices in
recessions but passed to the output in booms. But, the point is that
this particular kind of heterogeneity of agents is able to produce
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rations above, these results can be derived from any (S,s) pricing
model. The asymmetry of the bands is not required for this result.
It is purely due to the shifts of the price deviation density to one of
the edges of the distribution. So, asymmetry on the micro level is
not the cause of the aggregate output having two regime property,
but rather this is due to (S,s) pricing behavior itself. Thus, this kind
of aggregate asymmetry is the direct consequence off heteroge-
neity of agents, no matter whether their micro policies are
symmetric or asymmetric.
4. Conclusion
Individual prices change rarely, and there is a staggering in the
adjustment since the price changes across the firms differ in time.
This behavior is due to some costs involved in the price adjustment
process: costs of gathering information about the market conjunc-
ture, costs of loosing the market share, etc. So, the adjustment cost
is a wider notion than “menu cost”; the latter is one of the compo-
nents of the former. Due to the fact that some ingredients of price
adjustment costs are asymmetric for price changes in different
directions, the adjustment costs, as a whole, are also different for
price upgrades and downgrades.
In the current paper we presented the model where individual
firms follow asymmetric (S,s) pricing behavior. This is due to the
asymmetry in the adjustment costs mentioned in the previous
paragraph. We investigate few important questions such as asym-
metry in responses to expansionary and contrationaty monetary
policies and variance of the effectiveness of the policy during diffe-
rent phases of the business cycle. We also investigate the role of
the asymmetry in adjustment bands in these processes.
The basic results were derived by numerically simulating the
model. However, for the small idiosyncratic shocks the time inva-
riant price deviation distribution had been analytically derived.
This distribution does not depend on the initial conditions of the
model. One more specific character of the current paper is that,
unlike the most similar papers, we did not use simple binomial
random walk for the description of shock process. Rather we used
more elaborate shock process that allows for the variance in the
Zakaria Babutsidze200size of the idiosyncratic shocks. This is important as it highlights
the importance of firms located in the interior of the adjustment
bands. This contrasts to the models with binomial shocks (e.g.
Caballero, 1992), that but emphasis on firms located on margins of
the inaction interval. We have also explored the effects of the
changing variance in shock process.
We have explored at the implications of the asymmetric (S,s)
pricing behavior of firms for two kinds of stylized facts about the
asymmetry in the aggregate output dynamics. The first is the asym-
metric response of output to positive and negative monetary
shocks. Here the finding is that in the case of sufficiently high
shocks, the model is able to produce significant asymmetry on the
aggregate level between responses. The second type of asymmetry
is that the aggregate output has low and high response regimes
with respect to monetary shocks, depending on whether the
economy is in boom or in recession. Although the model is able to
produce this kind of effect for positive shocks, the main conclusion
is that this is not due to the asymmetry on the micro level. Instead,
firm heterogeneity itself creates the asymmetry on aggregate level.
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MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES IN AN 
AGENT-BASED ARTIFICIAL ECONOMY
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Andrea Teglio
Universitat Jaume I, Campus del Riu Sec
 Basel III is a recently-agreed regulatory standard for bank capital adequacy
with focus on the macroprudential dimension of banking regulation, i.e., the
system-wide implications of banks’ lending and risk. An important Basel III
provision is to reduce procyclicality of present banking regulation and promote
countercyclical capital buffers for banks. The Eurace agent-based macroeco-
nomic model and simulator has been recently showed to be able to reproduce a
credit-fueled boom-bust dynamics where excessive bank leverages, while bene-
fitting in the short term, have destabilizing effects in the medium-long term. In
this paper we employ the Eurace model to test regulatory policies providing
time varying capital requirements for banks, based on mechanisms that enforce
banks to build up or release capital buffers, according to the overall conditions
of the economy. As conditioning variables for these dynamic policies, both the
unemployment rate and the aggregate credit growth have been considered.
Results show that the dynamic regulation of capital requirements is generally
more successful than fixed tight capital requirements in stabilizing the
economy and improving the macroeconomic performance. 
Keywords:  Basel III, Macroprudential Regulation, Agent-Based Models and Simulation.  
The recent economic and financial crisis has cast serious
doubt on the idea of efficient self-regulating financial and credit
markets, and consequently the need for a more effective regulation
of these markets unquestionably has arisen. As a response to the
crisis, a new global regulatory standard has been proposed underRevue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto206the name of Basel III1, with the objective to improve the resilience
of the banking system.
The rational behind Basel III regulation, which is founded on
the same three pillars2 characterizing its previous version Basel II,
is that one of the main reasons why the economic crisis became so
severe was that the banking sectors of many countries had built up
excessive on—and off-balance sheet leverage. The erosion of the
level and quality of the capital base determined that the banking
system was not able to absorb systemic trading and credit losses
nor could it cope with the large off-balance sheet exposures. The
crisis was further amplified by a procyclical deleveraging process.
The weaknesses in the banking sector were rapidly transmitted to
the rest of the financial system and the real economy, resulting in a
massive contraction of liquidity and credit availability (for more
details see BIS, 2011).
Some previous works by the authors reproduced these economic
mechanisms by means of the agent-based model and simulator
Eurace (see Raberto et al. 2012; Teglio et al. 2012). In particular,
Raberto et al. (2012) shows that excessive bank leverages can drive
economies into severe recession in the medium-long run. The pres-
sure on wages and labor costs during credit-fueled economic
booms, in conjunction with the speed of growth of credit-money,
causes a rise of inflation, that in turn can determine higher interest
rates. Excessively indebted firms may be unable to fulfill their
financial commitments with the cash proceedings of their reve-
nues, and may be obliged to take new loans to pay interests on their
debt, therefore entering in a Ponzi scheme. However, the deteriora-
tion of firms creditworthiness causes a further rise of interest rates
due to the widening of the risk spread on policy rates. This, in turn,
affects the balance sheet of highly indebted firms, which may
become soon insolvent. Debt write-offs reduce banks’s equity and
their lending capacity, thus causing a widespread credit rationing
and a forced deleveraging of the corporate sector that may trigger a
possible wave of bankruptcies of even good but illiquid firms. A
credit-fueled economic boom may thus turn out in a depression.
1. For details and documents on Basel III, please visit the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) website at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm
2. The three pillars are: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review process and market
discipline. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm
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(2012), the aim of this paper is to understand if some of the post-
crisis measures proposed by the Basel Committee can have a posi-
tive impact in our model.
According to Borio (2011), the institutional response after the
crisis has taken two forms. Policymakers have been strengthening
the systemic (or macro-prudential) orientation of regulatory and
supervisory frameworks, and they have begun to question the
premise that financial stability can be secured without a more
active support of macroeconomic policies. The established pre-
crisis policy framework was focused on the stability of individual
institutions (micro-prudential orientation) while the reforms
introduced in Basel III provide a macro-prudential approach to
regulation and supervision that has a system-wide focus, with the
goal to limit the risk of episodes of financial distress with serious
consequences for the real economy (“systemic risk”).
Claiming that one of the most destabilizing elements of the
crisis has been the procyclical amplification of financial shocks
throughout the banking system, the new regulatory framework
introduces some measures in order to make banks more resilient to
such procyclical dynamics, like encouraging banks to create coun-
tercyclical capital buffers in order to accumulate capital when the
economy is strong and use it when the economic conditions are
bad. The problem, pointed out again by the Basel Committee in
BIS (2011) and also emerged from the computational experiments
of Raberto et al. (2012), is that losses incurred in the banking sector
can be extremely large when a downturn is preceded by a period of
excess credit growth. These losses can destabilize the banking
sector, creating a credit crunch that contributes to a downturn in
the real economy that then feeds back to the banking sector again.
According to Drehmann et al. (2010), the main target of coun-
tercyclical capital standards is to encourage banks to build up
buffers in good times that can be drawn down in bad ones. In this
paper, we design two endogenous adaptive policy rules for the
Eurace agent-based model; the two rules set capital requirements in
the spirit of encouraging banks to build up capital buffers in good
times. Details about the implementation of these policy rules, as
identifying bad and good times and choosing the conditioning
Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto208variables which could guide the build-up and release of capital, are
discussed in section 3.1.
The issue of pro-cyclicality in regulatory policy has been widely
discussed in the literature of the last 20 years. Blum and Hellwig
(1995) already observed that a “rigid link between bank equity and
bank lending may act as an automatic amplifier for economic fluc-
tuations, inducing banks to lend more when times are good and to
lend less when times are bad, thus reinforcing underlying shocks”.
They propose a simple stylized macroeconomic model where
banks must satisfy a minimum-reserve requirement and a capital
adequacy requirement, in order to study the effects of demand
disturbance for different levels of capital requirements. Their
conclusion, later extended by Cecchetti and Li (2008) in a more
complete economic framework, is that capital requirements have a
significant macroeconomic impact. Heid (2007) presents a model
with a representative bank which invests in riskless bonds and
loans, subject to regulatory constraint, explaining the cyclical
effects of capital requirements also in the case of banks which
always hold a positive capital buffer. In Raberto et al. (2012) and
Teglio et al. (2012), we addressed similar issues using an agent-
based methodology, confirming and extending the relevance of
the macroeconomic implications of capital requirements. We are
both able to reproduce the endogenous amplification of economic
fluctuations and to observe how these fluctuation are affected by
different levels of capital requirements.
In the last ten years, and markedly after the 2007 crisis, the
discussion on bank regulation and pro-cyclicality significantly
increased, incorporating new concepts as “systemic risk”. Acharya
(2009) shows that capital adequacy requirements fail to mitigate
systemic risk, using a multi-period general equilibrium model with
many agents and markets, inspired to the Allen and Gale (2000)
one-period model of bubbles and crisis. In order to assess the
cyclaclity of capital requirements, several macroeconometric
models have been proposed and estimated on data of different
countries. Andersen (2011) and Antão and Lacerda (2011) simulate
the IRB (internal rating based) approach of Basel II using Norwe-
gian and Portuguese data respectively, both confirming the
cyclicality of capital requirements and comparing the new regula-
tory framework with the previous one of Basel I.3 More recently, in
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utility and the correct implementation of macroprudential regula-
tion of the banking sector has arisen. Repullo and Saurina (2011)
present a critical assessment of the countercyclical capital buffer in
Basel III, evaluating the “conditioning variables” suggested for
taking buffer decisions (see Drehmann et al., 2010). Their conclu-
sion is that the choice of the credit-to-GDP gap as the “common
reference point” for taking buffer decisions can be misleading
because its correlation with the GDP growth is generally negative,
and this contradicts the necessity of building buffers of resources
in good times that can draw down when conditions deteriorate.
They also claim that credit growth “appears to be a much better
common reference point for the countercyclical capital buffer”. As
it will be shown in section 4, our results confirm the efficacy of
credit growth as conditioning variable.
In this paper we study the macroeconomic implications of
macroprudential policy regulations using an agent-based
approach. With respect to the previous literature, mainly consis-
ting in general equilibrium models or macroeconometric models,
the Eurace agent-based model and simulator is a much more
complex environment where all the economic adjustments are
endogenous and produced by the interaction of many heteroge-
neous agents acting in different markets. The completeness of the
Eurace framework is particularly important in this study, where it
is necessary to consider the interplay and spillover between the
production, the financial as well as the credit sector of the
economy. In the last decade, several agent-based economic models
have been developed in order to focus on the relation between the
credit and financial factors and the real economy, see e.g. Delli
Gatti et al. (2005, 2009); Raberto et al. (2008a); Dosi et al. (2010);
Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011). However, the novelty and the
advantage of the Eurace framework is the simultaneous presence of
the most important economic agents interacting in many different
markets. This feature allows for an endogenous and realistic repre-
sentation of the whole economic system in an evolving dynamic
3. In Basel II, with respect to Basel I, the capital charges depend on asset quality, based on
public or internal ratings, rather than on asset type.
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modelling.
The paper is divided as follows. Section 1 presents an overview
of the general structural features of the Eurace model with the
related references. Section 2 reports a detailed description of a new
model for capital goods’ demand within Eurace, while a
throughout description of the implementation of the Basel II
capital requirements rule and of the new countercyclical policies is
reported in section 3. Computational results are presented and
discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 draws our concluding
remarks.
1. An overview of the Eurace model
Eurace is a model and simulator of an artificial economy which
belongs to the class of agent-based computational models (see
Tesfatsion and Judd (2006) for a review). The agent-based
approach to economics addresses the modelling of economic
systems as complex adaptive systems, i.e., systems made by many
self-interested interacting units (economic agents here) that may
change their behavior in order to adapt to the changing
(economic) environment and to the change of other units’ beha-
vior. The main distinguishing features of an agent-based artificial
economy with respect to the mainstream dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) modelling can be summarized as
follows: out-of-equilibrium dynamics versus market equilibrium,
decentralized markets with pairwise bargaining and price disper-
sion versus centralized markets and the law of one price, adaptive
expectations with myopic behavior versus rational expectations
and infinite foresight, endogenous shocks and business cycles
versus exogenous shocks.
The Eurace artificial economy has been constantly evolving
since the start in 2006 of the Eurace project within a EU-funded
research grant under the sixth framework programme. Eurace is a
fully-specified agent-based model of a complete economy that
includes different types of agents and integrates different types of
markets. Agents include households which act as consumers,
workers and financial investors, consumption goods producers as
well as capital goods producers, banks, a government and a central
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for consumption goods and capital goods, a labor market, a credit
market and a financial market for stocks and government bonds.
Except for the financial market, all markets are characterized by
decentralized exchange with price setting behavior on the supply
side. Agents’ decision processes are characterized by bounded ratio-
nality and limited information gathering and computational
capabilities; thus, agents’ behavior follows adaptive rules derived
from the management literature about firms and banks, and from
experimental and behavioral economics of consumers and finan-
cial investors.
In the following, we outline the structural features of the Eurace
economy with respect to the agents considered, the types of real
and financial assets owned and exchanged by agents as well as the
related payment commitments over time. Finally, table 2 presents
the balance sheets entries of the Eurace agents. The balance-sheet
variables can be regarded as the state variables of any agent and,
along with wages, interests and prices, are endogenously deter-
mined within the system. In particular, wages and consumption
goods prices are heterogeneous and fixed by any CGP according to
labor market conditions and costs, interest rates are fixed by banks
and are heterogeneous as well, because they depend on the credit-
worthiness of the borrower as well as on the central bank rate;4 in
both cases see Raberto et al. (2012); Cincotti et al. (2012),  for
further details. The only exogenous variables are the price of
energy (or raw materials) which is considered constant and,
accordingly, the price of capital goods  which is constant as well,
being a fixed mark-up on the energy price. The number of the
different types of agents is also fixed.
1.1. Types of agents
• Households (Hous) (indexed by h) 
• Consumption goods producers (CGP) (also named firms and
indexed by f) 
• Investment goods producer (KGP) 
• Banks (B) (indexed by b) 
4. The central bank policy rate is endogenously determined via a Taylor rule
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• Government (Gov) 
• Central Bank (CB) 
1.2. Types of Assets
1.2.1. Real assets
• homogeneous consumption goods (C Goods): (q); 
• homogeneous capital goods (K Goods): (K); 
• homogeneous energy or raw materials; 
• homogeneous labor units: (L). 
1.2.2. Financial assets
• deposits (of households, firms and the KGP) at banks; 
• deposits (of banks and the government) at the central bank;
• loans from banks to firms; 
• loans from the central bank to banks; 
• equity shares (for firms, banks and the capital good producer); 
• government bonds.  
 
Table 1. Interaction matrix of the Eurace model
  Hous  CGP  KGP  B  FgnS  Gov  CB
Hous  equity shares   C GOODS   deposits   transfers  
 gov. 
bonds 
 equity 
shares    
 gov. 
bonds  
  dividends     coupons  
CGP  LABOR    Κ GOODS  loans    
    deposits    
KGP     deposits RAW MAT.   
B   interests      loans 
  principal      deposits 
FgnS        
Gov  taxes  taxes  taxes  taxes    seignorage 
CB     interests   bonds  
    principal   coupons  
The matrix should be read as follows: row agents are the ones demanding or receiving real assets (denoted in small
caps), financial assets (denoted in bolded style) and their related monetary payment commitments over time (deno-
ted in italics); column agents are the ones supplying the corresponding real assets, financial assets and their related
monetary flows.
Macroprudential policies in an agent-based artificial economy 213Agents’ behaviors are thoroughly described in our previous
works, see e.g. Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio et al. (2010b); Cincotti
et al. (2012) about decision making hypotheses in real (consump-
tion goods and labor) markets as well as in credit markets. In
particular, consumption goods producers as well as banks are
short-term profit maximizers that fix prices (the price of consump-
tion goods and the lending rate) based on a fixed mark-up on their
costs (wages and cost of capital for CGPs and the central bank
policy rate for banks). CGPs make their production decisions accor-
ding to standard results from inventory theory (Hillier and
Lieberman, 1986). Households’ saving-consumption decision is
modelled according to the theory of buffer-stock saving behaviour
(Carroll, 2001; Deaton, 1992), which states that households
consumption depends on a precautionary saving motive, deter-
mined by a target level of wealth to income ratio. Households can
invest their savings in the asset market, by buying and selling
equity shares or government bonds. Households’ portfolio alloca-
tion is modeled according to a preference structure designed to
take into account the psychological findings emerged in the
framework of behavioral finance and in particular of prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
Table 2. Balance sheets of the agents in the Eurace economy
 Agent  Assets  Liabilities
Household  Liquidity  Equity 
 Equity shares  
 Gov bonds  
CGP  Capital goods  (K f )  Loans 
 Inventories  Equity  (E f )
 Liquidity  
KGP  Liquidity  Equity 
Bank  Loans  
 Deposits (Liquidity of Hous, 
 CGP and the KGP)
 Liquidity  Standing facility with the CB 
  Equity 
Government  Liquidity  Bonds
  Equity
Central Bank  Standing facility with Banks  Outstanding fiat money 
 Gov bonds  Deposits (Liquidity of Banks and  the Gov) 
 Liquidity  Equity
( = )ff bbD ∑ A
( )fbf∑ A
Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto2141992). Households’ behavior in the financial market has been
thoroughly described in Raberto et al. (2008b); Teglio et al. (2009).
It is worth noting, however, that only the equity shares of CGPs
are exchanged among households in the stock market and only
CGPs are allowed to issue new equity shares to be sold to house-
holds (see the related cells in the Interaction Matrix in Table 1).
Equity shares of KGP and banks are equally distributed among
households and can not be traded; put in another way, profits of
the KGP and of banks are equaly shared and distributed to house-
holds. Finally, the balance sheet approach employed in agent-
based modeling, as outlined in Table 2, is described in details in
Teglio et al. (2010a) and in Cincotti et al. (2010), where computa-
tional experiments about the use of quantitative easing policies
have been reported.
The computational experiments reported in this study have
been realized within an enriched version of the Eurace model. In
particular, beside the new regulatory policies designed and investi-
gated in this study, the Eurace model and simulator employed here
is characterized by a new model for capital goods demand and a
better founded model for the estimation of bankruptcy probability
for firms, as described in the following sections.
2. Capital goods investments 
2.1. Demand of capital goods
Physical capital K is employed with labor L by consumption
goods producers (CGPs) to produce an amount of consumption
goods q according to a Cobb-Douglas technology, as follows 
q = γ Lα Kβ , (1)
where γ  is positive and constant returns to scale are considered, i.e.
α and β are positive constants with the constraint α + β  = 1. CGPs
need new capital goods both to replace capital depreciation and to
expand the production capacity. In the previous version of the
Eurace model, see e.g. Raberto et al. (2012), CGPs computed the
desired amount of physical capital, given the planned production
quantity, by means of a static optimization method based on the
Cobb-Douglas technology and isoquants. In the new model
Macroprudential policies in an agent-based artificial economy 215presented here, the demand for capital goods is based on the net
present value (NPV) approach, which, according to a recent empi-
rical survey (Graham and Harvey, 2001, 2002), is, along with the
internal rate of return (IRR),5 the most popular method used by
managers to evaluate investments. The new investments model
should be therefore considered better founded on the realistic
behavior of economic actors.
CGPs compute their demand for new capital goods, henceforth
investments or I, at the beginning of any production month.6 The
amount I of new capital goods will then be delivered and will be
ready to use during the next production month. The first step in
computing the demand of new capital goods is the estimation7 by
every CGP of the expected demand qd of consumption goods it
should face during the month. Based on this estimate and on the
inventories amount ν, the CGP computes the production needs q
as q = qd – ν, if ν < qd, or q = 0  otherwise. Given the production
goal q, its present capital endowment K and the Coob-Douglas
technology, any CGP computes the necessary workforce Ld in order
to meet the production goal as:
(2)
Considering the present workforce L, the CGP opens new
vacancies, if Ld > L, or decides layoffs if Ld < L.
It is worth noting that, if the present workforce L and the
present endowment of physical capital K are not sufficient to meet
the production goal, i.e., q > γ Lα Kβ, increasing the workforce to Ld
is the only feasible way to meet the production goal during the
present month. The reason is that the new demanded physical
capital would be available to the CGP only from the next month.
Nevertheless, the expected demand qd  is still used to determine the
demand of new capital goods. The rationale is that the CGP has to
check if the increase of the stock of physical capital to meet the
5. It can be shown, however, that the IRR is generally equivalent to the NPV, except for some
special cases.
6. It is worth remembering that 1 month, i.e., 20 business days, is the basic time span for the
production process in Eurace and that the starting production day of the month is fixed for each
firm but can be different (asynchronous) among different firms.
7. The estimate is based on a linear interpolation of the sales made during a given number of
previous months.
1
= ( ) .d qL
K
α
βγ
^
^ ^
^
Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto216production goal, given the present workforce, is profitable in the
reasonable hypothesis that  qd  would be a lower bound for demand
in the future.
If q > γ Lα Kβ, the CGP computes the desired endowment of
physical capital Kd as follows: 
(3)
 The difference Kd – K is a reference point for investments. It is
worth noting, however, that according to the realistic hypothesis
of imperfect capital markets in Eurace and according to the diffe-
rence between internal and external financing for producers, we
stipulate, in line with Fazzari et al. (2008), that cash flows are a
bound for nominal investments and we consider last month CGP
revenues as a proxy for cash flows.
The CGP computes the NPV using a grid of investment values I
in the range between 0 and Imax , where Imax is given by the
minimum between Kd – K and last months revenues divided by the
price of capital pK, set by the capital good producer.8
The NPV is computed considering the present cost of invest-
ments, i.e., pK I and the discounted values of the future cash flow
given by the augmented productive capacity.
In particular, we consider 
(4)
where pmc  is the expected consumption goods price level9 at month
m, r is the weighted average yearly cost of capital for the CGP, and
Δqmc is the additional amount of monthly production given by the
capital investment I, after properly taking into account the depre-
ciation given by ξ, i.e., 
(5)
8. See e.g. Raberto et al. (2012) for some details about the stylized modeling of capital goods
producers in Eurace.
9. As common in agent-based computational models, the approach is the one of adaptive
expectations. Expected inflation is then computed based on past inflation, measured in a given
moving time window.
1
= ( ) .d qK
L
β
αγ
l*
=1
( ) = ,
(1 )
12
m mm
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K
mm
p q
NPV I p I
r
Δ− +
+
∑
( 1)= ( (1 ) ) .m mCq L K I L Kα β α βΔ γ ξ γ−+ − −
^
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when investment is still higher than a given threshold after consi-
dering the monthly depreciation rate ξ. The CGP demands the
amount I of capital goods that maximizes the NPV(I). If NPV(I) < 0.
for any I in the grid, no investment should be done. Finally, it is
worth remembering that CGPs are never rationed in the demand
for capital goods; however, they may be obliged to reduce the
investment schedule because rationed in the credit market.
2.2. Supply of capital goods
Capital goods are offered with infinite supply by a single capital
goods producer (KGP), which follows a build to order production
approach. No inventories and financing needs are then considered
for the KGP. Energy and raw materials are the only factor of
production and are assumed to be imported from abroad. The price
of energy and raw materials is exogenously given and set to a
constant value. The price of capital goods pK  is a fixed mark-up on
energy prices and therefore is also constant in this setting. Profits
of the capital good producer are distributed in equal shares among
all households. Put differently, it is assumed that all households
own equal shares of the capital goods producer and that shares are
not traded in any market. Therefore, the amount payed by
consumption goods producers for capital goods is partially (the
part related to mark-up) channeled back into the economy, while
the part related to energy costs leaves the Eurace economy.
3. Credit financing of investments
Consumption goods producers face the liquidity needs neces-
sary to finance the production and investment plans as well as the
scheduled financial payments, i.e. interests, debt installments,
taxes and dividends. They decide between internal and external
capital according to the pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf,
1984), which states that, because of information asymmetries
present in both credit and equity markets, firms prefer to meet
their financial payments first by using their internal liquidity, then
by means of new debt, if liquidity is not sufficient, then by issuing
new equity if rationed in the credit market.
Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto218It is worth noting that, if the producer is unable to meet its
financial payments, it goes into bankruptcy. Two types of
bankruptcies are considered, i.e., insolvency and illiquidity
bankruptcy. The first type is when CGP’s equity goes negative. The
second type is when the CGP is unable to pay its financial commit-
ments but still owns a positive equity. The significative difference
between the two types of bankruptcies is that, in case of insol-
vency bankruptcy, CGP’s debt is restructured, i.e. the debt is
reduced to a target fraction of CGP’s total assets and the correspon-
ding loans in the portfolios of lending banks are written-off (as
consequently banks’ equity is written-off as well). When a CGP
goes into bankruptcy, either of the insolvency or of the illiquidity
type, it fires all its employees, stopping production for a period
necessary to raise new equity capital in the stock market in order
to further strengthen its capital base and increase its liquidity.
In the following, we will discuss in detail how the supply of
credit is determined within the banking sector.
3.1. Credit supply
Credit to consumption goods producers is provided by banks,
who are supposed to be short-term profit maximizers. Households’
deposits are not rewarded and interests due to loans from the
central bank are the only costs for banks. Given the positive diffe-
rence between the lending rate to the corporate sector and the
central bank rate, banks can always increase their profits by
increasing their lending. Banks are then supposed to always fulfil
loan requests if regulatory constraints are satisfied, i.e. if capital
requirements are met. In particular, following the Basel II capital
adequacy rules, we stipulate that a minimum percentage of the
risk-weighted loan portfolio should be held by the bank in the
form of equity capital as a buffer for possible loan write-offs and
equity losses. We denote this minimum percentage as κ and we
call it capital requirement. The risk weight ωλ of any loan λ
depends on the borrower credit worthiness after the loan and is
measured by using its balance sheet entries. Let us suppose that a
bank b, with equity Eb and risk weighted loan portfolio W b,
receives a loan request amount λ f  from CGP f, characterized by
debt D f and equity E f, then the bank is allowed to lend to the CGP
an amount  λ f  given by:  bf ≤A
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The rationale of the rule is that the bank is allowed to lend up to
the amount Abf that, weighted by the loan riskiness ωλ and summed
to its present risky weighted portfolio W b, can be sustained by its
equity base E b, which should be at least κ % of W b + ωλ Abf. The
loan riskiness is computed by considering first the borrower’s
default probability, along the lines of the Moody’s KMV model ,
then by adopting an ad-hoc approximation of the so-called Basel II
internal ratings approach that, given the credit rating of the
borrower (here given by the default probability), provides the loan
riskiness ωλ. In particular, inspired by the Moody’s KMV model
(Saunders and Allen, 2010), we consider the balance sheet entries
of the borrower as an indicator of its distance to default or, alterna-
tively, probability of default and credit rating. In this context, the
probability of default π f of borrower f is defined as: 
(7)
where the rationale is that the lower is the capital base of the
borrower with respect to its debt, the higher is the likelihood of
default, because of possible equity losses due to negative earnings.
We then stipulate that the risk weight of the loan depends on π f
through an ad-hoc function as follows: 
(8)
This particular cubic function has to be considered as an
approximation of the so-called Basel II internal ratings approach,
after considering its graphical representation as in Yeh et al. (2005)
(Figure 2).
3.2. Adaptive minimum capital requirements
Following the recommendations of the Basel committee, we
implement into the model a mechanism to encourage10 banks to
build up and release capital buffers, according to the overall
 ( ),
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=
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Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto220economic conditions of the economy, that are generally identified
with “bad times” and “good times”. The main idea is that in “good
times” banks should build up a precautionary capital buffer and
release it in bad times when credit is scarcely available. The
concept of good and bad times is clearly related with expansion
and contraction of the economic cycle, but the tricky part is to
choose the conditioning variable that permits to identify if times
are good or bad. Several possibilities have been already suggested.
Drehmann et al. (2010) suggests three typologies of conditioning
variables. The first one includes measures of the aggregate macroe-
conomic conditions (GDP growth, credit growth, or their ratio),
the second one focuses on the banking sector activity (banks aggre-
gate profits and losses, banks credit growth), while the last one is
related to the cost of funding for banks (spreads and cost of liqui-
dity). We choose to use a conditioning variable for each of the first
two typologies, the unemployment rate as a measure of aggregate
macroeconomic conditions and aggregate banks’ loans as a
measure of the banking sector activity.
The first rule for setting the minimum capital requirement κ  is
a piecewise linear rule that maps the unemployment rate into κ.
The logic is that the capital requirement should be tighter when we
are in “good times” (low unemployment rate) while they should be
more relaxed when we are in “bad times” (high unemployment
rate). The capital requirement11 κut  is then given by: 
(9)
We use the notation κut  here to highlight the dependence on
time and on the unemployment rate. The values of κut  then lies in
an interval between a minimum level κmin, reached when the
unemployment is higher than a given threshold u, and a
maximum value κmax that is assumed at full employment. In the
10. Let us note that we are “compelling” more than encouraging banks, because our
mechanism cyclically moves minimum capital requirements, as shown in Equation (9) and (10).
This may be questionable (see Repullo et al., 2010; Repullo and Saurina, 2011; Gordy, 2009) but
it appears to us an acceptable simplification, considering that in the model banks only have
loans as risky assets in their portfolio
11. We omit the adjective “minimum” here to avoid confusion between κut  that is the
minimum level of capital required to banks at time t, and κmin that is the minimum level under
which the time varying κ can not drop, and that is independent from time.
( ) < ,
=
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Macroprudential policies in an agent-based artificial economy 221computational experiments presented here, we have set κmin = 8%,
which is the actual reference in the Basel II accords, κmax = 12% and
u = 25%. The parameter u determines the slope of the straight line
in the (ut, κut ) plane, and represents the threshold unemployment
rate above which the maximum leverage is set to κmin.
The mechanism of the second rule is essentially the same as the
previous one, using the aggregate loan portfolio of all banks as the
conditioning variable. If Lt is the sum of all outstanding bank loans
at month t, the decision making about capital requirement is made
according to: 
(10)
where ΔLt/Lt is the percentage increase (or decrease) of aggregate
credit L from month t–1 to month t. The parameter η represents in
this case the threshold monthly credit growth above which κct is set
to κmax. The notation κ
c
t highlights the dependence on time and on
the credit growth. In the set of simulations presented in this paper,
η = 5%, i.e., if monthly credit growth is higher that 5%, capital
requirement is the maximum one (12%). The rationale behind the
rule is again to force banks to build up buffers in good times, which
are usually characterized by a rapid growth of credit, that can be
drawn down in bad ones. Buffers should be understood as capital
in excess that is available to absorb losses in bad times. Real world
experience as well as Eurace simulations have shown that a too
rapid credit growth, while benefitting in the short term, can result
in a bubble burst in the long run, when high levels of leverage
become unsustainable. In this perspective, this new rule for κct  can
also be interpreted on one hand as a way to moderate a too rapid
growth of credit by increasing the minimum requirement of
capital for banks and, on the other hand, as an attempt to prevent
the effects of banks’s loans write-off on the credit supply. Finally, it
is worth noting that whatever the negative value ΔLt /Lt can be, we
stipulate that capital requirement can never drop under the
minimum level of κmin, set to 8%.
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This section shows the results of computational experiments,
performed in a setting with 2000 households, 20 consumption
goods producers, 3 banks, 1 investment goods producer, 1 govern-
ment, and 1 central bank.
We present several tables resuming the average values (with rela-
tive standard errors) of some of the main economic indicators in
order to compare the overall performance of the artificial economy
for three different values of minimum capital requirements. In the
same tables, we also present the values of the same economic indi-
cators in the two implemented cases of macro-prudential policy,
i.e., a countercyclical buffer capital mechanism that uses the unem-
ployment rate as conditioning variable, as shown in Equation (9),
and a second one based on banks credit growth, as in Equation
(10). Moreover, we separate the simulations into two time periods.
The first period shows the first 5 years of simulation while the
second period represents the remaining 25 years.
Even in a different setting, results are in agreement with the
explications discussed in Raberto et al. (2012). When capital require-
ment is low, the economic performance is good in the short term,
due to the major amount of credit granted by banks, but turns bad
in the long term because of the augmented financial fragility of
firms that leads to a higher risk of insolvency. This mechanism
closely mimics what is reported in BIS (2011), i.e., that banks capital
losses “can destabilize the banking sector, which can bring about or
exacerbate a downturn in the real economy. This in turn can further
destabilize the banking sector...”. This is exactly what happens in
our model. In the short run, real consumption, employment and
investments (and therefore real GDP) are higher for loose capital
requirements, due to the easier access to bank loans. Indeed, a
worrying element is already present in the short run: firms leverage
increases when relaxing capital requirement, raising economy’s
financial fragility (or systemic risk). Table 3 corroborates this narra-
tive with the proper economic indicators. To observe the vicious
circle between banking sector and real economy, emphasized by BIS
(2011), we have to move to the medium-long run. Table 4 shows
that the hierarchy emerged in the short run is completely reversed.
Tighter capital requirements allow for better economic perfor-
mances in the long run, in terms of consumption goods production,
Macroprudential policies in an agent-based artificial economy 223unemployment rate and real GDP level. Basically, loose capital
requirements tend to push firms towards an unbalanced debt-
equity ratio, with excess of debt. This can be observed in Figure 5,
where firms leverage is plotted for a sample case. The higher finan-
cial fragility of firms determines a higher probability for firms to get
into insolvency bankruptcy, as shown in Table 6, with obvious
damage for commercial banks equity capital (see Figure 4) that
undermines the resilience of the banking system. Banks capital
losses trigger in turn a credit contraction that prevents firms to roll
over debt, therefore exacerbating the downturn in the real economy
thought chains of illiquidity bankruptcies. In Table 6 it can be
observed a clear trend for banks equity and firms insolvency
bankruptcies, showing that these economic indicators deteriorate
when relaxing capital requirements.   
Table 3. Values of the main economic indicators in the first 5 years of simulation 
for different capital requirements (κ)*
  cons. goods  inv. goods  unempl.  banks’  firms’ 
κ (%)  production  production  rate (%)  loans  leverage 
8  9629 (25)  1620 (14)  2.84 (0.18)  151393 (1042)  3.21 (0.02)
10  9530 (29)  1530 (18)  2.86 (0.18)  143659 (1090)  2.85 (0.02)
12  9486 (27)  1486 (14)  2.88 (0.18)  138126 (840)  2.60 (0.01)
 κ ut  9411 (40)  1442 (24)  2.95 (0.20)  136749 (1246)  2.58 (0.02)
 κ ct  8518 (57)  1069 (12)  7.54 (0.57)  121650 (512)  2.23 (0.01)
* An unemployment rule κut  (average value = 11.54) and a credit rule κ
c
t  (average value = 9.65) has been used to set
dynamic requirements. Values are averaged over 20 different random seeds (standard errors are in brackets).
Table 4. Values of real variables in the last 25 years of simulation for different 
capital requirements ( κ)*
  cons. goods  inv. goods  real GDP  unempl. 
 (%)  production  production  level  rate (%) 
8  14296 (160)  3650 (188)  17946 (333)  8.1 (0.5)
10  14637 (126)  3460 (154)  18097 (243)  7.6 (0.4)
12  15081 (154)  3729 (137)  18810 (270)  6.2 (0.4)
 κ ut  15040 (157)  3686 (131)  18727 (270)  5.5 (0.5)
 κ ct  15419 (151)  3901 (103)  19320 (224)  3.2 (0.4)
* An unemployment rule κut  (average value = 11.34) and a credit rule κ
c
t  (average value = 9.61) has been used to set
dynamic requirements. Values are averaged over 20 different random seeds (standard errors are in brackets)
Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto224From Figure 2 it clearly emerges the difference between κ = 8%
(that is the minimum capital currently required by Basel II) and
κ = 12%. In both cases a turbulent period starts in the 5th year (look
at Figure 2), first with a severe crisis and then with a period of
stagnation that ends in the 7th year of simulation. Observing the
dynamics of the aggregate banks equity capital in Figure 4, it can be
noticed that a tighter capital requirement (κ = 8%) forces banks to
raise their equity while, when the requirement is lower (κ = 12%),
banks can match the credit demand with a lower level of equity
capital. The capital surplus (or buffer) owned by banks in the case
of κ = 12% makes the difference when facing the following crisis
starting in the  year, allowing the economy to recover quickly from
the recession by means of an injection of new credit money by the
Table 5. Values of price variables in the last 25 years of simulation for different 
capital requirements (κ)*
  price  inflation  wage  interest 
 (%)  index  rate (%)  index  rate (%) 
8  1.53 (0.03)  5.92 (0.20)  6.76 (0.13)  8.41 (0.21)
10  1.53 (0.02)  6.12 (0.23)  6.84 (0.09)  8.61 (0.23)
12  1.55 (0.02)  6.33 (0.17)  7.03 (0.12)  8.82 (0.15)
 κ ut  1.51 (0.02)  6.22 (0.21)  6.97 (0.12)  8.58 (0.14)
 κ ct  1.43 (0.02)  6.13 (0.12)  7.27 (0.15)  6.90 (0.25)
* An unemployment rule κut  (average value = 11.34) and a credit rule κ
c
t  (average value = 9.61) has been used to set
dynamic requirements. Values are averaged over 20 different random seeds (standard errors are in brackets).
Table 6. Values of risk signaling variables in the last 25 years of simulation
 for different capital requirements (κ)
  total  banks’  firms’  illiquidity  insolvency 
 (%)  loans  equity  leverage  bankrupt.  bankrupt. 
8  720375 (25922)  78003 (4331)  7.19 (0.85)  11.0 (0.5)  4.5 (0.2)
10  681196 (23748)  93022 (4280)  6.74 (0.58)  8.3 (0.4)  4.2 (0.1)
12  722717 (25495)  117812 (5448)  7.12 (1.26)  7.4 (0.4)  4.1 (0.2)
 κ ut  698161 (17714)  105051 (3474)  6.76 (1.55)  9.0 (0.4)  3.8 (0.1)
 κ ct  590332 (10978)  53261 (1841)  5.69 (3.31)  15.1 (0.8)  0.6 (0.1)
* An unemployment rule κut  (average value = 11.34) and a credit rule κ
c
t  (average value = 9.61) has been used to set
dynamic requirements. Columns 4 and 5 show the annual bankruptcy probability for a firm. Values are averaged
over 20 different random seeds (standard errors are in brackets).
Macroprudential policies in an agent-based artificial economy 225banking sector. On the other hand, when equity capital is too low,
the banking system is not able to fuel the economy with new
credit, even if capital requirement is looser, and the depression
continues much deeper and for a much longer time. It is interes-
ting to observe the clear bifurcation of the two time trajectories
representing the total outstanding credit, emerging as a conse-
quence of the 9th year crisis, and revealing the apparent paradox
that banks will be much more "generous" lenders for the following
20 years in the case of higher capital requirements.       
Figure 1. Time evolution of GDP components*
* Two lines correspond to different fixed values for minimum capital requirement κ, while the third one represents
the outcome of the capital buffer rule based on credit growth as conditioning variable (κct ).
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Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto226Figure 2. Time evolution of GDP and unemployment rate*
Figure 3. Time evolution of yearly inflation and base interest rate*
* Two lines correspond to different fixed values for minimum capital requirement κ, while the third one represents
the outcome of the capital buffer rule based on credit growth as conditioning variable (κct ).
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Macroprudential policies in an agent-based artificial economy 227Figure 4. Time evolution of total credit and aggregate banks equity capital*
Figure 5. Time evolution of firms financial fragility indicators*
* Two lines correspond to different fixed values for minimum capital requirement κ, while the third one represents
the outcome of the capital buffer rule based on credit growth as conditioning variable (κct ).
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Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto228The lesson learned by this example is that having a capital
buffer in bad times is useful. As extensively commented in the
introduction, the same lesson seems to be shared by the main
banking policy regulators, thus we present here the results of two
computational experiments where two different rules to build-up
capital buffers have been implemented. The first one uses the
unemployment rate as a conditioning variable, as reported in Equa-
tion (9), while the second uses banks loans, as in Equation (10).
The two rules seem to have both a positive impact on the
economic performance. In particular, the capital buffer rule based
on the unemployment rate (i.e., κ ut ) improves all the economic
indicators in the long run. These results confirm and extend preli-
minary explication discussed in Teglio et al. (2012). Table 4 shows
that in the case of κ ut  the average unemployment rate is lower than
for fixed capital requirements, and the average output is higher.
The interesting point about this result is that dynamic require-
ments κ ut , varying in a range from 8% to 12% with mean 11.34,
perform better that the two range extremes, including the highest
one (12%). So it is not true that tighter capital requirements are a
better option overall, because it depends from the state of the
economy. In some cases, according to our outcomes, relaxing the
capital requirement is beneficial.
In order to analyze in more detail the effects of these policies, we
plotted the time trajectories of the simulation with bank credit
growth as a conditioning variable (case κ ct ) along with the two
extreme cases κ = 8% and 12% (for the seek of plots readability we
omitted to superimpose the case of κ ut ). Before looking at them, let
us highlight the excellent performance of the “credit rule” κ ct .
Whilst suffering in the first five years (see Table 3) the economy of
the “credit rule” is characterized by the best economic indicators:
consumption, investments, unemployment rate, real wages, firms
financial fragility, and others. Tables from 4 to 6 attest these results.
The only apparently jarring note in this idyllic picture is banks
equity, significantly lower than the rest of the cases. Moreover,
from an overall glance at the presented plots it clearly appears that
the economy is considerable more stable in the case of the “credit
rule”. In the following, we try to interpret these outcomes.
First, let us note that the initial conditions are the same for all
cases, and that banks are characterized at the beginning by a strong
Macroprudential policies in an agent-based artificial economy 229capitalization with equity equal to 20% of weighted assets. We
remind also that banks raise their equity capital when the capital
requirement constraint is binding, i.e., when they are not able to
satisfy the credit demand because of the low equity. The “credit
rule” states that when credit grows, capital requirement also grows,
but it remains lower when credit stagnates. So, at the beginning of
the κ ct case simulation, there is no need for banks to raise the
equity because of the low credit growth (see Figure 4). In the other
two cases (κ = 8% and 12%), on the other hand, banks have to raise
equity to match the growing credit demand. However, looking to
Figure 5, we can see how firms high borrowing raises the interest
bill, increasing consequently firms bankruptcy risk. On the
contrary, in the κ ct  case the situation is much more stable. In fact,
the high level of firms debt ends in a big economic crash around
month 100, accompanied by a quick deleveraging process. This
crisis, strong for κ = 8% and milder for κ = 12%, does not affect the
κ ct case at all. When the “credit rule” rule is active, the total
outstanding credit is growing much more smoothly. The same
holds for banks equity, that is rarely affected by falls caused by
insolvency bankruptcies (Figure 6). Illiquidity bankruptcies are
more frequent but the banking system is not directly affected,
remaining robust and propagating its robustness to the real
economy.
Figure 6 compares banks equity variations considering the
whole simulation set. The higher robustness of the banking sector
in the case of κ ct  is therefore extended from a single simulation
seed to the general case. In particular, it can be observed from the
plot that the falls of banks equity are much more infrequent in case
banks build up capital buffers according to the rule based on credit
growth. These results tell us that lower aggregated values of
outstanding bank loans and of banks equity capital do not have
negative implications on the economy if credit is granted at the
right time. In this sense, it seems to be desirable to have active
(public) institutions in charge of ruling banks credit supply accor-
ding to the macroeconomic conjuncture.
Silvano Cincotti, Andrea Teglio and Marco Raberto2305. Concluding remarks
After the recent financial and economic crisis, the Basel III
global regulatory standard has been proposed in order to improve
the resilience of the banking system. This new framework is
oriented towards a more active support of macroeconomic policies,
and presents a set of macro-prudential regulations with the objec-
tive to limit systemic risk. In particular, it has been identified the
procyclical amplification of financial shocks through the banking
system as a critical issue, and in order to cope with such procyclical
dynamics new countercyclical capital buffers regulations have
been proposed. The rational is to encourage banks to accumulate
capital during good times and use it when the economic condi-
tions are bad.
A coherent economic analysis has emerged from some previous
works by the authors, where computational experiments were
performed with the Eurace model. In particular, it has been shown
that excessive bank leverages can drive economies into severe
recession in the medium-long run. In this paper, we implement
Figure 6. Probability density function (PDF) estimation of the equity capital 
percentage variations for three different regulatory policies
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Macroprudential policies in an agent-based artificial economy 231into the model a mechanism to encourage banks to build up and
release capital buffers, according to the overall economic condi-
tions of the economy. As conditioning variables that set banks
capital requirements, thus ruling the capital buffers build up and
release phases, we use both the unemployment rate and aggregate
banks loans growth.
Moreover, the setting of the model has been improved incorpo-
rating a new demand for firms investments that is based on the net
present value (NPV) approach, which is one of the most popular
methods used by managers to evaluate investments. Therefore, the
new model for investments can be considered well grounded on a
more realistic behavior of economic actors.
Results confirm and extend our previous studies, showing that
loose capital requirements can affect the economic performance in
the medium-long run, raising the financial fragility (or systemic
risk) in the economic system and potentially triggering chains of
firms insolvency bankruptcies. The situation is generally better
when setting tighter capital requirements. Furthermore, results
have shown that the dynamic regulation of capital requirements
successfully stabilizes the economy and improves the main
economic indicators. In particular, when the “credit rule” is
adopted, the economic scenario seems to change in a significant
way, showing a much more solid banking sector with a resulting
positive effect on the real economy.
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WAGE FORMATION, INVESTMENT 
BEHAVIOR AND GROWTH REGIMES: 
AN AGENT-BASED ANALYSIS1
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 Using the “Keynes+Schumpeter” (K+S) agent-based model developed we
study how the interplay between firms’ investment behavior and income distri-
bution shapes the short—and long-run dynamics of the economy at the
aggregate level. We study the dynamics of investment under two different
scenarios. One in which investment is fully determined by past profits, and one
in which investment is tied to expectations about future consumption demand.
We show that, independently from the investment scenario analyzed, the emer-
gence of steady growth with low unemployment requires a balance in the
income distribution between profits and wages. If this is not the case, the
economy gets locked either in stagnation equilibria, or into growth trajectories
displaying high volatility and unemployment rates. Moreover, in the demand-
led scenario we show the emergence of a non-linear relation between real wages
and unemployment. Finally, we study whether increasing degrees of wage-flexi-
bility are able to restore growth and unemployment and reduce the volatility in
the economy. We show that this is indeed the case only when investment is
profit-led. In contrast, in the scenario where investment is driven by demand
expectations wage-flexibility has no effect on either growth and unemploy-
ment. In turn, this result casts doubts on the ability of wage-flexibility policies
to stabilize the economy.
Keywords: Agent-Based Models, Growth Regimes, Income Distribution, Wage-Flexibility.
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Mauro Napoletano, Giovanni Dosi, Giorgio Fagiolo and Andrea Roventini236 This work studies how the interplay between firms’ invest-
ment behavior, wage formation and income distribution affect the
short-run and long-run aggregate dynamics of an economy. We
study the aggregate behavior of the economy under two different
scenarios: one wherein investment in new productive capacities is
determined by past profits of firms (“profit-led scenario”) and one
in which firm investment depends on expectations about future
consumption demand (“demand-led” scenario). We show that in
both scenarios the distribution of income between profits and
wages crucially affects the characteristics of the growth path of the
economy. Independently from the investment rule adopted by
firms, the emergence of long-run growth associated with low rates
of unemployment and short-run volatility always requires a
balance in the distribution between profits and wages. Lacking
such a requirement, the economy can get stuck either into stagna-
tion equilibria with low growth and high unemployment, or into
trajectories characterized by high and volatile growth. Further-
more, we study the relation between the level of real wages and
unemployment in the economy. We show that the economy
displays the Neo-Classical (positive) relation between the two
variables only in the profit-led scenario. In contrast, in the
demand-led scenario such a relation is non-linear. In particular, it
exists a threshold below which unemployment increases (rather
than decreasing) with a reduction in real wages. Finally, we explore
whether increasing degrees of nominal wage sensitivity to unem-
ployment variations are effective in curbing unemployment and
stabilizing the economy. Our results show that this is the case only
in the profit-led scenario, provided that the characteristics of the
income distribution allow the economy to grow in the long-run. In
contrast, in the demand-led scenario, wage-flexibility is never able
to reduce unemployment, and can sometimes increase the inci-
dence of economic crises.
Our work is motivated by two different streams of literature.
First, we refer to a central debate in macroeconomics, i.e. the one
about the role of wages in determining unemployment in the
economy. On one side, the “Neo-Classical View” identifies into
real wage rigidity the main source of unemployment in labor
markets. Following an adverse shock to the economy, production
Wage formation, investment behavior and growth regimes: An agent-based analysis 237and labor demand will fall, and real wages must also decrease in
order to equilibrate demand and supply of labor. A rigid real wage
impedes such an adjustment and thus leads to unemployment in
the labor market. In contrast, downward flexibility of nominal
wages allows the reduction of the real wage down to the new level
compatible with full employment and thus the reduction of unem-
ployment.2 On the opposite camp, we find all works that starting
from Keynes (1936) pointed to deficiencies in effective demand as
the main source of unemployment. Moreover, in line with the
intuition of Keynes, these works (see Howitt, 1986; Amendola et
al., 2004) warned against the destabilizing effect of the downward
nominal wage flexibility . This is because a reduction of nominal
wages is likely to adversely affect consumption demand and to
induce deflationary pressures in the economy, with the conse-
quence of increasing (rather than decreasing) the level of
unemployment in the economy.3
Second, our work is related to both evolutionary (Freeman and
Perez, 1988; Coriat and Dosi, 2000; Chiaromonte et al., 2000) and
French “Régulation” research programs (see Aglietta, 1979, Boyer,
1988, see Lordon, 1991, for a survey), that study how “growth
regimes”, as well as crises, are generated by the matching or
mismatching between, on the one hand, processes of technical
change and, on the other hand, the characteristics of the processes
governing firms’ behavior and the division of income in the
economy.
We contribute to the above strands of literature along several
dimensions. First, we show how different growth regimes emerge
out of micro-interactions between heterogeneous agents. In that
fashion, our work provides a micro-foundation of early evolutionary
and “regulationist” theories of the role of institutions, demand-
formation patterns, and technical change in determining both
2. This approach is also largely followed by New Keynesian DSGE models (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2007). These models claim that price and wage rigidities constitute the main
impediments to full employment. Without such rigidities and in line with the Neo-Classical
View the economy would be able to adjust to whatever shock and keep the labour market at the
full employment equilibrium.
3. Another strand of research in the New Keynesian literature (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993)
warns against the perils of downward flexibility of nominal wages. Still, in these models
unexpected increases in real wages increase firms costs, thus leading to a reduction of firms’ net
worth and to lower levels of investment and output.
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income distribution as a crucial factor determining the characteris-
tics of growth paths followed by the economy. Third, by studying
the relation between wages and unemployment into different
investment scenarios, we study under which conditions one
observes the validity of either the Neo-Classical or Keynesian view
about the effectiveness of policies increasing the degree of wage
flexibility in the economy. Finally, we extend the analysis of wage-
flexibility to encompass also its long-term effects on the economy.
We perform the above investigations by extending the
“Keynes+Schumpeter” (K+S) model developed in Dosi et al. (2010)
and Dosi et al. (2012), that bridges Keynesian theories of demand-
generation and Schumpeterian theories of technology-fueled
economic growth. In Dosi et al. (2010), we studied the conse-
quences of different “innovation regimes”—and related policies—
and their interaction with (Keynesian) demand management. In
Dosi et al. (2012) we focused instead on the interactions between
income distribution on one hand, and monetary and fiscal policies
on the other hand. In this paper we exclude fiscal and monetary
policies from the picture, and we rather study how the interactions
between income distribution and firm investment behavior affect
the short—and long-run dynamics at the aggregate level. In addi-
tion, we try to assess whether different levels of nominal wage
sensitivity to variations in unemployment may promote long-run
growth and reduce output volatility and unemployment.
The work is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly presents the
K+S model. Section 2 presents the simulation results, starting with
the analysis of growth regimes under different income distribu-
tions and investment behavior (Section 2.1), and then moving to
the analysis of the effects of wage-flexibility to unemployment
variations (Section 2.2). Section 3 concludes.
1. The K+S model 
Let us now briefly discuss the K+S model developed in Dosi et al.
(2010) and extended in Dosi et al. (2012), to which we refer for
more details. The model portrays an economy composed of a
machine-producing sector made of F1 firms (denoted by the subs-
cript i), a consumption-good sector made of F2 firms (denoted by
Wage formation, investment behavior and growth regimes: An agent-based analysis 239the subscript j), LS consumers/workers, and a public sector. Capital-
good firms invest in R&D and produce heterogeneous machines.
Consumption-good firms combine machine tools bought by
capital-good firms and labor in order to produce a final product for
consumers. Capital-good firms are paid in advance for the
machines they have to produce. Consumption-good firms finance
their production and investment expenditures by using internal
funds and external financing provided by an un-modeled banking
sector. The latter provides credit to firms up to a credit ceiling that
depends of firms’ past sales.4 Finally, the public sector levies taxes
on firms’ profits and pays unemployment benefits. In what
follows, we present the timeline of events in the K+S model. Next
we will briefly describe each part of it.
1.1. The timeline of events
In any given time period (t), the following microeconomic deci-
sions take place in sequential order:
1.  Policy variables are fixed (e.g. the “Government” setting tax
rates and unemployment benefits, etc.). 
2.  Machine-tool firms perform R&D trying to discover new
products and more efficient production techniques and to
imitate the production technology and the products of their
competitors. Capital-good firms advertise their machines to
consumption-good firms. 
3.  Consumption-good firms decide how much to produce and
invest. If investment is positive, consumption-good firms
choose their supplier, send their orders and pay for the
machines. When internal funds are not enough to finance
production and investment plans, firms borrow up to a ceiling. 
4.  In both industries firms hire workers according to their produc-
tion plans if below their credit ceiling or at the ceiling otherwise
and start producing. 
5.  Imperfectly competitive consumption-good market opens. The
market shares of firms evolve according to their price
competitiveness. 
4. In Dosi et al. (2012) we model a banking sector that gathers deposits from firms and
provides credit to them on a pecking order that depends on the firms’ past net-worth-to-sales
ratio.
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their due loans to the bank to the extent that they have cash
flow to do that. 
7.  Entry and exit take place. In both sectors firms with near-zero
market shares and/or a negative stock of net liquid assets are
eschewed from their industry and replaced by new firms (for
simplicity, we keep the number of firms fixed; any dead firm is
replaced by a new one; and entrant firms are random copies of
incumbent ones). 
8.  Machines ordered at the beginning of the period are delivered
and become part of the capital stock at time t + 1. 
At the end of each time step, aggregate variables (e.g. GDP,
investment, employment) are computed, summing over the
corresponding microeconomic quantities.
1.2. The capital-good industry
The technology of capital-good firms evolves along the vintages
of produced machine-tools. Each firm-specific generation of
machine-tools has indeed a distinct production cost and distinct
labour productivity for the user. The price of machines is set with a
mark-up rule5 over production costs. The quality of each vintage is
measured by the productivity of machines in the consumption-
good sector.
Innovation and imitation are costly processes: firms invest in
R&D a fraction of their revenues and hire researchers at the current
market wage.
Both innovation and imitation follow a two-steps stochastic
process. In the first step, the resources allocated to search deter-
mine in probability whether the events “innovation” and
“imitation” are drawn. Note that the newly discovered capital
goods might be a “failed innovation”, because production costs
might be higher and/or user-efficiency might be lower than the
currently manufactured machines. Indeed, at the second stochastic
stage, each firm draws the characteristics of the would-be machine
and decide whether to keep on producing the current generation
of machines or to switch to the new vintage, by evaluating the
5. This in line with survey data evidence on firm pricing behavior (see Fabiani et al., 2006).
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ciencies. Once the machine tool is chosen, capital-good firms try to
reach their customers under conditions of imperfect information:
hence, we assume that they send a “brochure” with the price and
the productivity of their machines to both their historical clients
and a random sample of potential new customers.
1.3. The consumption-good industry
Consumption-good firms produce an homogenous good using
capital (i.e. their stock of machines) and labor under constant
returns to scale. We assume alternative scenarios for firms’ produc-
tion and investment decisions.6 In the first scenario, we assume as
in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Delli Gatti et al. (2005) that
desired production (Qdj ) is determined by the level of firm stock of
liquid assets (NWj), according to7: 
(1)
In turn, the level of firms’ net worth is determined—via cash
flows—by the past level of profits. Following Boyer (1988) we label
the above profit-led investment scenario. Notice that we here we
attempt to describe the economic dynamics in a highly hypothe-
tical scenario wherein both desired production and desired
investment are not limited by demand.8
In contrast, in the second scenario, that we label demand-led
investment scenario, firms plan their production according to adap-
tive demand expectations (Dej ): 
(2)
where Dj (t – 1) is the demand actually faced by firm j at time t – 1
(h positive integer)9. The desired level of production depends on
6. To simplify notation and unless it needed for the sake of clarity, in what follows we
suppress the time index to indicate variables in the text.
7. This kind of firm behavior may emerge in models where firms are equity rationed and face
positive bankruptcy costs. See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) for more details.
8. As it is discussed at more length in Boyer (1988), this kind of scenario however captures
some key features of the dynamics of investment in capitalistic economies of the 19th century.
9. For maximum simplicity, here we use the rule Dej (t) = Dj (t – 1). In Dosi et al. (2006) we check
the robustness of the simulation results employing more sophisticated expectation-formation
rules. We found that increasing the computational capabilities of firms does not significantly
change either the average growth rates or the stability of the economy. These properties still
hold in the model presented here.
 ( ) = ( 1), > 0dj jQ t NW tσ σ−
( ) = ( ( 1), ( 2), , ( )),ej j j jD t f D t D t D t h− − −…
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the actual stock of inventories (Nj): 
(3)
with .
Finally, in both scenarios, the output of consumption-good
firms is constrained by their capital stock (Kj). If the desired capital
stock (Kdj )—computed as a function of the desired level of produc-
tion—is higher than the current capital stock, firms invest (EIdj ) in
order to expand their production capacity10: 
(4)
Consumption-good firms have a capital stock composed of
heterogenous machines having different productivity levels. Firms
decide whether to scrap their machines following a payback period
rule, that is they assess whether the substitution cost of any current
machine, i.e. the price of a new one, can be recovered in a given
number of years through the savings obtained in production costs
(new machines have lower unit production cost than incumbent
ones). In this way, technical change and capital-good prices affect
the replacement decisions of consumption-good firms.11 The latter
choose their capital-good supplier comparing the price and
productivity of those machine tools which they know via the
brochures they received. Machine production is a time-consuming
process: consumption-good firms receive the ordered machines at
the end of the period.12 Gross investment of each firm is the sum
of expansion and replacement investment. Aggregate investment
is just the sum of the investments of all consumption good firms.
Given their current stock of machines, consumption-good firms
compute their average productivity and unit costs of production.
Firms fix prices applying a variable mark-up (μj) over the latter.
More precisely, we set an initial value for the mark-up , which
10. We assume that in any give period firm capital growth rates cannot exceed a fixed
maximum threshold consistent with the maximum capital growth rates found in the empirical
literature on firm investment patterns (Doms and Dunne, 1998).
11. This in line with a large body of empirical papers (Feldstein and Foot, 1971; Eisner, 1972;
Goolsbee, 1998) showing that replacement investment is typically not proportional to the
capital stock.
12.  The presence of gestation-lag effects in firm investments expenditures is supported by a
large body of empirical literature (see Del Boca et al., 2008).
( ) = ( ) ( ) ( 1),d e dj j j jQ t D t N t N t+ − −
 ( ) = ( ), [0,1]d ej jN t D tι ι∈
( ) = ( ) ( ).d dj j jEI t K t K t−
(0)μ
Wage formation, investment behavior and growth regimes: An agent-based analysis 243is equal across firms. The variation of mark-ups over time are regu-
lated by the evolution of firms’ market shares (fj): firms raise (cut)
mark-up whenever the growth rate of their market shares is posi-
tive (negative): 
(5)
with . This process in turn implies that the average mark-
up rate  (as well as firms’ ones) fluctuate around a sort of peg
represented by the initial mark-up rate . The level of real wages
(w/cpi) is determined by the average mark-up rate in the consump-
tion-good sector, it follows that by by tuning up and down the
level  one can vary the long-term income distribution between
wages and profits in the economy.
Prices are one the key determinants of firms’ competitiveness.
The other ones are the levels of unfilled demand. If firms cannot
fully satisfy their customers, their competitiveness is accordingly
reduced.
Market shares evolve according to a replicator-type dynamics
operating under conditions of imperfect information,13 so that
even if the product is homogeneous, firms may charge different
prices. In such dynamics, firms with above-average competiti-
veness expand their market shares, while those below shrink (or
even die).
1.4. The labor market
We do not impose any assumption of labor-market clearing: as a
consequence involuntary unemployment as well as labor rationing
are the rule rather than the exception. The aggregate labor demand
is computed summing up the labor demand of capital—and
consumption—good firms. The aggregate supply of labor is exoge-
nous and inelastic. Aggregate employment is then the minimum
between labor demand and supply. The wage is set according to: 
(6)
13. See Rotemberg (2008) for a survey of the empirical literature on consumers’ imperfect price
knowledge.
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consumer price index, and U(t) is the unemployment rate. The
wage rate is determined by institutional and market factors, with
both indexation mechanisms upon consumption prices and
average productivity, on the one hand, and, adjustments to unem-
ployment rates, on the others. Notice that, by varying the
magnitude of the parameters ψ1,ψ2 and ψ3 in Equation (6), and the
initial mark-up rate  we are able to tune the distribution of
productivity gains between workers and firms as well as the sensiti-
vity of wages no unemployment variations (see Section 2 fore
more discussion). In this way, and inn line with works in the
“Régulation” literature, we capture different institutional regimes
governing labor market dynamics and demand formation (see
Boyer, 1988, for a taxonomy of those regimes). More precisely, in
Section 2.1 we begin our analysis of the role of wages and income
distribution in determining aggregate dynamics by restricting
ourselves to a regime wherein wage just grows with average
productivity, i.e. where ψ2 = ψ3 and = 0 and ψ1 > 0. In Section 2.2,
we remove this hypothesis and we perform experiments where
nominal wages are also a function of variations in
unemployment.14
1.5. Consumption, taxes, and public expenditures
As in Dosi et al. (2010) and Dosi et al. (2012) the model has a
public sector that levies taxes on firm profits and worker wages (or
on profits only) and pays to unemployed workers a subsidy, that is
a fraction of the current market wage. In those models, redistribu-
tive fiscal policies significantly affect the aggregate dynamics both
in the short- and in the long-run. Therefore, in what follows we set
both the tax and unemployment subsidy rate to zero. This allows
us to better analyze the role of income distribution and wage
formation on aggregate dynamics, and the one of nominal wage
flexibility on unemployment in particular.
All wages are consumed in the model. The aggregate consump-
tion (C) is the sum of income of both employed and unemployed
14.  In the experiments we present below average inflation is always very close to zero (see
Tables 2 and 3). However, we also experimented with regimes wherein wage move also as a
function of inflation rates (i.e. where ψ2 > 0). All the properties discussed below robustly hold.
 ( )AB t
(0)μ
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tities: the sum of value added of capital—and consumption-goods
firms (Y) equals their aggregate production since in our simplified
economy there are no intermediate goods, and that in turn coin-
cides with the sum of aggregate consumption, investment and
change in inventories (ΔN): 
(7)
The micro decisions of a multiplicity of heterogenous, adaptive
agents and their interaction mechanisms is the explicit microfoun-
dation of the dynamics for all aggregate variables of interest (e.g.
output, investment, employment, etc.). 
2. Simulation results
In line with Dosi et al. (2010) and Dosi et al. (2012), we investi-
gated the micro and macro properties of the model through
extensive Monte-Carlo simulations.15 We perform our simulation
analysis in two complementary steps (see also the paper by Fagiolo
and Roventini in this issue for a discussion of this methodology).
First, we identify a “benchmark” setup for which the model is
empirically validated (see Table 1), i.e. it is able to replicate a wide
spectrum of microeconomic and macroeconomic stylized facts.
Next, we turn to a battery of “experiments”, by identifying sets of
parameters (e.g. the level of the initial mark-up rate, the degree of
wage-indexation to unemployment) whose values capture diffe-
rent structural conditions and/or policies.  
The macro and micro stylized facts robustly replicated by the
model are the same statistical regularities produced by and
discussed at much greater length in Dosi et al. (2010) and Dosi et
al. (2012). There we show that the model is able to generate
macroeconomic time-series of output, consumption and aggregate
investment characterized by self-sustained growth patterns and by
persistent fluctuations. Moreover, aggregate investment is more
volatile than GDP whereas consumption is less volatile.
15. All results discussed below refer to averages over MC = 50 Monte-Carlo iterations. Each
iteration has T = 600 time-steps.
 1 2
=1 =1
( ) ( ) = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
F F
i j
i j
Q t Q t Y t C t I t N tΔ+ ≡ + +∑ ∑
Mauro Napoletano, Giovanni Dosi, Giorgio Fagiolo and Andrea Roventini246In addition, the model replicates the empirically observable co-
movements between a large set of macro time series and GDP (net
investment and consumption pro-cyclical coincident, inflation
pro-cyclical and lagging, counter-cyclical mark-up rates, etc.). In
particular, the K+S model is also able to replicate two among the
most relevant statistical properties characterizing labor markets,
namely the fact that unemployment is strongly counter-cyclical
whereas real wages display little variation at business cycles
frequencies. At the same time, at the microeconomic level, the
Table 1. Benchmark Parameters
Description  Symbol  Value 
Number of firms in capital-good industry  F1 50 
Number of firms in consumption-good industry   F2 200 
R&D investment propensity 
 υ 0.04 
R&D allocation to innovative search   ξ 0.50 
Firm search capabilities parameters   ζ1,2 0.30
Beta distribution parameters (innovation process)   (α1, β1) (3,3)
Beta distribution support (innovation process)   [x1, x1] [–0.15,0.15]
New-customer sample parameter   γ 0.50
Desired inventories  ι 0.10
Payback period   b 3 
“Physical” scrapping age   η 20 
Capital-good firm mark-up rate   μ1 0.04 
Consumption-good firm initial mark-up  μ(0) 0.10 
Coefficient in the consumption-good desired 
production rule (profit-led scenario)  σ 2 
Coefficient in the consumption-good firm mark-up rule   υ 0.10 
Competitiveness weights   ω1,2 1 
Replicator dynamics coefficient   χ 1 
Wage setting  weight   ψ1 1 
Wage setting Δcpi weight   ψ2 0 
Wage setting ΔU weight   ψ3 0 
Tax rate   tr 0 
Unemployment subsidy rate   ϕ 0
Loan-to-value ratio  λ 2 
Baseline Interest Rate   r 0.025 
 ABΔ Δ
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mics (including right-skewed distribution of firm sizes, fat-tailed
distributions of firm growth rates, wide and persistent producti-
vity differences across firms, lumpy investment dynamics).   
Figure 1. Profit-led investment scenario. Average GDP growth rate as a function 
of the mark-up rate (confidence bands in gray)
Figure 2. Profit-led investment scenario. Average unemployment rate as a function 
of the mark-up rate (confidence bands in gray)
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next sections we turn to explore the behavior of the economy
under different income distribution hypotheses, and under diffe-
rent regimes of adjustment of nominal wages to variations in
unemployment.
Figure 3. Profit-led investment scenario. Standard deviation of GDP growth rate 
as a function of the mark-up rate (confidence bands in gray)
Figure 4. Profit-led investment scenario. Likelihood of crises in GDP as a function 
of the mark-up rate (95% confidence bands in gray) 
Note: Crises are defined as time periods with growth rates lower than –3%.
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Real wages in the model have a dual role. On the one hand, they
affect the level of firms’ costs and therefore profits, thus determi-
ning the ability of firms to survive and to finance production and
investment expenditures. On the other hand, real wages determine
aggregate consumption and via the latter they impact on firms’
investment decisions. The first effect is the one already emphasized
by Neo-Classical economists as well as by the works in the New
Keynesian literature with financial market imperfections (see
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993), and it should have a detrimental
effect on growth and employment. In contrast, the second effect,
as emphasized by Keynes in his General Theory (see e.g. also
Howitt, 1986, for a discussion), should affect aggregate demand
and thus output and unemployment. In what follows, we study
the behavior of macro-variables in the model under different levels
of the wage-share in the economy. We change the dynamics of real
wages (and of profits) by tuning up and down the level of the
initial mark-up rate of consumption good firms. The latter indeed
determines consumption-good prices in the model, and therefore
it determines how real income is divided between profits and
wages (see also Section 1.3). Moreover, we perform the aforemen-
tioned experiment on income distributions under different
regimes of firms’ investment behavior. In the first scenario, desired
investment is “profit-led”. More precisely, desired investment in
new productive capacity is determined only by the degree of finan-
cial robustness of the firm, proxied by its stock of net liquid assets.
In the second scenario, instead, desired expansionary investment
is “demand-led”, i.e. driven by expectations about future consump-
tion demand (see also Section 1.3). Finally, notice that in both
scenarios desired investment plans can be constrained by the avai-
lability of internal and external finance, respectively determined
by the level of past profits, and by the external credit ceilings.
Let us start by discussing the result of the experiment under the
“profit-led” investment scenario. Figures 1 and 2, show average
growth and unemployment in relation to the (initial) mark-up
rate. Both figures indicate that very low levels of the mark-up rate
(and, thus, very high levels of real wages) have a detrimental effect
on average growth and average unemployment. These outcomes
correspond to the “Neo-Classical” result, according to which high
Mauro Napoletano, Giovanni Dosi, Giorgio Fagiolo and Andrea Roventini250real wages have a negative effect on long-run growth and employ-
ment. More specifically, a high level of real wages implies lower
firms’ profits, and therefore a lower incentive of firms to invest in
new productive capacities, and thus to absorb the existing labor
supply. In addition, also productivity growth is lower, as the intro-
duction of more productive machines is limited to the substitution
of the existing capital stock.
Furthermore, Figures 3 and 4 show that volatility and (even
more so) the likelihood of crises are high when the mark-up rate is
very low. In this profit-led investment scenario, short-run business
fluctuations are generated by a Goodwin-type dynamics
(Goodwin, 1967). An increase in profits promotes via investment
an increase in both production and productivity (due to introduc-
tion of new and more productive machines). Productivity gains
however imply also an increase in real wages and a reduction in
the profit rate thereby creating the conditions for a fall in
economic activity. The lower is the mark-up rate the stronger is the
above described predator-prey dynamics. Accordingly, both GDP
volatility and the likelihood of crises turns out to be high at low
levels of the mark-up rate.
What happens if one increases the mark-up and therefore
decreases the level of real wages in this scenario? As Figures 1-4
show quite starkly, increasing the mark-up has the effect of
increasing growth and reducing unemployment. The economy
enters into a “Classical Growth Regime” (see Boyer, 1988) where
productivity increases are able to promote profits, hence invest-
ment and effective demand, which enhance employment. In
addition, in this growth scenario, the above-described dynamics
between profits and wages is dampened by a lower mark-up rate
because the process of workers’ appropriation of productivity gains
through real wages is weakened. As a result, both GDP volatility
and the likelihood of crises are lowered. In particular, notice that
the economy is characterized by a wide region of high and stable
growth (corresponding to levels of mark-up between 0.075 and
0.15) wherein, on one side, average growth is maximized and, on
the other side, unemployment, volatility and the probability of
crises are zero.
As real wages are reduced further (μ(0) > 0.15), however, the
economy enters a region where high growth are associated to wild
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ment. This occurs because the aforementioned “Classical” engine
of growth is hampered by the credit constraints imposed on firms
investment. More precisely, in this region the strong incentives of
firms to invest in large productive capacities imply also high debt
accumulation by firms. As time goes by, increasingly high debt
burdens erode profits, thereby creating the conditions for the inco-
ming recession. Accordingly, both volatility and the incidence of
crises become higher.
How do the above results change when firm investment is
“demand-led”? Figures 5, 6 and 7 compare the dynamics of macro-
variables in the profit-led vs. the demand-led scenarios, always as a
function of the mark-up rate. As in the profit-led scenario, low
levels of the mark-up rate are associated with low growth and high
unemployment and crisis incidence also in the demand-led
regime. The mechanisms generating this result are however
completely different between the two scenarios. In the profit-led
regime, low growth and high unemployment rates are determined
by the low incentive of firms to invest in new productive capaci-
ties. In contrast, in the demand-led scenario, the incentive to
invest is high when the mark-up rate is low, because wages and
thus expectations of consumption demand are very high.
However, firms desired investment plans are constrained by the
availability of internal and external financing, which are on
average lower in presence of a low profits. Moreover, a higher
incentive to invest induce a dynamics of debt accumulation
similar to the one analyzed in the case of the high-growth profit-
led regime, thereby causing higher volatility (not shown) and
crises incidence (cf. Figure 7). In light of the above, it comes as no
surprise that a small reduction in the (already high) level of real
wages is able to restore growth and reduce volatility and unem-
ployment (see Figure 5).
As the distribution of income between wages and profits gets
more balanced (0.05 ≤ μ(0) ≤ 0.15), the economy enters a regime
characterized high average growth rates and low unemployment
and volatility rates. Following the taxonomy suggested in Boyer
(1988), we shall label this a “Fordist Growth Regime”, roughly
matching the institutional conditions characterizing advanced
economies in the post-WWII period. Such a regime associates
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productivity gains between workers and firms. In that, improve-
ments in productivity lead to significant increases in wages, thereby
rising aggregate demand both via consumption and investment by
firms. Notice that this regime is characterized by significantly
higher average growth rates than the Classical one discussed before.
In turn, this occurs because high levels of consumption demand
now reinforce via expectations aggregate investment, rather than
crowding it out as in the Classical regime.
The high dependence of growth on expectations about
consumption demand also implies the emergence of a wide region
wherein real wages and unemployment are inversely (rather than
directly) related. More precisely, in the demand-led scenario,
further increasing the profits rate in the economy result into a
significant increase of unemployment and of the incidence of
crises (see Figures 6 and 7). Moreover, very high levels of the mark-
up rate (μ(0) > 0.20, cf. Figure 5) locks the economy into a low-
growth trajectory (similar to what very high real wages do). This is
explained by the fact (see also Dosi et al., 2012 for a more detailed
discussion) that in presence of very low levels of expected demand,
firms have low incentive to undertake investments into new and
productive machines. This hampers the growth of productivity
and therefore the long-term growth prospects of the economy.   
Figure 5. Average GDP growth rate as a function of the mark-up rate 
(confidence bands in gray)
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as provide some implications for theory. First, our results indicate
that the economy is not always characterized by an inverse rela-
tion between real wages and employment. The presence of such a
relation is indeed closely associated to a profit-led investment
behavior by firms. In contrast, under regimes where investment is
driven by firms expectations such a relation is non-linear.
Figure 6. Average unemployment rate as a function of the mark-up rate
 (confidence bands in gray)
Figure 7. Likelihood of crises in GDP as a function of the mark-up rate 
(95% confidence bands in gray)
Note: Crises are defined as time periods with growth rates lower than -3%.
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level of mark-ups) above which unemployment decreases (rather
than increasing) with the level of the real wage in the economy.
Second, in line with Boyer (1988) and Freeman and Perez (1988),
our experiments indicate that endogenous innovation is not able
by itself to guarantee high and stable growth without the presence
of specific institutional conditions determining investment beha-
vior and the distribution of income between wages and profits.
However, differently from that literature our analysis shows that
independently from firm investment behavior the presence of
high growth together with low levels of volatility and unemploy-
ment, always requires a balance in the distribution of income
between profits and wages. When such a condition is not fulfilled
the economy gets either into a low and highly volatile growth trap
(low mark-up rate in either investment scenario, high mark-up rate
in the demand-led scenario), or into a situation where high growth
rates are associated with significant volatility and high unemploy-
ment rates (high mark-up rate in the profit-led scenario). In the
next section we investigate the robustness of the above results in
presence of wage flexibility to unemployment variations.
2.2. Nominal wages flexibility, growth and unemployment
In the previous section we have shown that the distribution of
income between profits and wages crucially affects the properties
of the macroeconomic dynamics and the rate of unemployment in
the economy. However, these results were obtained assuming that
in the labor market wages were only a function of labor producti-
vity. In this section, we remove this hypothesis, and we allow for
nominal wages that depend also on changes of the unemployment
rate. More precisely, we select different levels of the mark-up rate
and we run different Montecarlo experiments by varying the level
of the parameter ψ3 in Equation (6), i.e. the parameter tuning the
response of nominal wages to relative changes in the unemploy-
ment rate U. We perform the experiment for the scenario wherein
investment is profit-led and for the one in which investment is
demand-led. In this way, we study how all the results discussed in
the previous section change under higher levels of nominal wages
flexibility to unemployment variations.
Table 2 and 3 present the results of the above described experi-
ments. Notice that the levels of mark-ups presented in the tables
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us start by discussing the results for the scenario with profit-led
investment and low mark-up rate (μ(0) = 0.01). In this region of
the parameters’ space, the high-level of real wages depresses profits
and therefore the incentive to invest. One could therefore expect a
positive effect of downward wage flexibility on the economy. This
is not the case, however. Introducing wage flexibility does not
affect growth and it does not reduce unemployment (see Table 2,
first and second column). Furthermore, increasing nominal wage-
flexibility exacerbates the volatility of the economy. More preci-
sely, increasing the sensitivity of wages to unemployment implies
a significant increase both in the standard deviation of GDP
growth and in the likelihood of crises (Table 2, columns 3 and 4).
The same occurs for the standard deviation of the inflation rate
(column 6). The significant increase in volatility is explained by
the fact that wage flexibility strengthen the competition between
profits and wages, which is one of the main mechanisms genera-
ting fluctuations in the profit-led investment scenario.
The situation dramatically changes when we consider higher
levels of the mark-up rate. Take for instance the scenario with
mark-up rate μ(0) = 0.05. There, the distribution of income
between profits and wages ensures that firms have enough incen-
tive to invest and therefore growth unfolds according to the
“Classical” mechanisms described in the previous section. In that
growth regime, wage-flexibility is able to significantly reduce
unemployment. In addition, the increases in growth and inflation
volatility are small and in most cases not significant. Notice,
however, that wage flexibility also induces a small reduction in the
average growth rate of the economy. In turn, this outcome is
explained by the fact that wage flexibility reduce firm incentives to
replace their machines, thus curbing productivity growth.
All the patterns described above emerge even more starkly in
the high mark-up scenario (μ(0) = 0.03 see Table 2). More precisely,
wage-flexibility significantly reduces unemployment and brings a
small reduction in average growth. However, and differently from
the case with μ(0) = 0.05 discussed before, now an increase in
wage-flexibility results in a reduction both of the standard devia-
tion of GDP growth and of the likelihood of crises.
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of nominal wages flexibility to unemployment variations
(Monte-Carlo simulations standard errors in brackets)
  Avg.GDP Avg.unempl.  St.dev. GDP  Avg.likel.  Avg. infl.  St.dev. 
 growth rate  rate  growth rate  GDP crises  rate  infl. rate 
Mark-Up Rate 0.01
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0060 (0.0003) 0.7386(0.0108) 0.0746(0.0015) 0.1442(0.0042) 0.0001(0.0000) 0.0591(0.0017) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0068(0.0003) 0.7113(0.0110) 0.0746(0.0014) 0.1963(0.0057) 0.0005(0.0000) 0.0673(0.0019)  
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0086(0.0004) 0.6300(0.0206) 0.0819(0.0043) 0.2023(0.0055) 0.0010(0.0001) 0.0732(0.0016) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0074(0.0004) 0.6703(0.0193) 0.1294(0.0350) 0.1816(0.0089) 0.0009(0.0002) 0.0723(0.0022) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0040(0.0010) 0.7124(0.0174) 0.4883(0.1149) 0.2106(0.0134) 0.0006(0.0002)  0.0708(0.0022) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.05
 ψ3 = 0.0 0.0270(0.0005) 0.1463(0.0287) 0.0456 (0.0014) 0.0582(0.0066) 0.0001(0.0000) 0.0353(0.0018) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0266(0.0005) 0.1098(0.0248) 0.0491(0.0014) 0.0733(0.0067) 0.0019 (0.0001) 0.0413(0.0017) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0247(0.0007) 0.0694(0.0187) 0.0562(0.0021) 0.0770(0.0054) 0.0035(0.0002) 0.0534(0.0028) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0198(0.0011) 0.0576 (0.0188) 0.0600 (0.0059) 0.0752 (0.0067) 0.0053 (0.0004) 0.0531(0.0032) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0177(0.0013) 0.0391 (0.0134) 0.0548 (0.0023) 0.0714 (0.0048) 0.0069 (0.0005) 0.0565(0.0040)  
Mark-Up Rate 0.20
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0309(0.0001) 0.0032(0.0010) 0.0332(0.0015) 0.0118(0.0014) 0.0000(0.0000) 0.0147(0.0007) 
ψ3 = 0.2  0.0311(0.0001)  0.0019(0.0003)  0.0470(0.0035)  0.0261(0.0024)  0.0017(0.0002)  0.0288(0.0019) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0278(0.0007) 0.0028(0.0006) 0.0574(0.0047) 0.0414(0.0050) 0.0027(0.0003) 0.0389(0.0035) 
ψ3 = 0.6  0.0250(0.0012)  0.0024(0.0003)  0.0526(0.0041)  0.0362(0.0046)  0.0033(0.0004)  0.0347 (0.0028) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0207(0.0015) 0.0030(0.0008) 0.0476(0.0035) 0.0334(0.0041) 0.0054(0.0007) 0.0373(0.0031) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.30
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0295(0.0002) 0.1318(0.0097) 0.2360(0.0091) 0.1596(0.0089) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0243(0.0008) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0307(0.0002) 0.0712(0.0113) 0.1849(0.0108) 0.1311(0.0080) 0.0014(0.0002) 0.0398(0.0025) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0263(0.0008) 0.0532(0.0111) 0.1707(0.0100) 0.1431(0.0072) 0.0033(0.0004) 0.0593(0.0042) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0222(0.0012) 0.0521(0.0112) 0.1605(0.0111) 0.1352(0.0076) 0.0049(0.0005) 0.0627(0.0047) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0173(0.0014) 0.0519(0.0112) 0.1435(0.0124) 0.1168(0.0088) 0.0061(0.0007) 0.0572(0.0043) 
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of nominal wages flexibility to unemployment variations
(Monte-Carlo simulations standard errors in brackets)
  Avg.GDP Avg.unempl.  St.dev. GDP  Avg.likel.  Avg. infl.  St.dev. 
 growth rate  rate  growth rate  GDP crises  rate  infl. rate 
Mark-Up Rate 0.01
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0042 0.7447 0.1952 0.1121 0.0001 0.0687 (0.0003) (0.0092) (0.0237) (0.0045) (0.0000) (0.0026) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0042 0.7356 0.2080 0.1206 0.0005 0.0767 (0.0006) (0.0135) (0.0193) (0.0048) (0.0001) (0.0034) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0045 0.7364 0.1881 0.1222 0.0007 0.0772 (0.0004) (0.0115) (0.0226) (0.0050) (0.0001) (0.0037) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0040 0.7432 0.1997 0.1336 0.0011 0.0766 (0.0006) (0.0130) (0.0208) (0.0051) (0.0001) (0.0022) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0038 0.7629 0.2884 0.1465 0.0012 0.0824 (0.0007) (0.0136) (0.0697) (0.0059) (0.0002) (0.0034) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.05
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0334 0.0307 0.0293 0.0080 0.0002 0.0137 (0.0003) (0.0119) (0.0008) (0.0043) (0.0000) (0.0010) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0333 0.0318 0.0291 0.0092 0.0025 0.0133 (0.0002) (0.0080) (0.0008) (0.0033) (0.0001) (0.0007) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0330 0.0509 0.0304 0.0169 0.0048 0.0170 (0.0003) (0.0150) (0.0012) (0.0058) (0.0001) (0.0013) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0335 0.0285 0.0285 0.0080 0.0074 0.0175 (0.0002) (0.0086) (0.0008) (0.0028) (0.0001) (0.0009) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0331 0.0540 0.0301 0.0151 0.0093 0.0218 (0.0003) (0.0178) (0.0012) (0.0053) (0.0003) (0.0014) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.20
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0314 0.2307 0.7430 0.1660 0.0000 0.0858 (0.0006) (0.0132) (0.0680) (0.0043) (0.0001) (0.0033) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0308 0.2356 0.7018 0.1683 0.0016 0.0826 (0.0006) (0.0124) (0.0751) (0.0038) (0.0001) (0.0031) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0296 0.2289 0.8236 0.1586 0.0026 0.1004 (0.0012) (0.0123) (0.0914) (0.0042) (0.0001) (0.0047) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0280 0.2374 0.8185 0.1612 0.0037 0.1007 (0.0015) (0.0173) (0.1028) (0.0055) (0.0002) (0.0036) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0289  0.2356 0.6773 0.1624 0.0046 0.1132 (0.0015) (0.0105) (0.0632) (0.0037) (0.0003) (0.0046) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.30
ψ3 = 0.0  0.0128  0.7733  1.7748  0.3388  -0.0003  0.1810  (0.0021)  (0.0216)  (0.0998)  (0.0042)  (0.0001)  (0.0088) 
ψ3 = 0.2  0.0128  0.8144  1.8682  0.3416  -0.0003  0.1835  (0.0020)  (0.0226)  (0.0831)  (0.0042)  (0.0001)  (0.0091) 
ψ3 = 0.4  0.0128  0.7836  2.0117  0.3390  -0.0006  0.1884  (0.0017)  (0.0215)  (0.0765)  (0.0037)  (0.0002)  (0.0102) 
ψ3 = 0.6  0.0125  0.8259  1.9303  0.3401  -0.0004  0.1705  (0.0019)  (0.0237)  (0.0869)  (0.0044)  (0.0001)  (0.0100) 
ψ3 = 0.8  0.0136  0.8018  1.8278  0.3384  -0.0004  0.1816  (0.0020)  (0.0249)  (0.0794)  (0.0045)  (0.0001)  (0.0103) 
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flexibility of nominal wages to unemployment variations can
stabilize the economy and reduce unemployment, when growth is
driven by a Classical mechanism, linking productivity growth to
investment determined by firms’ profits. Moreover, the role of
wage-flexibility as a stabilizing device is stronger the more the
distribution of income is biased towards profits.
How does the above picture change when we turn to the
demand-led scenario? Notice that in that scenario, investment is
tied to the level of real wages via expectations of consumption
demand. In turn, such a Keynesian expectation effect can be
stronger than the cost-saving effect when wages are reduced
following an increase in unemployment. Accordingly, higher
wage-flexibility to unemployment can de-stabilize (rather than
stabilize) investment and aggregate demand (see Keynes, 1936;
Howitt, 1986; Amendola et al., 2004). A rise in the degree of wage-
flexibility does not provoke a reduction in average unemployment
in any of the scenarios considered in the table. Consider for
instance the experiments with high mark-up rates (respectively
μ(0) = 0.20 and μ(0) = 0.30). Except for inflation volatility, none of
the macroeconomic statistics reported in Table 3 display a statisti-
cally significant variation when we increase the degree of wage-
flexibility.
One could expect the above results to be different in the scena-
rios with low mark-up rates (μ(0) = 0.05 and μ(0) = 0.01). There,
real wages and the level of consumption demand are expected to
be high, and therefore the cost-saving effect associated with wage
reductions in presence of unemployment could dominate the
Keynes’ expectation effect. Once again, the results in Table 3 show
that this does not happen. Higher degrees of wage-flexibility do
not lead to unemployment reductions. On the contrary, unem-
ployment increases (even though the variation is not statistically
significant). In addition, high levels of wage-flexibility lead to an
increase in the likelihood of crises when the level of the mark-up is
very low (μ(0) = 0.01).
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Using the Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S) agent-based model deve-
loped in Dosi et al. (2010, 2012) we investigated the characteristics
of growth regimes emerging different rules for firms’ investment
decisions and different distributions of income between profits and
wages. We studied the aggregate dynamics when investment is
determined by the stock of liquid assets of the firm (“profit-led
investment scenario”) and when it is determined according to
expected demand (“demand-led investment scenario”). We
showed that, independently from the investment scenario, the
occurrence of stable growth associated with low unemployment
requires a balanced distribution of income between profits and
wages. Moreover, we showed that in the demand-led scenario the
economy is characterized by a non-linear relation between the
level of real wages and the unemployment rate. In particular, we
find a threshold below which further reductions in the average real
wage are associated with an increase (rather than an decrease) in
unemployment. Finally, we investigated whether the introduction
of increasing degrees of nominal wage-flexibility to unemployment
variations are able to restore growth and curb unemployment. We
showed that this is indeed the case when investment is profit-led
and the mark-up rate in the economy is able to ensure positive
growth. In contrast, in the demand-led scenario wage-flexibility
never brings reductions in unemployment and in some cases can
also result into a higher incidence of crises in the economy. Accor-
dingly, our results cast doubts on the effectiveness of policies
promoting wage-flexibility when investment is related to expecta-
tions about future consumption demand.
The present work could be extended in at least two directions.
First, one could extend the above analysis by considering several
open economies, whose ability to export may depend on the level
of wages, and there study how the results of this work may change
in that context. Second, we considered only a very stylized repre-
sentation of labor market interactions. However, one could easily
extend the above framework to introduce a full-fledged analysis of
the labor market, e.g. like in Fagiolo et al. (2004); Dawid et al.
(2011) and study the inter-play between this market and the
processes of technical change and of the determination of income-
distribution in the economy.
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This paper describes the out-of-equilibrium approach to the analysis of
economic processes. We argue that such an approach is adapted to study quali-
tative (or structural) changes, like technical progress or changes in preferences.
Truly sequential analyses manage to capture the essential features of qualitative
change. In particular, we show how this approach shifts the focus from the issue
of optimality to the one of viability of the processes of change. The objective of
the paper is, first, to highlight the analytical elements of an out-of-equilibrium
approach, so as to serve as a guide for the construction of this type of models;
second to show, how this analysis allows to see controversial phenomena, like
for example the debate on wage rigidity or the productivity paradox in a new
and different light ; third to identify the real causes of the on-going crisis.
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The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to highlight the
interest of out-of-equilibrium analysis, that can as a first approxi-
mation be defined as the construction of models that allow dealing
with phenomena that are in the nature of qualitative change.
Changes, in other words, that entail modifications in the structure
of the economy, and that are in the nature of processes that take
place over time. An equilibrium analysis that, by its very nature, isRevue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
Mario Amendola, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Francesco Saraceno264limited to the comparison of equilibrium states (or paths), is not
apt to the analysis of what happens during the process triggered by
qualitative change. Out-of-equilibrium analysis allows studying
the process of change as a sequence of constrained choices: which,
as we shall see, shifts the focus from the question of optimality of
the path followed by an economy to its viability. 
The second purpose of the article is to detail the logical struc-
ture of out-of-equilibrium models, and to emphasize the necessary
analytical departures from the simplifying hypotheses used in
standard equilibrium analysis. This article should hence serve also
as a guide for the construction of this type of models.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the out-of-
equilibrium approach, emphasizing its departure from standard
equilibrium growth theory and its methodological pillars. Section 2
expounds the logical structure of a typical out-of-equilibrium
model, based on a sequential structure and on irreversibility in
production and in decision making. Section 3 shows how this
approach allows shedding a different light on some long standing
controversies such as, e.g., the desirability of wage rigidity or the
so-called “productivity paradox”. It will be shown that the specific
results obtained hint at more general conclusions that are a guide
line for policy interventions quite different and sometimes oppo-
site to those inspired by the prevailing equilibrium analytical
approach. We conclude the paper by stressing the relevance of our
approach for a better understanding of the current crisis and
possible ways out of it (section 4). The analytical elements are
finally discussed in an appendix.
1. The out-of-equilibrium approach
Most processes of economic change are not 'quantitative'—that
is, a simple modification of the intensity of a given functioning of
the economy—but 'qualitative' changes, that is, changes in the
very way of functioning (like changes in technology, a speeding up
of the growth rate, the introduction of new products, the entering
of new markets, the irruption of new countries and new firms in
the international trade, changes in the distribution of income, and
so on). This means by definition the breaking of equilibrium. It
implies the disruption of the existing productive structure, on
Production process heterogeneity, time to build, and macroeconomic performance 265which the behaviour of the economy depends, and the construc-
tion of a new and different one. This is a process that takes time,
and the market economy is not necessarily self-adjusting. Co-ordi-
nation failures are unavoidable, because problems of co-ordination
arise in the first place in the production process itself. These
problems, on the other hand, extend to the whole economic
system. New goods or techniques imply new types of production
processes and new activities that, in turn, call for new forms of
interaction among the existing agents and institutions, or even the
appearance of new actors and institutions. The heterogeneity of
the agents involved is an essential feature of processes of structural
change, as we shall stress in what follows.
The viability of the process of change, and even its outcome, are
not predetermined, but depend on the way the co-ordination
problems, both at the micro and macro level, are dealt with. Diffe-
rent outcomes may in fact be associated, e.g., with a given
technological advance, depending on the effective development of
the process, i.e. in the way in which co-ordination is (or is not)
restored. As a matter of fact, technical changes that potentially
allow for substantial increases in productivity may actually result,
at the end of the process, in a waste of productive resources.
The focus on processes of change has momentous analytical
implications. In the first place, the usual distinction between a
long-term, where equilibrium obtains, and a disequilibrium short
term disappears1. A process is neither a short nor a long term: it is a
sequence of linked disequilibria that shape the evolution of the
process itself. This is no longer seen as a transition path between
equilibrium positions. In an out-of-equilibrium perspective the
point of arrival becomes blurred. It is lost to sight, not necessarily
in the sense that it ceases to exist, but because everything that
matters is inside the process.
The analysis of this process does not call for a traditional type of
model, that is, a model capable of generating a 'solution' in the
sense of a behavior of the economy characterized by certain
1. The standard view, which considers trend and cycle as unrelated phenomena, is misleading.
“When we turn our attention to long-run questions, we aren’t turning away from co-ordination
and adjustment problems, we are simply looking at them from a different perspective” (Howitt,
1994, p. 765).
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becomes important, instead, is to follow the evolution of the
economy, traced out step by step by the sequence of disequilibria.
The essence of a thorough process is in its going on, that is, in its
being viable. This calls for a monitoring of the process itself to
bring to light its salient moments: which can only be achieved by
means of numerical experiments, that is, by simulations that,
under certain conditions (chosen so as to stress aspects relevant to
the analysis) allow to unveil what happens “along the way”.
In this light also the usual distinction between the terms 'exoge-
nous' and 'endogenous' must be interpreted in a different way. “In
a model there are variables and there are parameters, which reflect
the existing constraints. In the standard analysis the constraints,
which exist outside and above the economy and which determine
its behaviour, are taken to be exogenous. But once we recognize
that the time over which change takes place is an irreversible
process that shapes the change itself, ‘it is impossible to assume the
constancy of anything over time}...The only truly exogenous factor
is whatever exists at a given moment of time, as a heritage of the past’
(Kaldor, 1985, p.61). While the standard approach focuses on the
right place to draw the line between what should be taken as exog-
enous and what should be considered instead as endogenous in
economic modelling—a line that moves according to what we
want to be explained by the model—out of equilibrium the ques-
tion is no longer that of drawing a line here or there but rather one
of the time perspective adopted. Everything can be considered as
given at a certain moment of time, while everything becomes
endogenous over time” (Amendola and Gaffard, 1998, pp.32-3).
Out-of-equilibrium, oscillations no longer appear as short-term
deviations due to demand shocks from a long-term trend deter-
mined beforehand by fundamentals alone. Focusing on co-
ordination mechanisms implies to recognize that the short term
actually determines what the long term will be, and that supply
conditions and demand conditions interact with each other.
Finally, it must be stressed that different evolution paths can be
associated in fact to given fundamentals, according to how the
out-of-equilibrium process actually evolves, and the fundamentals
themselves undergo a change during this process, given the very
Production process heterogeneity, time to build, and macroeconomic performance 267definition of qualitative change. The 'fundamentals', in other
words, are no longer fundamental.
A framework that helps dealing with the co-ordination problems
concerning the heterogeneity of the entities involved in out-of-
equilibrium paths is Agent Based Modelling (ABM), that “seeks to
model the process by which one among many possible futures is
selected, rather than imposing constraints on the model that
ensure only a single equilibrium outcome” (Mehrling, 2006, p. 77).
With this kind of model, ‘agent’ refers broadly to an encapsulated
collection of data and methods representing an entity residing in a
computationally constructed world. Individual biological life
forms, social groupings, institutions, and physical entities can all be
represented as agents” (LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008, p. 246).
Our sequence analysis shares most of the properties of ABM
modelling, namely, heterogeneity of agents, bounded rationality,
and non-market clearing. Here, those are production processes of
different ages, and incorporating different technologies, which are
represented as agents. Economic dynamics is mainly driven by the
evolution of the composition of these processes, that is, by the
time structure of productive capacity.
2. The logical structure of the model
The main objective of out-of equilibrium models is to allow the
study of processes of change. Standard equilibrium analysis is
carried out by comparison of equilibria, be them points or steady
state paths. Transitional dynamics are most of the time neglected
because inherently short term phenomena, and because they are
pre-determined from the beginning, and as such not particularly
informative (for example, the saddle path adjustment). It was
argued above that a meaningful analysis of the transition may add
substantial information to our understanding of the economy,
notably as regards the viability of the out-of-equilibrium path
undertaken following a structural change of the economy. This
section aims at discussing the building blocks of out-of-equili-
brium models, without reference to any specific set of equations.
Some examples may be found in the appendix.
Out-of-equilibrium analysis shows that once we release some
simplifying assumptions of standard equilibrium theory, ongoing
Mario Amendola, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Francesco Saraceno268processes of change become interesting to study because, far from
being pre-determined, they are shaped by the interaction of agent's
behavior, institutional factors, and environmental characteristics.
The starting point is a standard general equilibrium model, with
households and price-setting firms using labor and capital. Typical
examples of this type of models may come from the New Keyne-
sian literature (see e.g., Woodford, 2003).
It is important to notice that the use of capital is not strictly
necessary, as it can be substituted by dated labor as was for the
example the case in classical analysis (see the discussion in Gare-
gnani, 1984).
A sequential analysis focuses both on the supply and on the
demand side of the economy. As for the supply side, the standard
hypothesis to be dropped is the perfect substitutability of factors
(usually embedded in a Cobb-Douglas production function) and
the instantaneous utilization of labor and capital. In out-of-equili-
brium models, production takes time, and is characterized by
complementarity rather than substitutability of the production
factors. This complementarity can be modeled through the defini-
tion of a productive process as a scheme by which a flow of labor
inputs is converted into a flow of output and the consideration of a
construction period, with inputs but no final output, which is
followed by a running-it period (Hicks, 1970; Hicks, 1973). It can
also modeled by using a CES function with a sufficient degree of
complementarity between capital/dated labor) and labor (the limit
case would be a standard Leontief function).
Analytically, time-to-build and complementarity are both
necessary, as they create sunk costs, and make choices at a certain
moment in time depend on the stock of capital/dated labor avai-
lable for the firm. Suppose for example that you had no
complementarity. Then no matter what their past choices and the
stock of capital/dated labor were, firms would always be able to
choose the desired level of output through an appropriate choice
of factor quantities.
A second simplifying assumption, rational expectations, also
prevents fully-fledged transitional dynamics. In out-of-equilibrium
analysis agents have bounded rationality, especially when facing
complex environments. “Innovativeness raises uncertainties. The
Production process heterogeneity, time to build, and macroeconomic performance 269future outcome of an innovative action poses ambiguity: the law of
‘unanticipated consequences’ applies (Merton, 1936) entrepre-
neurs have to act on their ‘animal spirits’, as John Maynard Keynes
(1936) put it; in the view of Friedrich Hayek (2002), innovations
are launched first, the benefit and the cost are ‘discovered’ afte-
rward” (Phelps, 2007, p. 544). A backward-looking component of
expectation formation is necessary for reasons analogous to time-
to-build, i.e. to create a link between past and current actions, and
hence to link periods into a sequence. While there is some ground
for rejecting backward looking behavior in equilibrium models, it
is much more difficult to do so in out-of-equilibrium contexts, in
which “knowledge of the model” is of little use, and in which at
least short term fluctuations, cannot be properly predicted. In
these situations, agents usually resort to “rules of thumb” that
resemble the adaptive behavior embedded in out-of-equilibrium
models (see for example Hommes, 1998).
A third important simplifying assumption of standard theory is
market clearing. Instantaneous price adjustments rule out, by defi-
nition, the possibility of disequilibrium. In sequential analysis, this
assumption is released in order to allow the emergence of quantity
constraints (the short side rule), and undesired stocks (both real
and financial). These stocks contribute to link the periods in a
sequence. This does not mean, of course, that prices do not
change: “The fix-price method is a disequilibrium method [...] If
flow demand is less than flow supply, a stock will have to be
carried over; we say here that it has to be carried over, for the alter-
native policy of cutting price so as to dispose of them within the
current period is not seriously considered. (And is not that, very
often, realistic?) [...] In describing this model as a fix-price model,
it is not assumed that prices are unchanging over time, or from one
single period to its successor; only that they do not necessarily
change whenever there is demand-supply disequilibrium.” (Hicks,
1956, p. 232).
Finally, out-of-equilibrium agents may be constrained, in their
transactions, by financial resources availability, strictly relevant in a
context where costs are dissociated in time from receipts. This can
be obtained by introducing missing markets, or more simply,
through cash-in-advance constraints. The first road is necessary if
the focus is on the working of credit and financial markets. The out-
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macroeconomic approach, and hence has made use of cash-in-
advance constraint that emerges because markets open sequentially.
All the modifications to the standard approach listed above
have been extensively used in the literature. As for price rigidity,
the early reappraisal of Keynes’s economics (Clower, 1965; Leijon-
hufvud, 1968) or temporary equilibrium models (Hicks, 1939;
Malinvaud, 1977; Bénassy, 1982), assume that prices only adjust
between periods. Nevertheless, by releasing the hypothesis of full
rationality, out-of-equilibrium analysis has to deal with the appea-
rance of unsold stocks. The New Keynesian literature (Clarida, Gali
and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 2003) also makes reference to a
monopolistic competition sticky prices environment, emphasizing
short run quantity adjustments in response to shocks, even if in a
context in which fluctuations are exclusively technology driven.
Time-to-build has also been extensively studied (Kydland and Pres-
cott, 1982), usually (but not only) in RBC type models, although
not with reference to fully vertically integrated production
processes. Finally cash-in-advance and credit constraints are rather
commonly studied in the mainstream literature.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, these hypotheses
were never considered jointly, so that their potential to analyze
sequential economies has not been fully exploited (Saraceno,
2004). It is easy to see why their interaction is relevant when we are
interested in analyzing out-of-equilibrium dynamics: each period
begins with state variables determined in the previous one, and
with imbalances that constrain agents in their subsequent deci-
sions. Expectations and the structure of productive capacity
further link the periods in a sequence. As a consequence, it is
impossible to consider each period in isolation, as for example in
the temporary equilibrium literature. A shock (no matter of what
type) disrupts the coordination between agents and between
phases of production (construction and utilization) that characte-
rizes the equilibrium. Ex ante disequilibria (i.e. inconsistency of
agent's plans) within the period are eliminated by rationing and
stock accumulation rather than by price adjustments. The "success"
of the subsequent transition lies in the ability of the system in
recovering coordination.
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framework, out-of-equilibrium models are usually built into a
sequence. The sequential opening of markets (for financial
resources, for labor, and for goods) creates binding constraints. The
sequence broadly speaking consists of three different moments
(the equation numbers refer to the equations in the appendix):
(A) At the end of every period we have a number of state variables:
— The productive capacity, represented by a population of
processes, or by a stock of dated labour (see eqs A.3 and A.4)
he stocks (of goods or financial means) in the hands of
agents (that appeared as rationing in the previous period
(eq. A.8). A set of prices and wages
— Some stock variables as labor supply or total money/credit
supply.
(B) At the junction between periods
— If imbalances in the labor and goods markets appeared,
wages and prices change (eqs. A.6 or A.7).
— The productive capacity 'ages': every productive process
becomes one year older.
(C) In the new period things happen in the following order:
— On the production side firms determine, based on expecta-
tions (eq. A.5), and the stocks left from the previous period,
both the desired quantity to be produced and investment.
— In the next step the desired production is compared with the
productive capacity. This may either result in a constraint, or
in a decision to keep part of productive capacity idle (equiva-
lently, scrapping of processes can occur).
— Once desired/feasible production is determined, firms can
compute the wage bill necessary to carry on production, and
investment. The difference between the desired wage fund
and available internal resources gives the amount of external
financing required by firms.
— The short side rule (eq. A.8). then determines (given the
supply from helicopter money or the financial sector) the
equilibrium quantity of financial resources. If the demand
side is rationed, investment and production are affected, and
this alters the structure of productive capacity.
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production, we can compute labor demand. The labor
market opens, and demand and supply are matched. If ratio-
ning occurs (eq. A.8)., either unemployment or non desired
money balances by firms appear
— Production takes place, and wages are paid. This allows
computing aggregate demand for the goods.
—  The matching of demand and supply in the goods markets is
the final step, and the short side rule (eq. A.8). determines
unsold stocks or non-desired money holdings by households.
While the details (on utility, technology, rationing, financial
markets) may change, most out-of-equilibrium models share a
sequential structure of this type that allows analyzing at each step
the emergence of constraints affecting the subsequent choices (a
constraint-decision-constraint sequence). Laying down the sequence
allows to realize that problems in the matching of demand and
supply may arise because of a number of constraints. A firm may
fail to meet the demand it expects because it has not enough
productive capacity, or because it faces a human resources
constraint, or again because it fails to raise the funding needed to
pay for wages and investment. In other words, problem of coordi-
nation may arise for a number of reasons, and the smooth
functioning of the economy along a regular path appears to be the
exception rather than the norm.
As a consequence of a change in the environment (the appea-
rance of a new and superior technology, the degree of extent of the
market due to a change in the distribution of income or to the
globalisation of the economy), firms have to adapt their productive
capacity, in fact they have to adopt a new one adapted to the new
environment. In any case, the new productive capacity must be
built before being used. And most of the time, there is a divorce
between the investment in terms of capacity and the investment at
cost. Whatever the reason for changing, the new capacity requires a
higher construction cost more than compensated by a lower utilisa-
tion cost. This inevitably creates distortions in the structure of
productive capacity, which engender fluctuations in output and
employment. As a matter of fact, in absence of a change in the
external resources available for carrying production processes, the
investment in capacity decreases and, mechanically, after a while,
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level of employment as well as the level of productivity. This is the
result of coordination failures due to both irreversibility of invest-
ment decisions and imperfection of market information. What
really happens along the way is the consequence of the distortion
in the structure of production capacity, which the main event asso-
ciated with any structural change (and the main property of our
model). It will depend on the reaction of agents, that is, the way in
which firms reacts to successive market disequilibria and govern-
ment reacts to global imbalances (unemployment, inflation
pressures).
3. Macroeconomic controversies revisited
An out-of-equilibrium analytical perspective allows shedding a
different light on issues that have been at the center of important
debates in macroeconomics. 
The prevailing policy consensus, reflecting the equilibrium
view of the existence of unique attractors defined with respect to
the properties of technological changes and/or other fundamen-
tals, maintains that the long term must prevail over the short term,
that the supply conditions are more important than the demand
conditions.
In an out-of-equilibrium perspective—where short term oscilla-
tions appear no longer as deviations from a fixed trend but rather
as the way in which a process of change takes shape and gets
realised—the short term actually determines what the long term
will be, supply conditions and demand conditions interact with
each other and there is a strict relation between the distribution
and the creation of wealth, that is, between equity and efficiency.
These are the general methodological conclusions that result
from the analysis of some relevant theoretical issues and contro-
versies, presented in the following sections: conclusions that
provide a guide line for policy interventions quite different and
sometimes opposite to those inspired by the prevailing equilibrium
analytical approach. For all the controversies listed below, here we
only want to give a sense of how the out-of-equilibrium approach
allows gaining a different perspective from equilibrium analysis.
While the structure of the models used broadly corresponds to
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cited papers for details on the specific choices made in each of the
models.
3.1. Wage rigidity and keynesian unemployment
In an equilibrium construct in which markets are complete, the
price vector conveys all the information necessary to fully coordi-
nate agent's decisions. In this framework, unemployment can only
stem from nominal rigidities in the relevant market, namely the
one for labor.
The focus on flexibility comes from Neo-classical and New
Keynesian models which both explain involuntary unemployment
as the result of real wage rigidity. The Neo-classical analysis also
postulates a positive correlation between nominal and real wages
(generally confirmed by empirical observations), so that any cut in
money wages should result in a cut in real wages. As a conse-
quence, money wage rigidities associated with some specific
institutional rules would be responsible for involuntary unemploy-
ment and should be reduced. The New-Keynesian analysis focuses
on the bargaining arrangements on the labor market. In particular,
entrepreneurs would fix a real wage rate above the equilibrium
one—the efficiency wage—in order to induce the workers to reveal
their actual level of productivity Stiglitz (1987). Once again, better
information would result in a lower real wage and a higher
employment level. 
According to Keynes, the persistence of unemployment is due
to a fall in the marginal efficiency of capital, which is not compen-
sated by an equivalent fall in the real interest rate. In other words,
it is due to capital market imperfections. "It was Keynes' position
that it is the failure of the incomplete market mechanism to
reconcile the implied values of forward demand and supplies [...]
that is the source of the trouble. Unemployment of labor and other
resources is a derivative phenomenon" (Leijonhufvud, 1968,
p. 276). Co-ordination failures at the system level rather than
failures in the labor market are responsible for unemployment,
which will therefore be involuntary in the strict sense. In this
context, disequilibria on the labor market call for wage adjust-
ments, but a fall in the money wage and in the price level, far from
leading to a decrease in the real wage and a re-absorption of unem-
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depression. The reason invoked by Keynes is that wage bargains
between entrepreneurs and workers do not determine the real
wage, and ‘there may exist no expedient by which labour as a
whole can reduce its real wage to a given figure by making revised
money bargains with the entrepreneurs’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 13). 
If the “source of the trouble” does not lie in the labor market,
whose disequilibrium is only a “derivative phenomenon”, the
hypothesis of fixed wages that stirred so much controversy
acquires a very precise meaning. Keynes writes that "if money-
wages were to fall without limit whenever there was a tendency for
less than full employment, [...] there would be no resting place
below full employment until either the rate of interest was inca-
pable of falling further, or wages were zero. In fact, we must have
some factor, the value of which in terms of money is, if not fixed,
at least sticky, to give us any stability of values in a monetary
system" (Keynes, 1936, p. 303). Keynes reverses the common
wisdom on wage rigidity that, in his framework, becomes a neces-
sary institutional feature to avoid the implosion of the system
rather than a source of disequilibrium.
The crucial role of co-ordination, however, is better tackled by
abandoning the equilibrium approach that also characterises
Keynes’ General Theory, and by seeing the working of the economy
as a sequential out-of-equilibrium process (Amendola, Gaffard and
Saraceno, 2004b; Saraceno, 2004). This is a complex process that
originates on the production side of the economy, but involves all
the relevant economic variables, as discussed in the previous
section. Involuntary unemployment appears then as the result of a
lack of co-ordination that emerges in the economy as a whole
along the way, at each step, and cannot disappear simply by
allowing price and wage flexibility. As a matter of fact, the stan-
dard treatment for taking care of unemployment, a reduction in
wages, may result in a sequential process and in further distortions
of productive capacity rather than in re-establishing co-ordination
and hence re-absorbing unemployment.
Whatever the nature of the original shock experienced by the
economy, it implies a distortion of its productive capacity, the
dissociation in time of costs and proceeds, a reduction in the
resources allocated to investments and hence in the demand for
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demand is reduced. An excess supply appears in the market for
final output, and undesired real stocks cumulate. The production
demanded no longer matches the existing productive capacity,
and the firms scrap some processes in the utilisation phase. As
production drops, the excess supply on the labor market persists.
An excess of demand may then appear on the market for final
output so that we can have an alternation of excesses of supply and
demand that, by amplifying the distortion of productive capacity,
result in ever increasing fluctuations of the economy. These can be
either reduced or amplified according to whether co-ordination is
successfully re-established or less. The prevailing wage regime has
an essential role in this. Flexibility interpreted as quick adjustment
feeds over-reactions in one or the other direction that result in a
stronger alternation of excesses of supply and demand, and
amplify the distortion of productive capacity. The relation
between employment and flexibility then appears under a comple-
tely different light. Employment is in fact the result of a complex
adjustment process and depends on how this process actually
evolves. Price variability implies trading at false prices that create
constraints and incentives, which in turn induce firms to take
wrong production and investment decisions. Thus the problem lies
not so much in the persistence of a wrong price than in the effects
of an excessive variability of prices on the structure of productive
capacity. In this case a certain wage rigidity prevents the fluctua-
tions from becoming too strong and representing a threat to the
viability of the economy. However, as the source of the problem is
not in the labour market but in the conditions under which the
investment creates, amplifies or eliminates distortions in the
productive capacity of the economy, the issue of flexibility versus
rigidity should be viewed in the light of how the investment issue
is taken care of. If the latter is properly dealt with, it does not
matter how flexible wages are: the wage–employment dilemma
does not exist.
Prices and wages volatility induces quantity and hence invest-
ment volatility, that is, distortions in the age structure of
productive capacity, which are responsible for stronger and
stronger fluctuations of final output. By the way, in case of techno-
logical change, reducing the real wage would be at the opposite of
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tivity level.
3.2. Financial constraints and monetary policy
The dissociation in time of inputs from output and costs from
proceeds that characterizes every structural change calls for a
central role of liquidity in ensuring the viability of the processes of
change. Additional liquidity is required to build the bridge
through time at the heart of the production process, destroyed by
the distortion of productive capacity: and this can only be the
outcome of an external intervention. Credit, or money creation,
have the crucial role of re-establishing consistency over time of
construction and utilization, investment and consumption, supply
and demand. This is a general feature of out-of-equilibrium
models, but was studied in detail in (Amendola and Gaffard, 1998;
Amendola et al., 2004b) where it is shown that the provision of
liquidity must be articulated over time so as to properly interact
with the modification in the structure of productive capacity
which is taking place sequentially; which means, in particular,
being harmonized with the time profile of internally generated
financial resources during the process of change. Following a posi-
tive technology shock, although the natural rate of interest should
finally increase, during the transition the lack of financial
resources makes it necessary to conduct a loose monetary policy. It
will be carried out through a reduction in the monetary interest
rate, which will respond to the temporary reduction in the produc-
tivity growth rate of the economy2. This monetary policy allows
minimizing both the output gap and the inflation rate over a given
period of time, because it allows minimizing the distortions in the
structure of productive capacity.
A policy dilemma is typical of economies that follow out-of-
equilibrium paths (Amendola et al., 2004b). Innovation requires
"to transmute the capital that was embodied in the late stages of
old production processes into capital embodied in the early stages
of new processes, that is a disruption of other activities which is
'bound to be a strain'" (Hicks, 1989, p. 535). Then inflationary pres-
2. The reasons why an initial fall in productivity is usually associated with a process of
structural change will be explored in detail in the next section.
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necessarily appear "because the goods in which the wages (...) will
be spent (...) cannot be provided out of the product of the labour
which is newly employed, for that is not yet ready" (ibid.). Central
banks can try to bring inflation back to the target level as soon as
possible, with the consequence of exacerbating the initial negative
impact of the shock on output and employment. They can, alter-
natively, decide an accommodating monetary policy bringing
inflation back to the target more slowly with the consequence of
simultaneously reducing inflation and unemployment (Amendola,
Gaffard and Saraceno, 2004a). The latter policy consists in accep-
ting a transitory inflation in the perspective of reducing
unemployment. Later on, when and if co-ordination of the
production process and the flow of internally generated financial
resources are re-established, a restrictive monetary policy may be
required to hamper the arising of inflationary pressures. These
results hence call for a conduct of monetary policy substantially
more articulated than a simple inflation-targeting rule, or even a
Taylor rule. Monetary policy needs by its very nature to be discre-
tionary, because it needs to accommodate the changing needs of
the economy during the transition process.
3.3. Appropriating the potential gains of technology: The 
productivity paradox
The standard representation of production and technology,
forces to consider unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon.
Its natural rate is determined by 'fundamentals' in a wide (i.e. not
only referred to labor market features) sense. Unemployment is
seen "as shaped by the structure of the economy rather than its
recent history: technology, individual preferences, social values
and institutions" (Phelps and Zoega, 1998, p. 783). Shocks—inclu-
ding temporary productivity shocks—may in the short run produce
disequilibrium transitory effects on employment due to adjust-
ments failures or lags; but in the long run only changes in the
fundamentals—e.g. in the productivity growth rate—may explain
changes in the natural rate. This, among other things, should
account for the fact that "unemployment rates viewed over the very
long run...appear to be un-trended in most nations, despite tremen-
dous increases in productivity" (Blanchard and Katz,1997, p.56).
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instantaneously mapped into increases in productivity, and the
only way to explain the ‘productivity paradox’—a fall in producti-
vity, we remember, notwithstanding the introduction of a superior
technique in terms of production coefficients—is to assume adop-
tion delays (Amendola, Gaffard and Saraceno, 2005). This happens
because in the standard representation of technology, productivity
is built into the production function as a given relationship
between inputs and output. Such a representation needs an equili-
brium framework, in which the ratios between the factors and
output are constant and corresponding to those dictated by the
production function coefficients. 
If productivity is seen instead as the outcome of an out-of-equi-
librium process, triggered by a technological shock, then the
potential gains of a superior technology may only be appropriated
if agents succeed in reshaping the productive capacity (whose
distinguishing feature is to be temporally articulated), and in reco-
vering the intertemporal co-ordination disrupted by the
introduction of the new technique. Physical, human, and financial
capital are complementary in this process of reshaping, and may
constrain each other. The outcome of the disequilibrium process
depends then on the interaction of accumulation choices, lear-
ning, and money supply rules. 
The out-of-equilibrium analysis, we have seen, makes it possible
to show how a shock of any kind brings about first and foremost a
distortion of the existing productive capacity due to a breaking of
the intertemporal complementarity of the production process.
This implies the appearance of disequilibria, and hence of
problems of co-ordination that extend to all aspects of economic
activity (resulting, for example, in inflation, unemployment, and
so on). Reactions to these disequilibria stimulate a process of
adjustment sketched out by sequentially interacting disequilibria,
which will amplify or dampen the original deformation of the
structure of productive capacity—and hence create or eliminate
viability problems—according to the working of the co-ordination
mechanisms along the way. If co-ordination is not re-established,
this will result in particular in increasing levels of unemployment,
and decreasing levels of productivity and real wages (Amendola et
al., 2005).
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characterised by higher construction costs, as it is typical of the
new information and communication technologies. The costs
come earlier, and hence cannot be financed out of current produc-
tion This causes a distortion of productive capacity and the
dissociation in time of inputs from output, and of costs from
receipts, which puts a financial constraint on investment in capa-
city. The availability of financial resources at the right time is then
essential to build a bridge over time between costs and revenues, so
as to render the required restructuring of productive capacity viable
while it is still on the way and does not yet deliver output and reve-
nues. If these resources are not available, the necessary investment
cannot be realised, which will further reduce final output and post-
pone (or even cast doubts on the effective obtainment of) the
expected increases in productivity. What we shall have in the
meantime is less production and less labor demand. Unemploy-
ment, lower revenues and the subsequent fall in final demand will
further reduce receipts and financial resources. Insufficient invest-
ments will paradoxically result in excess supply, excessive
productive capacity and in the scrapping of production processes.
And so on, in a process that is a threat to the viability of the change
undertaken. Viability that, therefore, calls for the kind of discretio-
nary monetary policy described in the preceding section.
This process also occurs if the new technology requires a diffe-
rent gamut of skills. We shall immediately have the appearance of
a human resource constraint, taking the form of a labour
mismatch, which implies the co-existence of unemployment and
unfilled vacancies (for lower and higher skills respectively). Once
again this will result in lower investment and hence in a subse-
quent fall in revenues and final demand. Unemployment thus
reveals the existence of co-ordination problems at the economy
level. It cannot be reduced to a matching problem, to be solved
thanks to appropriate changes in the regulations of the labour
market or appropriate actions that would allow workers to learn
new competencies. 
Of course, with a fully rational behaviour making available the
financial resources aimed at covering balanced investment
expenses, equilibrium will be maintained or mechanically re-esta-
blished. But this simply means wiping out by assumption the co-
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change and the implied requirement of a macroeconomic manage-
ment of the process itself. 
The above scenario illustrates the productivity paradox, that is,
a fall in productivity notwithstanding the introduction of a supe-
rior technique in terms of production coefficients. There is a
divorce between the productivity of the technique, which can only
be verified in an economy already in the equilibrium state asso-
ciated with the technique itself, and the effective productivity of
the economy resulting from how the out-of-equilibrium process of
transition takes place. This divorce has nothing to do with the
specific character of the technique concerned; it depends on the
co-ordination problems that arise in the transition process from an
old technique to a new one. 
3.4. Trade and domestic distortions
Comparative advantages postulate that an increase of
exchanges between countries is generally beneficial to all partners.
Importing new goods and services, even when these goods were
previously domestically produced, creates new opportunities and
allows the use of productive resources in a more efficient way. The
loss of manufacturing jobs due to the growing import penetration
is generally offset by the job creation effect of growing exports.
International trade is thus a positive sum game and cannot be held
responsible for increasing unemployment, waste of resources, and
low growth.
However, old as well as more recent analyses demonstrate the
possibility of losses for some participants to the exchange. These
losses would be essentially due to differences in productivity gains
among countries, which result in differences in real income (Hicks,
1953; Krugman, 1985; Gomory and Baumol, 2000; Samuelson,
2004). These models deal with the welfare effects for a country
when a part of domestic production is taken over by its trading
partner, generally a less advanced country. Usually, changes in
international trade result in widespread gains if there are no
obstacles to prevent the redistribution of productive resources
among sectors that allows the convergence toward the full employ-
ment equilibrium. Within the standard analytical framework,
these considerations lead to focus on the role played by wage
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from trade and relocation to materialize, it is essential that no
domestic distortion prevents the necessary adjustment (i.e. the
convergence towards the full employment equilibrium). Changes
in fundamentals (technology and preferences) must be accommo-
dated by relative prices (in particular wages). In this case,
relocation and outsourcing only correspond to a better allocation
of resources at the international level without harmful conse-
quences on employment. Increasing imports will be matched by
increasing exports.
Out of equilibrium models are not concerned by the final
welfare effects of changing trading patterns, but with the positive
implications of the transition process. One cannot deny that
changes in international trade entail social and distributional
costs: “An irony that is not sufficiently appreciated in the public
debate is that the economist's case for gains from trade relies
heavily on the restructuring of national economies by the forces of
trade: specialization requires restructuring. While re- structuring
may take different forms, in most cases it is likely to have distribu-
tional impacts-both in the short term as a consequence of
adjustment costs and in the long-term as a result of permanent
changes in relative factor demands. One might even say that the
dislocations and distributional consequences produced by trade
are the flip side of the efficiency gains. No pain, no gain!” (Rodrik,
1998, p.6).
The restructuring mentioned by Rodrik is an intrinsic feature of
globalization and of relocation processes. In fact, increasing
openness is a form of structural change and, hence, analytically
equivalent to technical progress; as such, it entails the destruction
of existing productive capacity (and of the corresponding jobs),
and the construction of something new to replace it. Changes in
international trade go hand-to-hand with the breaking-up of the
pre-existing industrial and spatial structure of productive capacity,
which results in unavoidable disequilibria between supply and
demand of final goods, all along the transition towards the new
adapted structure of the economy. Thus, the supply side, in parti-
cular investment, becomes crucial for the transition to a new
steady state. It is therefore pointless, when not harmful, to try to
bypass the transition and the associated turbulence by eliminating
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change, progressively removing or softening the constraint faced
by the economy.
 The out-of-equilibrium approach allows to push Rodrik's argu-
ment even further, by arguing that this process of restructuring
does not necessarily converge to the new equilibrium: the ex ante
benefits from increased openness may ex post fail to materialize, if
something goes wrong with the co-ordination process. Thus, the
process of restructuring needs not to be successful. The viability of
the transition and the recovery of coordination crucially hinge
upon the right mix of institutional and policy factors, notably in
access to credit.
A two sector oligopolistic model that is subject to an external
demand shock (Gaffard and Saraceno, 2012). Firms can migrate
between sectors, following relative profits, but need to adapt their
productive capacity to the new sector of activity. The natural
tendency of the system to converge to the new steady state equili-
brium corresponding to a different demand structure may be
hampered by excessive variations in wages and/or by too fast
migration between sectors; these may trigger, via aggregate
demand effects, an important drop in the investment capacity of
firms. In turn, if this lack of resources is not compensated by the
credit sector, the insufficient investment disrupts the productive
capacity of the economy, and triggers a cumulative explosive
process. Therefore, re-establishing the coordination between
investment and consumption and reabsorbing unemployment
requires an accommodating credit policy, and a sufficiently slow
change in wages on the one side and on migration rates on the
other. Excessive rigidity, on the other hand, will result in a new
equilibrium permanently characterized by unemployment. The
paper concludes therefore that there is a sort of “optimal” degree of
flexibility for the economy.
4. The current crisis from an out-of-equilibrium perspective
As already stressed, any structural change is a process of deve-
lopment defined as “disturbance of equilibrium, which forever
alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing”
(Schumpeter, 1934, p. 64). The on-going crisis is clearly a moment
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course, financial (mis)behaviours have played an essential role in
triggering the crisis. But, its roots are real. Technological shocks,
growth strategies carried out by emergent countries, and, most
important, dramatic changes in the income distribution, have
generated large distortions in the structure of productive capacity
in several countries. These have resulted in the involuntary accu-
mulation of real and financial stocks. 
Thus, the on-going crisis should have led to understand and
address the policy mistakes that prevented the world economy
from fully adjusting to the unavoidable structural changes, rather
than to propose the same recipes that prevailed before the crisis. As
a matter of fact, capitalism is submitted to recurrent structural
changes and its survival depends on the way co-ordination takes
place. Private (market) or public (policy) co-ordination will be
successful when leading to the harmonisation between supply and
demand at each moment of time and over time, that is, when
smoothing adjustment processes. This co-ordination consists in
arbitrages between conflicting objectives, but also requires a
harmonisation of interests, which in turn is possible only through
a fair distribution of income.
The sequence of events that have been observed can be
explained with reference to the analytical construct described
above, i.e. by focusing on the divorce between investment and
consumption that characterized most countries.
The US crisis can be interpreted as the consequence of the way a
deep structural change, mostly linked to technological advances,
has been managed. During a first phase, financial markets and
monetary policy have allowed investments in new technologies to
be easily financed (Amendola et al., 2005). But delayed reaction to
the building up of disequilibria led to overinvestment and to the
emergence of a stock market bubble that eventually burst. In the
second phase, the indebtedness of households belonging to poor
and middle classes compensated the increased income inequality
that should have had a negative effect on final demand and on the
potential growth rate (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010; 2011). Indeb-
tedness would have created inflationary pressure and would have
led the Federal Reserve to apply a tight monetary policy, if the gap
between domestic supply and demand for final goods had not
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imbalances in the structure of productive capacity have opened the
way to cumulative disequilibria (both real and financial, domestic
and foreign) that have resulted in a great contraction.
The EU crisis is a different story. During two decades large Euro-
pean countries have experienced a lower growth rate that has
ended in increasing budget deficits. This has been the result of a
restrictive monetary policy that compressed inflation, but also
prevented adequate investments in new technologies. In other
words, the transition to the new productive capacity that would
have incorporated new technologies has not been completed
(Amendola et al., 2005). Nevertheless there were no strong imba-
lances between investment and consumption that would have
rendered unviable this slow growth path. A serious problem arose
during the 2000’s, when Germany adopted a strategy that has
consisted in stimulating exports while constraining its domestic
demand with labor market reforms (Carlin and Soskice, 2008). This
has resulted in a divorce between Germany and other European
countries, that is, between a country with a current-account
surplus and countries with deficits, that contributed to the crisis of
the Euro in 2011. A strong imbalance between domestic invest-
ment and consumption in Germany required a high level of
consumption in some other developed countries. Decreasing inte-
rest rates in the euro zone periphery and available funds in
particular from German banks have fuelled housing bubbles, speci-
fically in Spain, where a symmetric distortion has arisen: domestic
consumption was no longer in line with investment in new
productive capacity.
In China, excessive inequality, and an insufficient provision of
welfare (in particular health care and pensions), led to the neces-
sity of an export led growth and to the ensuing accumulation of
assets. Given the large (and sometimes excessive) investment
driving the fast growth carried out, only increased exports of goods
have allowed absorbing the resulting supply. If this pattern of
growth is to be reversed, the growth of investment must fall well
below that of GDP and consumption must be dramatically
augmented. In our framework, the economy should re-establish a
balance between the construction and the utilisation of produc-
tion processes at the domestic level. This transition to greater
Mario Amendola, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Francesco Saraceno286reliance on internal consumption might be quite bumpy, and, it
should be managed smoothly to be successful. The government
response to the crisis, that took the form of increased public invest-
ment, and incentive to private capital accumulation, sustained the
economy in the short run, but widened the imbalance between
consumption and investment, making the long run adjustment
harder and more necessary at the same time.
The global imbalances that result from the prevailing relations
between advanced and emerging countries (mainly between the
US and China), but also among advanced countries (e.g., between
Germany and Spain), take the form of national current-account
surpluses and deficits offset by net capital inflows. According to
the international intertemporal trade agreement, these global
imbalances should create no problems since surplus countries are
foregoing goods and services today but expect, in return, to receive
net goods and services tomorrow. This is what Corden (2011) calls
‘the return journey’. In this scenario, borrowing is supposed to be
aimed at financing sound investment, and to provide for the
return journey. However, what has happened is that financial
resources thus made available have actually been devoted to
finance increased current consumption and unproductive invest-
ment (housing). As a consequence, a large imbalance has appeared
between consumption and sound investment, which is not sustai-
nable. This is an example of the paradox of thrift. We must stress
that we are not only concerned with the divorce between saving
and (sound) investment, but also with the imbrications of succes-
sive disequilibria that push economies out of their stability
corridor.
Focusing on the distortions between investment and consump-
tion as the engine driving the evolution of the economy, and
identifying them as one of the main causes that pushed economies
out of their stability corridor, helps to better understand the
intrinsic complexity of the situation. This also reveals how diffi-
cult is to elaborate exit strategies for macroeconomic policies. Re-
establishing a better co-ordination between investment and
consumption will take time. Governments should be able both to
smooth short-term fluctuations, and, at the same time, to favour a
restructuring of the economy. It would then be a mistake to focus
on fiscal consolidation and to ask to implement structural policies
Production process heterogeneity, time to build, and macroeconomic performance 287as if the only problem were to re-establish a balanced public
budget. Nevertheless, the old Keynesian recipes are also not
enough, because as the case of China teaches, they may worsen the
co-ordination problems the economy faces. The transition paths
should take place in such a way as to correct existing distortions,
which means obtaining greater reliance on investment in some
countries, on consumption in other ones, while sustaining aggre-
gate demand in the short run. In both cases, this requires
adjustments in the structure of the productive capacity and even-
tually in the distribution of income and wealth. Such changes take
time and must be managed in a way that prevents the economy to
experiment too strong fluctuations in the meantime. The real chal-
lenge is to co-ordinate and harmonize short-term and long-term
policies. This may require that inflationary pressures and budget
deficits are accepted for a while, when not sought for. Structural
policies should not be oriented towards more flexibility on the
market, but, at the opposite, they should favor rigidities that
permit smoothing the necessary adjustments. Indeed, “the crisis
has also put to the test long-standing dogmas that blame labor-
market rigidity for unemployment, because countries with more
flexible wages, like the U.S., have fared worse than northern Euro-
pean economies, including Germany” (Stiglitz, 2011).
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Analytical Elements of an Out-Of-Equilibrium Model
A.1. Technology
The two elements of complementarity and time-to-build can be
introduced via an Hicksian representation of technology (Hicks,
1970; 1973): Consider a sequential economy of a neo-Austrian type
which uses a homogeneous labour resource. Labour is inputted for
n periods to build the productive capacity, and used for the
following N to operate it and obtain a final output. An elementary
process of production is defined by input coefficients such that: 
(A.1)
and output coefficients 
(A.2)
We usually assume that ai
c = ac, ai
u = au, and bi = b, even if any
time profile can be modeled through the appropriate choice of
vectors. The productive capacity of the economy is given by the
number of processes in use at the moment t, in construction, xc(t)
and in utilization, xu(t):
(A.3)
 This capacity is subject to ageing and to modifications due to
investment and scrapping of processes in case of financial
constraints.
Alternatively, especially if the construction phase is short
enough, it can be assumed that the production function takes the
form of a Leontief function with dated labor input
(A.4)
 with q denoting quantity produced, and l denoting labour
imput either at time t or at t-1. Thus, dated and current labor (lt–1
and lt) concur in fixed proportions to the determination of produc-
tion q ; this formulation is equivalent to assuming capital, built by
labor in the previous period, that fully depreciates.
a
a
1,...,
, 1,..., ,
c c
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u u
a i n
a i n n N
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ment" may constrain current production: if firms don't possess the
appropriate amount of capital/dated labor, they will not be able to
produce as much as they wish. The Leontief representation is
analytically more treatable, whereas the Hicksian representation
allows a finer description of the time structure of production.
A.2. Expectations
We discussed at length, above, why short term expectations
(also called intraperiod) need to be anchored in past behaviour. A
general formulation, for a generic variable x (usually expected
demand) contains three terms:
(A.5)
 The first is the past value of the variable; the second is the
‘normal’ value, and the third is an error correction term. An appro-
priate choice of the coefficients φ γ and δ allows to describe a wide
range of adaptive behaviours. Steady state/ equilibrium values may
anchor long term or interperiod expectations (for example those
affecting variables like investment, in human and physical
capital). In this case, in eq. expect, we would have φ = δ = 0 and
γ = 1 so that xe = x*.
A.3. Prices
Out-of-equilibrium models borrow from the fix-price literature
(Hicks, 1939; Malinvaud, 1977; Bénassy, 1982), the idea that
disequilibria are absorbed by quantity adjustments (short-side
rule), while prices only change discretely over time. Analytically,
this is obtained by having wages and prices fixed within periods,
and adjustments that take place only between the periods (the
Hicksian ‘weeks’). The adjustment can simply follow previous
excess demand (D-S), for example
(A.6)
 ωj is an indicator of price flexibility that nevertheless, as the
equation clarifies, has nothing to do with market clearing beha-
1 1
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Calvo (1983) partial adjustment scheme:
(A.7)
 with ψ denoting the fraction of firms adapting their price to its
optimal value at each period.
A.4. Quantity Adjustments
The short side rule applies to obtain equilibrium in most
markets. The actual value of a variable is thus computed as 
(A.8)
The markets subject to quantity adjustments may be goods,
labour or financial markets.
A.5. The Sequence
We said before that the time structure of the model is generally
obtained through a sequence of periods linked by state variables
such as the quantity of (dated) labor embedded in production
processes, the stocks that result from past disequilibria, and past
prices and wages. The interperiod sequence is complemented by an
intraperiod sequence that allows the emergence of disequilibria:
Prices and wages change in response to market disequilibria,
even if we do not let them clear markets (eqs. A.6 or A.7).
Firms form expectations (eq. A.5), Given expectations, the tech-
nology (eqs. A.1, A.2 and A.3 or A.4), and the stock of dated labor
lt–1, firms decide desired demand (for labor and external funds, in
case the internal funds from previous periods are not sufficient)
and supply (of goods).
The first market that opens is the financial market, in which
demand for external funds may be rationed (eq. A.8). Financial
constraints cause a rescaling of labor demand.
Total labor employed is determined once the second market,
the labor market opens, where once again eq. A.8 determines
whether unemployment or a human resource constraint appears.
Then wages are paid, and production is carried over. Households
form their demand based on the actual wage perceived.
11t tp p ( )p ,ψ ψ∗ −= + −
d s
t t tx min[ x ,x ].=
Mario Amendola, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Francesco Saraceno294Finally, the product market opens; as in the other markets,
rationing may appear. Rationing in the goods and labor market
will determine the change in prices and wages between periods, as
well the stocks carried on from period to period.
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  We propose an agent-based computational model defining the following dimen-
sions of structural change—organisation of production, technology of production,
and product on the supply side, and income distribution and consumption patterns
on the demand side—at the microeconomic level. We define ten different parameters
to account for these five dimensions of structural change. Building on existing results
we use a full factorial experimental design (DOE) to analyse the size and significance
the effect of these parameters on output growth. We identify the aspects of structural
change that have the strongest impact. We study the direct and indirect effects of the
factors of structural change, and focus on the role of the interactions among the diffe-
rent factors and different aspects of structural change. We find that some aspects of
structural change—income distribution, changes to production technology and the
emergence of new sectors—play a major role on output growth, while others—
consumption shares, preferences, and the quality of goods—play a rather minor role.
Second, these major factors can radically modify the growth of an economy even
when all other aspects experience no structural change. Third, different aspects of
structural change strongly interact: the effect of a factor that influences a particular
aspect of structural change varies radically for different degrees of structural change
in other aspects. These results on the different aspects of structural change provide a
number of insights on why regions starting from a similar level of output and with
initial small differences grow so differently through time. 
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Tommaso Ciarli296The dramatic increase in output and consumption following
the industrial revolution was accompanied by substantial changes
in the structure of the economies involved. Countries of late indus-
trialisation and current transition countries are also experiencing
dramatic changes (Dasgupta and Singh, 2005). Economists usually
refer to structural change as the reshuffling in the share of employ-
ment or value added in the three main sectors: agriculture,
manufacturing and services (Clark, 1940; Fisher, 1939; Dietrich and
Krüger, 2010; Baumol, 2010) which has led to these grand
economic shifts to be described as ''industrialisation'' and
''tertiarisation'' of advanced economies. However, structural
changes encompass more than shifts in labour and value added
from one sector to another; they include complex adjustments in
the structure of production, consumption, labour organisation and
income distribution, which interact in a continuous evolutionary
process. For instance, industrialisation is accompanied by the
concentration of production in large capital intensive firms and
firm size growth (Desmet and Parente, 2009), an increase in the
number of goods available for final consumption (Berg, 2002),
closer involvement of science in technological change (Mokyr,
2002), increased use of capital in agriculture and especially manu-
facturing accompanied by an improvement in the technology
embedded in new machines and overall increases in productivity
(Kuznets, 1973), greater urbanisation usually accompanied by
increased income inequality and changes in social class composi-
tion (McCloskey, 2009), and so on. In other words, industrialisation
leads to transformations of economies and societies. Thus the defi-
nition proposed by Matsuyama, that structural change is
''complementary changes in various aspects of the economy, such
as the sector compositions of output and employment, the organi-
sation of industry, the financial system, income and wealth
distribution, demography, political institutions, and even the
society's value system'' (Matsuyama, 2008).
To be sure, some changes precede income growth, others unfold
as a consequence of income growth, and there are interactions
among the different aspects of structural change. For instance,
changes in the distribution of income are related to changes in
class composition and patterns of consumption. Changes to class
Structural interactions and long run growth 297composition, in their turn, are related to the accumulation of
capital and the different organisation of labour. The accumulation
of capital induces the search of new technologies embedded in
more efficient capital goods, and so on.
Ideally we would like to explain the changes in each aspect of
structural change, their co-evolution and their effect on the direc-
tion of economic growth and on other dimensions of structural
change. We believe that such an investigation is fundamental to
shed light on the determinants and dynamics of long-run growth,
and to derive policy implication that consider different aspect of
economic change. This is especially relevant since traditional
explanations of the relation between structural change and growth
point to opposing dynamics (Matsuyama, 2008): i) exogenous
changes in productivity in the manufacturing sector—which
somehow emerge in the economy—induce labour migration from
agriculture to industry; and ii) an increase of productivity in agri-
culture reduces demand for labour and induces migration to the
manufacturing sector where capital investment—characterised by
higher increases in productivity per unit of investment—spurs
growth; the more investment that is concentrated in manufactu-
ring, the greater manufacturing productivity increases. Both these
mechanisms are plausible. However, taken in their basic version
they do not acknowledge the wide array of ''complementary
changes'' they are conducive to, and which help in solving their
contradiction. We believe that a more accurate explanation should
include the various economic aspects that accompany the transfor-
mation of an economy.
In this paper we heed Matsuyama (2008) definition of structural
change and model complementary changes in various aspects of
the structure of an economy, namely organisation of production,
technology of production, and product on the supply side, and
income distribution and consumption patterns on the demand
side. However, we also follow Saviotti and Gaffard (2008) sugges-
tion and investigate the microeconomic sources of structural
changes. Saviotti and Gaffard (2008, p. 115), in line with
Matsuyama (2008), define structural change as a ''change in the
structure of the economic system, that is, in its components and in
their interactions. Components are [...] particular goods or
services, and other activities and institutions, such as technologies,
Tommaso Ciarli298types of knowledge, organisational forms etc.''. However, departing
from Matsuyama (2008), they ask: ''What does it mean for a system
to be in equilibrium when its composition keeps changing due to
the emergence of qualitatively different entities?'' [p. 116].
We take on board these remarks and propose a model of the
microeconomic dynamics of structural change as processes that
never reach equilibrium, because of the continuous changes to the
underlying dimensions of the economy. In order to model these
microeconomic interactions and study the emergent structural
change and aggregate output, we use computational models and
solutions (Colander et al., 2008; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008;
Dosi et al., 2010; Leijonhufvud, 2006; Buchanan, 2009; Delli Gatti
et al., 2010; Dawid and Semmler, 2010).
We propose an agent-based computational model defining the
following dimensions of structural change—organisation of
production, technology of production, and product on the supply
side, and income distribution and consumption patterns on the
demand side—at the microeconomic level. We model their co-
evolution in terms of the interactions among the different agents
on the supply and demand sides, and the changing behaviour
promoted by changes to income and structure. We contribute to
the traditional literature on structural change by accounting for
'complementary changes' and in a micro to macro framework,
which can be treated exhaustively using agent based computa-
tional models.
The model includes two types of firms: capital and final goods
producers. Final goods producers produce goods that satisfy diffe-
rent consumption needs, serving different markets. New markets
emerge as an outcome of firms' investments in innovation.
Consumer goods differ also with respect to their quality. A firm
includes many layers of employees (workers and managers at diffe-
rent levels), with each layer earning a different wage. This creates
consumers with unequal income distribution. Consumers are
grouped into classes that demand different varieties of goods, affec-
ting firm demand. Among other things, this implies that the larger
the number of organisational layers required in the firm (organisa-
tional complexity), the higher are the differences across consumers,
ceteris paribus. Each class distributes its consumption differently
across the different markets. These consumption shares evolve
Structural interactions and long run growth 299endogenously as new classes emerge in the economy, representing
Engel curves. Growth results from demand expansion, which is a
joint outcome of firm selection and technology investment.
The structure of the model is based on Ciarli et al. (2010) and
Ciarli and Lorentz (2010), which discuss the micro economic dyna-
mics that lead to growth in output via endogenous changes in
different aspects of economic structure. Ciarli et al. (2012) discuss
the non-linear effects of organisational complexity, production
technology and product variety on income growth and distribu-
tion. They show that output is negatively related to initial product
and demand variety, organisational complexity and faster techno-
logical change in capital goods increase output despite higher
inequality, and this last, in the form of large earning disparities,
leads to lower output growth.
In this paper we build on existing results and assess the relative
importance of all the factors that, in the model, determine the
initial conditions of structural change and also the pace at which
the different aspects of the economic structure evolve. The organi-
sation of production is defined by the structure of labour and
earnings disparities. Production technology is defined by the speed
of change in capital innovation, the share of resources invested in
R&D, and its success. Product technology is defined by the ability
of firms to explore new sectors for a given level of R&D invest-
ment, improved quality of a new product, and share of resources
invested in R&D. Income distribution is studied in relation to
profits in capital and final goods firms. Consumption patterns are
defined by the speed at which consumption shares change with
increases in income and class differentiations and changes in
consumer preferences promoted by the emergence of different
income classes. Whilst we define each aspect of structural change
based on specific factors, most of these factors induce structural
change in several aspects of the economy. For instance, the organi-
sation of labour has an impact on the evolution of income classes
and, therefore, also on patterns of consumption; the resources
invested in R&D reduce the profits available to be shared among
firm managers, which affects income distribution; and so on.
We use a full factorial experimental design (DOE) to analyse the
size and significance of the impact of the parameters that define
structural change, on output growth. We decompose and identify
Tommaso Ciarli300the aspects of structural change that have the strongest impact on
growth. We study the direct and indirect effects of the factors of
structural change, where indirect effects are those that occur
through those variables that also have an impact on income
growth. We focus on the role of the interactions among the diffe-
rent factors and different aspects of structural change.
Interactions among factors are of particular interest here, since
the early steps in the analysis show that in most cases the effect of
one specific factor that influences a particular aspect of structural
change varies radically for different levels of the other factors. In
many cases, the main effect of a factor defining the economic
structure is inverted under different structural conditions defined
by other factors. Second, we find that some aspects of structural
change, such as income distribution, changes to production tech-
nology and the emergence of new sectors, play a major role on
output growth, while the roles of others, such as changes in
consumption shares, preferences, and the quality of goods, play a
rather minor role. Related to this, we find that some factors can
radically modify the growth of an economy even when all other
aspects experience no structural change, whereas most factors, on
their own, do not affect outcomes if all other aspects change
rapidly. In other words, one single factor that induces rapid
changes in one particular aspect of the economy can induce
changes that lead to large growth in output; however, in econo-
mies already undergoing structural change in most aspects, slow
changes in most other factors have little influence. Finally, we find
that, when controlling for other model variables, the effect of most
factors on output growth is significantly reduced, showing large
indirect effects.
The arguments are organised as follows. First, we describe the
model focussing on the main micro dynamics and the main
aspects that are mostly affected by the factors that define structural
change (Section 1). Next we describe the methodology and briefly
present the model initialisation and design of experiment (DOE)
(Section 2). Section 3 is divided in four subsections. First, we
describe the general properties of the model, compare the model's
output with some empirical evidence, and show how the distribu-
tion of world income across countries can be explained by
different initial factors, with some caveats. Second, referring to the
Structural interactions and long run growth 301model, we show how each factor is suited to analysing one or more
aspects of structural change. Third, we use analysis of variance to
determine the significance of the main effects of factors and of the
interaction effects between pairs of factors. Fourth, we show results
from an econometric analysis of the factors to quantitatively assess
their relevance in the model, to distinguish direct from indirect
effects, and to assess the relevance and direction of the first order
interaction between each pair of factors. Section 4 discusses the
results and concludes the paper.
1. Model
1.1. Final good Firms
We model a population of firms producing final
goods for the consumer market. Each good satisfies one consumer
need . Or, equivalently, each firm produces in one of
the  sectors. For simplicity we refer interchangeably
to needs and sectors.2 The firms produce an output addressing a
consumer need n with two characteristics ij,fn: price pf,t = i1,fn and
quality qf,t = i2,fn.
1.1.1. Firm output and production factors
Firms produce using a fixed coefficients technology:3
Qf,t = min {Qdf,t ; Af,t–1 L1f ,t–1 ; BKf,t–1} (1)
where  Af,t–1  is the level of productivity of labour L1f,t–1 embodied in
the firm's capital stock Kf,t–1. Qdf,t  is the output required to cover the
expected demand Yef,t , past inventories Sf,t–1, and the new invento-
ries sYef,t : Qdf,t = (1 + s) Yet – S t–1. The capital intensity 1 / B is
constant.4
2. In referring to the same good, we prefer to refer to firm innovation in terms of sectors and
consumer demand in terms of needs. Establishing a mapping between the two is not one of the
aims of this paper and, ultimately, depends on the definition of sectors.
3. For the sake of readability we omit the sector/need index n.
4. This assumption is supported by evidence from several empirical studies, starting with
Kaldor (1957). The capital investment decision ensures that the actual capital intensity remains
fixed over time.
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Tommaso Ciarli302Firms form their sales expectations in an adaptive way to smooth
short term volatility (Chiarella et al., 2000): Yef,t = asYef,t–1 + (1 –as)Yf,t–1,
where (as) defines the speed of adaptation. We assume that the level
of demand faced by a firm is met by current production (Qf,t) and
inventories ( ), or is delayed (Sf,t–1 < 0) at no cost. Following
Blanchard (1983) and Blinder (1982), production smoothing is
achieved by means of inventories sYef,t  —where s is a fixed ratio.5
Given Qdf,t , labour productivity Af,t–1 and an unused labour
capacity (ul) to face unexpected increases in final demand, firms
hire shop-floor workers: 
(2)
where ε mimics labour market rigidities. Following Simon (1957)
firms also hire ''managers'': every batch of ν  workers requires one
manager. Each batch of ν second tier managers requires a third
level managers, and so on. The number of workers in each tier,
given L1f,t  is thus 
(3)
where  is the total number of tiers required to manage the firm f. 
Consequently, the total number of workers is 
The firm's capital stock is:6 
(4)
5. We assume adaptive rather than rational expectations. Here we assume an inventory/sales
ratio that corresponds to the minimum of the observed values (e.g., Bassin et al., 2003; U.S.
Census Bureau, 2008).
6. Following Amendola and Gaffard (1998) and Llerena and Lorentz (2004) capital goods
define the firm's production capacity and the productivity of its labour.
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Structural interactions and long run growth 303where Vf  is the number of capital vintages purchased, kh,f  and τh
respectively the amount 3of capital and date of purchase of vintage
h, and δ  the depreciation rate. The firm's productivity embodied in
the capital stock then is the average productivity over all vintages
purchased: 
(5)
where ag,τh  is the productivity embodied in the h vintage.
Capital investment is driven by market outcomes and depends
on the expected demand
where u is the unused capital capacity. This is equivalent to assu-
ming that if the firm faces a capital constraint (because of an
increase in demand or a depreciation of the current stock) it
purchases new capital, accessing profits or an unconstrained finan-
cial market. Investment then defines the demand for capital good
firms: kdg,f,t = kef,t . Each firm selects one of the capital producers
 with a probability that depends positively on g's
output embodied productivity (ag,t–1), and negatively on its price
(pg,t–1) and cumulated demand of capital g still has to produce. The
delivery of the capital investment may take place after one or more
periods, during which the firm cannot make a new investment.
1.1.2. Wage setting, pricing and the use of profits
We model an aggregate minimum wage (wmin)  as an outwards
shifting wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2006; Nijkamp and
Poot, 2005), where unemployment is derived following a Beveridge
curve from the vacancy rate (Wall and Zoega, 2002; Nickell et al.,
2002; Teo et al., 2004), endogenously determined by firms' labour
demand. The minimum wage setting (Boeri, 2009) is related to
changes in labour productivity and the average price of goods.7
The wage of first tier workers is a multiple of the minimum wage,
w1f,t = ω wmin,t–1. For the following tiers the wage increases expo-
7. For a detailed description of the computation of the minimum wage see Ciarli et al. (2010).
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Tommaso Ciarli304nentially by a factor b which determines the skewness of the wage
distribution (Simon, 1957; Lydall, 1959): 
(6)
Price is computed as a markup on unitary production costs
(Fabiani et al., 2006; Blinder, 1991; Hall et al., 1997), i.e. the total
wage bill divided by labour capacity:8 
(7)
The tier-wage structure implies diseconomies of scale in the
short-run, which is in line with the literature on the relation
between firm size and costs (e.g. Idson and Oi, 1999; Criscuolo,
2000; Bottazzi and Grazzi, 2010).
The profits (πf,t ) resulting from the difference between the value
of sales, pf,t–1Yf,t, and the cost of production,
 
are distributed between (i) investment in new capital (kef,t ), (ii)
product innovation R&D (Rf,t ) and (iii) bonuses to managers (Df,t ).
For simplicity we assume that firms always prioritise capital invest-
ment when they face a capital constraint, while the parameter ρ
determines the allocation of the remaining profits between R&D
and bonuses:9 
8. This is in line with evidence that firms revise prices once a year, mainly to accommodate
inputs and wage costs (Langbraaten et al., 2008).
9. We are aware of recent empirical evidence which suggest that R&D growth is caused by
growth in sales rather than profits (Coad and Rao, 2010; Moneta et al., 2010; Dosi et al., 2006).
Indeed, assuming a fixed markup, in our model profits are a constant share of sales. In other
words, we would maintain that R&D is related to sales figures but since the model does not
include a credit market we prefer to constrain R&D investment by the available resources, i.e.
profits. Moreover, the model accounts for the case where profits are distributed to managers and
not invested in R&D, for a very small ρ, as suggested in some of the cited literature. 
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(9)
 This amounts to assuming that (i) firms invest in R&D to seek
new sources of revenues, i.e. when they perceive a reduction in
competitiveness—as no new capital is required; (ii) respond to an
increase in demand reducing the resources constraint; and (iii)
distribute profits only when this does not interfere with the posi-
tive momentum—increase in demand, capital investment, increase
in productivity. We assume that bonuses are distributed proportio-
nate to wages, to the manager tiers . The overall
earnings of an employee in tier z is then wzf,t + ψ zf,t , where ψ zt  is
the share of redistributed profits to the managers of each tier  z.10
1.1.3. Product innovation
Firms innovate in two stages: first new products are discovered
through R&D, second they are introduced into the market. The
R&D activity has two phases: research, i.e. the choice of consumer
need/market n’ in which to focus the innovation effort, and deve-
lopment, i.e. the production of a prototype of quality q’f,t .
The range of sectors  that a firm can search is
centred on the knowledge base of the current sector of production
 (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and depends on R&D invest-
ment  and a parameter ι : 
(10)
where nint is the nearest integer function. Within this set a firm
selects the sector  with the largest excess demand Yxn,t .
10. This assumption is inspired by evidence that the exponential wage structure of a
hierarchical organisation is not sufficient to explain earnings disparities (Atkinson, 2007).
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Tommaso Ciarli306The quality of the new prototype developed in sector n’ is
extracted from a normal distribution where the mean is equal to
the quality currently produced by the firm and the variance is
negatively related to the distance between the old and the new
sectors and positively related to a parameter ϑ: 
(11)
If the innovation occurs in n the new good is maintained only if
it is of higher quality than the currently produced good and if it
represents an incremental innovation in the market n. Otherwise,
the new product is discarded. If it is maintained the new good is
introduced in a set Φ of prototypes q’φ,f,t–1. If Φ includes less than
three prototypes the new one is added. If Φ = {0;...;3} the new
prototype replaces the one with the lowest quality as long as its
own quality is higher. Otherwise, the new product is discarded.
A firm introduces a new prototype in its market with a probabi-
lity negatively related to the growth of sales.11 We assume that a
firm introduces in the market its highest quality prototype. We
assume also that if a firm's prototype is for a different sector from
the one in which it is currently producing, it will be introduced in
this other sector only if the number of firms in that sector is lower
than in the current sector of production. In other words, a firm
moves to a new sector where there is less competition, or intro-
duces a higher quality product in the current sector of production.
1.2. Capital suppliers
The capital goods sector is formed of a population of
capital suppliers that produce one type of capital
good characterised by vintage τh and an embodied productivity aτh.
1.2.1. Output and production factors
In line with the empirical evidence (e.g. Doms and Dunne,
1998; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006) we assume that production
11. For positive growth the probability is 0. We follow the well know Schumpeterian argument
that firms innovate to seek new sources of revenues. The probabilistic behaviour captures firms'
limited forecasting capacity and distinguishes between temporary falls in sales from long term
structural downturns which are more likely to require an innovation.
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Structural interactions and long run growth 307is just-in-time. Capital suppliers receive orders kdg,f,τf from firms in
the final good sectors—where τf  refers to the date of order—and
fulfil them following a first-in first-out rule. The total demand 
for a capital supplier is then the sum of current orders and past
unfulfilled orders
 .
For simplicity, we assume that capital producers employ labour
as the sole input, with constant returns to scale: Qg,t = L1g,t–1 ; in
each period firms sell the orders manufactured:
(12)
Similar to final goods firms, capital suppliers hire a number of
workers necessary to satisfy the demand plus a ratio u of unused
labour capacity: 
(13)
where ε mimics labour market rigidities. To organise production
capital suppliers hire an executive for every batch of vk production
workers L1g,t–1 , and one executive for every batch of vk second-tier
executives, and so on. The total number of workers in a firm there-
fore is: 
(14)
1.2.2. Process innovation
Capital firms use a share ρk of cumulated profits Πg,t to hire
R&D engineers. The maximum number of engineers is constrained
to a share vK of first tier workers:12 
(15)
12. See footnote 9 for a discussion of profits and R&D.
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Tommaso Ciarli308The outcome of R&D is stochastic (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1998;
Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005), and the probability of success
depends on the resources invested in engineers and a parameter ζ
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Llerena and Lorentz, 2004): 
(16)
If the R&D is successful13 a firm develops a new capital vintage
with productivity extracted from a normal distribution centred on
its current productivity: 
(17)
where is a normally distributed random function.
The higher is σ a the larger are the potential increases in producti-
vity. The new level of productivity enters the capital good
produced by the firm for the following period and sold to the final
good firms.
1.2.3. Wage setting, price and profits
The price of capital goods is computed as a markup (μk ) over
variable costs (wages divided by output (Qg,t)): 
(18)
where wEg,t  is the wage of engineers. The first tier wage is a multiple
of the minimum wage wmin,t , such as the wages paid to the engi-
neers (wEwmin,t–1 ). For simplicity we assume no layer/manager
structure among the engineers. Wages increase exponentially
through the firm's tiers by a factor b identical to the final goods
firms.
Profits resulting from the difference between the value of sales
pg,t Yg,t and the costs for workers and engineers
13. R&D is successful when a random number from a uniform distribution [0; 1] is smaller than
Pinng, t .
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Structural interactions and long run growth 309are cumulated (Πg,t ). The share not used for R&D (1–pk) is distri-
buted to managers as bonuses, proportionate to their wages: 
Dg,t = max {0;(1 – ρk ) Πg,t} (19)
where
1.3. Demand
The composition of demand depends directly on the structure
of production (product technology, firm organisation and labour
structure, and production technology) acting as the endogenous
transmission mechanism through which structural changes on the
supply side affect changes to consumption.
We assume that each tier of employees in the hierarchical orga-
nisation of firms defines one (income) class of consumers with the
same income (Wz), consumption share (cn,z), and preferences (υiz).
This is a restrictive assumption, but also an improvement with
respect to models that assume two fixed classes (rural and urban)
or homogeneous consumers.
1.3.1. Income distribution and consumption shares
The income of each consumer class 14 is the sum
of wages (W wz,t ), distributed profits (W ψz,t ) and an exogenous
income ( ): 
(20)
Consumers react to changes in total income, changing total
current consumption by a small fraction  and postponing
the remaining income for future consumption (Krueger and Perri,
2005): 
(21)
14. Where Λt  is the number of tiers in the largest firm in the market, and z = 0 is the class of
engineers in capital sector firms.
τττττττ
π ,
1
1=
1
1=,
1
1=,
= g
tEEt
g
t
tg DLw ∑∑∑ −−− −−Π
{ }0,1, , tz Λ∈ …
,z tW
1
, , 1 , , , , , , , , ,
=1 =1 =1 =1
=
F G F G
z
z t min t f z t g z t f z t g z t z t
f g f g
W b w L L Wψ ψ− −
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ + + + +⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
[0;1]γ ∈
, , 1 ,= (1 )z t z t z tX X Wγ γ− + −
Tommaso Ciarli310Consumers divide total consumption across different needs
, each satisfied by a different sector, and allocate to
each need a share cn,z. The desired consumption per need then is
simply   (where  ).
Following the empirical literature on Engel curves we allow
these expenditure shares to vary endogenously across income
classes, representing a different income elasticity for different
income classes and different consumption goods (needs in this
model). As we move from low to high income classes the expendi-
ture shares change from ''primary'' to ''luxury'' goods at a rate η: 
(22)
where is an 'asymptotic' consumption share of the richest theo-
retical class, towards which new classes of workers (with higher
income) emerging endogenously tend (see equations 3 and 14).
The ''asymptotic'' distribution is defined as the consumption shares
of the top income centile in the UK in 2005 for the ten aggregate
sectors (Office for National Statistics, 2006)—which we assume
satisfy ten different needs—ordered from smallest to largest
(Figure 1).15 For reasons of simplicity (and lack of reliable data) we
assume that the consumption shares of the first tier class, 2000
periods before—the initial period in the model, are distributed
symmetrically (Figure 1).16  
If the goods available on the market satisfy only a limited
number of needs—since new goods are discovered through firms'
R&D—consumers adapt consumption shares accordingly, redistri-
buting the shares for non available needs to the needs that are
available, proportional to the consumption shares of their existing
needs. The demand for non available needs is defined as excess
demand, which works as the signal for final goods firms to choose
the sector in which to innovate: 
(23)
15. We thank Alessio Moneta for these data.
16. Madisson (2001) provides qualitative evidence to support this assumption about changes in
household expenditure shares.
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Structural interactions and long run growth 3111.3.2. Consumer behaviour and firm sales
We model consumers who purchase a number of goods in each
of the available markets with lexicographic preferences. In line
with the experimental psychology literature (e.g. Gigerenzer, 1997;
Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001) we assume also that consumers have
imperfect information on the characteristics of goods, and that
they develop routines to match a satisficing behaviour, leading to
the purchase of goods equivalent to the optimal good.
Consumer classes access the market in sequence and demand a
non negative quantity of goods from each firm. Firm demand is
defined as follows. Consumers in a class z are divided into
 identical groups with an equal share of the class 
income . 
First, a consumer group m screens all the goods on offer from all the
firms in the market (need) and observes their characteristics
 , 
Figure 1. Expenditure shares: initial and asymptotic
The distribution of the asymptotic level of shares corresponds to current expenditure shares 
for the highest percentile of UK consumers. For simplicity, initial shares are assumed to be 
distributed symmetrically
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Tommaso Ciarli312where σ ij measures the extent of incomplete information, which
differs for quality and price (Celsi and Olson, 1988; Zeithaml,
1988).
Consumer preferences are modelled here as degree of tolerance
over shortfalls with respect to the best good available in the market
in terms of its characteristics . That is, given the tolerance
level  a consumer is indifferent towards all of the goods
that have a quality above  and a price below . In
other words, for a very large υj,z a consumer buys only from the
best firm in the market, while a small υj,z indicates indifference
towards a large number of goods that differ in terms of price and
quality. We assume also that preferences change across income
classes: first tier workers have a high tolerance towards quality
differences (υ2,1 = υ
min) and very low tolerance towards price diffe-
rences (υ1,1 = υ
max). As we move to higher income classes, tolerance
towards price differences increases and tolerance towards quality
differences reduces by a factor ς : 
(24)
Then, a consumer group selects the subset of firms that matches
its preferences:
 ,
and purchases are equally distributed among selected firms. Then,
the total demand of a firm in market n is the sum of sales across all
groups and classes: 
(25)
2. Methodology 
The main aim of this paper is to assess the relative effects of the
parameters that define the different aspects of structural change.
The model is agent-based and has no analytical solution, but we
can study its properties with a systematic numerical analysis. We
do so using a simple experimental design. We describe the initiali-
sation of the model, and then the method of analysis.
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Structural interactions and long run growth 313Table 1 presents the initial conditions and the value of the para-
meters not included in the DOE.17 For these parameters we also
Table 1. Parameters setting
Parameter's (1) name, (2) description, (3) value, and (4) empirical data range
  Parameter  Description  Value  Data 
i2 Initial min quality level  98  Analysed 
i2 Initial max quality level  102  Analysed 
a s Adaptation of sales expectations  0.9      // a 
s Desired ratio of inventories  0.1  [0.11 - 0.25] b 
ul Unused labor capacity  0.05  0.046 c 
u Unused capital capacity  0.05  0.046 c 
δ Capital depreciation  0.001  [0.03, 0.14]; [0.016, 0.31] d 
Capital intensity  0.4  B = [1.36, 2.51] e  
ε Labor market friction (final firms)  0.9  0.6; [0.6, 1.5]; [0.7, 1.4]; [0.3, 1.4] f
ω Minimum wage multiplier  2  [1.6, 3.7] g 
1-γ Smoothing parameter  0.2  [.04, .14]; [.06, .19] h
σ ij
Error in the consumer's 
evaluation of characteristics 
j = 1: 0.05; 
j = 2: 0.1 
     // i
 
ωE Engineers' wage multiplier  1.5  [1.2, 1.4] j 
υ min=υ 2,1 Highest = first tier quality tolerance  0.1      // 
υ max=υ 1,1 Lowest = first tier quality tolerance  0.9      // 
F Final good firms  100      // 
G Capital good firms  10      // 
Hz Consumer samples  100      // 
N Number of needs  10      // 
a) Empirical evidence not available: the parameters has no influence on the results presented here. 
b) U.S. Census Bureau (2008); Bassin et al. (2003). 
c) Coelli et al. (2002), with reference to the `optimal' unused capacity. 
d) Nadiri and Prucha (1996); Fraumeni (1997) non residential equipment and structures. We use the lower limit
value, (considering 1 year as 10 simulation steps) to avoid growth in the first periods to be determined by the repla-
cement of capital. 
e) King and Levine (1994).
f) Vacancy duration (days or weeks) over one month: (Davis et al., 2010; Jung and Kuhn, 2011; Andrews et al., 2008;
DeVaro, 2005.
g) Ratio with respect to the average (not minimum) wage in the OECD countries (Boeri, 2009). 
h) Krueger and Perri (2005); Gervais and Klein (2010). 
i) No empirical evidence available to the best of our knowledge. Parameters set using the qualitative evidence in Zei-
thaml (1988). 
j) Relative to all College Graduates and to accountants (Ryoo and Rosen, 1992). 
17. The remaining factors are presented in Table 7.
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Tommaso Ciarli314report the data ranges available from empirical evidence. While we
are not calibrating the model to any specific economy, all parame-
ters are within the ranges observed across countries and over time.
In t = 0 firms produce goods in the first two sectors, and consu-
mers can satisfy only those two needs.18 Final goods firms differ
only with respect to the quality of the good produced, which is
extracted from a uniform distribution (i2 ~ U [i2 ,i2]). All capital
goods firms are identical. All firms are small, requiring only one
manager; capital good firms also hire engineers. This labour struc-
ture defines three initial classes of consumers: engineers, first tier
workers, and one manager tier.
2.1. Experimental Design
To analyse the effect of the parameters that define the structure
of the economy (Table 7) we make use of the simplest DOE, the 2k
full factorial design. It consists of analysing k factors at two diffe-
rent levels (typically High and Low), simulating all possible
combinations of both levels (Montgomery, 2001; Kleijnen et al.,
Summer 2005). 2k factorial designs are appropriate for the purposes
of this paper: to study the main effects of a large number of factors,
and to identify the factors that are more influential on the model
behaviour from those that are less relevant; to study a large
number of interactions of different orders, between factors; and to,
at the same time, minimise the number of simulation runs
required to study a large number of factors in a complete design
(Montgomery, 2001).
In particular, we analyse the effect of the ten factors that define
the initial structure of the economy and the scale at which it
changes through time. To each parameter we assign ''Low'' and
''High'' values (Table 7), which we consider to be the theoretical
extreme values (observed infrequently). In Appendix A we provide
evidence for the choice of the extreme values.
We test all 210 combinations of Low and High values of the
i = 1, ..., I factors. We run 20 replicates for each combination for
2000 periods.19 We then totalise a sample of  factor responses (i.e.
output variables) yijlt where j = {1, ..., 1024} is the number of
18. The remaining sectors may emerge as a result of firms' product innovation.
Structural interactions and long run growth 315designs—combinations of the different parameters, l = {1, ..., 20} is
the number of replicates, and t = {1, ..., 2000} is the time periods.20
We focus on aggregate outputs and analyse the responses using
various methods, taking into account the violations of normality
and constancy of variance in the responses (Kleijnen, 2008).21
First, we assess the significance of the factors effect and of their first
level interactions with an analysis of variance. Then, we study the
relative importance of factors and their interactions, controlling
for the effect of a number of variables and using Least Absolute
Deviation (LAD) regressions. A graphical description of the impact
of each factor on output can be found in the working paper version
(Ciarli, 2012).
3. Results
Using the baseline configuration (simulated for 200 replicates)
the model generates long term endogenous growth in output with
a transition from linear growth to exponential growth (Figure 2
(a))—occurring here around t = 1400 —(Maddison, 2001; but also
Galor, 2010). Output growth is preceded by an increase in aggre-
gate productivity. The linear growth is characterised by very low
investment rate, that induce slow changes in productivity, and is
driven by the final demand—via slow grow in firm size, and
demand for labour. 
The transition to the second phase occurs as heterogeneous
firms emerge—due to the acquisition of slightly different vintages
and their own innovation—and the linearly increasing working
population selects the best firms. Selection induces large changes
in the demand for few firms, that require large investment in new,
more productive, capital. Demand for new capital, in turn, spurs
innovation in the capital sector, which supply even more produc-
19. Our model is a non terminating simulation, which requires us to choose a cut-off point
when the simulation enters a ''normal, long run'' regime (Law, 2004). For some responses, such
as output, under a large number of factorial combinations the model does not reach a steady
state. For others, such as output growth and market concentration, the model reaches a ''long-
run steady state'' before 2000 periods.
20. 20,480 simulation runs and 40,960,000 observations.
21. Our model and simulation procedure satisfy the remaining properties outlined in Kleijnen
(2008). See also Montgomery (2001) for a comprehensive treatment of the analysis of
experiments in simulations.
Tommaso Ciarli316tive capital goods. This starts a cumulative causation process
characterised by decreasing prices and increasing consumption,
profits, investment, and tiers of workers, which induce more
demand heterogeneity, at the higher inequality (Ciarli et al., 2010).
Indeed, we provide evidence of the often observed non-linear rela-
tion between inequality and income (Kuznets curve) for the period
from before take off to the end of the simulation (Figure 2 (b)).22  
For given values of the extent of exploration of new sectors, the
model qualitatively reproduces the s-shaped curve characterising
the growth in sectoral output from birth to diffusion in the
economy (Figure 3). Both figures show that at this level of aggrega-
tion, sectors are not expected to disappear (as it would be the case
with goods). Both figures also show that the emergence of new
sector is concentrated in a relatively short time span. However, the
simulated results show a higher concentration of emergence, due
Figure 2. Model properties: output (log), productivity and Kuznets curve
In graph (a) we plot the time series of output in log scale, and aggregate productivity in linear 
scale. In graph (b) we plot the relation between output (log) and the Atkinson index (dotted 
line), and the polynomial curve fit (full line) with confidence intervals (blune lines), for the 
period 1400-2000
22. Inequality is computed using the Atkinson index: 
where Wz,t is the total income of consumer class z, Lz,t is the total number of workers in class z
and ϱ is the measure of inequality aversion. As we are not measuring an empirical level of
inequality, we use an intermediate value of ϱ = 0.5.
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Structural interactions and long run growth 317to the fact that we have a fixed number of needs—unlike real
sectors, that firms attempt to satisfy as soon as they manage to
search all sectors: a lower ι would imply a less clustered emergence
(see equation 10). 
Table 8 in the Appendix reports the results of a Vector Autore-
gressive (VAR) analysis on 10 period growth rates, and coefficients
estimated using LAD—with bootstrapped standard errors. The VAR
shows the relations between output (1), aggregate productivity (2),
average price (3), the inverse Herfindahl index (4) and the
Atkinson index of inequality (5). Results are in line with the
expected macro dynamics. All variables show a strong cumulative
process with one lag. Inequality growth has an immediate positive
effect on output (1 lag) which becomes negative after three lags.
Similarly, an increase in market concentration has an immediate
negative effect on output (1 lag), which becomes positive after two
lags. Market concentration also determines an increase in prices
and inequality. The effect of productivity on output in this short-
run analysis is captured through price reduction, which has an
immediate positive effect on output (1 lag). A detailed discussion
on the short and long run dynamics of a previous version of this
model can be found in Ciarli et al. (2010) and Ciarli et al. (2012).
3.1. Distribution of income across countries
We now move to the analysis of the model for the 2k combina-
tions of factors. Each combination of factors in the model can be
interpreted as a different country with different initial conditions.
Figure 3. Sectoral output: industrial production in Britain and simulation results
(a) Sectoral output (log scale) computed by Rostow (1978) (cited in Aoki and Yoshikawa, 
2002); (b) sectoral output (log) from the model results with ι = 0.005 
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Tommaso Ciarli318We thus compare the distribution of the average growth rate of
GDP from 1980 to 2010 across countries using IMF data, with the
distribution of average growth rate of output from period 1 to 2000
across factorial designs using the simulated data (Figure 4). The
distribution is definitely more skewed in our simulations across
different combination of factors than across world economies.
There are three main reasons for this. First, a trivial one: we look at
2000 periods, which includes long periods of stagnation that
precede take-off (see above), while the IMF data refer to the the
period between 1970 and the present.
Second, we are analysing the model under extremely ''stressful''
conditions, i.e. for extreme values of the parameters not generally
observed in the real world (see Table 7). For example, for some
factor combinations no investment occurs, and the economy
stagnates over the 2000 periods. To show the relevance of these
extreme conditions on the distribution of output we show the
probability that a low or a high value of the parameters occurs for
designs with very high income. We analyse the following parame-
ters: the variance of the distribution that determine an increase in
the productivity of capital (σ a), the wage differentials between
classes (b), the probability of process innovation (ζ ), and the
markup (μ). Figure 5 plots the density of these four parameters
when the level of output (log) is larger than 36, the top bin of the
world income distribution according to IMF data. For these extre-
Figure 4. Income growth distributions—world Vs simulation
Graph (a) plots the distribution of income growth (averaged over 1980-2010) across world 
economies (Source IMF); graph (b) plots the distribution of output growth (averaged for 1-
2000) across different combinations of factors
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Structural interactions and long run growth 319mely high levels of output we observe almost one single
combination of factors: σ a is high with probability 1,23 b is low
with probability around .95, ζ  is high with probability nearly 1
and μ is high with probability .95. 
The third related reason for the atypical distribution of output
growth in our model simulated across the 2k different factor combi-
nations is due to the DOE: in Figure 4 (b) we are overlapping
distributions from different data generation processes, where each
combination of the High and Low values of the parameters repre-
sent one process. We show below that some parameters have a
dramatic effect on the output variables. The distribution of output
variables differs enormously when these parameters switch from
one state to another. We show this again by comparing the distri-
butions in the simulated data. Figure 6 plots the distribution of
output for different combinations of some influencing parameters
with High and Low values. It is sufficient to compare the support
23. We denote the low level of the parameters as 0 and the high level of the parameter as 1.
Figure 5. Density of some parameters when Log output > 36
0 denotes a low value of the parameter and 1 denotes a high value. For extremely high values 
of output the parameters take almost always the same value
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Tommaso Ciarli320of the total distribution (the last one in the figure, for all values of
the parameters) with the support of any other distribution which
represents a combination of different High and Low values (1,0) of
σ a, μ, ι, v, b. In only one case the support is the same. In most
cases, the support is radically different (lower by a factor 10 or 30). 
To sum up, the overall distribution of output variables, such as
output in the final period, and the average rate of output growth
over periods, cannot be approximated satisfactorily by any theore-
tical distribution that we know of: the closest would be the Pareto
distribution.
The above discussion suggests that economies endowed with
different factors that determine the initial structural conditions
and the way in which structural changes in different aspects of the
economy unfold (or not), experience very different growth paths.
By testing extreme values of these conditions we see that a limited
number of economic aspects—different from the beginning—
Figure 6. Distribution of output (log) for different High and Low values of the 
parameters
σ a, μ, ι, v, b ; 0 denotes a low value and 1 denotes a high value
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Structural interactions and long run growth 321produce dramatic differences in growth. Also the way that these
different aspects of structural change interact seems to be relevant.
The rest of the paper provides a detailed analysis of the (main,
interactive, direct and indirect) effects of these factors on the final
distribution of output across economies with very different star-
ting conditions.
3.2. The factors of structural change 
Before analysing factor responses we briefly summarise the
effect of the different factors (parameters) that define the initial
structure of the economy and the dynamics of structural change.24
We group them with respect to the aspects of structural change
they capture directly: product technology, production technology,
organisation of production (which refer mainly to the structure of
employment), income distribution and consumption patterns.
Table 7 summarises the ''Low'' and ''High'' values, the main aspects
affected, and the equation where they appear. Appendix A
provides detail for the choice of the ''Low'' and ''High'' values. 
24. The terms factors and parameters are used interchangeably.
Table 2. Effect of parameters on structural change
A ''+'' indicates that the High value of the parameter induces relatively 
more structural change
  Factor  Equation  High/Low  Low  High 
 Main 
Economic 
aspect a
 Main 
indirect 
aspects a 
ι   10 +  .001  .3  3  _
v   3 _  3  50  1  4, 5
b   6 +  1  3  1  4 
σ a   17 +  .01  .2  2  1
η  22 +  .1  3  5  _
ρ  = ρ k  8, 15 +  .05  .95  3, 2  4
ϑ   11 +  .01  10  3  _
ζ   16 +  .1  1000  2  1
ς 24 +  .05  .9  5  _
μ = μ K  7, 18 +  1.01  2  4  2,3, 1
a 1: Organisation of production; 2: Production technology; 3: Product technology; 4: Income distribution; 
5: Consumption patterns 
Tommaso Ciarli322Product technology: ι, ϑ, ρ. All these factors have an effect on
the variety in the final goods market, ι determining the pace at
which new goods are discovered, ϑ influencing the rate of change
in the quality of new goods and ρ altering the resources employed
by the firm for the exploration of new goods. ι and ϑ play no other
role in structural change; ρ influence the distribution of income
through the share of profit not redistributed as bonuses and used
for R&D.
Production technology: σ a, ζ, ρk. Large values of σ a and ζ
directly modify the capital structure of the economy, determining
the pace at which innovation occurs in the capital goods sector; ρk
has the same effect as ρ in altering the resources devoted to R&D.
All three factors have a number of indirect effects on other aspects
of structural change. Similar to ρ, ρk influences the income distri-
bution. σ a and ζ  in addition to altering the productivity of the
final goods firm, modify the demand for production factors
(labour and capital), affecting firms' labour structure (through
changes in size). Also, given the different pace at which different
firms change capital vintages, σ a and ζ  change the distribution of
prices in the final goods market, allowing consumers to select
based on their price preferences.
Organisation of production: v and b. Both parameters define
the way in which a firm is organised: a very low v means that a
corporation needs a large number of tiers to organise a small pool
of workers, whereas for a large v a single manager can deal with a
large production unit (few changes as the size of the corporation
increases). b tells us simply how the different levels of workers and
managers are paid (and bonuses are distributed). Both parameters
have a strong bearing on the distribution of income as they impli-
citly determine the number of income classes (v) and their wage
income. Indeed, v indirectly influences also at least one other
aspect of the economy—changes in consumption patterns—by
altering the pace at which new classes with different consumption
styles endogenously emerge.
Income distribution: μ, μk. For a small ρ and low capital invest-
ment a large μ implies a redistribution of income from all
consumers to higher classes. Indeed, an increase in μ also increases
the resources available for investment in R&D—thus it increases
the pace at which product and production technology change.
Structural interactions and long run growth 323Finally, differences in markups indicate different market struc-
tures, from competitive to oligopolistic.
Consumption patterns: η, ς. High level of both factors induce
faster change in consumption behaviour. A high η implies a very
fast change in expenditure shares from basic needs to the asymp-
totic distribution that of the top income centile of UK consumers
in 2005. ς  changes the consumer preferences in a given classes, for
a given expenditure share: a large ς implies that the tolerance for
relatively lower quality (higher price) goods decreases (increases) at
a faster rate moving towards the high income classes.
Main and cross effects (without normalising the scale). A
simple graphical analysis explaining the main and the cross effects
of the factors is detailed in Ciarli (2012). Given the scale effect that
underlies these results, in this paper we focus on the analysis of
variance (next section). However, a summary of the entity of the
effect of each parameter—which, including its scale, reflects the
fact that the parameters represent very different dimensions of
structural conditions—is a useful complement to an analysis of
variance that informs on the significance of the effects, but not on
their magnitude (more in Section 3.4).
For simplicity, we explored two extreme cases, out of the thou-
sand possible states of the world analysed in this paper: we
analysed the impact on total output of each factor when all other
factors are either Low (L) or High (H). We found that, in the case
where parameters induce low structural change in all dimensions
of the economy, a single factor inducing high structural change is
sufficient for a strong effect on output. However, this does not
apply to all factors and especially not to those that determine
changes in the structure of consumption: the wage multiplier (b)
and a higher variance of the productivity shock (σ a) have the
strongest positive effects, followed by the exploration of new
goods (ι); while ρ (share of profits invested in R&D) and μ (mark-
up) have the strongest negative impact. On the other hand, if all
the parameters induce high structural change in all dimensions of
the economy, then just two of the parameters inducing low struc-
tural change will have an effect on output (ρ and μ).
We found also that the effect of each parameter in many cases is
not monotonous: the signs of the main effects change if some of
Tommaso Ciarli324the other factors change from inducing low to inducing high struc-
tural change. For example, we analysed the effect of a more or less
complex organisational structure (v) under varying structural
conditions, such as wage regimes (b) the likelihood of inventing a
new product (ι), and increases in the productivity of capital
vintages (σ a). We found that, while a few factors do not interact
with v – η, ϑ, ς, and ζ, some induce only a level effect—ρ and μ—,
ι, b, and σ a change the sign of the effect of v: when they are Low,
an increase in v has a mild positive effect on output; when they are
High, an increase in v has a strong negative effect on output. This
seems to suggest that highly complex organisations (which require
many organisational layers, i.e., many employees receiving diffe-
rent levels of remuneration, for a given number of workers in the
first tier) have a positive impact on output growth when markets
diversify quickly (High ι), when firms can recover the higher orga-
nisational costs (reflected in higher consumer prices) through
increased productivity growth (High σ a), and when wages differ
between organisational layers (b). The rapid vertical growth of
firms in fact creates classes of workers with different consumption
shares and different preferences, i.e. consumers that buy more
goods from markets that firms still need to discover (with a High ι)
and that are ready to buy goods at higher prices. However, the
higher organisational costs translate into lower aggregate demand.
The net effect on output is positive only if either product innova-
tion brings results in rapid time to market for goods to satisfy the
emerging classes of consumers, or when rapid change in product
technology compensates for increasing prices (or possibly if both
conditions hold).
3.3. Analysis of variance: the significance of factors' interactions
In order to assess the statistical significance of the effect of each
factor, and the joint significance of the different factors on output,
we run an ANOVA on 20 replicates for each combination of para-
meters. The results in Table 3 show that apart from η and ς—
respectively the speed of convergence of the expenditure shares
and of the change in the preferences of consumers for a good's
characteristics—all parameters have a significant main effect, even
when tested jointly—when considering the effect of each para-
Structural interactions and long run growth 325meter for all possible states of the world (High and Low values of
the other factors).  
Due to the blatant departure from normality of the output
variable, we check the robustness of the results of the ANOVA by
testing one way differences between the samples defined by the
parameters High and Low values with a Kruskal-Wallis (KW) equa-
lity of population rank test. The results (see Table 9 in the
Appendix B) differ from the ANOVA only with respect to η, which
turns out to have a small but significant negative effect.25 The one
way mean test confirms the results from the graphical analysis:
high values of ι, v, b, σ a, ϑ and ζ are associated with a higher
output; high values of ρ and μ are associated with a lower output;
and η and ς  have a negligible effect.
This similarity makes us confident that the results of the
ANOVA for our large sample are informative, and we proceed to
analyse the significance of the first order interactions between all
factors. For instance, as discussed above, ι, b, and σ a modify the
effect of the organisation structure on output. We analyse these
interactions more systematically in Table 4, which summarises the
Table 3. ANOVA – main effects
   Source  Partial SS  df  MS  F  Prob>F 
Model 1.258e+06  9  139790  414.1  0.00
 
ι 4840  1  4840  14.34  0.00
v  101546  1  101546  300.8  0.00
b 114912  1  114912  340.4  0.00
σ a 260782  1  260782  772.6  0.00
η 691  1  691  2.05  0.15
ρ   481609  1  481609  1427  0.00
ϑ  1399  1  1399  4.150  0.04
ζ  240068  1  240068  711.2  0.00
ς  0.821  1  0.821  0  0.96
μ  52954  1  52954  156.9 0.00
 
Residual  6.909e+06  20469  337.5
 Total  8.168e+06  20479  398.8
Number of obs = 20480; Root MSE = 18.37; R-squared = 0.154; Adj R-squared = 0.154
25. However, note that the KW test is one way.
Tommaso Ciarli326results of the ANOVA that includes all the main effects and first
order interactions (i.e. all possible interactions between two diffe-
rent factors).  
Table 4 confirms the intuition—from the analysis of distribu-
tions of output (Figure 6)—that most factors induce structural
changes that have a significant effect which differs (in size or direc-
tion) for different combinations of the other factors, that is, which
is subject to the structural changes induced by the other factors. In
other words, the different dimensions of structural changes
induced by the factors, significantly interact in determining the
aggregate behaviour of the economy.
For example, what would be the effect on growth of increasing
the opportunities for R&D in the capital sector (σ a)? As shown in
Table 3, σ a alone has an apparent impact on output. However,
Table 4 shows that the role of the production technology crucially
depends on many other structural aspect of the economy, such as
the organisation of production (v, b), and especially the share of
profits invested in R&D and its effectiveness on the innovation
result (ρ, ζ ). Its strong effect on output is relatively independent of
the introduction of product variety in the consumer market (ι, ϑ)
and of the structure of demand for more variety (η, ς).
To better discriminate among the different aspects of the struc-
ture of an economy, in the next section we perform a regression
analysis that allows us to quantify the effect of factors across designs.
Table 4. ANOVA – first order interactions
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ι v b σ a η ρ ϑ ζ ς μ 
ι  0          
v  **  ***         
b  ***  ***  ***        
σ a  0  ***  ***  ***       
η  **  0  0  0  0      
ρ   ***  ***  ***  ***  0  ***     
ϑ  0  0  0  0  0  **  0    
ζ  **  ***  ***  ***  0  ***  0  ***   
ς  0  ***  *  0  0  0  *  0  0  
μ  **  ***  ***  ***  0  ***  0  ***  **  ***
Note: Values on the diagonal refer to the factor main effect. 
***Prob > F < 0.01; **Prob > F < 0.05; *Prob > F < 0.1; 0: Prob > F > 0.1
Structural interactions and long run growth 3273.4. The relative influence of the different aspects of structural 
change
We run quantile regressions (with bootstrapped standard errors)
to estimate the relative impact and significance of each factor and
their first order interactions on output. We distinguish between
direct and indirect impact: Table 5 reports estimates for the factors
(1), for a number of control variables, most of which are correlated
to the factors (2), and for the parameters when the least correlated
control variables are included—a sort of reduced form of the model
(3).26 Table 6 reports the estimates for the parameters and their
first order interactions, with and without control variables (respec-
tively bottom-left and top-right triangular matrix).
On average, when abstracting from the different structural
change regimes (column 2), the model shows that aggregate labour
productivity (A)—measured as output per worker—is strongly and
positively correlated to output as well as average expenditure on
R&D (across firms and time periods) (R). As noted elsewhere (Ciarli
et al., 2010; Ciarli and Lorentz, 2010), product variety (averaged
over the full period)— σ q and σ p, respectively for quality and
price—and the selection that they enable also positively affect
output; but their effect is weak and non-significant when control-
ling for inequality and productivity, which is the prime cause of
price differences. Inequality (AT), averaged over the whole period,
has an overall negative effect on output. 
  With reference to factors (column 1), ρ and μ determine struc-
tural changes with the strongest (negative) effect on output,
followed by σ α, ι and b. Related to σ α, ζ also has a positive and
significant effect. The least relevant are the structural changes
induced by v, ς  (positive) and η  (negative).
The factors determining structural change also influence the
dynamics of a large number of variables. Therefore, the estimated
effect of a variable on output (Table 5) is likely to differ for diffe-
rent levels of the parameters. Likewise, the use of control variables
in the estimation of parameters allows us to estimate the direct
effect of the factors on output, depurated from the indirect effect
through the control variables.
26. The estimated sample is the result of the simulations for the last period for 20 replicates of
each combination of parameters.
Tommaso Ciarli328Table 5. The relative impact of factors and main variables on output
LAD estimates with s.e. obtained from bootstrapping (400); the dependent variable is 
(Log) output
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables  Factors  Contr Var  F & CV 
        
ι  0.692***   1.063*** 
  (0.056)    (0.071) 
 v  0.009***   -0.012*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
 b  0.107***   -0.061*** 
  (0.008)    (0.007) 
σ a  3.242***   0.966*** 
  (0.088)    (0.083) 
η  -0.023***   -0.016*** 
  (0.006)    (0.004) 
ρ   -4.900***   -3.947*** 
  (0.024)    (0.036) 
ϑ  0.013***   0.003** 
  (0.002)    (0.001) 
ζ  0.001***   0.000*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
ς  0.040**   0.021* 
  (0.019)    (0.011) 
μ  -9.330***   -9.510*** 
  (0.018)    (0.021) 
A   1.201***  2.900*** 
    (0.071)  (0.057) 
A T   -3.809***  3.523*** 
    (1.109)  (0.109) 
σp   0.119*  -0.092*** 
    (0.065)  (0.004) 
σq   0.001  0.000*** 
    (0.001)  (0.000) 
R   0.779***  
    (0.048)   
Constant  28.301***  12.944***  29.424*** 
 (0.043)  (0.380)  (0.075) 
Observations  20,480  20,480  20,480 
Pseudo R2  0.43  0.09  0.48 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Structural interactions and long run growth 329To better show this interaction between factors and economic
variables, Figure 7 plots the relation between an independent
variable, aggregated productivity, and output (Log), for different
values of the parameters.  In panel a no restrictions on parameters
are imposed, and the relation between the two variables is distinctly
non-linear and non monotonic. More importantly, panel a suggests
that the relation between productivity and output could be reduced
to different functional forms, depending on the combination of
factors. In panel b we restrict all factors to either the high or the low
value: aggregate productivity does not show any significant effect
on output under either condition. Results are different if we allow
the parameters that are strongly related to aggregate productivity to
fluctuate. In panel c all factors are either high or low, except for ρ,
which takes both values. Although the relation between the two
variables is not so clear cut, the scale is radically different—the
small dot in the bottom left of panel c is the flat relation that we
observe at the bottom right side of panel b. Alternatively, for diffe-
rent levels of markup (μ) the relation turns from null to positive, for
high values of all other parameters (panel d).
Returning to Table 6, column (3) shows estimates for the direct
effects of the factors and for the effect of the least correlated
variables. First, the sign of the two factors defining the organisa-
tion of production are inverted. A high v means a lower number of
(organisational) workers per good produced, increasing labour
productivity. When we control for labour productivity, though,
the lower number of tiers for a given number of shopfloor workers
reduces the pace at which firms grow in size and diversify by
adding different levels of workers and managers (see Eq. 3 and 14).
The effect on structural change is a slower increase in the aggregate
demand and its variety, and a negative impact on output growth.
While large wage differentials (b) increase inequality, which has a
negative effect on output, ceteris paribus, but which in our model is
associated also with larger aggregate demand (Eq. 20); thus the
inverted sign of AT when controlling for the factors. Second, the
direct effect of σ α is strongly reduced when controlling for aggre-
gate productivity. Third, the estimated effect of a few variables
change their sign and significance as we control for different
combinations of the factors determining structural changes.
Tommaso Ciarli330As already mentioned, the effect that each of the factors induces
on structural change depends also on other structural aspects. The
relevance of the interaction among several factors is established in
the results of the quantile regression where all first order interac-
tions are estimated together with the main effects, with and
without the control variables Table 6. We estimate the effect of the
high value of factors, the low value being the reference case. Esti-
mates without control variables are reported in the top-right
triangular matrix and those that include control variables are
reported in the bottom-left triangular matrix. On the diagonal we
report the main effects (when controlling for interactions). In the
following we discuss the estimates obtained when including the
control variables (bottom-left triangle). First, the results in Table 6
show that the main effects are strongly significant, despite the
inclusion of the interaction terms. Second, most of the first order
interaction terms are also significant, particularly when they
Figure 7. Aggregate productivity Vs output (Log)
T=2000, aggregate productivity on the x-axis and output on the y-axis
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Structural interactions and long run growth 331include a factor shown to have a significant main effect. We
proceed by discussing the effect of the different aspects of struc-
tural change, following the classification in Table 2.
Product technology: ι, ϑ, ρ. The effect on output of rapid emer-
gence of new sectors is large and positive on average, but is always
negative when other factors induce strong structural change (with
the exception of the factors defining consumption patterns, η and
ς). That is, for fast changes in consumption shares and/or prefe-
rences the high level of ι has a (weakly) significant positive effect.
We note also that the interaction between the two main factors of
product technology, ι and ϑ—respectively needs and quality—is
not significant.
Table 6. LAD regression – the effect of first order interactions on output
The top-right triangular matrix shows estimates without control variables; the bottom-left 
triangular matrix shows estimates with control variables. 
The dependent variable is output (Log)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ι v b σ a η ρ  ϕ ζ ς μ
 
ι 1.51 0.16 -0.09 -0.31 -0.01 -0.55 0.03 -0.18 0.04 -0.97 
1.38          
v
0.28 0.33 -0.95 0.69 0.23 -0.56 -0.08 0.62 0.12 0.20 
   -0.81         
 
b 
-0.10 -0.16 1.14 -0.24 -0.15 0.11 -0.05 -0.34 -0.28 0.10 
  0.10        
 
σa
-0.37 0.68 -0.34 1.51 0.00 -1.58 0.09   2.26   -0.12   -0.73 
   1.39       
 
η
0.04 0.28 -0.21 -0.03 -0.18 0.00 -0.02  -0.04   0.08   0.10 
    -0.26      
 
ρ  
-0.52 -0.35 0.31 -1.00 0.00 -0.56 -0.57   -1.42  0.01   -2.51 
     -0.98     
 
ϑ 
-0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.18 0.00 -0.61 0.55   0.10   0.20   -0.17 
      0.58    
 ζ -0.14 0.42 -0.34 1.18 0.03 -0.88 0.08   1.24   -0.14   -0.39 
       1.05   
 
ς 
0.05 0.23 -0.20 -0.03 0.11 -0.06 0.20  -0.12  0.17  -0.37 
         0.10  
 
μ
-0.98 -0.24 0.37 -1.27 0.12 -1.61 -0.56  -0.96  -0.31   -6.06 
          -6.22 
Note: Values on the diagonal refer to the factor main effect. Standard errors computed with 400 bootstraps. Refe-
rence case is the low value of factors.
p<0.01 p<0.05 p<0.1 
Tommaso Ciarli332Production technology: σ a, ζ, ρK. The main factors that affect
changes in production technology, σ α and ζ, also have a pervasive
effect, interacting with all other aspects of structural change,
except those that define changes to consumption patterns. In
particular, the relation with organisational factors is negative: for
an increase in organisational complexity—i.e. reduction in v—or
wage differences, fast changes in technology reduce output
growth. Taken together with the negative sign of the interaction
with ρ, this result suggests that rapid changes in the productivity
component of capital have a negative impact on output in the
presence of high markups, large wage differences and multiple
organisational tiers which amplify wage differences. In other
words, economies that experience fast changes in productivity
grow at a lower pace if the structure imposes as well an unequal
distribution of the productivity gains. The interaction with
product technology is negative with respect to the discovery of
new sectors, and positive with respect to changes in product
quality. Finally, the two main factors affecting changes in produc-
tion technology— σ a and ζ —are strongly and positively related to
increased output.
Organisation of production: v and b. A large number of layers
required to manage an organisation (low v) and large wage diffe-
rences (b) between these layers have a negative impact in the
presence of strong structural change in all other aspects except
those affecting income distribution, μ. Even in the presence of
rapid changes in consumption patterns, higher wage inequality
reduces output growth.
Income distribution: μ, μk. A large markup generating high
profits in our model has a negative impact under almost all aspects
of strong structural change, except for the organisational aspects
discussed above, and changes in expenditure shares.
Consumption patterns: η, ς. As already noted, the factors
determining structural changes in consumption play a minor role
in output growth. The interactions with many other aspects of
structural change are not significant: the main effects of consump-
tion patterns are visible when structural change occurs in product
technology and the distribution of income. Indeed, the emergence
of new products is a requirement for changes in consumption to
Structural interactions and long run growth 333have a role on output. The two main aspects of consumption
patterns, η and ς  interact positively.
4. Discussion and conclusions
 A large wealth of research has investigated why regions starting
from a similar level of output grow so differently through time.
Which are the initial apparently small differences that diverge so
markedly? In this paper we build on the idea that the initial diffe-
rences that determine growth divergence are those that define the
structure of an economy and the way in which this evolves
through time. We maintain that structural change occurs in diffe-
rent aspects of the economy, such as the structure of production,
consumption, labour organisation and income distribution. These
different dimensions of structural change interact in a continuous
evolutionary process, and are not independent from the growth
pattern. For example, one could not think at the industrial revolu-
tion without considering aspects such as changes in knowledge
and technology, changes in the patterns of consumption, changes
in trade patterns and extraction of resources through colonial
power, and institutional changes. In turn, changes in knowledge
and technology may be driven by changes in the demand, as well
as by changes in labour relations (e.g. increase in the cost of
labour). Similarly, changes in transportation and military techno-
logies are not independent from changes in technological
knowledge. Changes in consumption patterns are also related to
increased trade. And so on.
We propose a model of the microeconomic dynamics of struc-
tural change and their interactions, abstracting from the
institutional aspects. The model defines the following related
aspects of structural change: organisation of production, techno-
logy of production and the emergence of new sectors on the supply
side, and income distribution and consumption patterns on the
demand side. Ten different parameters (factors) in the model
account for these five dimensions of structural change.
In this paper we simply investigate the relative importance of
each aspect of structural change in economic growth. We also
acknowledge that some of these aspects are likely to have a sizeable
impact on economic growth only when complemented by other
Tommaso Ciarli334aspects of structural change. For example, changes in consumption
patterns may not occur if there is no change in the sectoral compo-
sition of the economy, or if there is no change in wages. We
therefore use the model to study the interaction among the diffe-
rent aspects of structural change, analysing factors' interactions.
To do so, for each of the ten parameters defining the different
aspects of structural change we assign a high and a low value,
respectively identifying large and small structural change as the
economy grows. We then define a DOE that accounts for all
possible combinations of the parameters' high and low values.
In other words, we define 210 different economies, all starting
from the same initial conditions except for one of the aspects of
structural change. On one extreme we have an economy that expe-
riences negligible structural changes in all economic aspects, and
on the other extreme an economy that experiences large structural
changes in all economic aspects. In between are all other possible
combinations. We study the impact of the five different aspects of
structural changes with an analysis of variance, and running quan-
tile regressions on the cross-design—cross-country—sample.
We find that almost all aspects of structural change are signifi-
cant determinants of the differences in the growth rate of output
across designs, but their magnitude varies substantially. Income
distribution, rate of change in production technology and the
emergence of new sectors, explain a great deal of output growth
differences, changes in consumption patterns—shares and prefe-
rences—are barely significant, and changes in the organisation of
production—organisation and compensation of labour—lay in
between. Moreover, the most relevant factors of structural change
play a determinant role even in the presence of negligible struc-
tural changes in all other economic aspects. While the opposite
case is rarely true: the output growth of economies that are set to
experience large structural changes in all aspects except for one, is
not affected if one of the changes is only negligible.
Concerning the complementarity among different aspects, we
find that most factors of structural change strongly interact. This is
an extremely relevant result suggesting that we should always
account for a large number of economic aspects to understand
long term patterns of across-countries divergence. For example, we
Structural interactions and long run growth 335find that changes in the composition of sectors available in the
market become more relevant when consumption patterns also
experience strong structural changes. Or, technological progress is
strongly relevant, but quick technological advances have a nega-
tive effect on output growth when they are accompanied by
structural changes in the organisation of labour that leads to large
inequality among a large number of emerging classes. In other
words, economies that experience fast changes in productivity,
grow at a lower pace if the structure imposes as well an unequal
distribution of the productivity gains among workers.
Taken together, the model and the analysis of the experimental
design we proposed in this article clearly show that to explain long
term growth we need to look at the way in which a large number of
structural changes interact at the microeconomic level. It is not
unlikely to find that some aspects of structural change were deter-
minant for some regions, and detrimental for others (such as the
pay structure at the beginning of the industrial revolution in
Europe). Moreover, while some of the interactions between the
different aspects are relatively known, many interactions instead
suggest avenues for future research on the relation between growth
and structural change.
For example, the results show that inequality is related to
output growth in a number of different ways through the different
aspects of structural change. This is in line with the lack of agree-
ment, on theoretical and empirical grounds, on the relation
between inequality and GDP growth (Aghion et al., 1999; Eicher
and Turnovsky, eds, 2007). In our model the effect of inequality on
output is transmitted through the aggregate demand. For example,
higher wage inequality per se increases the overall amount of
resources allocated to consumers, as well as more complex organi-
sation of firm labour (low v). But the relation between inequality
and output when we do not control for structural parameters (a
result biased by omitted variables) is negative. This correlation
simply says that in stagnating economies, due to a lack of demand,
there is no investment in capital goods and all profits are redistri-
buted to managers: low growth induces inequality. Although
institutions have no role in our model, this result is in line with the
literature that shows the relevance of elite behaviour in countries
long run development (Acemoglu et al., 2005). While an economy
Tommaso Ciarli336growing rapidly also generates some inequality, due to the hierar-
chical structure of firms, this same non-linear increase in vacancies
that accompanies an increase in demand generates even more
growth and demand. This is amplified by the size of wages, i.e.
consumable income. However, as noted elsewhere (Ciarli et al.,
2010), it is the overall demand that counts in our model, and not
how it is redistributed, given that we assume that all classes have
the same propensity to consume their income. Here we simply
observe that growing firms generate more demand; and different
wage classes consume a different set of goods. However, given the
minor role played by demand side factors in our model, we can
make no judgement on what would be the best way to redistribute
salaries. What seem to be essential from analysing the model dyna-
mics is the selection of firms by consumers, either because they
differentiate on price (low income) or on quality (top incomes).
And because of the pyramidal structure of the firm, the price selec-
tion by the large population of shop-floor workers seems essential
in facilitating the transition from low to exponential growth.
Finally, large profit shares in the form of large mark-up have the
opposite effect on real demand, through an increase in prices, with
a negative impact on output growth. We plan to focus more on the
relation between the different aspects of inequality and output
growth in future research, exploiting the panel structure of the
simulation data.
Among the implication for future research with this and similar
models, two limitations in the analysis of this paper suggest two
future steps. First, here we do not consider the deeper determinants
of the initial differences in the factors that determine structural
change, which are mainly related to institutional aspects—in a
broad sense—and to the intricate relation between knowledge,
technology, and institutions. In future work we want to build on
the sizeable literature that uses the case of the industrial revolu-
tion(s) to investigate the relations between knowledge,
technology, and institutions to shed more light on the origins of
the structural difference that we model here. Second, having
studied here which are the most relevant aspects in determining
the output response with a simple DOE, the next step is to focus on
those aspects and analyse whether their effect on output is linear
and monotonous, as assumed in the DOE. Previous work suggests
Structural interactions and long run growth 337that it is not (Ciarli and Lorentz, 2011; Ciarli et al., 2012). Of parti-
cular importance is the relation between the various components
of inequality, labour organisation and output growth. Moreover,
we plan to study how different aspects of structural change modify
their effect through time, exploiting the panel structure of the
data. Finally, one can exploit these same results to simplify the
model reducing the number of parameters and behavioural details.
With reference to the model presented here, we plan to simplify
purchase behaviour to a completely adaptive demand behaviour.
More in general, it seems like a good strategy to start with highly
complex agent based models, thoroughly analyse the most rele-
vant aspects with an appropriate DOE, and learn from the analysis
how to simplify the model, stylising the aspects that have little
influence on the outputs.
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A. Experimental design
The choice of limit values
The ''Low'' and ''High'' values of the factors analysed in this
paper were chosen following three criteria: (i) the minimum or
maximum possible values (when a limit exists, such as in shares):
in this case we selected values that approximate the extremes. (ii)
We made reference to the empirical evidence, and chose values
below the minimum observed for ''Low'', and values above the
maximum observed for High. Or (iii) when the factors have been
tested in previous work (for a large number of values) we used the
values below/beyond which the factor did not show to have a
significant effect. The mix of these criteria makes the choice of the
''Low'' and ''High'' values in this paper quite robust and meanin-
gful—we do not see many other options for this type of work.
Table 7. Choice of limit values of factors
The ''Low'' and ''High'' values of the factors are chosen with respect to available empirical 
evidence and/or within theoretically possible and meaningful values.
  Factor  Low  High 
ι   Approximates the minimum 
No significant effect found above 0.2 when we 
analyse a large number of values between 0 and 
10 (Ciarli and Lorentz, 2011)
ν Minimum postulated in Lydall (1959); Simon (1957)
Far above the max postulated in Lydall (1959); 
Simon(1957) and very marginal effect observed 
beyond 15 (Ciarli et al. 2012)
b The minimum Above the maximum postulated by Lydall (1959); Simon (1957) 
σa Approximates the minimum 
Maximum valued used in Ciarli et al.( 2012): 
an extremely large number for the time frame 
postulated here 
η
Close to the minimum (to allow for 
some changes in consumption pat-
terns) 
Well beyond the theoretical maximum 
ρ = ρk Approximates the minimum share Approximates the maximum share
ϑ Approximates the minimum value 
No significant effect found above 2 when we 
analyse a large number of values between 
0 and 10 (Ciarli and Lorentz, 2011) 
ξ Close to the minimum Close to max probability (also for small level of R&D investment)
ς Approximates the minimum share Approximates the maximum share 
μ = μ K Approximates the minimum 
Well beyond observed evidence (De Loecker 
and Warzinski, 2009; Joaquim Oliveira et al., 
1996; Marchetti, 2002)
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Table 8. Vector autoregression analysis of the main macro variables
Results from LADestimates of 10 periods growth rates, and bootstrapped standard errors 
(400). (1) ΔY: output growth; (2) ΔA: Aggregate productivity (3) ΔP: price; (4) ΔIHI: inverse 
Herfindhal Index (5) ΔAT: Atkinson inequality index. The numbers in parenthesis indicate the 
number of lags 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Variables ΔY  ΔΑ    ΔP ΔIHI   ΔAT  
 
 ΔY (1)  0.986***  -0.021**  0.014  0.189  0.247*** 
  (0.037)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.145)  (0.076) 
 ΔA (1)  0.016  0.735***  -0.045***  -0.284  -0.273* 
  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.013)  (0.237)  (0.161) 
 ΔP (1)  -0.697***  0.049  1.058***  0.718  0.165 
  (0.063)  (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.746)  (0.405) 
 ΔIHI (1)    0.010***  0.019***  -0.011***  0.624***  -0.249*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.043)  (0.026) 
 ΔAT (1)  0.020***  0.001  -0.001  0.065  0.941*** 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.049)  (0.035) 
 ΔY (2)  0.081  0.024  -0.012  -0.384**  -0.165* 
  (0.051)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.192)  (0.088) 
 ΔA (2)  0.049*  0.044  0.025  -0.085  0.228 
  (0.026)  (0.039)  (0.017)  (0.272)  (0.228) 
 ΔP (2)  0.771***  -0.001  0.054  -1.045  -2.385*** 
  (0.092)  (0.082)  (0.072)  (0.981)  (0.690) 
 ΔIHI (2)  -0.014***  -0.026***  0.005*  0.237***  0.247*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.053)  (0.032) 
 ΔAT (2)  -0.001  0.006  -0.000  -0.032  0.013 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.057)  (0.045) 
 ΔY (3)  -0.069**  -0.006  0.000  0.213*  -0.080 
  (0.035)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.127)  (0.052) 
 ΔA (3)  0.000  0.085***  0.005  0.138  -0.015 
  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.014)  (0.271)  (0.177) 
 ΔP (3)  -0.052  -0.083  -0.131***  0.247  2.104*** 
  (0.056)  (0.066)  (0.051)  (0.775)  (0.528) 
  ΔIHI (3)  0.006*  0.005  0.005  0.098*  -0.010 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.054)  (0.029) 
  ΔAT (3)  -0.014***  -0.008  0.002  0.018  -0.019 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.042)  (0.029) 
Constant  -0.000  0.000***  -0.000***  -0.001  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Observations  1,950  1,950  1,950  1,950  1,950 
Pseudo R2  0.98  0.61  0.84  0.71  0.67 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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   Parameter  Obs  Rank Sum  chi-squared  df  Prob
ι
   0.001  10240  1.010e+08 
 76   1  0.00
   0.3  10240  1.090e+08 
ν     
   3  10240  1.020e+08 
 34.94   1   0.00 
   50  10240  1.070e+08 
b      
   1  10240  1.030e+08 
 17.54   1   0.00 
   3  10240  1.070e+08 
σa      
   0.01  10240  9.120e+07 
 1048   1   0.00 
   0.2  10240  1.190e+08 
η      
   0.1  10240  1.060e+08 
 8.621   1  0.00 
   3  10240  1.040e+08 
ρ      
   0.05  10240  1.310e+08 
 3744   1   0.00 
   0.95  10240  7.900e+07 
ϑ      
   0.01  10240  1.030e+08 
 15.88   1   0.00
   10  10240  1.070e+08 
ξ      
   0.1  10240  9.220e+07 
 902.3   1   0.00 
   1000  10240  1.180e+08 
ς      
   0.05  10240  1.050e+08 
 0.334   1   0.56 
   0.9  10240  1.050e+08 
μ      
   1.01  10240  1.480e+08 
 10452   1   0.00 
   2  10240  6.160e+07 
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Long term economic development is characterized not only by increasing
efficiency of economic activities but also by qualitative change within indus-
tries and increasing variety concerning the existence of different industries.
Traditional economic growth models do not cope with the complex amalgam
of these three trajectories of economic development nor could comprise the
interactions among them. Furthermore, economic development is not a process
which is spurred by supply-side effects but driven by the co-evolutionary inter-
play of supply and demand side forces. With our TEVECON model we analyze
economic development driven by efficiency and quality improvements
together with structural change and the co-evolution between innovation and
demand. The first part of the paper introduces to the basic model and some
general results. The second part of the paper deals with policy experiments
which are undertaken by comparing different numerically analyzed scenarios.
Keywords: Economic Development, Qualitative Change, Co-Evolution, Simulation. 
The main objective of this paper is to establish that innova-
tion could not have contributed to economic development unless
a demand for the goods and services created by innovation existed.
We explore the conditions required for such a demand to exist and
argue that the process which gave rise to the observed path of
economic development was the co-evolution of demand and inno-
vation. Furthermore, we explore how the co-evolution of demand
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Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka348and innovation changed the capitalist economic system from one
in which most people could afford only bare necessities to one in
which most people have a highly and increasingly varied pattern
of consumption, including a growing proportion of items which
cannot be judged necessities, and which are of higher quality than
in the past. Finally, we study the possible impact of economic poli-
cies on the above co-evolutionary process. We carry out these
explorations by means of an extension of our TEVECON model of
economic development, which is described in the following part of
the paper.   
1. 2. Conceptual background 
1.1. Co-evolution and economic development 
The concept of co-evolution has recently been used in the inno-
vation literature to analyze the co-evolution of technologies and
institutions. In this section we make a brief reference to this litera-
ture and propose a more general concept of co-evolution.
Technologies cannot develop in an institutional vacuum but need
appropriate institutions (Nelson, 1994). Such institutions are
required to support the collective interests of a new technology
and of the corresponding industry, to lobby the industry, to regu-
late it, to establish intellectual property rights, to create the
required infrastructures etc. Examples of such co-evolution are
mass production in the United States car industry, the emergence
of synthetic dyes in Germany (Murmann, 2003), biotechnology in
the USA (Nelson, 2008). 
The need for new institutions becomes evident when new tech-
nologies emerge. There are even institutions which might be
appropriate at a level of aggregation higher than that of an indivi-
dual industry. For example, a set of interconnected technologies
sharing common resources could require a set of institutions
appropriate to the whole set. Perez (1983) used the related concept
of techno-economic paradigm (1983) to encompass a technolo-
gical paradigm (Dosi, 1982) and the institutions appropriate to it.
She maintained that the creation of the appropriate institutions
was likely to be a longer and more complex process than the initial
creation of a given technology, or technologies, corresponding to a
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country which had been successful in creating a given set of tech-
nologies and the appropriate institutions might be unable to do
the same for a subsequent set of technologies. Veblen (1915) had
already remarked how British industry, which was very successful
in the early part of the industrial revolution, could not adopt the
institutions appropriate to the new technologies that Germany
developed much more successfully. Lazonick (1990) maintained
that the organization of work and the institutions for training
labor which had underpinned successful development of Britain in
the late 18th and early 19th century became a handicap in the
20th century. At a higher level of generality Polanyi (1944) main-
tained that capitalism would require the creation of institutions
which were capable to compensate the harsh if efficient nature of
capitalist societies. 
A more general interpretation of the concept of co-evolution
can be proposed at a system level. A system is constituted by diffe-
rent and interacting components. Co-evolution exists when two
different components (C1 and C2) interact in such a way that
changes in one of them, say C1, affect C2 and that changes in C2
affect C1. Typically, for co-evolution to exist this relationship of
mutual interaction must last for several periods, giving rise to a
sustained feedback loop. 
The dynamics we can imagine for an economic system consists
of the early emergence of an innovation in a pre-institutional
form, that is, without institutions specific to the new technology.
This would be followed by the creation of institutions which, for
example, would provide the rules for the new technology to be
used for the advantage of society at large avoiding as much as
possible negative side effects, and of infrastructures which would
allow the market for the new technology to grow. A clear example
is given by cars and roads: the scope for cars has been considerably
enhanced by the construction of roads. Thus, the more the new
technology develops, the more the appropriate institutions need
to grow giving rise to a feedback loop which would slow down
only when the market(s) for the new technology were completely
saturated. 
The type of co-evolution we are going to be concerned with in
this paper is between innovation and demand.  Thus, it would be
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influencing each other during the course of economic develop-
ment. In TEVECON this co-evolutionary process occurs because
sectoral search activities, which increase with sectoral demand,
affect output price, quality and differentiation, which in turn
affect demand. A positive feedback loop can be established which
can give rise to a faster growth of both demand and innovation
than it would have been possible if the two variables had not been
influencing each other. In this sense co-evolution works as autoca-
talysis (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989) by using the output of one
stage of the process as the input of the following stage. 
1.2. Trajectories and patterns of economic development 
Models of economic development need to be able to explain
patterns of long run development and growth. Here long run is
intended to indicate a period such as the one from the industrial
revolution to the present. Focusing on such a period requires
understanding the broad features which occurred in it. First, we
had the emergence of manufacturing industry. Second, within
manufacturing there was a progressive differentiation, beginning
with sectors such as textiles, energy (steam engine), railways, steel
and following with chemicals, electricity, cars, planes etc. During
this process manufacturing industry became increasingly differen-
tiated, with newer sectors coexisting with older ones. Third, the
employment share of services overtook that of manufacturing. 
Any model of economic development which is in principle
capable of interpreting events which occurred since the industrial
revolution needs to explain why such structural change occurred.
The fundamental ingredient which gives rise to growth and deve-
lopment in our work is innovation. The emergence of innovations
is due to search activities, which provide the knowledge required to
create and modify innovations. Innovations affect economic deve-
lopment because entrepreneurs fund new firms to exploit the
outcomes of search activities and because consumers and users
purchase the products and services embodying such innovations.
In this process the economic system becomes increasingly differen-
tiated. The addition of new sectors to the economic system not only
contribute to structural change but to a structural change occurring
in a particular direction, that of increasing differentiation. 
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ries and of two periods.
Trajectory 1: The efficiency of productive processes increases
during the course of economic development. Here efficiency must
be understood as the ratio of the inputs used to the output
produced, when the type of output remains constant.
Trajectory 2: The output variety of the economic system
increases in the course of time. Here such variety is measured by
the number of distinguishable sectors, where a sector is defined as
the set of firms producing a common although highly differenti-
ated output.
Trajectory 3: The output quality and internal differentiation of
existing sectors increases in the course of time after their creation.
This means that if during the period of observation the type of
output changes what we will observe is a combination of growing
productive efficiency and of quality change.
 From now on we will use the term variety as a synonym of
diversity, although the two are in principle not identical. Such
variety can exist at the inter-sectoral as well as at the intra-sectoral
level. Thus, two sectors will produce completely different types of
output while one sector will produce a diversified output. In the
literature these two types are often described as vertical and hori-
zontal differentiation respectively. Such long run trajectories do
not emerge separately but exist due to a complex pattern of inte-
ractions within the economic system.        
These trajectories occur at a level of aggregation higher than
that of an individual industrial sector or a technology. The ratio
can be calculated in value or in volume terms. Growing productive
efficiency is the oldest and, until the industrial revolution, the
most developed of the three trajectories. For example, the effi-
ciency of food production increased with the transition from
hunters and gatherers to settled agriculture (Diamond, 1997).
However, any such increases in productive efficiency were very
slow and not necessarily cumulative. Productive efficiency started
growing in a cumulative fashion only after the beginning of the
industrial revolution (Maddison, 2007).  Simple recent examples of
this trajectory can be found in the falling number of workers
required to produce a unit of output in the steel, chemicals or car
Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka352industries. Of course, these are just examples and the phenomenon
is far more general. Growing productive efficiency is certainly one
of the factors which contributed to economic growth since the
industrial revolution. However, the observed patterns of economic
development could not have been produced by growing produc-
tive efficiency alone. In this case we would produce today Ford
Model T like cars with much smaller quantities of all the inputs
required. As even the most casual observer would have noticed,
today's cars are not only produced much more efficiently than
those of the early 20th century but they are also of a much higher
quality. Hence, growing productive efficiency and growing output
quality were combined in the patterns of economic development
which we can observe today. 
During the industrial revolution output differentiation (trajec-
tory 2) was very limited. At the beginning it occurred mostly at the
level of capital goods (new textile and engineering equipment,
railways equipment etc.) and only considerably later at the level of
consumer goods. The increasing internal differentiation and
output quality of consumer goods and durables started increasing
during the 19th century and in particular after the beginning of
the 20th century. Growing output variety can be observed at the
inter-sector level. A clear example of this is the large number of
completely new sectors which emerged during the 20th century,
such as cars, aircraft, television, computers, telecommunications
etc. All of these not only constituted completely new sectors but
underwent a very high degree of internal differentiation. 
These three trajectories are not independent. None of them
could have occurred taken place alone without the other two.
Thus, a continuous increase in productive efficiency, if not accom-
panied by the emergence of new sectors and by their internal
differentiation and rising quality could have led the economic
system to a bottleneck in which all demanded output could have
been produced  by a declining proportion of the labor force (Pasi-
netti, 1981). Such a bottleneck, determined by the imbalance
between continuously increasing productive efficiency and satura-
ting demand, could have been overcome by the emergence of new
sectors (Pasinetti, 1981). While the assumption of demand satura-
tion and the neglect of the internal differentiation of sectors
limited the possible generalization of Pasinetti's approach, we have
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sectors and their increasing quality and internal differentiation
provided additional scope for further growth and allowed its conti-
nuation in the long run. In this context, full demand saturation is
unlikely to occur within any sector as long as new sectors keep
being created (Saviotti and Pyka, 2010). Furthermore, both the
emergence of new sectors and their growing quality and internal
differentiation can compensate the diminishing capability to
create employment of incumbent and maturing sectors.    
In the previous sections we described the period from the indus-
trial revolution to the present as the transition from necessities to
imaginary worlds. This description emphasizes that until the end
of the 19th century most people, even in countries which were for
the standards of the time relatively rich, could not purchase
anything but bare necessities. All throughout the 19th century
British working class households spent about ninety percent of
their income on food, clothing and housing.  Only during the 20th
century, and in particular after the 1930s, the share of income
spent on the above three categories started falling (Hobsbawm,
1968, diagrams 45 and 46).  By the 1950s the share of necessities
fell to about 60 percent, leaving about forty percent to be spent on
other, presumably higher, goods and services. The compression of
the combined expenditure on necessities (trajectory 1) created the
disposable income required to buy the new goods and services
which were gradually being created. Starting from the beginning of
the 20th century new goods and services emerged (trajectory 2)
and their quality and differentiation increased constantly (trajec-
tory 3). This combination of trajectories contributed to a
mechanism which allowed the capitalist economic system to
create growing wealth for most of the population of industrialized
countries. 
1.3. TEVECON 
1.3.1. Modeling philosophy 
Our model, which we call TEVECON, can be considered an
Agent Based Model (ABM) for a number of reasons. First, it is not
an analytical model in the same sense as the more orthodox
models, because it lacks closure conditions. The most important of
Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka354such conditions is the presence of general equilibrium. Our model
has an endogenously varying number of sectors, and thus an endo-
genously variable composition. In these circumstances, as Kaldor
(1957) had already well understood, there can be no general equili-
brium. However, we do have sectoral equilibrium in the form of a
feedback mechanism ensuring that demand does not deviate too
much from supply. Also, TEVECON agents are not optimizers but
only improvers possessing bounded rationality (Pyka and Fagiolo
2007), since learning mechanisms (mainly learning by searching)
play a central role in TEVECON. 
TEVECON has a number of agents, but sometimes they are
implicitly or lightly represented only. The central agents of
TEVECON are sectors, defined as the collection of firms producing
a unique though highly differentiated type of output. Firms are
present and one of the most important modeling outcomes of
TEVECON is the evolution of the number of firms in time.
Although reduced, such a presentation of firms gives rise to the
very interesting prediction of the existence of an Industry Life
Cycle (ILC) under a very wide range of conditions. However, the
representation of firms can be considerably expanded by including
firm characteristics, internal structure and distributional proper-
ties. An agent which is present only implicitly is the
Schumpeterian entrepreneur, who is creating new firms by
exploiting important innovations induced by the expectation of a
temporary monopoly. The role of the entrepreneur is extremely
important in TEVECON but its representation at the moment is
reduced to the action of open up new sectors. Thus, the central
agents of TEVECON are industrial sectors as previously defined.   
Another important feature of Agent Based Models (ABM) is the
reconstruction of the macro-economic states of the system from its
micro-economic ones (Pyka, and Fagiolo, 2007). In this sense
TEVECON is best defined as providing aggregation from micro to
meso and from meso to macro. Firms (micro) are aggregated to
sectors (meso) and sectors are aggregated to the macroeconomic
state of the system.  In the present version of the model the meso to
macro aggregation is better specified than the micro to meso one. 
Sectors are very considerably heterogeneous in TEVECON. They
can differ on a very large number of   dimensions, such as expected
market size, technological opportunity, investment patterns, wage
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required to be considered an evolving complex system (ECS) (Pyka
and Fagiolo, 2007, p. 474) since it is a highly interactive model in
which new interactions are continuously being introduced
between existing variables. One such interaction that was present
from the very early versions of the model  is that between search
activities and demand, where there is a feedback mechanism from
rising demand to rising search activities to further rising demand
in following periods. More such interactions are continuously
being introduced.  Again, these interactions contribute to the
emergence of complex properties out of repeated interactions
among simple entities (Kirman, 1998).    
TEVECON shows Endogenous and Persistent Novelty (Pyka and
Fagiolo, 2007, p. 475). It is non stationary in the sense that its
composition is continuously changing. New sectors produce
outputs that are qualitatively different from the pre-existing ones.
This means that in principle the outputs of different sectors should
not be substitutable. In reality our model includes two types of
competition, intra- and inter-sector. The latter exists if different
sectors produce comparable services out of non comparable
internal structures (Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984; Saviotti, 1996).
Thus, the qualitative difference lies mostly in the internal structure
of sectoral outputs and in the sector's knowledge base. 
As a consequence of the above, TEVECON shows 'true dyna-
mics'  (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2007, p. 475). Some form of dynamics is
present in orthodox models simply because they include equations
which show the time paths of the system. This form of dynamics
does not take into account qualitative change and is not affected
by the emergence of new entities.  One of the most important
differences between evolutionary and ABM models on the one
hand, and orthodox models on the other hand, is the emergence
of new entities, qualitatively different from pre-existing ones. The
true dynamics which is more difficult to represent and yet vital to
understand the long run evolution of the economic system is the
one including qualitative change. 
If the above considerations allow us to consider TEVECON an
ABM model, we can still situate it within the wide range of mode-
ling techniques which are in principle compatible with the ABM
definition. TEVECON bears a close similarity to dynamical systems
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difference equations. Although complete closure conditions such
as general equilibrium are absent, the equations used are in most
cases similar or identical to those which are used in orthodox
analytical models. Given the absence of closure and the nature of
the equations involved, TEVECON cannot be analytically solved
but needs to be simulated. Thus, amongst all ABM modeling tech-
niques TEVECON could be described as having a partly analytical,
not entirely computational, structure but needing simulation to
find solutions.  This gives TEVECON both advantages and disad-
vantages. With respect to orthodox analytical models it has the
advantage of allowing us to include a greater number of variables
and interactions while having a greater similarity to orthodox
analytical models than purely computational ABM models.
TEVECON's disadvantage with respect to purely computational
ABM models is its lower adaptability to model institutions and
policies. 
1.3.2. The model 
In TEVECON the economic system is composed of an endoge-
neous variable number of sectors. The emergence of new sectors is
due to the dynamics of the incumbent ones and the main source of
economic growth consists in the emergence of new sectors. Each
sector is created on the basis of an important, pervasive, innova-
tion taken up by entrepreneurs who start new companies and
thereby provide the basis for a new industry. The innovation crea-
ting the sector gives rise to an adjustment gap AGi, a variable
intended to capture the size of the potential market established by
the innovation. However, this market is initially empty because
neither the production capacity nor a structured demand for the
new products exists. Both the production capacity and the evolu-
tion of the demand will take place during a (possibly long) period
of time, by means of a gradual interaction of producers and users.
Thus, the adjustment gap measures the extent to which the market
is far from saturation. When the market becomes saturated, the
adjustment gap is reduced to zero or to a small and constant value.
The adjustment gap is very large right after the creation of the
sector, and later it decreases gradually, although not continuously.
It is in fact possible for the adjustment gap to grow during certain
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improve either the performance of the product or the efficiency
with which it is produced, or both.
Each sector has a dynamics given by the entry and exit of new
firms. Schumpeterian entrepreneurs create new firms to exploit a
pervasive innovation induced by the expectation of a temporary
monopoly. The following bandwagon of imitators raises the inten-
sity of competition and gradually eliminates any further
inducement to enter. Thus, the once innovative sector is trans-
formed into a part of the circular flow (Schumpeter, 1912) or into
one additional routine of the economic system. This happens
when the incumbent sector saturates, a condition which in
TEVECON is attained when the adjustment gap AGi, becomes zero
or reaches a very low and constant value (Saviotti, Pyka 2004a,
2008). The saturation of incumbent sectors induces entrepreneurs
to search for new niches which could subsequently become new
markets. The dynamics briefly outlined above provides a mecha-
nism for the endogenous generation of new sectors which allows
the process of economic development to continue in the long run. 
A very important role is played in TEVECON by search activi-
ties, a general analogue of R&D (Nelson, Winter, 1982). Search
activities can be defined as all the activities which try to better
understand our external environment and which can provide the
basis for the emergence of new routines. Thus, search activities are
the source of new innovations and we can expect a positive rela-
tionship between the resources allocated to such activities and the
rate of creation of innovations. In TEVECON the resources allo-
cated to search activities are expected to increase with accumulated
demand: 
 (1)
The combination of the emergence of new sectors and of their
increasing quality and internal differentiation leads to an
increasing differentiation of the economic system during the
process of development. However, this combination can occur in
many different proportions giving rise to many development
paths. The analysis of the paths is one of the objectives of the
present paper. A more detailed description of our TEVECON model
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Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka358can be found in Pyka and Saviotti (2011) and in previous papers
(Saviotti and Pyka, 2004a, 2004b, 2008).   
Here we describe an extension of our TEVECON model having
two objectives. First we want to study the co-evolution of demand
and innovation in the process of economic development; second,
we want to study the effect of output variety and of output quality
and differentiation on economic development paths. Most existing
models of growth, including the endogenous growth ones (Aghion
and Howitt, 1992; Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 2001),
are supply based and they pay no attention to demand. However,
innovation would not have had any impact on economic develop-
ment if the products embodying specific innovations had not been
purchased by consumers and users. Even evolutionary economics,
which owed its origin to the difficulties encountered when attemp-
ting to use neoclassical economic theory to explain the nature and
impact of innovation on economic development, is until predomi-
nantly concerned with the supply side. On the other hand, models
which focus on demand tend to stress structural change and to
belong to a neo-Keynesian approach (Kaldor, 1957; Pasinetti, 1981;
Aoki and Yoshikawa 2002). Recently a growing attention has been
paid to demand in models of economic growth, both orthodox
(Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Matsuyama, 2002; Foellmi
and Zweimuller, 2006) and evolutionary (Bianchi, 1998; Andersen,
2001, 2007; Aversi et al., 1999; Metcalfe, 2001; Saviotti, 2001; Witt,
2001; Ciarli et al., 2010). An even more recent paper by Nelson and
Consoli (2010) makes the brave attempt to sketch a broad outline
of such a demand theory. They explore the use of routines by
consumers to guide their choices. In this approach the mecha-
nisms whereby routines are constructed are of crucial importance.
In demand as in supply innovation creates uncertainty. Thus,
consumers' knowledge is not just likely to be imperfect but to
become more so when new types of goods and services completely
unknown to them are introduced into the economic system. Espe-
cially at the beginning of the life cycle of the emerging goods and
services very few consumers are likely to be able to overcoming this
uncertainty. In fact, in these circumstances consumers can be
expected to act as innovators but to require a threshold level of
human capital to do that (Saviotti, 2001). 
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First, this paper is part of a research program, the initial objective of
which was to prove that economic development has occurred by
means of a growing differentiation of the economic system. This
objective placed our model not only within evolutionary econo-
mics but also with the research tradition of structural change.
Furthermore, from the very beginning we were interested in long
range patterns of economic development. The relationship between
demand and innovation was always present in our model as the
potential imbalance between saturating demand and continuously
growing productive efficiency (Pasinetti, 1981). However, the speci-
fication of demand changed considerably in subsequent versions of
TEVECON by first incorporating product quality and differentia-
tion (Saviotti and Pyka, 2008) and becoming for the first time fully
endogenous in this paper. The distinguishing features are: 
— It does not share most of the assumptions of orthodox
models, such as general equilibrium or optimizing behavior,
but it only considers economic agents as potential improvers
engaged in learning activities. 
The type of structural change that is at the center of the
process of economic development leads to a growing output
variety of the economic system. Thus, there is in TEVECON
an arrow of time continuously raising the differentiation of
the economic system. Interestingly, this feature of
TEVECON finds a growing validation in recent empirical
work (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Imbs and Warcziag,
2003; Saviotti and Frenken, 2008; De Benedictis et al., 2009).
— The mechanism whereby disposable income is created is
closely related to the growing differentiation of the
economic system. 
— The growing product quality and differentiation within each
sector contributes together with growing output variety to
the compensation of the falling ability of mature sectors to
create employment.
None of these features is present in the orthodox models
referred to above. Furthermore, some of the objectives of the
papers referred to above are similar to those of our paper, but they
differ in a number of ways. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny  (from
now on MSV) (1989) rescue the theory of the big push put forward
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multi-sectoral model in which simultaneous investment in the
different sectors of the economy can lead to growth even if no
sector individually breaks even. The contribution of simultaneous
investment to growth comes from the pecuniary externalities
generated by each sector, which increase purchasing power in all
sectors. Moreover, growth occurs by each sector shifting from
constant returns to scale in cottage industry to increasing returns
to scale in factory production. In this sense for MSV it is a change
in process technology which gives rise to growth while in
TEVECON it is the emergence of new sectors which differ for the
type of output they produce. Thus, in MSV neither the type of
output of sectors nor the direction in which structural change can
be expected to vary, for example towards growing output variety,
are defined. On the other hand, we find similarity between the
ways in which MSV and our paper deal with demand: in both cases
it is the income generated by the investment in industrialization
(MSV) or in the emergence of new sectors (TEVECON) which
creates the required demand.  
With Matsuyama (2002) we share the interest for a similar tran-
sition. What we call the transition from necessities to imaginary
worlds and the closely related one from low to high quality are
very similar to Matsuyama’s rise of mass consumption societies.
However, with respect to Matsuyama our model differs for (i) the
types of learning mechanisms, different types of search activities
(fundamental and sectoral in TEVECON) compared to only lear-
ning by doing in Matsuyama, (ii) the specification of preferences,
non-homothetic for Matsuyama,  differing for consumers’ propen-
sity to move up or down a hierarchical ladder of goods or services
in TEVECON, (iii) the impact of income distribution on develop-
ment, which is present in Matsuyama and so far not in our model.
As for MSV Matsuyama does not characterize the outputs of diffe-
rent sectors, and only allows them to be gradually adopted by
different sections of the consumer population as the effect of lear-
ning by doing reduces the output cost of each sector making it
affordable for larger and larger sections of the consumer popula-
tion. Thus, Matsuyama includes a form of co-evolution (he talks
about two-way causality) and a mechanism which is very similar to
our trajectory 1 (growing productive efficiency). However, he has
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output variety) nor of growing output quality and differentiation
(trajectory 3). 
Foellmi and Zweimuller (FZ) (2006) use non-homothetic prefe-
rences, hierarchically ordered goods and investigate the effect of
income distribution on growth. Their paper differs from
Matsuyama (2002) for its learning mechanism, learning by doing
in Matsuyama and industrial R&D in Foellmi and Zweimuller, and
from MSV due to their claim to apply a more general nature of a
preference system and also due to the more dynamical character of
their model. 
All the three above papers investigate the effect of income distri-
bution on growth but they reach different and sometimes opposing
conclusions. For example, FZ find that falling income inequality
reduces growth for MSV whereas it increases growth for FZ.
In summary, our paper is part of a research program, one of
whose most important objectives is to investigate the process of
progressive differentiation which accompanies, and we maintain
partly determines,  economic  development. None of the above
papers shares this objective. The extent of differentiation is given.
Change occurs by a transition in process technology (MSV), by
learning by doing (M), or by industrial R&D technology (FZ).
Given this difference in objective, TEVECON is the only model in
which the number of sectors is endogenously variable, thus stres-
sing the direction of structural change.  From the very beginning
the interaction between demand and supply has been at the center
of TEVECON in the form of the imbalance between saturating
demand and continuously increasing productive efficiency. Aoki
and Yoshikawa (2002) share part of this approach. Yet our specifi-
cation of the co-evolution of demand and innovation has been
completed only in recent versions of TEVECON by including
disposable income in the sectoral demand function. The goods and
services of TEVECON are hierarchically ordered, but what deter-
mines the order is the action of entrepreneurs creating new sectors
in the expectation of a temporary monopoly. Consumers do not
have the ability to anticipate the emergence or nature of future
sectors but react to their existence by purchasing their goods and
services to the extent that their disposable income and preferences
allow them to do. In particular, the preferences of our consumers
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older goods and services to start consuming new ones. With
respect to MSV, M, and FZ we do not have included in our analysis
income distribution but only calculate the average disposable
income available for the consumption of new goods and services.
The creation of such depends on the growing productive efficiency
of older sectors (trajectory 1) and on the income created by the
investment in the new sectors.
A further modeling approach which deserves to be discussed for
both its similarities and differences with respect to TEVECON is
that of Amendola and Gaffard (AG) (1998). AG share with
TEVECON the out of equilibrium nature of the model and their
emphasis on qualitative change. They include an interesting
discussion of the nature of money but in the whole the sources of
disequilibrium and the representation of technology are very diffe-
rent from TEVECON. For example, while they talk about
qualitative change they do not take into account the non-compa-
rable nature of the product and process technologies which emerge
in the course of economic development. 
The comparison of ours and of the above papers shows that
each of these models investigates different aspects of the economic
system and thus that they are not strictly comparable. Within this
set of models the specificities of ours are that: (i) it is much ‘lighter’
in terms of its assumptions than orthodox models since it does not
include closure conditions such as general equilibrium or optimi-
zing behavior; it has a particular representation of structural
change as leading to a growing output variety; (iii) it has an
explicit analysis of the co-evolution of innovation and demand;
(iv) it has an explicit representation of product quality and diffe-
rentiation; (v) it has a more complete representation of search
activities, including both fundamental research and sectoral
applied research.   
The previous references explored the mechanisms of creation of
demand in relation to innovation at a micro economic level. In
this paper we are more concerned with the joint dynamics of inno-
vation and demand at a meso-economic level of aggregation. Two
conditions are required in order for demand for new products or
services to emerge:
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them to purchase the new goods and services;
(ii) Consumers must have or develop preferences which make
them value positively the new goods or services.
Here the term disposable income must be understood to be the
residual income, left over in a given period, after all the types of
consumption of previous periods have been satisfied. A demand
function had been introduced into TEVECON in a previous paper
(Saviotti and Pyka, 2008). However, the demand function we used
in that paper depended on output quality, on output differentia-
tion and on price but not on income. This had the effect of
overstating demand since high quality products are always
preferred to low quality products irrespective of the consumer
purchasing power. In this paper we use a demand function Equa-
tion (2) which depends on disposable income and on preferences
in addition to product price, quality and differentiation.
          (2)
where 
Dit = demand for product i at time t 
Yi = services supplied by the product, measuring product
quality 
ΔYi = range of services supplied by the product, measuring
product differentiation
pi = product price 
DDisp,i = disposable income which can be allocated to purchase
product i  
kpref,i = parameter representing preferences  
We calculate DDisp,i as the difference between the total income
and the income required to satisfy the types of consumption of
previous periods in period t. 
To study how different preference systems can affect the time
path of demand and of economic development we represent three
very simplified preference systems which we call progressive,
conservative and random. We realize that in a real economic
system, preference systems of these different types would be distri-
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Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka364buted within a consumer population and that they would not be
immutable. Consumers can learn and change their preferences in
the course of time. Our main objective here is simply to show that
consumer preferences can affect directly demand and indirectly
the macroeconomic growth performance of the economic system.
Consumers with a progressive preference system value more
highly new goods and services than older ones. Consumers with a
conservative preference system value more highly old goods and
services than newer ones. Consumers with a random preference
system will have preferences randomly distributed amongst the
outputs of different sectors, old an d new. These three preference
systems are represented as three different parameters in the demand
Equation (1). kpref,i  is a parameter which is constant for each sector
in the course of time but can vary between different sectors. The
three preference systems are then represented as follows:
— Progressive preference system:  kpref, i+1  > kpref,i
— Conservative preference system:  kpref, i+1  < kpref,i
— Random preference system:  kpref, i+1 >< kpref,i
The second objective of the paper consisted of comparing the
economic development paths which would be obtained when
product quality (i) remained unchanged or (ii) increased during
the life cycle of each sector in TEVECON. This objective is attained
by modifying the values of the parameters k14-k17 linking search
activities to product quality and differentiation Equations (3), (4) 
 (3)
 (4) 
When these parameters have extremely low values product
quality and differentiation remain virtually constant during the
evolution of the respective sectors. Values of the parameters k14-k17
are varied by giving them extremely low values in the low quality
(LQ) scenario and considerably higher values in the high quality
(HQ) scenario. Thus, in the LQ scenario the saturation of each
sector is attained much more rapidly due to the absence of quality
change in sectoral outputs. In other words, in the LQ scenario
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2007). On the other hand, in the HQ scenario market saturation
can occur much later, giving rise to longer industry life cycles (ILC)
because the market can still expand after volume saturation has
been attained by moving towards products of higher quality and
thus of higher value. 
By recalling that according to equation 1 search activities
increase with accumulated demand and by combining equation 1
with equations 3 and 4 we can realize that search activities depend
on demand and demand depends on search activities. This is the
basis for the co-evolution of innovation and demand. The co-
evolutionary loop is completed by equation 2  according to which
demand is not only affected by three variables which are them-
selves affected by search activities (Yi, ΔYi and pi) but also by the
presence of a disposable income which can be used to purchase
new goods and services. 
Human capital is created by investment in education, which
gives rise to an education capital stock (CSedi ), which in turn deter-
mines the quality hi of human capital Equation (5). The parameter
ked represents the effectiveness with which the investment in
education is transformed into human capital. Hence, ked  repre-
sents the quality of educational institutions in forming  human
capital. Overall human capital is obtained by multiplying sectoral
labor by the quality hi of human capital Equation (6). 
 (5)
 (6)
Bearing in mind that sectoral output depends on human
capital, we can realize that the time path of output depends on
investment in education and on the effectiveness with which
educational institutions improve the quality of human capital.
Furthermore, the intensity of production is determined by the
parameter kHQ see Equation (7).  Equation 7 also shows that human
capital in a given period depends on investment in previous
periods, which itself depends on output in previous periods. In
turn, future output is affected by present human capital. Here we
see some more examples of the co-evolutionary patterns included
in TEVECON.   
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Qit := sectoral output
γ := scaling parameter
α tci := production adjustment
Wages depend on labor productivity and on a parameter, kwages,
Equation (8). The parameter kwages leads to an increase or a decrease
in wages at equivalent labor productivity. Thus, it could reflect the
presence of particularly powerful labor unions, which would tend
to raise it, or of reforms in the labor market, which could reduce it.
We expect that at equivalent labor productivity a low value of
kwages increases the competitiveness of a sector or of a country. 
    (8)
1.4. Disposable income for new sectors 
Our calculations show that under a wide range of circumstances
a disposable income can be created for new sectors, thus allowing
consumers to purchase their output Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Effect of product quality on the disposable income created 
in the economic system
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sector 2  a reduction of the expenditures on sector 1 is required,
such a sacrifice is not necessary for subsequent sectors. The deve-
lopment of the economic system manages to create enough
resources in the system to allow consumers to purchase the new
goods and services. The mechanisms by means of which such
increasing purchasing power is created are related to the three
trajectories described above. First, the growing productive effi-
ciency in incumbent sectors (trajectory 1) reduces the cost of those
sectors' goods and services and creates a surplus which can be used
to fund the search activities and the investment required to
produce the new goods and services. Second, the previous invest-
ment creates income for the labor employed in the production of
the new goods and services. Third, as the average revenues of the
population increase the possibility to make higher quality, more
expensive and more profitable goods and services emerge. To the
extent that such new goods and services fit consumers’ preferences
they will create new markets or enlarge existing ones. Thus, the
growing quality and differentiation of goods and services (trajec-
tory 3) together with the emergence of new sectors (trajectory 2)
can compensate the falling ability of incumbent sectors to create
employment and enable growth to continue in the long run.
While this conclusion expands the range of possible growth
mechanisms, in relatively wealthy economic systems it also intro-
duces a source of uncertainty. In fact compensation can occur only
if the innovations required to create new sectors are available
when the saturation of pre-existing  ones occurs. While this has
been assumed so far in TEVECON there is no guarantee that in a
real economic system this will always occur. 
1.5. Preferences 
The existence of an adequate disposable income is a necessary
condition for consumers to be able to purchase the new goods and
services which are created by innovation. However, consumers will
do that only if they have an adequate set of preferences. In this
section we study how the three different preference systems we
suggested in the previous section can affect the time path of
demand and of economic development. We realize that that these
representations of a preference system are an approximation.
Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka368However, we consider that such an approximation is sufficient for
our main objective here, which is to show that consumer prefe-
rences can affect directly demand and indirectly the macro-
economic growth performance of the economic system. 
In different experiments we vary the degree of progressiveness
or of conservativeness of our consumers by changing the Δkpref
between sectors i and i+1. Thus, a large and positive Δkpref  between
sectors i and i+1 indicate strongly progressive consumers while a
smaller but still positive Δkpref  indicate mildly progressive consu-
mers. Likewise, a large and negative Δkpref  between sectors i and
i+1 indicate strongly conservative consumers while a smaller nega-
tive Δkpref  indicate mildly conservative consumers. The results of
these experiments are summarized in figures 2 and 3 by plotting
the straight lines which give the rate of growth of income (Figure 2)
and of employment (Figure 3). Such straight lines are the best
linear fit for the income and employment curves and their slopes
give us the rate of growth of income (RIG) and the rate of growth of
employment (REG) respectively (see Saviotti and Pyka, 2008). 
Figure 2. Influence of the different preference systems on the rate of growth 
of income
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rences pass from conservative to neutral to progressive. However,
as more preferences become more and more progressive both, REG
and RIG start falling indicating the presence of a non-linear rela-
tionship between preferences on the one hand and employment or
income on the other hand. Such non-linearity can be explained
because the change from conservative to neutral to progressive
preferences implies a transfer of resources from the purchase of old
goods and services to that of emerging ones. While a moderate
transfer can accelerate the emergence of new sectors, an excessive
one can depress the demand for older goods and services and
thereby reduce the overall growth of employment and of income. 
The results of sections 1.4 and 1.5 show that (i) disposable
income for new goods and services can be created by a combina-
tion of trajectories 1, 2 and 3, corresponding to the growing
productive efficiency in incumbent sectors (trajectory 1), to the
emergence of new sectors (trajectory 2) and to the growing quality
and differentiation of goods and services (trajectory 3); (ii)
consumer preferences can affect the macroeconomic performance
of the economic system. We now pass to the second objective of
this paper.   
Figure 3. Influence of the different preference systems on the rate of growth 
of employment
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and the growing quality and differentiation of existing ones
To study this problem we define a set of parameter values which
seem to give the type of regular pattern of development we had
detected in previous papers. In other words, we started from a
situation in which new sectors were regularly created and where
the aggregate rates of growth of employment and of outcome were
positive. We called this set of parameters our standard scenario.  
Although many combinations of the emergence of new sectors
and of the growing quality and differentiation of goods and
services can be envisaged, we can in principle expect such different
combinations to give rise to different development paths. To
explore the relative impact of the emergence of new sectors and of
the growing quality and differentiation of goods and services, we
simulate two development scenarios, called high quality (HQ) and
low quality (LQ) respectively. These scenarios are obtained by
giving different values to the parameters k14-k17 of Equations (3)
and (4). These parameters determine the extent of product quality
and differentiation corresponding to a given level of search activi-
ties. The LQ scenario is obtained by giving the parameters k15 and
k17 values so low that product quality and differentiation are
almost constant during the ILC of the sector. The HQ scenario is
obtained by giving the same parameters considerably higher
values. The results of this simulation show that the HQ and LQ
scenarios give rise to very different development paths. The
comparison HQ-LQ was explored by means of both micro- and
macro-economic variables. In the LQ scenario, demand, human
capital, wages and output remain substantially static or even decli-
ning while they increase in the HQ scenario (Figures 4a, b and c).  
At an aggregate level: 
— Disposable Income grows faster in the low quality case with
respect to the high quality case (Figures 5 and 1)
— Employment growth is always faster in the low quality case
with respect to the high quality case (Figure 6b)
— The rate of creation of new sectors is higher in the low quality
case with respect to the high quality case
— The rate of income growth (RIG) of the HQ scenario is
initially lower but it overtakes that for the LQ scenario at a
later time (Figure 6). We can also notice that RIG slows down
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while it accelerates for the HQ scenario. 
The above results can be explained as follows as follows: 
Constant wages and constant human capital limit the scope for
income growth in the LQ case. The absence of increases in quality
and in sectoral differentiation in the LQ case, lead to shorter
industry life cycles (ILC) and to a higher rate of creation of new
sectors. Since the rate of employment growth (REG) is higher in the
early phases of an ILC, the aggregate REG is higher for the LQ than
for the HQ scenario, although such higher REG is obtained at the
expense of lower wages, lower demand and lower human capital. 
Initially the higher REG leads to a higher RIG for the LQ
scenario. However, the rising wages and demand lead to a RIG
which is not constant but increases in the course of economic deve-
Figure 4. Product quality
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shapes of the  RIG curves for HQ and LQ scenarios can be unders-
tood because in the former case an increase in demand leads to an
increase in search activities, which in turn leads to an increase in
output quality and differentiation, which is finally translated into
an increase in demand. This feedback loop is considerably
weakened in the LQ scenario because in this case search activities
have a negligible impact on output quality and differentiation.     
To interpret the previous results we note that empirical observa-
tions show that product differentiation started considerably after
the beginning of the industrial revolution, probably towards the
end of the 19th century, and initially only in relatively rich
countries. Such transition proceeded by liberating a growing
proportion of household income from necessities and thus making
room for the purchase of new goods and services which were not
necessary in the physical sense in which food or shelter  are (see
Hobsbawm, 1968, diagrams 45 and 46).  Rather than being necessi-
ties, the result of adaptation to the external environment in which
human beings live, the new goods and services shape the external
environment in ways which were not necessary and along a deve-
lopment path which was not necessarily unique. Thus, we
described the evolution of the capitalist economic system as the
transition from necessities to imaginary worlds. This transition
Figure 5. Effect of product quality on the disposable income created 
in the economic system for the low quality case
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On the co-evolution of innovation and demand: Some policy implications 373could be interpreted as the result of a continuous, linear progress
which constantly improves human welfare. We think that such an
interpretation would be rather simplistic. We are more interested
in understanding how the mechanisms which we explore in this
paper, however oversimplified, could provide us with an explana-
tion of how the capitalist economic system managed to survive
since the industrial revolution by profoundly transforming itself.
Every economic system, however successful at the time it is
created, brings in itself the seeds of its own destruction. Such
destruction need not necessarily occur if the economic system
manages to transform itself enough. 
Figure 6. Effect of product quality on the aggregate rate of income growth
(a) Income
(LQ light curve, HQ bold curve); The vertical line indicates the time required for HQ income to catch up
with and to overtake LQ income, which we call ICUT.
(b) Total employment
(LQ light curve, HQ bold curve)
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Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka374The development mechanism we hypothesize began with the
saturation of the markets for necessities, attained during the early
part of the industrial revolution due to the growth of productive
efficiency which occurred in that period. In turn, that saturation is
likely to have induced efforts by producers to avoid it by opening
new markets or by enlarging existing ones. Assuming that new
technologies potentially giving rise to new markets could be
created, as they were, the markets themselves would not come into
being unless a large enough percentage of the population had the
required purchasing power. A mechanism which could give rise to
the coordinated emergence of production capabilities and of
purchasing power is the following: 
— The production of some of the new  goods and services and
the rising quality and differentiation of existing ones
required higher levels of competencies and of human
capital; 
— such higher competencies required training and education;
— better educated workers had to be paid higher wages;
— new jobs were created in the training and education system; 
— the new jobs and higher wages created the disposable
income required to purchase the new goods and higher
quality goods and services.
The combination of the above steps gave rise to a virtuous circle
which could continue expanding the economic system as long as
technologies and demand could co-evolve. This co-evolution
allowed the capitalist economic system to escape the development
trap which Marx and other critics of capitalism had foreseen. Of
course, we think that the mechanism previously described is only a
component of an overall repertoire. The capitalist economic
system cannot have been saved only by an ever increasing shop-
ping frenzy of new and more luxurious goods and services. Social
innovations in pensions, unemployment benefits, health care etc.
are likely to have co-evolved together with the mechanism
described above to allow the capitalist economic system to trans-
form and adapt. Thus, the real co-evolution included more
mechanisms and steps than the ones we described above.
However, we think our exercise is useful because it provides an
analytical approach to the explanation of long range transitions in
economic systems.  The addition of further components to the co-
On the co-evolution of innovation and demand: Some policy implications 375evolutionary process described above can be envisaged without
substantial modifications of our approach. 
Let us observe that the transition from low to high quality
goods and services, henceforth (LQ → HQ) transition, is not iden-
tical to that from necessities to imaginary worlds. The former is
from an economic system dominated by trajectories 1 and 2 to one
dominated by tranjectories 1, 2 and 3, while the latter is from an
economic development dominated predominantly by trajectory 1
for consumer goods but with trajectory 2 occurring in capital
goods. In its present state TEVECON cannot accurately distinguish
between consumer and capital goods. In spite of these differences
the transition (LQ → HQ) is very similar to that from necessities to
imaginary worlds, especially for what concerns the emergence of
higher quality and internally differentiated goods and services.
Thus, the study of the (LQ → HQ) transition can help us unders-
tand the mechanisms of capitalist economic development.     
The analysis we carried out shows that long range processes of
economic development cannot be explained only by the
increasing productive efficiency, or even by the increasing output
quality, of a constant set of activities, but that they intrinsically
involve a very high degree of structural change. In this context
structural change not only means the changing weight of different
sectors but also other changes in the composition of the economic
system, with the inclusion of completely new institutions and
organizations and of their interactions. Structural change becomes
more important for the explanation of processes of economic deve-
lopment the longer the time horizon chosen. 
We now describe a set of policy relevant experiments carried
out with TEVECON. 
2. Policy experiments
In these experiments we explore the effects of changes in a
number of TEVECON parameters on some aspects of the process of
economic development. In particular, we focus on the role of
human capital and of wages. According to the above described
mechanisms we can expect that both human capital and wages
had to increase to allow the economic system to generate the
higher quality goods and services and the income required to
Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka376purchase them. Thus, we chose to modify some parameters which
affect these two variables. First, we hypothesized that at least in
some types of economic activities there could be a barrier in
human capital. In these activities only human capital above this
barrier could be employed. Second, we hypothesized that the
weight of human capital in the production function could affect
economic development processes. Third, we expected wages to
affect economic development processes. In TEVECON wages are
proportional to labor productivity according to a parameter kw,
henceforth called the wage parameter. Accordingly, in our experi-
ments we vary the barrier in human capital, the weight of human
capital in the production function and the wage parameter. We
start by varying one parameter at a time and then we combined
variations of two or more parameters (Table 1, Appendix). 
The starting point of our experiments here was the comparison
of the LQ and HQ scenarios described in Figures 6 a, b. These
results show, that (i) the rate of employment growth (REG) is syste-
matically higher in the LQ scenario, and that (ii) the rate of income
growth (RIG) is initially higher for the LQ scenario but becomes
higher for the HQ scenario at later times. In the following experi-
ments we investigate the impact of the three above parameters on
(i) the time required for HQ income to catch up and overtake LQ
income, which we called ICUT, (ii) the relative REG for the two
scenarios, and on (iii) the variance of income determined by the
change from conservative (CP) to progressive (PP) preferences.
ICUT was measured as the time at which the HQ income crossed
the LQ income curve (see Figure 6a). ICUT is plotted as a function
of the weight of human capital in the production function
(Figure 7) and of the wage parameter kw (Figure 8).     
The most general trend observed is a fall in ICUT when both kHi
or kw increase. This means that the (LQ → HQ) transition would
have occurred earlier if a higher intensity of human capital and a
higher wage rate had been used in the economic system. However,
the behavior of ICUT becomes more complex when the increases
in the above two parameters are combined with increasing values
of Bhi. In this case ICUT alternately rises or falls for different ranges
of values of either Bhi  or kw. These more complex types of behavior
could be understood by bearing in mind that the introduction of a
human capital barrier excludes some workers from the labor force.
On the co-evolution of innovation and demand: Some policy implications 377The resulting outcome would be due to the balance between the
higher wages of the employed workers and the absent wages of the
unemployed ones. The general point to be made here is that wages
are both a source of costs and of revenues. The effect of rising wage
rates and of rising levels and intensity of human capital depends
on the balance of their effects on revenues and on costs. Also, we
have to bear in mind that the introduction of an hi barrier in the
present state of TEVECON is equivalent to an internal differentia-
tion of the labor force. Thus, introduction of a low hi barrier into
an economic system which has low wages and low human capital
can have a very different effect than the introduction of a higher hi
barrier into an economic system which has high wages and high
Figure 7. Effect of changing the weight kHi of Hi in the production function 
for different values of barrier in human capital Bhi
Figure 8. Effect of changing the wage parameter kw for different values of barrier 
in human capital
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Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka378levels and intensity of human capital. The effect of the human
capital barrier on the ICUT falls for higher values of both kHi and
kw. Thus, a system which already has high wages and high levels
and intensity of human capital is less affected by the introduction
of a human capital barrier than a system which has low wages and
low levels and intensity of human capital.
Finally, we can observe that the LQ income curve is virtually
unaffected by the changes in the three above parameters. This is
the result of the fact that human capital and output quality are
almost constant in the LQ case.
The same set of experiments described in table 1 was carried out
for the relative REG of the LQ and HQ scenarios. The result
described in Figure 6b showed that REG(LQ) was systematically
higher than REG(HQ). In fact, the two curves diverged conti-
nuously. Furthermore, both curves were approximately linear in
time. In the vast majority of the experiments we carried out
REG(LQ) was greater than REG(HQ). However, for particular values
of the parameters used, REG(HQ) increased considerably showing
an inflection point in the employment curve (see for example
Figure 9).   
After the inflection pint the HQ employment curve can some-
times overtake the LQ one. The inflection point occurs at very long
development times, which correspond to high levels of economic
development. In other words, similarly to what happened for
Figure 9. Employment for the LQ (light line) and HQ (heavy line) scenarios 
for Bhi = 0.5 and kHi = 2.0.
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character in the HQ which is absent in the LQ case. In the HQ
employment case this self-accelerating character seems to arise
fairly suddenly while in the HQ income case it was continuous.
However, even in the HQ employment case we can see premoni-
tory signs of the inflection in the shortening of the ILCs which
starts occurring form the beginning, a phenomenon which does
not occur at all for the LQ scenario. Such shortening of the ILCs
can be explained by (i) the increasing quality and internal differen-
tiation of goods and services which lengthens the life cycles of the
sectors producing them, as it can be seen by comparing the LQ and
HQ cases (see also Saviotti, Pyka and Krafft, 2007); (ii) the
increasing quality and internal differentiation of output can be
become faster the more knowledge creating resources are present
in the economic system. As in the income case the employment
curve of the LQ scenario is almost unaffected by the changes in
parameters used in our experiments. As for the income case this
different sensitivity of the LQ and HQ cases to changes in parame-
ters affecting human capital or wages can be explained by the
much weaker feedback loop between demand and search activities
existing in the LQ case.
The relative dynamics of income in the LQ and HQ scenarios is
affected also by a change in preferences. Figures 10 and 11 compare
the impact of preferences on the income curves for the LQ and HQ
scenario with different parameter settings. Figure 10 corresponds
to our standard scenario (Experiment 1 in Table 1) while Figure 11
corresponds to experiment 27. The results can be summarized as
follows:   
(i) The variance in income induced by a change of preferences
from conservative (CP) to random (RP) and then to progressive
(PP) for both the LQ and LQ cases increases in the course of time,
that is the more highly developed an economic system is. In what
follows we call this variance PIVI and we measure it as the diffe-
rence between the income levels corresponding to PP and CP
respectively at the maximum time at which we ran our model (the
intercepts of the income curves with the vertical axis on the right
of the diagram).
(ii) At equivalent times in our standard scenario (Exp 1, table 1)
PIVI is larger for the LQ than for the HQ case. 
Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka380(iii) When the barrier to human capital, the weight of  human
capital in the production function and the wage parameter are
increased, either individually or in combination (Exps 2 – 44,
Table 1)  PIVI grows also for the HQ case and it can become compa-
rable to that of the LQ case.   
(iv) For very high values of kHi the income curve for the HQ case
starts growing very rapidly at fairly long times and then abruptly
stops. In these conditions the process of economic development
becomes so unbalanced that it cannot proceed any further. 
Figure 10. Income curves for the LQ (green curves) and HQ (blue curves) cases 
showing the impact of different preferences on income generation. The parameter 
settings correspond to the standard scenario
Figure 11. Income curves for the LQ (green curves) and HQ (blue curves) cases 
showing the impact of different preferences on income generation. The parameter 
settings correspond to higher values of the Bhi barrier in human capital and in the 
weight of human capital in the production function (Exp 27 in table 1) 
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impact of changing preferences is likely to increase as economic
development proceeds. In other words, differences in consumer
preferences are likely to have a greater effect on the growth of
income on those which are already rich than on relatively poor
ones. In an economic system in which most people can just afford
basic necessities the disposable income required to buy new goods
and services would be absent or very scarce. In these conditions
preferences could hardly exert any impact on income generation.
Preferences can be expected to start exerting an impact when there
is a disposable income with which consumers could choose to
purchase different goods and services in addition to necessities. 
While the previous conclusion makes sense in general it is not
immediately clear why different preferences should have a greater
impact on income formation in the LQ than on the HQ case. If we
remember that in the LQ case the only choice consumers could
have is that amongst different types of goods and services, but that
within each type quality remains constant. As a consequence, ILCs
would be shorter and the rate of growth of disposable income
would initially be faster. Yet the effect of preferences on PIVI would
still be lower even after HQ income had overtaken LQ income. PIVI
for the HQ case can start growing and become comparable to that
of the LQ case only after barriers to human capital, a higher weight
of human capital in the production function and a higher wage
rate had been introduced. Thus, although for both the LQ and the
HQ cases different preferences start exerting an effect on the rate of
growth of income, the time at which preferences start affecting
income varies depending on the case and on the parameter setting
used in the experiments. In particular, barriers to human capital, a
higher weight of human capital in the production function and a
higher wage rate seem to have a much higher impact on the HQ
than on the LQ case. This in understandable because both levels of
human capital and wages remain relatively flat in the LQ case,
while they increase in the HQ case. 
Let us conclude this section by pointing out that the term
policy needs to be interpreted carefully in this context. Usually
policies have a relatively short term orientation with respect to the
time horizon we are envisaging in this paper. The parameters the
influence of which we explored are related to human capital and to
Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka382wages, two variables the importance of which in modern economic
systems is still, and is likely to remain, very high. We have seen
that rising wages and rising levels and intensity of human capital
played a fundamental role in capitalist economic development by
allowing to create both the competencies required to produce
goods and services of higher quality and internal differentiation
and the disposable income required to purchase them. These
results cannot be interpreted as implying that economic develop-
ment will always be positively affected by raising wages and levels
and intensity of human capital. There are many examples in which
a reduction in wages can positively contribute to economic perfor-
mance. What matters is not wages per se but the combination of
wages, human capital and other variables. Thus, even if rising
wages and levels and intensity of human capital are required to
sustain the long term development of the economic system, short
term adjustments in their combination can be required to compen-
sate for temporary slowdowns or bottlenecks. What matters is not
wages or human capital per se but the way in which their co-evolu-
tion can create in a coordinated way new demand and the required
purchasing power and preferences. 
As for preferences, it is quite clear from our results that their
impact on growth and development becomes increasingly impor-
tant as the economic system becomes richer. As a consequence, the
scope for activities which help consumers to form preferences for
emerging goods and services increases with the level of economic
development. This is particularly true for high levels and intensi-
ties of human capital and for high wage rates. However, we must
remember that if facilitating the formation of preferences for emer-
ging goods and services can positively affect economic
development, a balance must be maintained in the economic
system between speeding up the introduction of new goods and
services and  reduce the weight of pre-existing ones.
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In this paper we study the co-evolution of innovation and
demand and try to understand how it could have contributed to
the long run development of the capitalist economic system by
means of our TEVECON model. We show that the economic
system can create the disposable income required for consumers to
be able to purchase the new, higher quality and more differenti-
ated goods and services created by innovation. The creation of
such disposable income is due to the combination of growing
productive efficiency (trajectory 1), growing variety (trajectory 2)
and growing output quality and internal differentiation
(trajectory 3). Furthermore, we show that consumer preferences
can affect observed macroeconomic development paths. In parti-
cular, we show that consumers with progressive preferences led to
higher rates of growth of output and of income than consumers
with conservative preferences, where progressive preferences imply
a strong relative propensity to purchase new goods and services at
the expense of older ones. Thus, our results confirm that demand
matters and that observed patterns of economic development can
be explained by the co-evolution of innovation and demand. 
After having established this point we explore the economic
development paths that could be generated by different combina-
tions of growing  variety (trajectory 2) and growing output quality
and internal differentiation (trajectory 3). This is done by choosing
two rather extreme scenarios, one including only growing variety,
which we called low quality (LQ), and one including both growing
variety and growing output quality and internal differentiation,
which we called high quality (HQ). The HQ scenario gives rise to a
slower but richer growth path. The LQ scenario has a higher rate of
creation of new sectors and consequently a higher rate of growth
of employment but at the expense of having lower wages, lower
sectoral demand and lower levels of human capital. 
An important result of our comparison was that the HQ income
was initially lower than the LQ one, but that at later times the
situation was reversed with HQ income becoming dominant. We
called this phenomenon the (LQ → HQ) transition. This is impor-
tant because it seems to map some observed paths of economic
development, in particular what we call the transition from neces-
sities to imaginary worlds. Admittedly the two transitions are not
Pier Paolo Saviotti and Andreas Pyka384identical but they both include the emergence of higher quality
and more internally differentiated goods and services at a later
stage of economic development. We then explore further the
(LQ → HQ) transition to better understand long run mechanisms
of economic development. To do this we vary some TEVECON
parameters affecting human capital and wages. We find that
growing wages and growing levels and intensity of human capital
favour long run economic development. We then hypothesize that
the (LQ → HQ) transition could have been the outcome of a
virtuous circle in which growing human capital and growing wages
provide both the competencies needed to produce higher quality
and more internally differentiated goods and services as well as the
disposable income required to purchase them. Our TEVECON
model proves that this virtuous circle is possible but that it is not
necessary. As in all co-evolutionary processes the necessary ingre-
dients are required with the appropriate coordination. 
Furthermore, we show that the LQ and HQ cases are both
affected, although differently, by changing consumer preferences.
In both cases, the variance in income produced by progressive (PP)
and conservative (CP) consumer preferences tend to grow as
economic systems become progressively richer. This points
towards an important scope for policy, especially for those activi-
ties which help consumers to learn about new goods and services, a
necessary condition to for them to have clear preferences.    
We conclude this paper by pointing out that the policy implica-
tions we can derive here are long term. Thus, we have seen that
growing wages and growing levels and intensity of human capital
favour long run economic development. This conclusion cannot
be translated into the short term prescription to keep raising wages
and levels and intensity of human capital under any circums-
tances. What matters are not the individual values or trends of
wages and of human capital but their combinations. Many adapta-
tions can be required to overcome short term bottlenecks and to
restore long run trends.
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Table Appendix
hi entry 
Barrier (Bhi) 
a
Weight of Hi  in Production 
Function(kHi) 
b
Wage Function
Parameter (kw)
c
1. 0.0 0.1 1 Standard
2. 0.5 0.1 1 Entry 
3. 0.8 0.1 1 Barrier
4. 1.2 0.1 1 Experiments
5. 1.5 0.1 1
6. 0.0 0.5 1 Production 
7. 0.0 1.0 1 Function
8. 0.0 1.5 1 Experiments
9. 0.0 0.1 0.5 Wage  
10. 0.0 0.1 1.5 Function
11. 0.0 0.1 2.0 Experiments
12. 0.5 0.5 1 a&b
13. 0.5 1.0 1
14. 0.5 1.5 1
15. 0.5 2.0 1
16. 0.8 0.5 1
17. 0.8 1.0 1
18. 0.8 1.5 1
19. 0.8 2.0 1
20. 1.2 0.5 1
21. 1.2 1.0 1
22. 1.2 1.5 1
23. 1.2 2.0 1
24. 1.5 0.5 1
25. 1.5 1.0 1
26. 1.5 1.5 1
27. 1.5 2.0 1
28. 0.5 0.1 0.1 a&c
29. 0.5 0.1 0.5
30. 0.5 0.1 1.5
31. 0.5 0.1 2.0
32. 0.8 0.1 0.1
33. 0.8 0.1 0.5
34. 0.8 0.1 1.5
35. 0.8 0.1 2.0
36. 1.2 0.1 0.1
37. 1.2 0.1 0.5
38. 1.2 0.1 1.5
39. 1.2 0.1 2.0
40. 1.5 0.2 0.1
41. 1.5 0.1 0.1
42. 1.5 0.1 0.5
43. 1.5 0.1 1.5
44. 1.5 0.1 2.0
45. 0.5 0.5 0.1 a,b&c
46. 0.8 1.0 0.5
47. 1.2 1.5 1.5
48. 1.5 2.0 2.0
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Environmental innovations heavily depend on government policies and
consumers’ behaviour. This paper addresses the issue of how these two factors
interact in shaping the transition to a green technology. We extend models of
technological selection with heterogeneous agents and learning by including a
weak hierarchy between green and polluting goods. For general distributions of
agents’ income and the explicit inclusion of a carbon tax, the model is not
analytically tractable so we derive our results using numerical simulations.
Given the level of income, carbon taxes are more effective when technological
improvements brought about by wealthy pioneer consumers suffice in inducing
the remaining population to buy the green good. In this case, a negative rela-
tionship between income inequality and tax effectiveness emerges. Taxes on
polluting production have a regressive effect since they are mainly paid by
poorer people who consume less of the green good. For these people, a negative
wealth effect strongly contrasts the standard substitution effect of the tax.
Finally, both lower inequality and taxes have the expected effect for interme-
diate levels of the learning parameter. 
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Concerns for quality of life, sustainability of growth and envi-
ronmental issues occupy an increasingly important position in the
set of citizens’ values, especially in developed countries where
basic needs have been met (Inglehart 1995). Technical change is at
1. We wish to thank an anonymous referee, Alessandro Sapio and Mauro Napoletano, one of
the editors of this issue, for particularly useful comments and suggestions. Usual disclaimer
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Fabrizio Patriarca and Francesco Vona390the centre of the political discourse being the unique way of
reconciling current consumption patterns with both natural
resources preservation and environmental quality. In the case of
environmental technologies, policy interventions and the sponta-
neous involvement of citizens-consumers are particularly
important as market prices do not reward for the lower environ-
mental impact of green goods. Furthermore, two channels are
recognized to be the most important drivers of environmental
innovations (Beise and Rennings 2005): a direct market demand
for green products and an indirect political pressure for the
approval of ambitious environmental policies.
On the political side, consumers, local communities and envi-
ronmental activists play a key role in signalling harmful effects of
certain economic activities, in giving political voice to ethical
issues (i.e. the rights of future generations) and in reinforcing the
effectiveness of government interventions (Esty 1998). For
instance, cooperatives and diffused ownership characterize the
industry of wind turbines in Denmark (Johnson and Jacobsson
2003), while German environmental activists played a key role in
sustaining ambitious feed-in-tariff programs (Lauber and Mez,
2004). On the economic side, agents’ consumption choices and
willingness-to-pay (WTP, henceforth) higher prices for products
with low environmental impacts allow the creation of niche
markets for these products. Policies can be targeted to promote the
creation of niche markets through labelling, public procurement
or regulation, e.g. car sharing requiring low-emission cars (Kemp
et al. 1998). Another example is the one of the private provision of
a public good where certain consumers accept to contribute to the
good independently on what the others do (Kotchen 2006). All
these examples suggest that the effectiveness of environmental
policies depends on the distribution of preferences for environ-
mental quality across heterogeneous agents.
This paper focuses on a particular aspect of the complex rela-
tionship between agents’ heterogeneity in preferences, technology
diffusion and environmental policy. In particular, we analyse how
the effect of the policies on green technologies is mediated by the
distribution of agents’ preferences and by the budget constraints
preventing these preferences to be realized, i.e. poverty and finan-
cial distress. With this aim in mind, we develop a simple model of
Environmental taxes, inequality and technical change 391technological selection with heterogeneous agents and pioneer
consumers generating positive spillovers on the remaining popula-
tion. These ingredients are common to a wealth of models, both
analytical (Matsuyama 2002, Bertola et al., 2006) and computa-
tional (Frenken et al. 2006, Cantono and Silverberg 2010). We
contribute to this literature in two ways. First, heterogeneous atti-
tudes towards green or non-green goods, embodying technologies
with different environmental impacts,2 depend in our model on
microfounded agents’ behaviour. More precisely, following our
previous paper (Vona and Patriarca 2011, PV henceforth), we
capture the fact that wealthier households care relatively more
about environmental quality by introducing a weak hierarchy
between green and non-green goods. This allows us to analyse not
only the decision of buying the green good or not, as in related
studies (e.g. Cantono and Silverberg 2010), but also the intensity of
that choice. As a result, consumers’ decisions depend on two
income thresholds: a low threshold when a consumer starts buying
the green good, a high threshold when she shifts from a mix of
goods to full green consumption. Second, we extend PV (2011) in
two ways: 1. by examining technological selection for general
distributions of income, 2. by looking at the effect of a tax on
polluting goods under different levels of income inequality.
These two extensions require a substantial departure from the
methodology used in our original paper as it is difficult to preserve
analytical tractability with many heterogeneous consumers not
uniformily distributed and two thresholds moving endogeneously
with technological learning. Besides, numerical simulations help
in quantifying the effect of the tax in scenarios characterized by
different learning speeds and levels of income inequality. Results
of computer simulations not only generalize our previous theore-
tical and empirical findings on the reversion of the effect of
inequality on the diffusion of the green good, but also contribute
to explain the heterogeneneity in the effect of environmental poli-
cies on technological development (e.g. Vona et al., 2012). In
particular, we show that, given the initial level of income per
capita, environmental taxes are more effective when positive
2. We assume that each good is produced with only one technology. Green (resp. non-green)
goods are produced using a technology with low-(resp. high-) environmental impact.
Fabrizio Patriarca and Francesco Vona392spillovers from pioneer consumers can effectively trigger a second
wave of demand for the green good. Thus, a negative relationship
between income inequality and tax effectiveness emerges. In
extreme cases, the regressive impact of polices like carbon taxes
may have the paradoxical effect of reducing the number of consu-
mers of green products. Our final contribution is methodological
as we develop a model that has an analytically tractable core and
an extension solved numerically. With respect to closely related
percolation models of technology adoption (e.g. Cantono and
Silverberg, 2010) and to ABM in general, this extension seems
particularly promising as it enables to anchor simulation results to
analytical ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section reviews the lite-
rature on inequality, environmental technologies and consumers’
behaviour. In section 2, we remind the model and extends it for
general distribution of income, Section 3 presents the main results,
while section 4 concludes.
1. Related literature
Understanding the determinants of environmentally friendly
behaviour represents the point of departure to entrench theoretical
analyses on well-established stylized facts. Two strands of literature
analyse the formation of green preferences: at the micro level, the
empirical evidence on the determinants of the WTP for green
goods; at the macro level, the one on the determinants of environ-
mental regulation.
The macro strand of literature is quite scant given the lack of
reliable time-varying data on environmental policies and regula-
tion. Among the few exceptions, Dasgupta et al. (2001) and Easty
and Porter (2002) show that GDP per capita is positively correlated
with two independently built indicators of environmental policies,
even when adding proxies of government efficiency and of costs of
bureaucracy.3 Interestingly, too, the index built by Easty and
3.  The composite indicator used in Dasgupta et al. (2001) includes both environmental policy
and environmental awareness and it is based on a survey conducted by the United Nation. The
indicator used in Easty and Porter (2002) attempts to measure environmental regulation and
uses data sources from the ESI project and the Global Competitiveness Report. Data sources:
http://www.yale.edu/esi/ and http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness
Environmental taxes, inequality and technical change 393Porter tends to be significantly higher in more equal Nordic and
central European countries. Recent work of Nicolli and Vona
(2012) develops time-varying aggregate indicators of renewable
energy policy4 that are positively correlated with GDP per capita.
Moreover, they show that lowering inequality positively affects the
policy support for renewable energy, especially in high income
countries and using policy indicators built with factor analysis.
Inequality has a strong negative impact on public expenditures in
green R&D as found by Magnani (2000) and by PV (2011), where
the effect of inequality appears even stronger in the longer time
span considered. Both in PV (2011) and in Nicolli and Vona (2012)
a reversion in the relative effect of income levels and inequality
emerge, that is: whereas for rich countries inequality negatively
affects public policies and demand for green technologies, per-
capita income is paramount in poorer ones. This evidence supports
our claim that environmental quality is a good relatively higher in
the hierarchical ranking.
At the micro level, several studies have shown that wealthier
and more educated households are generally more willing to pay
higher prices for green goods (Roe et al., 2001; Wiser, 2007; Diaz-
Rainey and Ashtonn 2009),5 to participate voluntarily to the provi-
sion of green public goods (Rose et al. 2002, Wiser 2007, Kotchen
and Moore 2007, Kotchen 2010) or to effectively buy green goods
(OECD 2008, Kahn 1998, Gilg et al. 2005). It is worth noticing that
the overall impact of richer households on the environmental
quality can be either positive or negative as long as richer house-
holds consume more. However, their impact on technology
through the demand of green goods is certainly positive. Also
micro-evidence is consistent with our claim that environmental
quality is a good relatively higher in the hierarchical ranking. In
particular, sociological studies using value and social surveys show
that "[the] concern for quality-of-life issues, such as free of speech,
liberty and environmental protection... arise only after individuals
4. Data source: http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=re
5. Peer effects in consumption are also found to be very relevant in the Contingent Evaluation
of the WTP for clean energy carried out by Wiser (2007). In particular, the expected
contribution of the others is found to be significantly correlated with the individual willingness
to contribute. This result becomes relevant for the relationship between inequality and
environmental quality if, as well known in the literature on peer effect in education, peer effects
enter nonlinearly in the utility function.
Fabrizio Patriarca and Francesco Vona394have met their more basic materialist needs for food, shelter, and
safety" (Gelissen, 2007; p. 393, see Diekmann and Franzen 1999,
Franzen 2003).
On the theoretical side, the standard way to examine the rela-
tionship between income inequality and environmental quality is
to look at the political-economy determinants of environmental
regulation. Using a median voter argument, Magnani (2000) claims
that income inequality and expenditures for environmental R&D
can be negatively correlated if richer households prefer more envi-
ronmental quality than poorer ones. Eriksson and Persson (2003)
also derive a partial negative relationship between inequality and
pollution in a political economy model where heterogeneous
agents decide the optimal level of pollution control under the
assumption that wealthier individuals are less affected by pollu-
tion.6 Kempf and Rossignol (2007) study a similar problem but
allow for a dynamic trade-off between growth and environmental
quality. There, the median voter jointly decides the taxes devoted
to finance two public goods: environment and infrastructures,
which are conductive to growth. In line with previous studies, if
the weight assigned to the “environment” in the utility function is
low enough with respect to the one assigned to “consumption,” a
more unequal society would privilege production rather than the
environment. Among the channels that support a negative impact
of inequality and social segregation on the environment, recent
studies (e.g. Rothman 1998, Roca 2003) claim that rich people are
often able to divert the monetary benefits out-of-pollution from
the cost of it. For instance, in a model of spatial sorting of agents by
skills, Gawande et al. (2001) show that hazardous waste sites tend
to be located in neighbourhoods with a higher fraction of poorer
workers willing to accept higher pollution in exchange of jobs in
the polluting sector.
All these models examine settings where technology does not
change and hence neglect the role of environmental innovations,
especially of those innovations that imply a redesign of the whole
production process rather than the mere adoption of end-of-pipe
solutions. Environmental innovations can be conviniently distin-
6. As in Magnani (2000), the result hinges upon the fact that, given the average income, a
richer median voter can afford both more pollution control and more consumption.
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technologies: “Cleaner production reduces resource use and/or
pollution at the source by using cleaner products and production
methods, whereas end-of-pipe technologies curb pollution emis-
sions by implementing add-on measures” (Frondel et al., 2004,
pp.1). The former are true innovations, both from the perspective
of reducing net energy and material flows and from the one of
economic agents, who have to change their behaviour to adopt
these technologies.7 More in general, a transition from polluting to
a cleaner technology is best understood as a complex phenomenon
involving changes in many institutional layers and the building of
new social constituencies (Kemp 1994). Particularly important is
the process through which new technologies acquire social legiti-
macy and become cost-effective. Overall, these socio-cultural
features of new technologies are particularly important for green
products that involve radical changes in habits and convey an
intrinsic ethical motivation.
Following this argument, it is convenient to think at the
dynamic interaction between consumers’ behaviour and technolo-
gical development as a prototypical feature of green technological
transitions. Standard growth models are not well-equipped to deal
with the path dependency emerging from demand-supply interac-
tions. This weakness of standard models is even more relevant
when consumers are heterogeneous and hence the dynamics of
demand results from the aggregation of different evolving beha-
viour (e.g. Faber and Frenken 2009 on this argument in relation to
environmental issues).
With regards to the diffusion of green products, agent-based
computational models (ABM) have been applied to capture the
intrinsic socio-cultural aspects of green technologies by introdu-
cing a richer set of assumptions on consumers’ behaviour. These
models typically analyse diffusion patterns of green goods in
complex environment characterized by rich supply-side dynamics
(Bleda and Valente 2009, Windrum et al. 2009) and using cali-
brated data to build scenarios for technological transitions
7. Examples of significant behavioural changes are: production of energy from renewable
sources involving greater decentralization and self-production; change in the ownership
structure to enlenght the durability of certain goods, e.g. cars; recycling and reusing activities;
creation of consumers’ networks to ensure steady demand to local producers of biofood.
Fabrizio Patriarca and Francesco Vona396(Schwarz and Ernst 2010). Within the broad class of simulation
and ABM models, percolation models (Antonelli 1996, Silverberg
and Verspagen 2005, Frenken et al. 2008) represent the most parsi-
monious approach to study technology selection with economies
of scale and network externalities (e.g. Geroski 2000) when consu-
mers are heterogeneous. Cantono and Silverberg (2010) apply
these models to the case of the diffusion of environmentally
friendly goods and analyse the effectiveness of a green subsidy.
Diffusion of green consumption is constrained by both the hetero-
geneity in individual WTPs and the consumers’ network structure,
which affects the spread of information diffusion across potential
adopters. To capture learning, the price of the new good decreases
with the number of adopters. In this simple setting, the subsidy is
effective only within an internal range of the learning parameter:
when learning is too slow consumption does not take off, when it
is too fast diffusion takes place anyway.
The logic of our model is related to the one of Cantono and
Silverberg (2010) as lead-users and consumers’ heterogeneity are
also essential. Our paper, however, provides a different microfoun-
dation for agent’s adoption decision that depends explicitly on the
opportunity cost of giving up consumption of the polluting good,8
through income, and on the initial price gap between the two
goods. As will be clearer in the next section, our model also
analyses the relationship between the shape of the distribution of
WTP for environmental quality and the final outcome.
2. The model
To analyze the choice between polluting and non-polluting
goods, we adopt the framework of PV (2011). The simplest setting
to address this issue is to consider two goods and two wants. Both
goods satisfy a basic need, like food or shelter. The green good,
8. It is interesting to note that, in sociological surveys measuring the values for environmental
quality, result strongly depends on the way the demand is made. In terms of absolute
preferences developed and developing countries do not differ much. In turn, the higher
propensity to spend in environmental quality of developed countries clearly emerges when the
opportunity cost of environmental protection in terms, for instance, of foregone income is
explicitly mentioned in the survey questionnaire (Inglehart 1995, Diekmann and Franzen
2003). Therefore, this opportunity cost should be also considered in building theoretical
models.
Environmental taxes, inequality and technical change 397indexed by 2, is more expensive but it also satisfies a non basic
want like environment preservation. The green good enables
agents to enjoy the same direct utility of the old one plus an addi-
tional utility linked to an “eco-friendly” motif. This is a convenient
way to model preferences for the environment as it encompasses
both the case in which “eco-friendly” goods are of better quality,
and the one where they are consumed for “altruistic” reasons or
moral obligations (see Eriksson 2004, Conrad 2005, OECD 2008).
The weak hierarchy between the two wants, the second being
not necessary in an Inada sense, is essential to derive the particular
shape of the Engel curve that, in turn, is crucial to derive our main
results. As discussed in previous section, this assumption is also
empirically founded.
More in details, we adopt the simplified framework of a utility
function w(.) that is continuous and additively separable in the
two wants. In particular, w(.) is concave in the basic want and
linear in the second one. Thus9: 
w(x1; x2) = u(x1 + x2) + x2 ; (1)
where xi is the quantity of the good i and u(.) is a strictly concave
function. Note that each unit of the second good gives a greater
utility than each unit of the first one, so the first good is consumed
only if the price of x2 is sufficiently higher than the price of x1. Now
let m be the total income to be allocated between the two goods, δp
the relative price gap, i.e. p2–p1 / p1 that represents a proxy of tech-
nological expertise in the production of the two goods. Under the
previous hypotheses on the utility function, the first order condi-
tion for the internal solutions of this simple constrained
optimization problem gives:10
(2)
9.  Further details are discussed in PV (2011) where we also show that the linearity of the
utility function in the second want is not necessary to derive our results. Note that the more
general form wi (x1; x2) = u(x1 + x2) + υi x2 would allow to capture heterogeneity in individual
preferences for the environment. 
10.  The first order condition in Equation (2) states that x~ corresponds to the level of
consumption at which the ratio between the marginal utilities of the basic want u’ (x1 + x2) and
of the other want (1) equals the marginal cost of substitution between the two goods
1 2
1( ) = ;'
P
u x x δ+
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the inverse of u’, this condition has the following solution: 
(3)
Equation (3) implies that a mixed bundle is chosen only within
an income thresholds . If income is not enough to buy
the quantity x~ of the cheapest good ( ) the green good
is not consumed. When agents are rich enough to buy a quantity
of good 2 ( ), they will consume only that good which satis-
fies also the other want. 
Figure 1 shows the Engel’s curve derived by this analysis. The
particular S-shape of the Engel’s curve of x2 is the main driver of all
further developments. To give a preliminary intuition, it is worth
to recall an important property of this curve (see PV 2011 for
details). It is steeper in the region (m–, m+) than above m+ Between
m– and m+, the gradual substitution of the old good with the new
one reinforces the positive effect on the consumption of due to the
income expansion itself, while in the third region (m > m+) substi-
tution no longer occurs.
In what follows, it is useful to recall that the income thresholds
(m–, m+) have a “dual” counterpart in the price domain. The “price
gap” thresholds are important to analyse technological change in
so far as, under standard competitive conditions in all markets,
Figure 1. Engel’s curves for the two goods
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Environmental taxes, inequality and technical change 399prices reflect costs and the inverse of the price gap reflects techno-
logical levels. Moreover, the two price gap thresholds, that
correspond to a shift in consumers’ behaviour, depend on m. The
richer the consumer, the lower the two price gap thresholds
required to start consuming the green good. Put it differently, rich
consumers buy the green good even if the way of producing it is
relatively inefficient.
2.1. The effect of a tax on the first good
In this section, we derive the basic analytical results on the
effect of a tax that increases the price of good 1, i.e. a carbon tax.
The non linearities in the income-demand curves derived in
previous section imply that higher income people consume lower
shares of the taxed good. Thus, the tax has a regressive impact. For
consumers with incomes above m+, the tax has clearly no effects
since they do not consume the taxed good. Conversely, for
consumers with incomes below m+, the tax will have, as usual, the
two contrasting substitution and income effects. The strength of
each of these effects varies according to agents’ shares of consump-
tion, hence according to their income. To analyze the combined
impact of these two effects, let us consider the effect of the tax on
the two thresholds. A higher p1 entails a lower δp. Since the
marginal utility is a decreasing function (see Equation (2)), it is
straightforward to show that this implies a lower x~ . That is, a tax
on the old good always decreases the income threshold of
consumption at which agents start consuming the new good. In
formulas we have.11
(4)
However, the effect of the tax on the income thresholds is not
so trivial. Indeed, we have: 
11. The continuity and differentiability of all functions considered give: 
the definition of φ and the properties of the derivative of an inverse function gives
Equation (4). .
2
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(6)
While the upper threshold will always diminish with the tax,
thus favoring the demand shift to the green good, the effect on the
lower threshold, i.e. the minimal income needed to consume the
new good, deserves to be further discussed. The first term in
Equation (6) represents the substitution effect. It is always negative
and, according to Equation (4) is decreasing in the concavity of the
utility function and increasing in the price gap. The second term of
Equation (6) is the income effect, it is positive and, according to
Equation (3), is increasing in the price gap. As a result, for not very
concave utility functions and high price gap, the tax may increase
the income threshold at which agents start consuming good 2. In
this case, some households in the neighborhood of m– are induced
to consume less of the second good because the income effect asso-
ciated with the higher cost of satisfying the basic need offset the
substitution effect associated with a lower price gap. Although this
can be seen as an extreme case, it is important to be aware of such
possible reversing effects when designing incentive schemes to
foster environmental preservation.12 In the more general cases, the
tax increases the demand of the new good of all agents but such an
increase is much lower for poorer people that have a stronger nega-
tive income effect. Figure 2 summarizes the two possible effects of
the tax on the Engel curves. 
The case represented on the right panel of Figure 2 allows to
visualize the range of middle-low incomes for which the tax has
the paradoxical effect of reducing consumption of the green good.
The left panel of Figure 2 displays instead the well-behaved case. It
is also important to remark that, in both cases, the environmental
tax has the standard regressive effect of benefiting wealthier house-
holds more than poorer ones (e.g. OECD 2004). In our model, this
12. For instance, this paradoxical result provides a different, simpler rationale to justify the
joint adoption of a carbon tax and a subsidy for the green good The standard justification is that
the tax is needed for the environmental externality, while the subsidy for the learning or
knowledge externality (Jaffe et al. 2005). Mix of taxes and subsidies are also commonly observed
in practice. The subsidy here can be used to offset the negative income effect of the tax.
2
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Environmental taxes, inequality and technical change 401result depends on a simple compositional effect. Poorer house-
holds consume a large fraction of the dirty good that becomes
more expensive. Notice also that subsidizing the consumption of
the green good cannot be enough to offset this regressive effect as
long as poorer households keep buying a greater fraction of the
dirty good. Income transfers are hence required to offset the redis-
tributive effects of environmental policies.
Grounded on these analytical results, the next section address
the issue of the effectiveness of environmental taxes on the diffu-
sion of the green good in a context of heterogeneous agents, drawn
from a left-skewed distribution of income. Before this, the next
sub-section briefly summarizes the relationship between aggregate
demand of x2 and the shape of the income distribution.
2.2. Income Distribution and aggregate demand
In an economy where agents are heterogeneous in their
incomes, the non-linearities in the Engel curves imply that the
diffusion of good 2 jointly depends on the average income and on
the level of income inequality. With the purpose of giving prelimi-
nary insights on this process, let us consider numerical examples
drawn from a log-normal distribution of income with a concave
shaped utility for the basic want.13 This is also the distribution of
consumers’ characteristics chosen by Cantono and Silverberg
(2010), which, however, do not analyse the role played by the
second moment of the distribution.14
Figure 2. The effect of a tax on the Engel curve
13. In particular, we take: u (x) = ln (x) and δ p = 2.
14. Also the functional distribution of income matters on the diffusion pattern of a new good
(see Patriarca and Vona 2009).
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m
Fabrizio Patriarca and Francesco Vona402In Figure 3, we plot the aggregate demand X2 as a function of
the variance in income distribution for different mean income
levels (m1 < m2 < m3 ). If the mean income is relatively high, an
unequal distribution implies an increase in the number of agents
with income under the threshold  m–. For the characteristics of the
Engel curve for x2, that is steeper in (m– < m+), a redistribution
would have in this case a positive impact on the diffusion of the
green good. Conversely, in relatively poorer economies, higher
income dispersion enables fewer rich people to consume the green
good, which can at most emerge as niche consumption. 
This reversal effect of inequality on the diffusion of x2 is a
consequence of the S-shaped feature of the Engel curve of the new
good. In turn, the S-shaped relationship depends both on the
assumption of a weak hierarchy between the two goods and on the
fact that very poor consumers do not buy the green good. It is
interesting to note that the S-shaped feature of our Engel curve
does not allow to sketch a uniform relationship between inequality
and the diffusion of x2 as it would be for concave—or convex-
shaped curves considered in the previous literature on the “aggre-
gation argument” (e.g. Heerink et al. 2001). For a standard
aggregation argument, if the rich buy relatively more of the green
good, higher inequality would generate more consumption of
green goods. In our model, instead, middle income households are
Figure 3. Variance of the income distribution and diffusion of the green good 
for different levels of the mean income
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Environmental taxes, inequality and technical change 403the only ones for which an income expansion translates in a more
than proportional increase of x2. Hence, there is a reversal in the
effect of inequality on the diffusion of the green good for suffi-
ciently high levels of average income. 
3. The effect of a tax on the diffusion of green technologies
3.1. The dynamic setting
To analyse the effectiveness of the carbon tax, we consider an
environment where technology improves endogenously. As well-
documented in the literature on demand-driven innovation (e.g.
von Hippel 1988), initially pioneer consumers are willing to buy
more expensive innovative products. Their consumption is a
source of positive externalities as long as it triggers price reductions
that may enable low-budget consumers to adopt these products
(pioneer consumer effect, PC henceforth). However, an “excessive
income distance” between pioneer consumers and the remaining
population prevents the process of diffusion to fully trickle down
(consumption polarization effect) to other consumers. The overall
effect of the heterogeneity in consumers’ characteristics, notably
the variance, on the diffusion pattern depends on which of the two
effects prevails.
The simplest way of including technological spillovers from
pioneer consumers consists in introducing a positive relationship
between the growth of demand for X2 and technological change,
i.e. a global externality. This assumption is a quite standard way to
capture pioneer consumers’ spillovers (e.g. Matsuyama 2002,
Cantono and Silverberg 2010). Let us denote with γi the technolog-
ical level in sector i, which is equal to the inverse of pi i.e. pi = 1/γi .
We chose a particular linear form for the learning function: 
γ2,t = γ2,t–1 + c(X2,t–1 – X2,t–2 ), (7)
where c measures the effectiveness of technological change. We
now analyze the process of diffusion of good 2, by considering the
initial condition in which the green good appears at time 1, with a
technological level γ2,0 low enough as to induce a niche demand
for this good by few pioneer consumers. Clearly, we also assume a
Fabrizio Patriarca and Francesco Vona404positive technological gap at time 0 i.e. γ1,0 – γ2,0 > 0 being the
green technology initially less developed.
Once the niche level of demand emerges, the process of techno-
logical progress involves a self-reinforcing process of decreases in
p2 and thus increases in the demand of this new good. For a given
mean income, the dynamics of demand depends on the techno-
logical parameter c and on the mass of consumers that, in
correspondence to each technological improvement, increase their
consumption of x2 the latter being a function of the income distri-
bution. We consider a realistic and general distribution of
incomes: the incomes of a population of 1000 agents are extracted
from lognormal distributions. The higher complexity of this
model with respect to the original paper requires the use of simula-
tion methods.
We compare the diffusion patterns for the new good of two
random samples with the same mean (set at a level that allows for a
niche consumption of the green good at time 0) but with different
variances associated with a Gini coefficient of respectively 0.22
and 0.44, which are the lower and upper bounds of Gini coeffi-
cients in OECD countries.15 The results of this preliminary exercise
are shown in Figure 4: the left panel considers a lower level of the
learning parameter while the right one a middle level.16 In the left
panel, when technical change is too slow, the PC effect prevails so
the unequal society guarantees greater diffusion of the green good.
In the right panel, the level of c potentially allows a full diffusion
of the new good and the more equal society outperforms the
unequal one.
In both cases, technological progress is initially faster in less
equal countries because of the stronger PC effect. When techno-
logy becomes more mature, however, the more equal population
recovers and overcomes the less equal one given the larger number
of potential followers, i.e. the middle class is larger. This result,
jointly with the empirical evidence presented in the PV (2011),
seems to confirm that pioneer consumers play an important role in
explaining early stages of technological development, while the
mass of potential adopters is more important in later phases. In the
15.  See, e.g., OECD on-line statistics: http://stats.oecd.org
16.  Respectively, c and c = 0.2.
Environmental taxes, inequality and technical change 405right-hand panel of Figure 4, the crossing-point between the two
diffusion curves corresponding to different levels of inequality
highlights this leap-frogging effect that—it is worth to remark—
occurs only for a sufficiently high learning potential. Finally,
Figure 5 replicates the analysis of Figure 4 for a lower level of
income per capita. In this case, the green good diffuses less in the
equal society also in correspondence to higher levels of the lear-
ning parameter. This further exercise generalizes our analytical
result on the reversion in the effect of inequality depending on the
level of income per capita   (see PV 2011).
Figure 4. Dynamics of consumption of the green good
Figure 5. Dynamics of of consumption of the green good (lower mean income)
x2 x2
Time Time
x2 x2
Time Time
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To examine the effect of a carbon tax, we use a slightly different
approach and extract randomly 100 couples of populations of
1000 consumers. Each couple of populations is a random sample
from two lognormal distributions having the same mean but two
different variances that correspond to the lower and upper bounds
of the Gini coefficient in OECD countries, respectively .22 and .44.
For every couple we analyze the effect of a 5% carbon tax on the
diffusion of the new good. We run the model for four cases: with
and without the tax for each of the two population. As we already
discussed in the previous section, the dynamics of the system
depends on the income distances between agents. In each popula-
tion, these distances vary although they are all randomly extracted
from the same stochastic process. The 100 replications allow to
make the results independent from the income distances of the
specific population. First, we consider a benchmark case setting the
parameter c at an intermediate level (the same as in the left panel
of Figure 4), then we will move to the more general case, by
varying c in its relevant range.17
The first two columns in Figure 1 show the average final
demand levels of of the new good in the four cases. The third
column shows the average relative increase of the final demand
level involved by taxation. The result states the higher effective-
ness of the tax for the more equal population. In particular, the
average improvement is 17.75 for the equal population with
respect to an average of improvement of 10.31 for the unequal
one. The difference in the effect of the tax is highly statistically
Table. Final Levels of  X2
  no tax  tax  % change 
Population1  mean  844.8  993.4   17.75
(Gini=0.22)  std. dev.  [1.9]  [1.5]  [1.6]
Population2  mean  760.4  839.1   10.31
(Gini=0.44)  std. dev.  [1.8]  [1.5]  [1.8]
Source: Simulated values for 100 couples of populations of 1000 consumers.
17.  The parameters for the benchmark case are: c = 0.2, p1 = 1, the initial level of the price gap
is δp = 2 and the mean income is μ = 2 .
Environmental taxes, inequality and technical change 407significant since standard deviations are very low. Comparing
column 1 and 2, it is evident that the tax amplifies the positive
effect of lowering inequality on the diffusion of the green good.
The final robustness exercise consists in exploring the effect of
the tax for different learning parameters. For the sake of simplicity,
we consider two populations, characterized respectively by a Gini
equal to .22 and .44 respectively, for which we plot the dynamics
of the demand of the new good for different levels of the parameter
c (c1 < c2 < c3 < c418). This simple graphical analysis of specific cases
allows to draw some insights on the joint role of the parameters of
the model. Results are shown in Figure 6, where the third panel is
the benchmark in Figure 4.
18.  We set: c1 = 0.16; c2 = 0.18, c3 = 0.20 and c4 = 0.28. 
Figure 6. The effect of a tax for different learning parameters
x2 x2
x2x2
Time Time
TimeTime
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previous section is confirmed, except for high levels of the learning
parameter (south-east panel of Figure 6). Similarly to Cantono and
Silverberg (2010), a very effective technological learning renders
useless both the carbon tax and an income redistribution. Panel
north-west in the same figure confirms that the unequal society
outperforms the equal one for low levels of the learning parameter.
However, the tax is more effective in the equal society also in this
scenario. The north-east and south-west panels stress the conti-
nuity of our main argument: the tax can be very effective when a
lower inequality favours the formation of a second wave of
demand for the green good, while it is relatively ineffective when
inequality is too high. Interestingly, too, the tax allows the more
equal system to outperform the less equal one also for relatively
low learning parameters (see north-east panel in Figure 7). This
important result reinforces our result (see also PV 2011) that envi-
ronmental policy turns out being significantly more effective in
more equal societies. 
 To conclude, as a robustness analysis, we take the previous 100
couples of random populations and run the dynamics of the
system for 20 consecutive values of c in its relevant range (0, 0.3).
As in the table in Figure 1, for each value of c we obtain the average
relative increase in the final level of the X2 due to the tax for the
two inequality cases. Figure 7 shows the result of this exercise.
Figure 7. Tax effectiveness (average relative increase in the diffusion of the new 
good due to taxation) and learning parameters
10%
20%
30%
40%
Increase
in x2
c
Environmental taxes, inequality and technical change 409Previous conclusions are strongly confirmed: tax effectiveness is
almost everywhere higher for the equal case; the relation is
reverted only for higher values of c, that is, when the effectiveness
of the tax tends to zero as technological change allows by itself for
a wide diffusion of the new good. Furthermore, the tax has a
stronger impact for intermediate values of the learning parameter,
especially in the equal case.
4. Conclusion
This paper generalizes to the case of realistic distributions of
heterogeneous agents our previous theoretical and empirical
findings on the reversion of the effect of inequality on the diffu-
sion of green goods (PV 2011). In correspondence to low levels of
income per capita, high inequality maximizes the positive effect of
early adopters and positively affects diffusion. In turn, the reverse
occurs for high levels of income per capita as pioneer consumers
can effectively trigger middle class consumption, provided the
income distance is sufficiently low.
The second and main result of the paper is to provide a ratio-
nale for the heterogeneity in the effect of environmental policies
on green technologies (e.g. Vona et al. 2012). First, notice that the
policy is regressive as it increases the income required to buy the
basic good and hence reduces residual income that poor house-
holds can devote to the green good. For middle—and low—income
households, the tax can bring a negative wealth effect that may
overcome the standard substitution effect and, under certain
conditions, it leads to the paradoxical result of a reduction in the
overall diffusion of the green good.
In the dynamic setting, environmental taxes are generally more
effective when, given the level of income, technological externali-
ties from pioneer consumers suffice in inducing less wealthier
households to buy the green good, and thus when inequality is
lower. The tax can benefit also the middle and low classes only if
this negative income effect in the short-term is more than offset by
an effective increase in the consumption of the green good in the
long-term. Another interesting result, similar to the one of
Cantono and Silverberg (2010), is that the tax appears to be signifi-
cantly more effective when learning is neither too slow nor too
Fabrizio Patriarca and Francesco Vona410fast. When learning is too slow, green consumption remains
anyway in a niche. When learning is too fast, the transition does
not depend on the level of inequality. Instead, relatively unequal
societies with a larger pioneer consumer effect transit fast to the
new steady state characterized by fully green consumption.
Finally, as a methodological contribution, our analytically trac-
table model can represent a useful benchmark for numerical
simulations and extensions accounting also for local interactions.
Two extensions appear particularly promising. First, in the spirit of
ABMs, one could explicitly set local consumers’ network to
examine how the distribution of income across space shapes
consumers’ habits and technological development. Second, one
could model the green good as an impure public good to investi-
gate how agents’ implicit cooperation in the provision of that good
is affected by different level of income inequality and different
expected gains from new technology.
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HIGH WIND PENETRATION IN AN AGENT-
BASED MODEL OF THE ELECTRICITY MARKET
THE CASE OF ITALY1
Eric Guerci  
Department of Quantitative Methods for Economics, University of Genoa
Alessandro Sapio
Department of Economic Studies, Parthenope University of Naples
 In this paper, we build a realistic large-scale agent-based model of the Italian
electricity market and run simulations to investigate how a significant increase
in wind capacity can affect electricity prices at the national level when the wind
resource is geographically concentrated, as in the case of Italy. The simulator
implements both cost-based and oligopoly models in which electricity compa-
nies learn to bid strategically. We compare a scenario based on the 2010 wind
supply and a scenario based on the maximum potential wind capacity as esti-
mated in technical reports. Results confirm the beneficial effect of low-cost
renewable energy in reducing average market prices, but simulated power flows
in the grid suggest that congestion in the electricity network induced by high
wind penetration creates market power opportunities that can offset the price
reduction effects. 
Keywords:  Electricity Market, Wind Power, Agent-Based Modeling.
A number of environmental and security issues in recent years
have pushed energy economists and policy makers to analyze the
prospects of renewable energy sources. Government programs for
the abatement of greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions caused by,
among other things, combustion of fossil fuels, have been adopted
1. The authors are grateful to the special issue editors, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Mauro
Napoletano, and to an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. REF-E
(Economics, Engineering, Energy, Environment) is thankfully acknowledged for sharing
information about the electricity industry and for providing their dataset on the Italian
electricity production pool.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 124 (2012)
Eric Guerci and Alessandro Sapio416to face growing worries about anthropogenic climate change.
Foreign dependence of most countries from fossil fuels, which are
nearing depletion and cause diplomatic clashes, call for the inten-
sified exploitation of locally available energy sources. The high
human and economic losses due to nuclear disasters (Three Miles
Island, Chernobyl, Fukushima), the fear of nuclear proliferation,
and the signs of diminished financial attractiveness of nuclear
investments (Bradford, 2012) trigger the quest for alternative,
cheap energy sources. Hydroelectricity, wind, solar radiation,
biomass, tidal waves, and geothermal heat pumps are renewable as
they are replenished over time through natural processes; they are
locally available; and their GHG emissions and impact on climate
change are negligible.
While the environmental benefits of renewables are not under
discussion, the debate is open concerning their economic effi-
ciency (see Joskow (2011) and references therein). Power plants
using progressive renewable energy technologies, such as wind
power and photovoltaics, are characterized by small efficient scale
and low variable costs, but upfront costs are high. Market entry
therefore needs to be subsidized. The ensuing burden on public
budgets is more acceptable for tax-payers if, besides bringing envi-
ronmental benefits, renewables push electricity prices down.
The impact on electricity prices of increasing power production
from renewables has been examined in a number of papers with a
focus on wind power, a highly dynamic renewable source in terms
of growth rates of installed capacity.2 Sensfuβ et al. (2008), Sáenz
de Miera et al. (2008), Twomey and Neuhoff (2010), Green and
Vasilakos (2010), Banal-Estañol and Rupérez-Micola (2011b) and
Sioshansi (2011) are among the main references. Price reduction
effects are commonly found, since greater availability of a power
source with negligible marginal costs causes the displacement of
high-cost, fossil-fueled power plants. However, faced with the
prospects of lower prices, oligopolistic power generating compa-
nies (gencos henceforth) may look for market power opportunities.
One such opportunity can be given by congestion in the transmis-
sion grid caused by increased wind outputs. This is likely to occur
2. Worldwide wind capacity has grown from 74 GW in 2006 to 197 GW in 2010 (World Wind
Energy Association report 2010).
High wind penetration in an agent-based model of the electricity market 417when wind production is geographically concentrated and there
are significant transmission bottlenecks. High electricity demand
and high wind production may jointly cause congestion, thereby
magnifying local market power and partly or wholly offsetting
price reduction effects.
Italy is an interesting test bed for hypotheses concerning the
price effects of increasing wind penetration.3 Thanks to relatively
high wind speeds in its southern regions and islands, Italy has a
strong potential for wind power production, and a rather fast
growing wind power market thanks to incisive support policies.
Wind production is concentrated in Italian regions where gencos
possess relatively high market power. In particular, limited compe-
tition ensues when transmission lines between different zones of
the electricity network are congested. This is far from being a rare
event due to significant bottlenecks in the Southern Appennine
and between Sicily and Calabria, that emerge because the grid was
not designed to accommodate such levels of power generation.
Because of such bottlenecks, forced outages of wind turbines have
been ordered by the transmission system operator, in the face of
threats for reliability and security of supply. This caused the loss of
about 10.7% of wind energy in 2009, and 5.6% in 2010 (APER,
2011; Lo Schiavo et al., 2011). Further reasons why wind power is a
hot topic for Italy include the potential to stimulate development
opportunities for regions whose per-capita incomes are below the
national average, and concern that public resources in support to
renewables may be appropriated by organized crime, which is
particularly strong in those regions.
We are interested in verifying two research hypotheses. First,
electricity prices decline as wind penetration increases. Second,
growing wind power penetration causes an increase in congestion
frequencies. These research questions are investigated by means of
an agent-based model depicting an electricity market in which
heterogeneous, boundedly rational, and capacity-constrained
oligopolistic gencos serve a time-varying price-inelastic demand.
Gencos engage in price competition in a uniform price (non discri-
minatory) auction. Their portfolios include both thermal power
3. Wind penetration is the fraction of electricity demand satisfied by means of wind power
production.
Eric Guerci and Alessandro Sapio418plants and wind plants, but wind power is supplied unstrategically.
Strategy learning on thermal capacity is modeled by means of
genetic algorithms. The market-clearing price is set by the market
operator using supply offers, taking into account transmission
constraints between zones. A model along these lines is used by
Guerci and Fontini (2011) for an assessment of the potential
impact of nuclear power in Italy, and by Guerci and Sapio (2011)
for a comparison between agent-based and optimizing models of
the Italian electricity market. Previous applications of agent-based
modeling to the electricity market include Bower and Bunn (2001),
Bunn and Oliveira (2003), Sun and Tesfatsion (2007), Rastegar et al.
(2009), while Weidlich and Veit (2008) and Guerci et al. (2010)
provide critical surveys. To our knowledge, the impact of wind
power on the Italian electricity market has never been studied
before; most papers focus on Spain, Germany, and the UK.
In the simulations of the model, we set the parameters on wind
power supply, electricity demand levels, and cost coefficients as
equal to real-world data from the January 2010 Italian electricity
market sessions, collected from various sources (REF-E, GME, GSE,
Terna).4 The simulated market outcomes in the scenario based on
January 2010 data are then compared with a ''wind potential
scenario'' in which we assess what would happen if, all else being
given, the Italian wind power supply reached its potential, i.e. the
maximum amount of wind power that could be produced, given
the Italian orography and the geographical distribution of wind
speeds, pressures, temperatures, and available land. Cost-based
scenarios are also simulated for the sake of assessing the extent of
markups charged by power generating companies.
Our findings show that electricity prices drop as wind supply
reaches its potential, but prices remain well above marginal costs.
Sharper drops are observed when demand is low than at times of
peaking demand, thereby magnifying volatility. The sensitivity of
electricity prices to wind power fluctuations, detected through
regressions controlling for power demand, is larger in the wind
potential scenario. Looking at the patterns of network congestion,
4. REF-E is a Milan-based research and consulting company specialized in energy and
environmental economics. Gestore dei Mercati Energetici (GME) is the Italian electricity market
operator. Gestore dei Servizi Energetici (GSE) is an Italian State-owned company in the field of
renewables. Terna is the Italian electricity transmission system operator.
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frequent separation between the southern regions, rich in wind,
and the 'windless' northern regions. The ensuing market power
opportunities partly offset the price reduction effects of high wind
penetration. This is a novel result in the literature.
The value added of agent-based modeling in the analysis of the
effects of renewables on market outcomes lies in greater realism of
the assumptions on behaviors and market structure than the
commonly used alternatives (Cournot, Supply function equili-
brium, auction-theoretic models). Beyond that, the gencos'
environment is a large scale economic system with complex inte-
ractions between competing gencos and between possibly
congested zones. In such circumstances, full optimization is
impracticable, in the sense that a global optimum, if it exists, may
not be found in a reasonable amount of time (Simon, 1978). This
would force gencos to engage in search for satisficing solutions,
which we model by means of genetic algorithms. Most previous
works on the price effects of wind power relied on simple models
depicting a small number of symmetric, profit-maximizing compa-
nies (e.g. duopolies) and ignored issues of grid congestion. Agent-
based modeling allows to deal with a very detailed and realistic
model of an electricity system—including the real-world structure
of the Italian transmission grid and the true spatial distribution of
power generating facilities—in an oligopolistic setting. This comes
at the cost of giving up the assumption of perfect rationality, but
for the reasons given above, bounded rationality provides a better
approximation of individual behaviors even when economic
agents are specialized in sophisticated activities, such as bidding in
the electricity market.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 gives a brief over-
view of the electricity sector and of wind power production in
general and in Italy. In Section 2, we summarize the existing litera-
ture on the impact of wind generation on electricity market
outcomes. We then outline an agent-based model of the electricity
market in Section 3, which also describes the implemented lear-
ning algorithm. Section 4 illustrates the simulated scenarios,
whereas the results are in Section 5. Conclusions and suggestions
for further research are provided in Section 6.
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This section offers basic information on the structure and func-
tioning of the electricity industry. The interested reader can refer
to the books by Stoft (2002), Kirschen and Strbac (2004), and
Harris (2006) for thorough expositions of electricity economics.
Electricity is a property of certain subatomic particles (e.g. elec-
trons, protons) which couples to electromagnetic fields and causes
attractive and repulsive forces between them. Trading electricity
amounts to trading the availability to supply electrical energy at
given times. As such, electricity is not storable: one can only store
the means to generate it—e.g. one can keep reserve capacity, or
store water behind a dam. Electricity is produced by gencos
through turbines activated by several alternative means, such as:
combustion of fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas), biomass, or
biofuels; the potential energy of water stored behind dams or in
reservoirs (hydroelectricity); the kinetic energy of wind;
geothermal energy; heating of fuels using sunlight (concentrated
solar power); conversion of sunlight using the photoelectric effect
(photovoltaics). Once generated, power is injected in sources
(linked to the power plants) and withdrawn in sinks (loads),
which, together with the transmission line system, constitute an
interconnected transmission network or grid, through which elec-
tricity flows as an alternating current (AC) and is transported over
long distances. Because AC repeatedly changes direction, it is
impossible to link specific suppliers to specific users: all power is
pooled in the network. This is due to Kirchhoff's law, stating that
the sum of the currents entering any node (i.e., any junction of
wires) equals the sum of the currents leaving that node. Therefore,
equality between demand and supply is a technical necessity. But,
due to physical transmission constraints (some interconnecting
branches may have small capacity values), there can be congestion
in the transmission grid. From an economic viewpoint, this can be
stated as if a supply and demand matching mechanism based on a
purely economic merit order criterion cannot be implemented
because of the implicit rationing determined by the Kirchoff's law.
Hence an appropriate mechanism based on Kirchoff's law needs to
be implemented in order to correctly account for the electrical
power flows among the different areas of the grid.
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large industrial consumers. The former, in turn, supply small
commercial users and households by means of low-voltage distribu-
tion networks and often are also integrated in the retail segment
(e.g. billing and metering services). Final electricity consumers are in
most countries allowed to choose among competing retailers, or
stick to a regulated contract with a public utility. In the short run,
final demand is price-inelastic (Considine, 1999; Halseth, 1999;
Earle, 2000). The use of regulated tariffs is widely cited as shielding
end users from hourly and daily price fluctuations, hence causing
limited short-run sensitivity of electricity demand to prices. Demand
responsiveness programs, involving real-time metering of electricity
consumption and time-of-use pricing, are being experimented in
many countries, with results that are so far below expectations (see
Kim and Shcherbakova (2011) and references therein).
In countries where the electricity industry has been liberalized,
wholesale trading of electricity takes place in organized markets
and over-the-counter. Trading concerns the physical delivery of
electricity as well as derivatives (forwards, futures, options) on
various horizons. The day-ahead market draws much attention in
research on electricity economics. Participation to that market
involves the submission of production and consumption plans for
the day after. Periodic (uniform or discriminatory) double auctions
and bilateral continuous time trading are among the adopted
trading setups. Further market sessions (adjustment market,
market for reserves, real-time market) are held between the day-
ahead session and delivery time. Such sessions allow buyers and
sellers to adjust their forward and/or day-ahead positions in light
of updated information on demand and plants availability, so that
the transmission system operator can insure balancing between
withdrawals from and injections into the grid.
1.1. The Italian wholesale electricity market
In Italy, day-ahead wholesale trading of electricity takes place in
the Italian Power Exchange (Ipex), run by Gestore dei Mercati
Energetici (GME), a State-owned company. The Ipex day-ahead
market is a closed, uniform-price (non discriminatory), double
auction. Each day, market participants can submit bids concerning
each hour of the next day. Demand bids are submitted by large
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final users) and by Acquirente Unico, a State-owned company that
takes care of final customers who have not switched to competitive
retailers. Supply bids are presented by gencos.
The market operator, GME, has the responsibility of clearing the
day-ahead market, for each hour of the following day, based on
supply and demand bids received from market participants. Market-
clearing occurs through a constrained optimization algorithm with
the objective to minimize the total expenditure for electricity. The
constraints are given by minimum and maximum capacity
constraints for each plant, and by transmission limits between
zones. A zone is a subset of the transmission network that groups
local unconstrained connections. Zones are defined and updated by
the transmission system operator, or TSO (Terna in the case of Italy)
based on the structure of the transmission power-flow constraints.5
Choice variables for GME in such optimization problem are the
dispatch quantities of electricity to be generated by each power
plant, and electricity prices that remunerate electricity production.
If transmission constraints are not binding, day-ahead supply offers
are remunerated by the same price, the System Marginal Price (SMP).
However, when lines are congested the optimal solution involves
the calculation of zonal prices.6 In all cases, electricity buyers pay a
weighted average of zonal prices, called PUN (Prezzo Unico Nazio-
nale, or single national price), with weights equal to zonal demand
shares. At the optimum, GME calls into operation power plants in
merit order, i.e. giving priority to offers for the lowest prices. In the
merit order typically renewables come first, followed by coal-fired
and gas-fired plants. By the same token, demand bids are ordered in
decreasing price order. The day-ahead electricity demand curve,
however, is typically very steep, consistent with low short-run
demand elasticity to price.7
5. Zones in the Italian grid are: North, Central North, Central South, South, Sardinia, Sicily,
plus some limited production poles, namely Brindisi, Foggia, Monfalcone, Priolo, and Rossano.
In limited production poles, transmission capacity is lower than the installed power.
6. Holders of long-term contracts receive the contract price; subsidized plants receive
regulated tariffs.
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Italy's rich endowment of renewable energy sources—such as
hydroelectricity (from the Alps), sunlight, wind (Southern Appen-
nine, Sicily, Sardinia), geothermal energy (in Larderello,
Tuscany)—puts it at the forefront of the battle against global
warming. Recent years have witnessed the fast growth in wind
power capacity in Italy—from 2123.4 MW in 2006 to 5797 MW in
2010. As a result, Italy in 2010 ranked 6th in the world for installed
wind capacity penetration, behind China, USA, Germany, Spain,
and India, and 9th in terms of wind capacity per land area (19.2
kW/sqkm), the first being Denmark with 86.6 kW/sqkm (source:
World Wind Energy Association report 2010).
Wind turbines produce electricity by exploiting airflows.
Because work done by a moving mass is proportional to the square
of speed, power generated by a wind turbine goes like the cube of
wind speed. The relationship between wind speed and power is
tuned by the characteristics of the wind turbine, by air density, and
by temperature. Minimum and maximum capacities of wind
plants are also defined in terms of wind speed: they start operating
when wind speed is about 4 m/s; above 25 m/s the turbine is auto-
matically shut down, and a brake is applied to prevent mechanical
damage (Bartolazzi, 2006).
Wind speeds are highly variable across space, altitude, and time.
As to spatial heterogeneity, average wind speeds and nameplate
capacities in Italian regions are given in Table 1. As it can be
noticed, the top Italian regions for wind capacity and output fall
into just four zones: Center-South, South, Sicily, and Sardinia.
7. We have computed the arc elasticity of national day-ahead electricity demand with respect
to price in a neighborhood of the single national price (PUN) for all of the 744 hourly market
sessions held in January 2010 (our period of interest in the subsequent analysis). We have
chosen a pretty large neighborhood of the PUN, namely [0.5 PUN; 1.5 PUN], not to be too
conservative, taking also into account that the real-world demand curves are discrete. The
median arc price-elasticity of demand is 0.1080, the mean is 0.1051, and the 95% percentile is
0.1689.
That the price-elasticity of electricity demand in Italy is low may sound surprising in light of the
wide program of real-time electricity consumption metering implemented by Enel, the former
monopolist, as early as 2005. About 90% of final customers were equipped with smart meters by
the end of 2009. This is a key step towards stimulating demand response, together with a time-
of-use pricing scheme, that has been in place in Italy even before the creation of the day-ahead
market in 2004 (Torriti et al., 2010). However, until December 2011 the difference between the
peak and off-peak retail prices was fixed by the energy regulator at 10%, hence it did not
adequately reflect intra-day wholesale price fluctuations (Lo Schiavo et al., 2011).
Eric Guerci and Alessandro Sapio424Such spatial concentration reflects differences in average wind
speeds.8
The map of Italy in Figure 1 shows wind penetration rates in
Italian regions, in varying degrees of green, as well as the zonal
market subdivision adopted by the transmission system operator
(bold lines). The transmission lines connecting zones are listed in a
grid connection table (top-right). The Italian transmission grid has
the shape of a chain that connects the northern, almost windless
zones, to the southern zones, rich in wind.
 
Table 1. Wind power in Italy in 2010
  Regions  Zones  n. plants  Inst. capacity Output
  (MW)  (GWh)
Piedmont  North  7  14.4 21.4
Aosta Valley  North  1  0.0 0.0
Lombardy  North  1  0.0 —
Trentino Alto Adige  North  5  3.1 2.2
Veneto  North  5  1.4 1.7
Friuli Venezia Giulia  North — — —
Liguria  North  15  19.0 34.8
Emilia Romagna  North  15  17.9 24.7
Tuscany  Central-North  17  45.4 76.1
Umbria  Central-North  1  1.5 2.3
Marche  Central-North  3  0.0 0.0
Lazio  Central-South  7  9.0 15.1
Abruzzo  Central-South  25  218.4 329.3
Molise  Central-South  23  367.2 532.3
Campania  Central-South  76  803.3 1333.2
Apulia  South  134 1287.6 2103.2
Basilicata  South  28  279.9 458.3
Calabria  South  31  671.5 952.3
Sicily  Sicily  62  1435.6 2203.0
Sardinia  Sardinia  31  638.9 1036.1
Source : GSE Rapporto Statistico 2010 - Impianti a fonti rinnovabili.
8. See the Italian Wind Atlas: http://atlanteeolico.rse-web.it/viewer.htm.
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tency in the availability of the wind resource—implies that wind
outputs are less controllable than outputs from fossil-fueled power
plants, hence they cannot be set strategically in the short run.
Large discrepancies can arise between wind supply and wind
output if wind power must be offered in advance of delivery.9
Gencos that cause such imbalances incur costs related to correcting
their positions in the adjustment and real-time markets. 
Although power plants using renewables are characterized by
negligible marginal costs, high upfront costs—the cost of the
turbine, foundation, electrical equipment, grid connection—tend
to discourage their adoption. Various support schemes have there-
Figure 1. Map of Italy showing the regional distribution of installed wind capacity 
(in varying degrees of green) and the borders between zones in the transmission 
grid (thick black lines)*
* Zonal connections are reported in the top right corner.
9. In a study on the Nordic countries, Holttinen (2005) mentions 30%-50% wind outputs were
forecasted wrong over a time horizon of 7-38 hours ahead of delivery.
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is channeled by means of feed-in tariffs10 and green certificates.11
2. Literature review: the effects of wind power supply 
on electricity prices
A growing literature examines the price effects of high wind
penetration in electricity markets under different assumptions on
market structure. The main result of this literature is that, since
wind plants have lower variable costs, fossil fueled power plants
are displaced in the merit order, yielding a downward pressure on
wholesale electricity prices.
Price reduction effects due to wind power are found by Saenz de
Miera et al. (2008), who   perform an empirical analysis focusing on
the Spanish wholesale electricity prices. In their model, perfectly
competitive gencos submit linear supply functions in order to
maximize expected profits. Expected profits depend on a stable
probability distribution of wind generation, and the opportunity
costs of CO2 allowances are internalized. The marginal cost of wind
is assumed below that of fossil-fuel generation. A first exercise
consists in comparing the market prices in three consecutive days
with similar levels of electricity demand in order to isolate the
impact of wind generation from the other factors affecting the
market price. In a second exercise, the authors simulate the market
solution in the absence of wind generation using data for 2005,
2006, and the first 5 months of 2007, and compute the difference
between the prices simulated with and without wind generation.
The findings indicate a reduction in wholesale electricity prices
10. Since 1992, energy generated through renewable sources is sold to the transmission system
operator at a tariff set by the energy market regulator and revised annually. Legislative Decree
78/99 (Art. 12) obliges the transmission system operator to re-sell the subsidized power at prices
determined through a merit order. Small plants (below 200 kW for wind plants) that started
producing after December 2007 can choose to take advantage of an alternative feed-in tariff
(tariffa onnicomprensiva). In this case, it is GME who withdraws renewable energy from producers
and sells it on the market.
11. Legislative Decree 79/99 (art. 11) stipulates that producers and importers of energy from
conventional power plants supply, from 2002 on, a minimal required amount of renewable
energy. Such percentage was 3.8%, and has been increased by 0.75% every year, reaching 7.55%
for 2012. Obliged parties can meet this requirement either by injecting electricity from
renewables in their portfolios, or by purchasing green certificates for an equivalent amount. The
green certificates market is managed by GME. Plants using renewables that started operations
after April 1999 are assigned a number of green certificates that is proportional to their outputs.
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greater than the increase in the costs for the consumers arising
from feed-in tariffs.
More recent works assuming oligopolistic market structures
have demonstrated that price-reduction effects of wind power
penetration are exacerbated if thermal power plants are run by
gencos with market power. Indeed, when wind is low, gencos with
market power face a higher residual demand, therefore they find it
optimal to withhold capacity, pushing up the wholesale electricity
price. In a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model of the UK elec-
tricity market, Green and Vasilakos (2010) show that market power
with high wind penetration magnifies price volatility: because stra-
tegic gencos view wind sales as a shift in their residual demand
functions, increased wind penetration adds to the uncertainty in
the residual demand faced by them.
Banal-Estañol and Rupérez-Micola (2011b) analyze an auction-
theoretic model in which electricity demand, known with
certainty, is served by two symmetric high-cost plants and a low-
cost plant. Two cases are analyzed: the low-cost plant can generate
intermittent energy (a wind plant) or dispatchable energy (a
nuclear plant). In both cases, the model solution features multiple
equilibria (with lower prices when high-cost plants are not pivotal,
i.e. when their capacity is not essential for market-clearing) and
mixed-strategy equilibria. The introduction of low-cost capacity—
whether intermittent or dispatchable—depresses prices, but wind
pushes price down more than nuclear when high-cost gencos are
pivotal, and less so when they are not. Moreover, prices remain
well above marginal cost even after substantial increases in wind
capacity, and wind causes greater volatility. The reason why elec-
tricity prices stay above marginal costs is that wind intermittency
makes it more difficult for gencos running high-cost plants to
coordinate on low-price equilibria.12 The main insight raised by
the authors is that, in the presence of multiple equilibria, intermit-
tency alters the process of equilibrium coordination.
12. The results are robust to several extensions of the analysis (larger strategy spaces,
experience-weighted learning, high-cost capacity replacement through low-cost capacity, joint-
ownership of low-cost and high-cost plants, risk aversion).
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wholesale prices can discourage wind investments, since it amounts
to a negative correlation between availability of wind power and
electricity prices. Hence, wind plants receive, on average, lower
prices than conventional plants—which can be dispatched at any
time. Such a negative correlation can be mitigated if wind output is
higher in months of high demand—but it is stronger when gencos
running thermal power plants possess market power. Twomey and
Neuhoff (2010) illustrate this effect in a model with a non-strategic
wind generator and conventional Cournot gencos. According to
their simulations, the average difference between energy prices of
wind and thermal generation can be more than £20/MWh for some
parameter settings. The results of the SFE oligopoly simulations of
Green and Vasilakos (2010), based on the UK electricity market,
confirm this. Sioshansi (2011) builds a Stackelberg oligopoly model
wherein a wind generator acts as the leader, and fossil-fueled
gencos—the followers—compete in SFE fashion. Using data concer-
ning the ERCOT (Texas) market in 2005, a scenario including
additional 10 GW of wind capacity shows that as more wind enters
the market, the discrepancy between the average value of overall
electricity sales and the average value of wind energy sales grows,
depressing the profitability of wind generators.
The models that have been used in the wind power and electri-
city markets literature are open to critical observations concerning
their general validity as well as their usefulness for the Italian case.
One advantage of cost-based models is that, in assuming away stra-
tegic interaction and learning, they allow the modeler to give a
rich description of the transmission grid. One may also argue that
opportunities for market power exercise will vanish after a substan-
tial increase in wind power penetration, thereby making marginal
cost bidding a realistic behavioral assumption. Yet, in absence of
grid investments that will relieve the existing transmission bottle-
necks, market power in Italy should hardly disappear, given the
spatial concentration of Italian wind. Modeling strategic interac-
tion is therefore needed. Among models with strategic interaction,
the Cournot model, as in Twomey and Neuhoff (2010), assumes
quantity-setting gencos and a downward-sloping demand func-
tion, thereby violating the evidence of price-based competition
and inelastic demand. SFE models (Green and Vasilakos, 2010)
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supply functions. This is useful to avoid convergence problems of
the kind highlighted by Baldick et al. (2004). Convergence
problems are even more severe if, in order to consider transmission
constraints, gencos are assumed to optimally set a supply function
for each plant, with non-linear dependencies between marginal
profits from different plants, and if plant-level marginal cost slopes
are small (see Hobbs et al., 2000). In such a case, even slight
changes in parameters (e.g. in fuel prices) can push the model out
of the convergence region, as mentioned by Sapio et al. (2009).
Auction theory provides a more realistic framework for our
analysis, as in Banal-Estañol and Rupérez-Micola (2011b).
However, the authors' game-theoretical results crucially rely on
mixed strategy equilibria and on equilibrium coordination
between multiple equilibria. A mixed strategy equilibrium can be
interpreted as the distribution of pure strategies in a large popula-
tion of agents, or as plans of action that depend on exogenous,
payoff-irrelevant factors (Rubinstein, 1991). Neither interpretation
is appealing as a description of supply behaviors in electricity
markets. Consider also that the practical application of mixed stra-
tegies is further hindered if their implementation is costly (Abreu
and Rubinstein, 1988)—and when transmission constraints are
involved, such computational costs can be high.
More generally, since the gencos' environment is a large scale
system with complex interactions between competing gencos and
between possibly congested zones, full optimization is likely
impracticable, in the sense that a global optimum, if it exists, may
not be found in a reasonable amount of time (Simon, 1978).13
Following Simon (1972), this is even more true for a large-size
combinatorial problem, such as competition in prices between
gencos endowed with diversified portfolios. Temporal specificities
in electricity market operations (Glachant and Finon, 2000) act as
further constraints on computationally-intensive decision
processes. Thus, gencos are very likely to rely on bounded rationa-
lity. Agent-based models are well suited to represent gencos that
engage in search for 'satisficing' solutions (to use Simon's jargon) in
13. The definition of complexity that is relevant for our purposes was given by Simon (1962): a
complex system is a system made up of a large number of parts that interact in non-simple
ways.
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detailed representation of the transmission grid. Search in agent-
based models occurs through inductive strategy selection methods
based on learning dynamics, that are shown to possess high predic-
tive power with respect to agents' behaviors (Roth and Erev, 1995;
Camerer and Ho, 1999).14
3. An agent-based model of the Italian day-ahead market
3.1. The model
Consider a day-ahead electricity market populated by G gencos
and a large number of electricity consumers. Company g
(g = 1,...,G) owns a portfolio of Ng thermal power plants and Wg
wind plants. Thermal power plants can use either of F fuels,
indexed by f = 1,...,F. Power plants inject power in a transmission
network connecting Z zones indexed by z = 1,...,Z. Demand in
each zone is price-inelastic.
Wind plants owned by genco g are placed in different zones, so
that  Wind plant j in zone z can produce at null
marginal costs within the feasible production interval
Wind power is offered at zero price and the offered volume is set
equal to day-ahead forecasts. Sold quantities are denoted by 
The unitary remuneration consists of feed-in tariff TP.
Each thermal generation unit  is characterized
by a feasible production interval defined by lower Qg,i and upper
Qg,i production limits, so that dispatched power Qg,i must satisfy
Qg,i < Qg,i < Qg,i [MWh]. The cost function of the ith thermal power
generating unit run by g and using fuel f  is given by
TCg,i  (Qg,i) = FPf  (ag,i . Qg,i + bg,i) (1)
where FPf  [Euro/GJ] is the price of the fuel f and the term within
round parentheses corresponds exactly to the amount of fuel in GJ
required to generate an energy of Qg,i MWh. The dimensionless
coefficient ag,i and the coefficient bg,i [GJ/MWh] refer to the tech-
nology-specific efficiency of the power plant and are assumed
14. To be fair, Banal-Estañol and Rupérez-Micola (2011b) perform simulations in which gencos
select among equilibria through an Experience-Weighted Attraction mechanism.
=1 =
Z z
g gz W W  .∑
,,
[ , ]
ww
g jg j
Q Q  .
 ,wg jQˆ  .
 },{1,= gg Ni ?I∈
^
^
High wind penetration in an agent-based model of the electricity market 431time-invariant. In particular, ag,i  specifies the relationship between
the energy input and output, whereas bg,i denotes the real value of
no-load costs that are born only if the plant is dispatched.15
The marginal cost MCg,i  for g's thermal plant i is constant across
the feasible production interval:
MCg,i  (Qg,i) = FPf   . ag,i (2)
Let  denote the set of all thermal power
plants belonging to genco g in zone z using technology f, where
r = (z, f ). Thus . For each hour of the following day,
genco g sets for all plants in r the same markup level .16
Thus the action space of genco g is , that is, the Carte-
sian product of the markup spaces  for the representative plant
of g in r.17
Each genco g bids to the day-ahead market session of hour h a
pair of price and quantity values for each generating unit . A
strategy for genco g is defined as
  
where Rg is the number of genco g 's representative plants. Each
pair is defined by a limit price Pg,i = mgr . MCg,i ([Euro/MWh]) with
 and a quantity of power Qg,i = Qg,i [MWh], that is,
gencos are assumed to bid the maximum capacity of their thermal
power plants.
Upon receiving all generators' bids, the market operator clears
the market by performing a total welfare maximization subject to
equality constraints posed by zonal energy balance (Kirchhoff's
law) and inequality constraints, i.e. the maximum and minimum
15. The cost structure of a thermal power-plant includes several terms which can be grouped in
two distinct components, that is, fixed costs (such as debt and equity obligations associated
with plant investments) and operating costs. The latter occur only if production takes place (i.e.,
if fuel combustion takes place) and are commonly broken down into variable costs, no-load
costs, startup and shutdown costs (see Kirschen and Strbac, 2004). In our model, only variable
and no-load costs are considered and are both introduced in Equation (1). No-load costs in
power engineering refer to quasi-fixed costs. They correspond to the hypothetical cost incurred
by a generator if it could be kept running at nearly zero output. 
16. This allows to reduce the size of the strategy space. See Müsgens and Neuhoff (2006) for a
similar assumption.
17. For instance, the cardinality of the action space of a generation company owning 4
representative plants is .
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Eric Guerci and Alessandro Sapio432capacity of each power plant and inter-zonal directional transmis-
sion limits (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004).18 The dual of this welfare
maximization, given perfectly inelastic demand, is the total
production cost minimization. The optimal solution consists of a
set of zonal prices ZPz , for  z = 1,..., Z, and dispatched quantities of
electricity Qg,i  for g = 1,..., G and i = 1,..., Ng.19
The profit per hour for genco g, Πg, is obtained as the sum of the
profits from representative thermal generating units and the
profits from wind power generating units:
(3)
3.2. The learning algorithm
How do gencos decide their offers to the day-ahead market? The
boundedly rational behavior of gencos is formalized here by assu-
ming that gencos search for 'good enough' or 'satisficing' markup
levels by means of a genetic algorithm. The genetic algorithm goes
through T runs, indexed by t = 1,..., T. In run t, a population of P
markup vectors evolves across Kt generations by means of selec-
tion, mutation, and crossover operators. Across runs, gencos
compute the prices and profits associated to various points in the
space of markups, treating the markups of their opponents as
fixed. The conjectured markups of their opponents are updated
after each run, allowing gencos more exploration.
The learning algorithm can be schematized as follows.
• Initialization of the simulation: at the beginning of run 1 each
genco g draws uniformly a population of P–1 markup vectors,
whose  p-th element is , 
with   and p. Markup levels are drawn from the set
{1.00,1.04,1.08,...,5.00}. Along with the P–1 randomly drawn
18. This optimization problem is known as DC optimal power flow (DCOPF).
19. Zonal prices are the shadow prices of the active power balance constraints in each zone in
the minimization problem.
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High wind penetration in an agent-based model of the electricity market 433markup vectors, we include the markup vector Mg = [1.00,...,1.00]
(i.e. all plants bidding at marginal costs).
    • Initialization at each run t: at the beginning of run t each
genco g draws one markup vector Mg with probability
  
(a logit probabilistic choice model) from the population of P
markup vectors. FMg,p  is the relative frequency of Mg,p in the popu-
lation of P markup vectors, and λ is a parameter that affects the
probability of choosing a markup vector. As , the probabi-
lity of choosing the markup vector with the highest frequency goes
to 1. Only at run 1 we impose that the markup vector being chosen
is Mg = [1.00,...,1.00].
• At each run t: at generation  of run t, for each
markup vector of the current population of size P genco g
computes the zonal prices ZPz , z = 1,...,Z, and its own profits Πg
under the conjecture that all other gencos play the markups
selected at the beginning of run t. Given the current profits/
fitnesses for each candidate strategy, a genetic procedure based on
selection, mutation, and crossover establishes the next population
to be used at k + 1 if k + 1  ≤ Kt or at run t + 1 otherwise. 
The learning algorithm is depicted in Figure 2. The left part of
the figure shows the evolution of the algorithm through T runs for
all G gencos, whereas the right part zooms into the behavior of one
genco in one generic run.
  In the simulations, we adopt the following parameter settings:
P = 200,T = 50, K1 = 3,..., K50 = 20. Our simulation results are there-
fore based on the markups selected from the K50th generation.
Notice that the number of generations Kt changes across runs. The
idea is to favor exploration in initial rounds (smaller Kt) and then
to let agents exploit their experience (larger Kt).20
20. We assume that gencos learn independently to bid strategically on each hourly market, i.e.,
no interrelationships are considered among such hourly auctions. The reason is that gencos bid
simultaneously on all 24 hourly auctions scheduled for a day.
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need not end up on either a local or a global optimum, even if they
exist. The idea here is that gencos set a stopping rule for their
search that is independent of the optimality properties of the
markups finally selected. The amount of search performed through
the genetic algorithm can be thought of being viewed by a genco
as satisfactory.
4. Simulation scenarios
By simulating the agent-based model described above, we aim
to provide answers to two research questions. First, increasing
wind penetration yields price reduction effects. Second, congestion
frequencies increase with the rate of wind penetration. These
research questions are investigated by building simulation scena-
rios that differ only for the amount of wind supply: a 'real'
scenario, based on January 2010 wind data, and a 'wind potential'
scenario, in which we set wind power production to its maximum
potential, estimated for Italy in some technical reports. For the
sake of comparison, further simulations are run in which all
gencos bid their marginal costs. Detailed descriptions of each
scenario are provided below.
Figure 2. A schematic representation of the learning algorithm
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In the real scenario, plant-level and demand parameters are
measured using January 2010 data from the Italian day-ahead elec-
tricity market.21 We use data from a number of sources. A first
source is a database covering most Italian thermal power plants,
supplied to us by REF-E, including information on the capacity
range (minimum and maximum capacity), technical coefficients of
cost functions based on engineering estimates, and transmission
constraints. In order to compute costs we also use REF-supplied
data on fuel prices and CO2 prices. We draw hourly data on zonal
demands, imports, and the amount of power from renewable
sources supplied into the Italian Power Exchange (Ipex) from the
website of the market operator GME. Hereby we take into account
day-ahead electricity demand after subtracting net imports. A data-
base of Italian wind farms (featuring denomination, technical
characteristics, and localization of each plant) is supplied by Terna,
the transmission system operator. In the reference period, the avai-
lable set of power plants consisted of 156 wind power plants and
223 thermal generating units (coal-fired, oil-fired, combined cycle,
turbo-gas). Those power plants were independently or jointly
owned by 19 different gencos.
We distinguish between core gencos, which behave as
oligopolists, and fringe gencos that behave competitively. The
competitive fringe includes seven price-taking companies (AA API,
AEM, ATEL, Elettrogorizia, EnPlus, Italgen, Set) that own only one
power-plant each, and a company, Sorgenia, which owns four
generating units all located in the north zone where almost one
third of all thermal units are installed. The remaining eleven
companies (A2A, AceaElectrabel, EDIPOWER, EDISON, EGL, ENEL
Produzione, ENIPOWER, EOn, ERG, IRENMERCATO, TIRRENO
Power) behave as oligopolists.
One important issue in implementing our agent-based model
concerns the measurement of wind supply. Ideally, one would like
to have information on the technical characteristics of individual
21. Focusing on a recent year is an advantage in view of the increasing trend in the Italian wind
capacity. In January, the Italian power consumption is at its highest on average, and in 2010
January was the second highest month in terms of wind production, the first being December—
but power consumption falls during Christmas festivities (sources: GME and GSE Annual
Reports).
Eric Guerci and Alessandro Sapio436wind turbines, as well as wind speeds, pressures, and temperatures
at their exact locations. Such information is usually not available.
In most papers, it is assumed that all gencos use wind turbines of a
standard type—e.g. of given size and height—and wind outputs
from such standard wind turbines are computed by plugging into
the wind output-wind speed relationship weather data recorded at
nearby weather stations. This approach neglects heterogeneity
among wind farms and discrepancies in meteorological conditions
between the wind farm location and the weather station location.
Our approach is to use the available data on wind power offers.
Such offers are ostensibly determined by gencos based on their
day-ahead forecasts of wind outputs. Because of intermittency,
wind outputs typically deviate from their predicted values, hence
blurring the information conveyed by wind offers. Yet, since imba-
lances imply monetary penalties, players in the wind industry
spend resources to refine their forecasts, as testified by Niglio and
Scorsoni (2008) in their description of wind forecasting methods
employed by GSE. Our wind offers have the advantage of reflecting
the individual choices of actual gencos based on weather condi-
tions at the precise locations of wind plants.
A simple statistical look at our data reveals a number of empi-
rical facts. First, demand bids in the day-ahead market are inelastic
in the relevant price range (see also footnote 7). Second, plant-level
marginal cost functions are linear, with extremely low slopes. This
justifies ex post the assumption of constant plant-level marginal
costs of Equation (2). Third, gencos' portfolios are diversified across
technologies/fuel types and include plants localized in different
Italian regions. Fourth, about 75% of the sell offers consist of a
single price-quantity point, even though up to 4 points can be
submitted. Finally, intra-day patterns of wind offers are heteroge-
neous across gencos, due to different locations of the wind plants
and different forecasting accuracies.22
The time profile of the Italian wind supply and electricity
demand in January 2010 is represented in Figure 3, with hourly
frequency. This plot shows that, while electricity demand follows
quite regular intra-day and weekly patterns—only slightly blurred
22. Wind offer profiles for some gencos are flat across consecutive hours, despite wind
intermittency.
High wind penetration in an agent-based model of the electricity market 437by holidays in the first days of the year, wind supply is quite
erratic, with fluctuations that suggest stronger winds at the begin-
ning and at the end of January 2010.23 Interestingly, these plots
highlight the presence, in the same month, of market sessions in
which the balance between wind supply and electricity demand
was very different: low wind with high demand (the Jan 11-15 and
Jan 18-22 weekdays), high wind with high demand (Jan 8, Jan 28),
high wind with low demand (first and last weekend). This should
allow to have a rather complete assessment of the potential effects
of wind on electricity prices.
4.2. Wind potential strategic scenario
As a way to detect the price effects of high wind penetration, we
build a scenario in which the wind outputs are scaled up, and all
the other variables and parameters (the number of gencos, the
composition of their thermal portfolios, zonal demands, fuel
prices, plant efficiencies, thermal generation capacities, transmis-
sion constraints) are kept at the January 2010 level. In particular,
we aim to scale up wind outputs until reaching a wind penetration
rate similar to that considered by previous papers. Twomey and
23. No entry of new wind plants occurred during January 2010.
Figure 3. Time series of electricity demand and wind supply, Italy, January 2010
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Eric Guerci and Alessandro Sapio438Neuhoff (2010) analyzed scenarios with wind covering 15% and
30% of the UK electricity demand. Other studies on the UK
(Sinden, 2007; Oswald et al., 2008) considered 20% and 16% scena-
rios, respectively.
It turns out that similar wind penetration rates can be attained
if the January 2010 wind outputs are scaled up to the Italian wind
potential, i.e. the maximum amount of on-shore wind energy that
could in principle be produced, given the Italian orography and
the geographical distribution of wind speeds, pressures, tempera-
tures, and available land. Using data supplied by CESI, SPS Italia
estimated the Italian wind potential to be about 60 TWh (31 GW),
corresponding to about 20% of total electricity consumption in
Italy.24 A study performed by the University of Utrecht gave figures
of 69 TWh (34.5 GW). For comparison, notice that wind power
production covered about 2.6 % of demand as of January 2010;
and that the 1999 Italian White Book targeted to install 12 GW of
wind power capacity by 2020. See Ronchi et al. (2005) for further
details. We therefore simulate our agent-based model as if the wind
potential estimated by CESI-SPS was already available in January
2010.25
4.3. Cost-based scenarios
In addition to the above strategic scenarios we simulate cost-
based scenarios—that is, we run the agent-based model as if all
gencos bid their marginal costs. We perform this exercise with
both wind supply at its January 2010 levels and at its potential. The
outcomes of such cost-based scenarios will be compared with those
of the corresponding strategic scenarios, in order to highlight the
extent to which markups are eroded by the entry of additional
wind power capacity. Notice also that some downward pressure on
electricity prices should be expected even if gencos asked their
24. The CESI-SPS study focuses on only locations able to guarantee at least 1750 hour/year of
wind power production, and assumes 25 MW of wind capacity per squared Km, and that only
2% of the available land would be occupied by wind farms.
25. Neither the CESI-SPS study, nor the present paper consider the potential for off-shore wind
power production in Italy. According to RSE's Wind Atlas, annual average wind speeds of 7-8 m/
s are recorded south-west of Sardinia and south of Sicily; 6-7 m/s south-west of Sicily, around
Sardinia, and offshore Apulia. RSE (Ricerca sul Sistema Energetico) is a State-owned company
performing research on the electricity industry.
High wind penetration in an agent-based model of the electricity market 439marginal costs, simply because expensive thermal plants are
displaced in the merit order.
5. Results
After running the agent-based model, we obtain four simulated
hourly-frequency time series of the single national price (PUN)—
one for each scenario (real strategic, potential strategic, real cost-
based, potential cost-based). In addition, our model yields, as
outcomes, the quantity sold by each plant. Together with zonal
demands and transmission limits, this allows to determine which
lines are congested at each hour, and therefore what zonal configu-
rations appear in the Italian transmission network.
The time dynamics of the single national price is compared
across scenarios in Figure 4. The horizontal axis reports each hour
of the days indicated. As the picture shows, the day-ahead electri-
city price fluctuates in a periodic fashion, following the daily and
weekly cycles of economic activity. Prices are lower during nights
and weekends, and during the first days of January due to holi-
days—but reach high peaks in the central hours of working days,
when electricity demand is at its highest. Prices in strategic scena-
rios are much higher than cost-based simulation outcomes,
Figure 4. Time dynamics of Italian day-ahead electricity prices, January 2010: 
baseline cost-based, baseline strategic, wind potential cost-based, 
and wind potential cost-based scenarios
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Eric Guerci and Alessandro Sapio440testifying to market power exercise. The impact of increased wind
power capacity can be grasped by comparing the price series for the
strategic real and wind potential scenarios. Electricity prices in the
wind potential strategic scenario are nearly always below those
obtained in the baseline strategic scenario. Such a price reduction
effect is particularly strong during periods when demand is lower:
weekends, nights, and holidays. A price reduction effect is
observed even when gencos bid their marginal costs, as expected.
Electricity prices are well above marginal costs even when wind
capacity is at its potential. This result is consistent with findings by
Banal-Estañol and Rupérez-Micola (2011b).
Wind power affects electricity prices not only across scenarios,
but also over time. For each scenario, using hourly-frequency data,
we estimate linear regressions of the simulated PUN on wind
supply, the real-world national electricity demand, supply from
hydropower and other non-wind renewables, and a dummy equal
to 1 for all hourly sessions between Jan 1, 2010 and Jan 6, 2010
included and 0 otherwise. Such dummy accounts for exogenous
shifts in demand caused by Christmas holidays, that in Italy last
until January 6 included. All non-binary variables are in natural
logarithms, hence regression coefficients can be interpreted as elas-
ticities. Wind supply is at the January 2010 value in the real
scenario, and at the potential value in the wind potential scenario.
Estimates are obtained using ordinary least squares as well as a
robust estimator, to control for heteroskedasticity and outliers.26
Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are reported
in Table 2. As indicated by the table, estimated coefficients for
demand are positive and statistically significant, with larger
magnitudes in strategic scenarios than in cost-based ones, and
when wind is at its potential. Closer to our focus, the coefficient
estimates for wind supply are all negative and statistically signifi-
cant—showing that wind production can yield a downward
pressure on electricity prices. More in detail, doubling wind supply
yields nearly a 4% drop in electricity prices in the real, strategic
scenario, a drop that becomes larger (36%) under the wind poten-
tial, strategic scenario. 
26. Regressions have been performed in Matlab, using the 'regress' and 'robustfit' commands.
High wind penetration in an agent-based model of the electricity market 441Elasticities of electricity prices to wind supply are around 2% in
the real, cost-based scenario, and equal to -0.345 (OLS) or -0.299
(robust fit) in the potential, cost-based scenario. Regression results
thus suggest that price reduction effects are much more seizable
when wind reaches its potential. Moreover, comparing the coeffi-
cients of demand across scenarios suggests that increasing wind
supply brings additional volatility to the market.
In Table 3 we report the congestion frequencies for each trans-
mission line, i.e. the fraction of hours in which each line was
congested. Congestion frequencies are computed for each scenario,
and for different groups of days (workweek and weekend) and
hours: off-peak (10 pm-6 am) and peak (7 am-9 pm). We observe
that, although congestion becomes slightly more rare in the
Rossano-Sicily line under the wind potential scenarios, congestion
becomes more frequent precisely in lines that connect the zones
hosting the bulk of wind capacity with each other or with the other
zones: Central North-Central South, Central South-Sardinia,
Central South-South, and Priolo-Sicily (except for peak hours in
Table 2. Estimated coefficients from log-linear regressions of PUN on electricity 
demand, wind supply, supply from hydropower and other renewables, and holiday 
dummy: hourly frequency, various scenarios and estimation methods. 95% 
confidence intervals are reported in square brackets
  Variables Conf  Real, strat.  Pot., strat.  Real, cost-b. Pot., cost-b
     .Int.  OLS  Robust  OLS  Robust  OLS  Robust  OLS  Robust 
  -3.397  -3.552  -5.835  -5.968  2.381  2.210  0.822  1.138
Constant  95%  [-3.840  [-4.016  [-6.398  [-6.542  [2.269  [2.099  [0.428  [0.813
 -2.954]  -3.087]  -5.271]  -5.393]  2.492]  2.321]  1.216]  1.464]
 0.663  0.664  2.116  2.091  0.501  0.543  1.117  1.012
Demand 95%  [0.533  [0.527  [1.958  [1.930  [0.468  [0.510  [1.007  [0.921
 0.793]  0.801]  2.275]  2.253]  0.534]  0.576]  1.228]  1.104]
Wind 
supply 
  -0.039  -0.037  -0.367  -0.361  -0.021  -0.017  -0.345  -0.299
95%  [-0.065  [-0.064  [-0.398  [-0.393  [-0.028  [-0.023  [-0.367  [-0.317
-0.013]  -0.010]  -0.335]  -0.329]  -0.015]  -0.011]  -0.324]  -0.280]
Hydropower
& other 
renewables
  0.151  0.165  -0.905  -0.870  -0.372  -0.404  -0.599  -0.559
95%  [0.009  [0.016  [-1.079  [-1.046  [-0.408  [-0.439  [-0.720  [-0.659
 0.293]  0.314]  -0.732]  -0.693]  -0.337]  -0.368]  -0.478]  -0.459]
 -0.097  -0.102  0.024  0.019  0.059  0.066  0.089  0.106
Holidays 95%  [-0.125  [-0.132  [-0.010  [-0.0157  [0.052  [0.059  [0.065  [0.087
 -0.069]  -0.073]  0.059]  0.054]  0.066]  0.073]  0.113]  0.126]
Eric Guerci and Alessandro Sapio442weekdays).27 Notice that most wind capacity installed in Apulia
and Campania is connected through the Central South-South line,
which is affected by significant bottlenecks. The Central South-
Sardinia line also connects zones with above average wind capa-
city, while the Central North-Central South line is likely congested
because of exports of wind power from the Central South zone to
the Central North zone. Congestion frequencies in other lines
change only slightly. What we observe, thus, is that increasing
wind penetration comes at the cost of increased congestion
episodes that effectively separate the 'wind-intensive' southern
regions from the 'windless' north, and that cause fragmentation
even among southern zones. One may conjecture that such zonal
separation creates more opportunities for market power exercise in
the southern zones. If so, it might as well be that price reduction
effects of wind penetration are partly offset by such stronger
market power. The fact that increased wind power production
yields more congestion may also be the reason why electricity
prices lie above marginal costs even in the wind potential strategic
scenario. Recall that Banal-Estañol and Rupérez-Micola (2011b)
attributed this to equilibrium coordination attempts by agents. Our
simulations provide a different explanation.
27. The reader can refer to Fig.1 for a graphical representation of zones in the Italian grid.
Table 3. Market splitting under strategic scenarios 
   Periods  Scenarios  BR  CN  CN  CS  CS  FG  MF  PR  RS  RS
   S  CS  N  SA  S  S  N  SI  SI  S 
 Off-peak 
(10pm-6am) 
Real, workweek 0.01 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.91 0.04
Potential,workweek 0.00 0.47 0.06 0.52 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.82 0.01
Real, weekend 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.93 0.04
Potential, Weekend 0.00 0.62 0.04 0.52 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.66 0.00
 Peak 
(7am-9pm) 
Real, workweek 0.03 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.40 0.12 0.00 0.22 0.94 0.10
Potential,workweek 0.00 0.25 0.11 0.58 0.54 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.79 0.04
Real,weekend 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.92 0.06
Potential, weekend 0.00 0.45 0.05 0.61 0.50 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.77 0.01
Legend: BR = Brindisi, CN = Central North, CS = Central South, MF = Monfalcone, N = North, PR = Priolo, RS = Ros-
sano, SA = Sardinia, SI = Sicily, S = South.
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In this paper, we have built an agent-based model with the
purpose of assessing the impact of high wind power penetration
on electricity prices in Italy. Our findings show that, as wind
supply reaches its potential, electricity prices decrease, although
they remain above marginal costs. Wind power fluctuations bring
more volatility to the market, as testified by the fact that price falls
more sharply when demand is low, thereby magnifying volatility.
The elasticity of electricity prices to wind power fluctuations,
detected by means of regression methods, is larger in the wind
potential scenario. The patterns of network congestions show that
high wind penetration implies more frequent separation between
the southern regions, rich in wind, and the 'windless' northern
regions. Our conjecture is that zonal separation induced by high
wind penetration creates market power opportunities that, if exer-
cised, offset the price reduction effects of wind.
The main policy implication of our results is that transmission
investments in the southern zones would we worthwhile, since
they would bring further electricity price reductions, to the benefit
of consumers. Additional investments in the grid would of course
put pressure on the public budget. Whether price reductions would
be enough to compensate citizens for the additional tax burden is
an interesting research question for the future. In particular, one
could explore a further scenario relaxing the transmission
constraints that separate the northern and the southern zones.
This would confirm or falsify our conjecture that, in the case of
Italy, price reduction effects of wind are partly offset by increased
market power driven by congestion. Our policy implications are in
any case in line with the idea that, since the existing power trans-
mission grids had been conceived to support power generation by
large centralized plants, large-scale use of renewable energy, fed
into the grid by a myriad atomistic producers, will require the tran-
sition to smart grids able to 'communicate' with its users.
The foregoing analysis is by no means a complete assessment of
costs and benefits from wind power. In performing comparisons
between scenarios, a number of variables have been held constant,
such as the efficiency and the vintages of power plants. Technolo-
gical progress may cause obsolescence of the currently available
projections on wind potential. Moreover, since intermittency of
Eric Guerci and Alessandro Sapio444wind power production gives rise to large discrepancies between
programmed and actually produced energy, supplemental energy
reserves for balancing the system are required. Such reserve capaci-
ties will most likely be supplied by new thermal plants that will
have low utilization rates. Generators will therefore be encouraged
to install low-cost and low-efficiency plants with greater GHG
emissions (Oswald et al., 2008; Strbac et al., 2007).
Future research will also have to take account of endogenous
responses of gencos and energy users to the actual and expected
impact of high wind power penetration. Following Twomey and
Neuhoff (2010), one could build scenarios in which gencos engage
in strategic forward trading. Further scenario analyses could be
motivated by the likely increase in demand response induced by
the diffusion of distributed generation facilities, relaxing the
assumption of inelastic demand along the lines indicated by Banal-
Estañol and Rupérez-Micola (2011a).
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